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 “6the sociological imagination6is a quality of mind that 
seems most dramatically to promise an understanding of the 
intimate realities of ourselves in connexion with larger social 
realities.” 
 
C. Wright Mills (1970:  22, emphasis added) 
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Abstract 
     This is a study of self and authority in the popular “spiritual” field.  
Since Heelas’s The New Age Movement (1996), the notion of a common “Self-
spirituality” in which “seekers” trust “the authority of the Self” has been familiar 
within academe.  Yet, contrary to the direction of Heelas’s earlier work on 
“indigenous psychologies” and “self-religions”, the different ways participants 
conceive terms like “seeker” and “self” has largely escaped analysis.  This 
omission allows scholars to homogenise diverse activities and portray broad 
cultural trends.  But, it also “black boxes” the “self”, side-lines how “authority” 
actually works, and obscures conflicts between participants.  I address such 
gaps by examining four international “enlightenment cultures”, each with a 
“guru” (Andrew Cohen; Gangaji; Tony Parsons; and Steven Saunders of 
“Holigral”).   Research materials include field experiences, recorded events, 
and participants’ printed and online publications.  Combining multi-site 
ethnography with sociological conversation and discourse analysis, and 
drawing upon science and technology studies throughout, my argument 
addresses three themes:  seekers; gurus; and truths.  Developing Heelas’s 
earlier work, I show seekers are not pre-constituted but “configured” in 
interactional practices which draw upon various cultural idealisations of the self. 
An “enlightened self” is likewise configured differently in each culture.    I show 
such mundane local practices constitute gurus as “experiential experts” through 
associating their personas with participants’ configured experiences of self.  
Different configurations of self are consequential, implying differing “modes of 
engagement” with wider society and figuring in “credibility contests” between 
different cultures. I provide a way of understanding “enlightenment cultures” 
which avoids homogenising them, considers their respective potentials to 
promote social change, and accounts for antagonisms between them.  As 
tangential themes, through a literary “Seeker Self” voice, I address issues of 
distance and engagement in studying “spirituality” and the often transparent 
penetration of academic discourse by the “discourse of spirituality”, or its 
“spiritual repertoire”.     
Key Words:  Spirituality, enlightenment, sociology, discourse, seeking, 
seeker, guru, expertise, authority, self.   
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Introduction 
 
 
 
Outline 
 
This Introduction is a brief account of what this thesis is about, the 
methods I have used, and how it is written.  Its purpose is to clarify my thesis 
arguments to my reader, and map out the chapters which follow.  It should also 
prepare my reader for what might otherwise seem to be a puzzling immersion 
in an unconventionally written ethnographic chapter about an unusual course 
culminating in my own “enlightenment”. 
 
Enlightenment cultures 
 
Luckmann (1990) has noted that societies differ in how they organise 
human experiences of transcendence, that is experiences in which everyday 
reality is left behind.    He considered that in modern times  “great 
transcendences”, derived from “traditional’ sacred universes’”, are giving way to 
“intermediate” or “little” transcendences in an expanding religious field.  This 
field is populated by both fundamentalists and a “privatised social form of 
religion”, in which a “demonopolised market” for transcendence has several 
suppliers, including “‘new’ religious communities around charismatics”, also 
“commercialised enterprises in the fold of the ‘New Age’”,  and the 
“consciousness-‘expanding’” and “‘self-realization’” pursuits they offer (ibid, 
135-8). While none of those I have studied describe themselves in this way, it is 
this “popular” aspect of the religious field I set out to explore, well known to 
religious scholars but notoriously tricky to conceptualise. 
Broadly, then, this thesis is a sociological study of spiritual 
enlightenment outside of established religions.  It is therefore concerned with 
those aspects of popular spirituality in which notions of enlightenment are 
prominent features.   My research began from the observation that the concept 
of enlightenment is a  plural notion, found across a variety of what I term 
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“enlightenment cultures”.  These, like Becker’s (2008) “Art Worlds”,  bear a 
striking resemblance to one another and share a range of concerns, practices 
and terms.  Enlightenment, for example, like art, is both a noun and collective 
activity, with conventions, mavericks who depart from conventions, and those 
who depart so much they are excluded so what they produce is not widely 
acknowledged  as enlightenment at all.  
Some common but not exclusive features of enlightenment cultures are: 
claims to be distinct from orthodox religious traditions (or to not be a religion);   
a prioritising of existential and self-reflexive questions (e.g. who am I? why am I 
here?  what should I do? what is the nature of reality?); an ontological 
emphasis upon a presumptively unassailable monist truth (which is portrayed 
as if paradoxical, in that it is ineffable yet intuitively realizable or recognisable); 
and ambivalence towards candidate canonical texts and emphasis on fostering 
direct personal experience as a source of knowledge.1  Since enlightenment 
cultures exist in the popular realm, positioning themselves outside of religious 
orthodoxy and concern themselves with revealing the “true” nature of 
participants’ selves to them,  they may also be viewed as instances of what 
Sandywell terms “reflexivity on the streets” (1996: 425), or what Gergen 
(2000a: viii) describes as “living through the ‘dissolution of self’ discussed 
within the academy”. In this particular sense these cultures also set out to 
persuade participants that they are not really who they (otherwise) think they 
are, and so may also be regarded as contemporary expressions of academic 
views of “New Age” thought (cf. Hanegraaff 1998: 212). 
While each culture seems superficially similar, and all share a concern 
with enlightenment, have one or more gurus, teachers or facilitators, who 
charge for their services and produce texts and obtain kudos for enlightening 
others, there is a wide variation within them in what enlightenment means as 
well as in what happens during pedagogic activities whereby such reflexivity or 
vicissitudes of the self are actually performed.  From a sociological perspective, 
enlightenment is an inherently multiple research object, and any claim to it is 
                                                 
1 These features generally accord with characteristics many other contemporary scholars have 
identified within popular spirituality itself (e.g. Forman 2004; Heelas 2008; Lynch 2007). I see 
them as distinctions made in the discourse of individual enlightenment cultures, and more 
generally in a wider discourse of spirituality.  This subtle distinction is important to my later 
discussion of the incorporation of spiritual discourse within such studies. 
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always contestable.  It is the rich variety in enlightenment’s popular forms and 
the practices associated with it across such cultures as well as their academic 
significance which interested me. And by “practices”, here I do not mean only 
overtly “spiritual exercises” openly concerned with “self-realization” or the like 
(Hadot 1995), but all the empirically researchable discourses, ways of acting 
and speaking, and features of settings which may have a bearing on 
“enlightenment”.  
 
My argument in a nutshell   
 
My thesis is about self and authority in enlightenment cultures. My 
argument is that previously, academic commentators on contemporary 
spirituality have oversimplified and homogenised the variety of activities and 
views of the self  found across different enlightenment cultures, and that 
making this variety the topic of empirical investigation is fruitful.  My case picks 
up the early work of Paul Heelas who linked “self-religions” with “indigenous 
psychologies” (very simply, culturally held models of the self) and argues that 
the self, in all its varieties and modes of constitution, should be (re) instated as 
a key topic of study in social studies of religion. My suggestion, of which I hope 
to convince my reader, is that when this is done previous academic interest in  
self-authority2 may be reconceptualised analytically and new questions raised 
about the nature and cultural antecedents of the selves which participants may 
take to possess authority, and the empirically researchable practices of 
expertise and self-configuration by which such selves are invoked, relayed, and 
constituted.   An important thread to my argument is that with this alternative 
focus, the selves which populate the enlightenment cultures I examine are 
revealed to echo both ancient and modern, as well as Eastern and Western, 
notions of the self in ways which bring very different characteristics and 
sensibilities to the fore.  Moreover, I seek to show that differences between the 
respective enlightened selves of each culture result in tensions and clashes 
                                                 
2 Like Wood (2007), I use the term “self-authority” as a shorthand for Heelas’s longer 
expression, “the authority of the Self” (e.g. Heelas 1996:  161; 121).  Also like Wood, I drop 
Heelas’s capitalisation of “Self” in the abbreviated phrase for reasons I explain later in this 
chapter.  
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between such cultures, i.e. at the “level” of the self.  The payoffs include 
reconceiving spiritual seeking and seekers as phenomena constituted within 
local interactional practices which invoke wider cultural views of the self, 
explaining the long puzzling lack of co-operation between similar seeming 
proponents within the spiritual field in terms of different social selves, and a 
conceptually informed and empirical basis for assessing the overall potential of 
specific enlightenment cultures to inspire cultural change.  Indeed, so far as 
social change goes, several of the cultures I consider seem to promote forms of 
selfhood which bolster Western individualism, while alternative forms of self  
are not presented in ways which suggest viable alternatives to it. 
 
The “other” sort of enlightenment   
 
“Enlightenment” is an intriguing term. As well as denoting an historic 
period, it can be used to identify particular kinds of knowing.3 For example, the 
Concise Oxford Dictionary distinguishes two  different senses in which the term 
is used: 
 
“1 6the attainment of spiritual insight, in particular (in Buddhism) that 
awareness which frees a person from the cycle of rebirth. 
2. (the Enlightenment) a European intellectual movement of the late 17th 
and 18th centuries emphasizing reason and individualism rather than 
tradition.”  
(Soanes and Stevenson 2006:  473). 
  
The first limb describes what we might call a spiritual form of knowing, 
which is generally, as in the definition, associated with Eastern religions such 
as Buddhism, Hinduism, and their variants.  The second limb of the definition 
largely follows Kant’s (1996 (1784)) equation of “enlightenment” with the 
freedom to apply one’s own reason to all things, and denotes what is commonly 
taken to be  a  rational,  scientific, or Western form of knowing. These two 
definitions somewhat contradict each other, given a key aspect of “tradition” 
challenged by Enlightenment thinking was religion, the basis of the spiritual 
definition. I do not suggest we limit our understanding of “enlightenment” to 
                                                 
3 The aptness of unifying an historic period by the label “Enlightenment” has been brought into 
question by modern historians such as Outram (2005).  
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dictionary definitions, but they illustrate very nicely that the term can signify two 
forms of knowing, each with its own favoured epistemic vocabulary:  one 
speaks of “reason”, while the other refers to  “insight” and “awareness”.   
Whether or not there are (just) two different kinds of “enlightened” 
knowing need not concern us. What matters is that this distinction is not only 
made in the dictionary, but is commonly made by scholars and within the 
“discourse of spirituality” (which I describe further below).  My thesis does not 
treat these two discourses and senses of the word enlightenment equally, and 
as a sociological thesis is more closely aligned with the perspective and 
discourse of “rational enlightenment”,  taking as its object of study various 
aspects of what from an academic perspective is the “other” form of 
enlightenment. To say my thesis is “more closely aligned” rather than 
“completely aligned” with “rational” enlightenment acknowledges that in it, 
distinctions between different forms of enlightenment sometimes break down or  
vanish, albeit temporarily.  For example, although my ethnographic fieldwork 
involved me in activities which from a participant’s perspective might also count 
as “spiritual” pursuits leading me towards my own “insights”,  “awareness”, or 
even “enlightenment”, writing my thesis required me to reflect upon the same 
activities and understandings differently,  and to subject my own and other 
records of such pursuits  to various forms of sociological analysis to produce a 
“text that works”4 for an academic reader.5   
Before outlining my materials and methods, I should therefore 
emphasise that while I take “popular teachings about spiritual enlightenment” 
as my topic, I do not intend to entirely subsume any particular “spiritual” form of 
enlightenment to a supposedly more “rational” counter-form of knowledge. But, 
since this text is an empirical doctoral thesis, it has been necessary for me to 
write it in a way which allows for, even encourages,  such a reading.  Thus,  my 
                                                 
4 I am indebted to Malcolm Ashmore for this concise formulation of what any academic thesis 
must be to count as an academic thesis.  
5 For a detailed philosophical comparison of “Enlightenment East” and “Enlightenment West”, 
see Angel (1994). Angel uses these terms to denote two distinct “styles of thought” or “value 
systems”, and his argument attempts to persuade readers there are important social and 
human benefits in striving towards their synthesis. In sociological theorising, the view that 
(rational) enlightenment thinking alone may ultimately be self-destructive, and an inadequate 
basis for a satisfactory social existence is expressed most famously and pessimistically by 
Adorno and Horkeimer (1997 (1944)).   
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mixed-methods methodology, talk of a “toolkit”, and cited academic sources, 
are in part designed to portray and generate  distinctly academic ways of 
understanding enlightenment cultures which do not necessarily square with 
how participants in such cultures see things.  This helps emphasise the point 
that distinctions between “rational” and/or  “spiritual” forms of enlightenment 
never speak for themselves, but are always social artefacts, made by particular 
people, on particular occasions, in particular ways, drawing upon particular 
discourses and practices, in order to achieve particular rhetorical or practical 
purposes.  Furthermore, we will see in later chapters that what might pass as 
(“spiritual”) enlightenment itself varies between enlightenment cultures, and is 
variously described or denied to the extent that doubt might be cast upon the 
very possibility of enlightenment cultures being organised around any single 
common “it”, let alone the “it” of any “spiritual enlightenment” as I might define 
this term.  Thus, from a sociological perspective, making generally valid 
distinctions between “spiritual” and “rational” kinds of enlightenment and the 
“cultures” concerned with either is at least deeply problematic, and at most 
nonsensical.    
 
The “discourse of spirituality” 
 
While attempting to define the spiritual invites many problems, it is 
important to clarify my own usage of the term for two reasons.  Firstly, I use the 
term to define my topic.  The distinction between the spiritual and the rational is 
implicit in the title of my thesis, as well as the literary manner in which I portray 
and separate my “academic” and “spiritual” quests within this text (see below).  
Secondly,  in later chapters I point out that other scholars do not always 
distinguish participants’ (“emic”) usage of important terms from their adoption in 
analytical’ (“etic”) terminology, such as in Heelas’s (1996) double-barrelled term 
“Self-spirituality”.  This behoves me to be careful about my own use of 
terminology which overlaps that of the enlightenment cultures I am researching.   
There are two senses in which I use the term “spiritual” and related word 
“spirituality”.   The first follows generic emic (i.e. participants’) categories, which 
I apply self-consciously although generally without quotation marks in an etic 
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(i.e. analytical) sense.6 In this way I denote social practices and discourses 
associated with supposedly ultimate (i.e. a-social or a-cultural) knowledge or 
truth-claims concerning such existential matters as the nature of the self, 
reality,  and the purpose of life, which knowledge is considered to be verifiable 
through personal experience. Here, I am not concerned with possible 
distinctions between my usage and what participants might understand by the 
term “spirituality”,  and accept that people from different enlightenment cultures 
and within the same culture may produce differing definitions or even deny the 
appropriateness of such terms altogether. In this sense, all of the 
“enlightenment cultures” I have researched are also “spiritual cultures”.  This 
view of the spiritual is in keeping with the understanding many scholars 
attribute to such terms.  For example,   Wuthnow (1999: viii) defines spirituality 
as “all the beliefs and activities by which individuals attempt to relate their lives 
to God or to a divine being or some other conception of transcendent reality”, 
while Hadot (1995:  103-5) described “spiritual exercises” as “a return to the 
self, in which the self is liberated from the state of alienation into which it has 
[previously] been plunged” and revealed in its “universality”, thus involving  
“self-transformation and –realization”. 7 
The second sense in which I use the terms “spiritual” and “spirituality” is 
to denote a diffuse “discourse of spirituality”, upon which my own use of such 
words both relies and is an instance.   I borrow this term from Sutcliffe (2003:  
esp. 211ff; see also Chapter 2 below), who argues a “discourse of spirituality” 
has figured in the practices of small “spiritual groups” since the 1930s.  He 
claims this discourse had a number of distinct features, and is still playing out 
today.  The features of the discourse to which he draws particular attention are 
that it is: 
 
1.  dissident, always seeking an alternative to organised religion; 
2.  lay and populist, sacralising the mundane in people’s daily lives; and 
                                                 
6 On the emic-etic divide see Headland et al. (1990). Also see discussion of the Tao-daimon in 
social research, discussed in Chapter 2 below.  
7 Since to many readers from a lay perspective such definitions might appear to simply state 
the obvious, I should mention that in my personal experience there are also many people 
including academics who struggle to articulate any conceptual meaning for the terms “spiritual” 
or “spirituality”, just as there are many people who would disagree with the academic definitions 
I have given in favour of their own. 
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3. rational-functional, that is preoccupied with skills and techniques 
which are considered to “work”. 
  
Sutcliffe associates this “discourse of spirituality” with the development of 
seekership as an activity open to many people rather than a minority, with an 
associated identity which those engaged in or providing such activities might 
use to describe themselves and other “seekers”.  He argues that from around 
the 1930s, the discourse was distributed through print and face-to-face 
interaction, and deployed in the exemplary biographies of spiritual virtuoso. He 
sees its spread as intimately associated with the development of a “diffuse 
collectivity of questing individuals” (ibid,  223),  which other scholars have 
associated with “New Age”.  While it is tempting to treat the discourse of 
spirituality as always being particular to such a “diffuse collectivity”, Campbell 
(1982: 236) has pointed out another “diffuse phenomenon” which has also 
been building for some time in “society at large”. He describes this 
phenomenon as “best considered as an ethos or cluster of values and beliefs 
which accords a general place to spirituality.”  The extent to which previously 
“alternative” aspects of the discourse of spirituality may, by the early years of 
the current century, have entered “mainstream” culture, is nicely captured by 
Partridge’s (2004a) description of contemporary culture as “occulture”. 
 Viewing “spirituality” as a “discourse” encourages us to consider its 
“ideological” aspects, though we need to be careful here.  Billig el al. (1988) 
distinguish two broad meanings of  ideology.  First,  they distinguish “lived 
ideology”, that is what passes as society’s “way of life” and “common sense”.   
Then there is “intellectual ideology”, which they define as “a system of political, 
religious or philosophical thinking...very much the product of intellectuals or 
professional thinkers” (ibid, 27).   While the former is beset with contradictions 
which may crystallise as “ideological dilemmas”, generating thought and 
debate, the latter aims at coherence and sees the contradictions of lay 
ideologies as indicative of “confusion”.  In Chapter 4, I argue that scholarly 
debates about the significance of apparent contradictions within  supposed 
“new age thought” may be reappraised by viewing that “thought” as “lived” 
rather than “intellectual” ideology.  Here, I simply emphasise that we should not 
be surprised by any overall lack of ideological coherence within the discourse 
of spirituality.  
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The current cross-disciplinary interest in “spirituality” as a topic of study 
both within and beyond sociology of religion and religious studies is perhaps 
further evidence of the increasing cultural prominence of the discourse of 
spirituality, as is the steady flow of celebrity autobiographies and extremely 
popular artistic and “self-help” products with “spiritual”  themes, such as about 
attaining personal insights regarding the nature of reality and the 
interconnectedness of all things.8  Nevertheless, while today scholars of 
religion routinely profess to be studying both “religion” and “spirituality” as if 
they are two separate though related phenomena, spirituality itself is proving to 
be a notoriously difficult topic to conceptualise (cf. Heelas and Houtman 2009).  
I suggest the apparent elusiveness of spirituality as a topic stems from 
confusing its nature as discourse, beset with “ideological dilemmas”,   with the 
truth claims and putative real-world correlates of that discourse (which from 
within that discourse tend to be defined as recognizable yet ineffable).  Thus, in 
his introduction to a recent collection titled A Sociology of Spirituality, Flanagan 
(2007: 2) claims that “As a phenomenon, spirituality is something subjective, 
experiential, non-rational, unverifiable and serendipitous in its eruptions, all 
properties an enlightened sociology finds difficult to transpose into the ordering 
argot of the discipline.”  I suggest that the greater problem is that although 
conceiving spirituality as real-world discourse and practice may render it  just 
as researchable as any other social phenomenon,  this involves using 
analytical methods, practices, and styles of reporting which are associated with 
a view of  knowledge not only outside of this discourse, but criticisable from 
                                                 
8 There are many contemporary examples.  In music, for instance, consider  rock singer 
Melissa Etheridge’s (2007) concept album, The Awakening.  In liner notes, Etheridge describes 
a period of being “still”  during chemotherapy which left her feeling “enlightened”.  Afterwards, 
she says she “began reading everything that had to do with my ‘awakening’” and wrote the 
overtly biographical and “spiritual” album. The possibility of “awakening” spontaneously is a 
common biographical trope, in which protagonists typically also describe subsequently 
exploring popular teachings about spiritual enlightenment in order to retrospectively make 
sense of their experience (e.g. Tolle 2006).  While this implies such prior teachings did not cue 
their own experiences, it adds to the pool of such teachings and biographical examples 
available to others.  In film and literature, consider the themes of connectedness and the 
meaning and role of “spirituality” in personal and cultural “evolution” in Redfield’s bestseller The 
Celestine Prophecy (book 1993;  film  2006).  In “blockbuster” “action” film, consider  the 
dramatic and visual portrayal of the connection between the indigenous species of an alien 
planet in Cameron’s (2009) Avatar.   
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within it.   As Sutcliffe has noted, the discourse of spirituality is characteristically 
“dissident” towards other discourses touching upon its subject matter.9  
I address this problem through using multiple qualitative methods, 
several of which I suggest, to employ the spiritual repertoire, “resonate” better 
with the discourse of spirituality than others. For example, comparisons may 
easily be drawn between Wolff’s (1976) “surrender-and-catch”, with its embrace 
and even celebration of the possibility that a researcher’s own “self” may be 
transformed in the process of conducting social research, and notion of 
“surrendering-to” one’s spiritual teacher or guru found in many Eastern guru-
based religions and also in adapted forms within some popular teachings about 
spiritual enlightenment.10  Nevertheless, and especially since I also deploy 
more positivist methods and try to highlight tensions between my various 
“academic” and “spiritual” endeavours,  I do not attempt to combine academic 
and spiritual discourses to the extent their differences disappear.  Indeed, 
maintaining distinctions between the academic and spiritual is crucial to this 
sociological study. 
 
The spiritual repertoire in academic writing 
 
 Before leaving the subject of spirituality as a discourse, it is worth briefly 
addressing some aspects of its continuing dispersal in wider society. Sutcliffe’s 
observation that the discourse is still circulating today is evidenced by the 
penetration of the discourse into ostensibly “secular” aspects of social life, such 
as the workplace (e.g. see review and empirical study of nursing in Grant et al. 
2004),  and also academic discourse across the social sciences and 
humanities.  I suggest in Chapter 2 that the capitalisation of the word “self” 
within (Heelas’s) academic concepts of “Self-spirituality” and “the authority of 
the Self” are examples of such penetration. (I have followed Heelas’s 
capitalisations when referring to his terminology, as I have done when referring 
                                                 
9 For a sustained illustration of the oppositional relationship between academic and spiritual (or 
“esoteric”) discourses or “epistemologies”, see Iwersen’s (2007) critique of Hammer (2004) 
discussed in Chapter 2.   
10 For example, with regard to my research participants,  see Cohen (1999).  In this text Cohen 
applies the Eastern notion of surrendering to one’s guru in order to advance towards spiritual 
enlightenment to his own teachings.  
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to participants’ terms which are generally capitalised by their native users, e.g. 
“the Authentic Self”, but to try to avoid such connotations in my own writing and 
analysis I have not generally capitalised the word “self”).  While academics 
such as Lynch have argued that “popular culture” is a proper subject matter for 
sociology of religion and religious studies because it contains “sacred” objects 
and symbols, i.e. those “regarded as a grounding or ultimate source of power, 
identity, meaning and truth” (2007: 138), the extent to which academic 
discourse itself has become “spiritualised” or contains the “sacred” has gone 
largely unnoticed and unstudied.  For example, in his most recent book, Heelas 
provides a detailed account of the setting and circumstances of the “eureka 
moment” or “‘life’ epiphany” which accompanied his “realization” that “‘Life’ is 
the term, not ‘Self-spirituality’... ‘Life’ is what lies at the heart of the so-called 
‘New Age movement’...life = spirituality = life = spirituality....”  (2008: ix; 26-7).   
While the mundane geographic location of the “epiphany” (Schipol airport), and 
details of the book Heelas was reading at the time (Martin Goodman’s (1998) 
spiritual autobiography and biography of Mother Meera) 11 do not embellish the 
rationality of his views, these descriptions portray their author as going about 
his academic work in a recognisably spiritual fashion.12  
                                                 
11 Mother Meera lives in Germany.  She is renowned  internationally as a spiritual guru and is 
famous for her silent, gaze and touch-based methods of teaching.  
12 Interestingly, Heelas describes his “realization” as both a  “eureka” and “epiphany”.  I take 
eureka accounts in science to be a recognisable form of accounting in which there are 
descriptions of some of the human, contingent, and local  circumstances in which a person is 
portrayed as suddenly coming to a new understanding of a scientific, practical or natural 
problem or phenomenon.  I take epiphany accounts to be similar in that human, contingent and 
local circumstances are described, though their “subject matter” is conventionally regarded as 
being of a more personally subjective and “spiritual” nature, and moreover typically comprises 
or accords with understandings and knowledge already widely known by others within the same 
culture.  While eureka accounts  are well known in science, in keeping with empiricist writing, 
they are not generally incorporated within the scientific publications to which they relate, but are 
formulated and relayed separately, often by persons other than the scientists concerned (cf. 
Gratzer 2004), and especially to children (cf. Platt 2003). Recounting a spiritual epiphany, on 
the other hand, is a characteristic ingredient of, or credential for, establishing a “spiritual” 
identity.  Such accounts figure in several of the publications of or relating to the “gurus” I 
consider in later chapters, and likewise figure in popular literature where they may also be the 
subject of compilations (e.g. Dyja 2001).  It is notable that there are no analogous published 
collections of eureka accounts or epiphanies relating to theoretical or practical developments in 
the social sciences and humanities.  This  suggests that eureka accounts and epiphanies may 
be more associated conventionally with “hard scientific” and “spiritual” knowledge claims than 
with other kinds, including those of the “social sciences”. In this sense Heelas’s 
eureka/epiphany seems particularly noteworthy as an instance of the spiritual being 
incorporated within the academic.  Moreover, it does not bolster the “scientific” value of his 
“realization”, but rather contributes to the building of a “spiritual” authorial identity.  
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The infusion of the discourse of spirituality into academic discourse is 
not limited to studies of religion, though these provide its most obvious 
examples.  Understanding something of the manner in which this discourse 
works within academe is important to my research aims, as I suggest later this 
discourse has infused certain canonical works with which I engage, and I 
further suggest it has distracted scholars from older and equally fruitful lines of 
inquiry.    
One way of conceiving how the discourse of spirituality works in 
academe is to by analogy draw upon a methodological approach to the 
sociological study of scientists’ discourse which was developed in the 1980s.  A 
foundational example of this type of analysis was Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) 
identification of two distinct “interpretative repertoires” used by scientists to 
“depict action and belief in ways which are appropriate to the different 
interpretative contexts they are involved in reproducing” (ibid, 40). Each 
repertoire was characterised by “certain recurrent stylistic, grammatical and 
lexical features which appear to be coherently related” (ibid, 55-56). They 
culled examples of scientific discourse, both printed and spoken, from a variety 
of empirical materials and contexts including interviews and science journals.  
The first repertoire they identified in such materials was the “empiricist 
repertoire”,  which they argued was characteristic of formal scientific discourse. 
This was routinely used to account for experimental success by depicting 
scientific facts as appearing inevitably through the neutral medium of 
experimental method and scientific writing.  This contrasted with an 
incompatible “contingent repertoire” which Gilbert and Mulkay claimed 
scientists characteristically tended to deploy in informal talk and when  
accounting for scientific failures.  This repertoire emphasised the personal, 
social, and non-scientific circumstances  associated with scientific activities, so 
that experimental “errors” might be depicted as down to circumstantial failings 
of researchers and their equipment rather than the natural world transparently 
yielding odd results.  This study marked the beginning of a reflexive turn in 
sociology of science, as Mulkay (e.g. 1985) and others (e.g. Ashmore 1989) 
grappled with the implications of the “empiricist” character of sociology’s own 
predominate style of accounting.  Today, in sociology and religious studies at 
least, I suggest there is a third prominent “interpretative repertoire” which is 
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readily identifiable (in an etic sense),  which like the empiricist one bolsters its 
users’ knowledge claims, albeit in a different manner since it is associated with 
knowledge claims which may differ from those of empiricist discourse.  That is 
what I term the spiritual repertoire, which as the above discussion of Heelas’s 
“epiphany” suggests, is characteristically an affective, expressive manner of 
reporting,  entailing researchers revealing more of their personal biography, 
“truths”, intuitions, and self-transformations than are conventionally kept out of 
empiricist writing.  
While in empiricist writing the natural or social world is portrayed as if 
speaking through the neutral medium of the researcher or academic text,  the 
spiritual repertoire emphasises  the researcher’s (and sometimes also reader’s) 
personal role,  journey, and experiences, and the affective, personal,  and  
(self-) transformative character of any truths or realizations encountered on the 
way.  In contrast to “contingent” accounting, in spiritual discourse such 
exposure of researchers’ humanity and indeed “spirituality” can bolster 
credibility rather than denigrate it or explain away errors.   The spiritual 
repertoire, like others, has discernable “stylistic, grammatical and lexical 
features”, though I suggest that unlike how Gilbert and Mulkay conceived the 
scientific and contingent repertoires, as a discourse spirituality is not 
necessarily incompatible with other discourses.  Indeed, its features can be 
drawn into other discourses, including social scientific empiricist discourse,  in 
varying degrees.  When this happens, it can come at certain expense to 
empiricist aims (such as by creating  scope for conceptual confusion),  and also 
may transform the character of the empiricist discourse into a vehicle which 
supports some of the rhetorical aims or features of spiritual discourse  (such as 
the rhetorical distinction between  “spirituality” and “religion”). 
The vocabulary used within spiritual discourse is drawn from a myriad of 
sources spanning the sciences, world religions, and Western psychology and 
psychotherapies. Components of this vocabulary are often incorporated into 
analytic writing and indeed other forms of official discourse which are not 
obviously religious or “spiritual” in nature (consider the emphasis upon “holistic” 
care across mainstream caring professions).   Producing a general glossary of 
such terms is problematic in that different enlightenment cultures tend to 
promote or combine certain terms rather than others, and moreover weave 
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those terms into  their own idiosyncratic and nuanced discourses of the self. 
Like any discourse, that of spirituality is a flexible one and its boundaries are 
not precise.  Even recurrent terms such as “holistic”, “integral”, “awakening”, 
“liberation”, “oneness”, “Self”  and “spirituality” itself can have a myriad of 
formal definitions varying between enlightenment cultures, as well as different 
contextual meanings when actually put to use.  When such terms are 
incorporated in academic discourse, we therefore need to be very attentive to 
how they are used and alert to the possibility of confusion being caused by any 
distinctions  or overlap between emic and etic usages. Their usage within 
analytical writing is seldom if ever itself turned into a topic of analysis, rather 
they tend to be deployed as discursive resources within superficially topical 
seeming “grounded” analytical vocabularies. 
The discourse may also penetrate academic work through its associated 
rhetorical devices, which generally construct and embellish the significance of 
whatever counts as the spiritual. Examples of such rhetorical devices include: 
contrasting spirituality with religion, usually so as to assert the superiority (cf. 
Orsi 2005: 187-8) or progressively greater prevalence (cf. Heelas et al. 2005) of 
the former;  bolstering truth claims through biographies of experience rather 
than, say, textual canon or scientific evidence (cf. Hammer 2004); and the 
assertion that spirituality redresses a crisis created by the empirical sciences 
having provided humanity with the capacity to destroy itself yet inadequate 
means to redress (cf. Loy 2003; 2008). While these citations are to academic 
sources, such features are found natively in many popular “spiritual” bestsellers 
(e.g. Tolle 2005).   
The increasing popularity of spirituality as a discourse within academic 
writing and research practice is apparent from the growing number of journals 
and publications which explicitly treat “spirituality” as both a research topic and 
worthy aspiration for researchers or their subjects.  This aspiration may be 
presented in a programmatic fashion, as something which may benefit those 
other than the researcher.   For instance,    Bandsucha and Cavanagh (2005) 
argue the cultivation of “spirituality” in the workplace can lead to individual and 
organizational benefits, while Mathews (2009) argues that both social workers 
and their clients may benefit from social workers’ attentiveness to their 
respective “spiritualities”. However, increasingly social researchers are 
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advocating the use of research methods and strategies which infuse spiritual 
discourse and practices into the heart of the empirical research venture itself.  
This trend is illustrated by recent calls for Buddhist inspired forms of 
“mindfulness” in social research.  See for instance Stanley’s (forthcoming) call 
for “mindfulness” as a form of psychological inquiry, Loy’s (2003; 2008) 
integration of Buddhism and sociology, and  Bentz and Shapiro’s (1998) 
textbook advocating “mindful methods” in social research in general.   
The discourse of spirituality has thus penetrated academic discourse in 
a number of ways, including by influencing concept formation (e.g. “Self-
spirituality” or “life”; Heelas 1996; 2008), methods (cf. Bentz and Shapiro op. 
cit.), style (Heelas’s “epiphany”; also Orsi’s 2005 study of Catholicism which 
synthesises scholarly exegesis and spiritual autobiography), and topics 
(“spirituality” has become a distinct cross-disciplinary object of study, cf. 
Flanagan 2007). In this last respect, while Heelas et al’s (2005) study of 
religious activities and beliefs in the UK town of Kendal set out to assess 
whether or not there really is a “spiritual revolution” in which “religion” is giving 
way to new or “holistic” forms of “spirituality”, from the perspective of spirituality 
as a circulating discourse, the study is actually part of this revolution.  That is, it 
endorses the distinction between religion and spirituality which Sutcliffe 
identified as characteristic of this discourse, and incorporates that distinction 
into its research objectives. Moreover, like most academics who write about 
“spirituality”, any incorporation of spiritual discourse is “transparent” because 
the authors are entirely unreflexive to such possibilities.  Put otherwise, they  
do not consider the extent to which their own analytical language may depend 
upon,  further, or contradict aspects of the discourse  of the various individuals 
and groups they investigate (whether taken to be representative of “religion” or 
“spirituality”  or any finer distinctions between these categories).13 
                                                 
13 Much more could be said about the penetration of academe by the discourse of spirituality, 
and the nature of what I have termed the spiritual repertoire and the circumstances in which 
researchers  tend to use it (such as for example when creating certain kinds of authorial or field 
identities, or wishing to appeal  to certain academic or non-academic readerships). While 
Gilbert and Mulkay’s (1984) style of discourse (or repertoire) analysis has long been out of 
vogue within sociology, it seems to me an appropriate and sound potentially reflexive method 
which might be used to take such observations further. Recognising that the discourse of 
spirituality or a distinct spiritual repertoire now figure in academic writing raises several 
interesting research issues, such as the possibility that while academics have been debating 
the potential of “New Age” and other “spiritualities” to bring about social change, such change 
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I will outline my materials and methods in the following sections. By now, 
I hope it is apparent that while my methodology prioritises the aim of 
understanding enlightenment cultures over adherence to any single research 
method (I hope avoiding what Mills (1970) and Berger (2002) respectively refer 
to as “methodological fetishism”), it also brings to the fore my above distinctions 
between kinds of enlightenment, different ways of knowing, and especially 
empiricist and spiritual discourse.   Above all, however, my main concern is to 
explore and understand themes of self and authority within the practices and 
discourses of specific enlightenment cultures. 
 
Materials 
 
The materials I draw upon and analyse while pursing these arguments 
are a mixture of ethnography, text and transcript relating to four  enlightenment 
cultures which I selected based upon the apparent variety in how they made 
enlightenment available – e.g. over a one week course, a stage appearance, a 
lifetime of spiritual practice, or through grammatical denials of one’s 
individuality.   I was fortunate and am grateful to have obtained informed 
consent to be researched from four teachers of enlightenment:14  American 
guru Andrew Cohen and his international organisation “EnlightenNext” which 
teach an open ended, ever changing form of “evolutionary enlightenment”; 
American author/teacher Gangaji who is a well-known “Satsang” teacher and 
whose  teachings are very different from those of Cohen although they were 
both enlightened by the same Indian guru, H. W. Poonja or “Papaji”; Tony 
Parsons, a UK based author and speaker on non-duality who promotes a 
stripped-down statement of existential truth similar to, but starker than, satsang 
teachings; and Steve Saunders of Holigral, a Glastonbury based business 
                                                                                                                                              
has been occurring within the discourses of the academe itself. I return to this possibility in 
discussing Heelas’s work in Chapter 2. 
14  Appendix 1 contains samples of my consent forms. I adapted the longer form to each 
research participant. Where possible, I also obtained informed consent from those who taught 
me on behalf of their own gurus.  When video recording group events, I used a much shorter 
form for my co-participants.  Where only audio recording, and  even this would have been 
overly disruptive, I did not ask everyone’s consent.  All occasions when  I did not use a form 
and used audio recordings were audio and/or video recorded on behalf of gurus anyway (to 
form the basis of future publications).  I never made any effort to hide my own recorders and 
always explained what I was doing to anyone who asked.  As Chapter 1 shows, obtaining 
consents from large groups of people was not always easy or possible. 
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partnership running “enlightening” personal development and business 
leadership courses.15  All of these people/organisations offer teachings, talks or 
workshops in different countries.  For each culture, I recorded and participated 
in at least one public event where the head teacher or guru was present in 
person (the events of course varied in nature, duration, and price) and where 
possible I also considered their various media materials including where 
available public interviews, newsletters, and more glossy self-published 
periodicals. I also read much literature authored by the teachers concerned or 
about their teachings, including published works and critiques, free articles, and 
other background information including from internet forums and YouTube.  I 
did not set out to read everything relevant to my subject matter (for this would 
have been like a sociologist of science reading everything a scientist might 
draw upon in his or her work as a scientist), though I read enough to be able to 
speak coherently to participants about emic history and important emic issues 
and could show I had a genuine interest in each teacher and knew more than a 
little about their views. 
 
Methodology and methods 
 
My methodology follows what Marcus describes as multi-sited 
ethnography.  This is a methodology which “defines for itself an object of study 
[mine is enlightenment] that cannot be accounted for ethnographically by 
remaining focused on a single site of intensive investigation” (1998: 80). While 
there is no set method for doing such a “mobile” ethnography, speaking of the 
problems new ethnography faces in addressing the global system, Marcus 
formulates its aim as being the ethnographic construction of both “the lifeworlds 
of variously situated subjects” and “aspects of the system itself through the 
associations and connections it suggests among sites” (ibid.).   
                                                 
15 I also spent much time gathering recordings of my entire course of instruction in the 
mediation techniques of FISU, the Foundation for International Spiritual Enfoldment, a guru led 
meditation school in which enlightenment may take several lifetimes of spiritual practice.  I have 
not used  those materials in this thesis since including a further  site would have made it  
unfeasibly lengthy, without adding much more of academic substance.  My decision to leave 
out this site rather than any other was made purely on pragmatic grounds, as I could not attend 
or make my own recordings at their retreats or “Togatherings”, so would have been short of 
materials similar to those I had from the other sites.   
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Multi-sited ethnography obliges researchers to be cautious about the 
traditional division between the micro and macro, and encourages them to 
approach the latter as not just an “emergent” aspect of the former, but as a 
consequence of the associations between researched sites which might take 
many forms (e.g. a common person, text, object, or metaphor).  Marcus 
explains:   ‘‘Multi-sited research, is designed around chains, paths, threads, 
conjunctions, or juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer 
establishes some form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited 
logic of association or connection among sites that in fact defines the argument 
of the ethnography’’ (ibid, 90). 
While multi-sited ethnography has no fixed method, I make use of fairly 
conventional qualitative research methods to focus upon some of the “micro” 
practices of enlightenment cultures.  The methods I employ are drawn within a 
broadly constructionist and adaptive methodology.  I began with the intention of 
analysing recorded and other textual materials using methods suited to making 
sense of multiple versions of enlightenment.   Initially, I was disposed towards 
methods of discursive or rhetorical analysis, as developed within sociology of 
science (see Gilbert and Mulkay 1984), though was prepared to adapt my 
methods and data gathering iteratively as my research proceeded.   This early 
style of discourse analysis seemed viable, as it focuses upon the multiple and 
contextually sensitive ways participants describe similar aspects of their social 
worlds, in order to perform actions in them (like accounting for scientific errors 
or success).  Since its inception, such sociological discourse analysis has been 
developed and applied in different ways. Within sociology it inspired reflexivity 
towards analysts’ own accounting practices and epistemologies (e.g. Mulkay 
1985; Ashmore 1989; here I was pursuing both academic and spiritual forms of 
enlightenment so a degree of reflexivity seemed appropriate). Also, outside of 
sociology in the more recent and still developing approach of “discursive 
psychology”, it has been combined with conversation analysis (CA) in a 
constructivist approach which focuses upon how “psychological terms” are 
used by people to perform social actions (Edwards and Potter 1992; arguably 
the term “enlightenment” suggests a psychological state or states).     I was 
also open to the use of CA itself.  This positivistic form of analysis originates in 
the work of sociologist Harvey Sacks, and sets out to reveal the “machinery” 
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behind the apparent orderliness of conversational talk (Sacks 1984:26-7), 
relying on a particular system for transcribing talk which highlights its sequential 
format (Jefferson 1984; see Appendix 2 for a summary of the transcription 
symbols I have used where appropriate).   
As my study progressed, and my field experiences increased, I became 
increasingly troubled by the feeling that my “toolkit” was too reductive and 
objectifying, and could not do proper justice to hermeneutic aspects of my 
subject matter, in particular the sense in which participants in all the cultures I 
was researching not only invoked or deployed various configurations of the self, 
but in a very human sense experienced, aspired towards, and became them. 
Around the same time, I considered turning the same “toolkit” on my own 
academic project, as a reflexive move towards highlighting certain formal 
similarities and differences between my spiritual and academic “quests”. I was 
surprised that this proved impossible since several academics that routinely 
employed such methods were reluctant to be recorded so as to become “data” 
themselves.  Subjecting the academic quest to the same sort of scrutiny I 
intended to subject enlightenment cultures was therefore unfeasible.  Although 
this was never my main interest, this very practical limitation on how reflexive I 
might be added to my unease about using such methods on others without 
supplementing them somehow. 
A further concern which became more troubling as my study progressed 
was the theological implications of the constructionist ontology. Since Berger 
introduced the term to sociology in 1967, many social researchers have 
adopted a “methodological agnosticism” toward the truth claims of those they 
study (Berger 1969; also Cox 2003).  However, there is a thin line between 
agnosticism and atheism.  More recently, in the context of a growth in 
popularity of “constructionist” perspectives within academe (see Burr 2003), 
Gergen (2002:  9) has aptly noted that a constructionist perspective stands at 
odds with any “claim to transcendent truth”, that is one with validity “beyond the 
local culture”.  Initially I had believed, following Berger (1969:  179ff.) that given 
their different concerns, there was also no “intrinsic necessity” for dialogue 
between sociology and any of its “theological” subject matter.  But as my study 
came to focus on “the self”  I saw my sociological subject matter as overlapping 
the concerns of my research participants so that inevitably my analysis and 
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theoretical perspectives could be seen as challenging or supporting their 
claims.  This rattled my initial aspirations to remain agnostic and made some 
form of dialogue seem warranted, although this might not be easy given my 
favoured methods. 
There were also very practical reasons dictating against a 
straightforward application of any particular method which arose from the 
nature of my research materials.   The most striking feature of my materials 
was their variety, in both content and form.  For instance, the occasions I was 
examining were so diverse that when I collated “similar” interactions between 
different sites (for instance, those in which people seemed to achieve whatever 
counted as enlightenment in that setting) on examination they involved such 
different interactional and rhetorical practices, as well as versions of 
enlightenment, that simply applying research methods designed to elaborate 
interactional machineries was problematic as I was not likening like to like. 
 So, rather than attempt to collect forms of data which made the 
application of my initially favoured  methods and agnosticism easier, I sought 
other ways of making sense of my materials which acknowledged rather than 
ignored some of the overlap between my academic standpoint and the 
perspectives of the cultures I was researching   I repeatedly replayed 
recordings, re-read my ethnographic notes,  re-read primary texts,  and 
continued to visit gurus whenever I could, and slowly and inductively came to 
see each enlightenment culture as involving a distinct structural triad, both 
discursive and enacted,  between seekers, gurus, and truths.  For each 
different enlightenment culture, my research objective became to make sense 
of each aspect of this triad by identifying and describing the local practices and 
wider cultural notions of the self which they invoke, and to relate this analysis to 
my thesis arguments concerning the superficial treatment of the self in certain 
academic literature.   The analytical chapters which follow are therefore not the 
outcome of a straightforward application of purist method to materials, whether 
“micro” or “macro”, but more attempts to apply a “sociological imagination” in 
order to provide understandings of the local practices and especially “selves” I 
have researched and their relationship with wider social relations and realities 
(cf. Mills 1970: esp.  22).  For example, while I do not intend this to be  a 
conversation analytic thesis, CA’s transcription system can re-create the “flow” 
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and form of original speech simply and more accurately than other forms of 
transcription, so where this seems important I have used CA transcription 
symbols (see Appendix 2).    
This still leaves the issue of my problematic “agnosticism”, which no 
longer seemed tenable.  I chose to address rather than ignore this difficulty, 
and have done so in a manner intended to be in keeping with my above 
methodology and aim as well as the polyvoval view of the self I adopt as an 
analytic heuristic.  This text itself has a polyvocal aspect, by which I have gone 
some way towards giving “expression to the multiple voices or selves 
possessed by both the researcher and researched” (Gergen op.  cit.:  13). This 
polyvocality is achieved through the use of a “Seeker Self” character or voice in 
the text, specifically written to address the issue of “distance and engagement” 
in social research, which in the context of discussing religious subject matter 
Neville (1996) has termed the “Tao-daimon”. For example, the Tao-daimon 
tension is evident in the relationship between my constructionist commitments 
and initially inadvertent and later deliberate strategy of “surrendering-to” field 
experiences (Wolff 1972), to the extent that while in the field there were 
occasions in which I uncritically felt I was “enlightened” in some way.  Out of 
the field, recounting such experiences in an academic context and without 
great qualification seems absurd.  The Seeker voice and indeed literary form of 
this thesis as a whole are thus Wolffian “catches” which go some way to 
expressing my field experiences in this sociological context, while preserving 
and highlighting tensions and differences between participants’ and scholars’ 
perspectives on such subject-matter.  The distinct Seeker voice also serves to 
create a shifting authorial standpoint which mimics my own biographic shifts 
between being inside and outside of the discourse of spirituality whilst 
conducting my fieldwork and writing up.  While the Seeker voice incorporates 
aspects of the discourse of spirituality within this study, in the context of this 
text it is intended to do so in a noticeable and reflexive manner, so as to 
encourage the reader to also reflect upon such distinctions. 
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Chapter structure 
 
Aside from methodological complexity, multi-sited ethnography can in 
any event be difficult to write,  as researchers and readers must be able to 
track several sites and also (usually) a theoretical discussion which links them. 
The micro focus of some of my analysis makes such tracking and comparisons 
between sites all the more difficult. The chapter structure I have used attempts 
to address such difficulties and assist the reader in keeping track of my 
arguments and the sites.  I begin by providing an initial sense of ethnographic 
immersion in one of my researched sites, a one week Holigral course (Chapter 
1:  Awakenings).   All of the analytic themes of my thesis run through this 
chapter though are revealed through ethnographic showing rather than telling, 
including the malleability required of a “spiritual tourist”. I use a literary style 
which underlines the episodic character of the event, and some of the 
differences between how participants and my early supervisor wanted me to 
research it.   This is followed by a chapter which highlights the nature of the 
spiritual quest created by my research, and that it exists in both overlap and 
tension with my academic aims, or quest (Chapter 2: My Academic and 
Spiritual Quests).  This chapter also includes a review of the literature and 
issues I am addressing in my academic quest, and reminder I am in particular 
addressing the neglect of the varieties of the self in recent studies of 
contemporary spiritualities, which I suggest tend to “black box” the self and/or 
homogenize diverse spiritualities and identity terms as if they share a single 
coherent ideology or meaning.16 Here, I also introduce the literary “Seeker” 
voice I employ from then on, and explain the conceptual etic sense in which I 
speak of “the self”.  
The three subsequent chapters are the main analytical substance of this 
text.  Each deals with a separate theme or ingredient common to all 
enlightenment cultures: seekers; gurus; and truths. These themes occurred to 
me gradually and inductively as I moved between cultures.  The themes 
broadly correspond to communication theory notions of the sender, receiver, 
                                                 
16 I use the term “black box” following Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) usage of the term in relation 
to scientific facts.  The metaphor nicely captures the sense in which like scientific facts, “the 
self” is also typically attributed with facticity, by analysts and participants alike, while its inner 
workings and the processes whereby it is (socially) constituted remain opaque.  
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and content of a media message, although I approached each in a conceptually 
informed manner drawing upon the field of science and technology studies 
(STS) which is very much concerned with participants’ actual practices. I was 
here assisted by a recommendation from one of my   supervisors, Malcolm 
Ashmore, to read Woolgar’s (1991) work on the “configured user” of computer 
technology.  I also drew upon STS literature on expertise (especially Mieg’s 
(2001) concept of “expert interaction”) and scientific controversies (especially 
Gieryn’s (1983) notion of credibility contests). However, STS is largely 
unconcerned with the issue of human selfhood and moreover contains a 
tendency to deny any special distinction between human and non-human 
“entities” (cf. Latour 2005).  This may suit those who study science and 
scientists empirically, but seemed to me conceptually lacking when 
(ethnographically) studying enlightenment cultures overtly concerned with the 
nature of the self.  Needing to adopt and clarify my own analytical standpoint on 
the self, I was greatly assisted by the recommendation of Paula Saukko, my 
second supervisor, to read Bakhtin (1981) and Volosinov (1973) for their 
polyvocal view of social consciousness.  I explain all of these influential writings 
and how I have used them in later chapters.  
Thus, returning to my themes, I devote an analytic chapter to spiritual 
seekers (Chapter 3:  Configuring the Seeker), arguing that like Woolgar’s “user” 
of computer technology, seekers do not come pre-formed but are “configured” 
in local practices as users of particular spiritual services.  I show that as Heelas 
found in his early work on “self-religions” (e.g. 1982), seekers are configured in 
ways which reflect a variety of wider cultural tropes of the self, and each suited 
to how that seeker’s quest might unravel. Then (Chapter 4:  Gurus as 
Experiential Experts) I  analyse several occasions involving different spiritual 
teachers to show how they have a special form of expertise I term  experiential  
expertise, which I argue is  constituted from practices and technologies 
whereby others come to associate gurus’ personas with affective experiences 
and particular discourses of the self.  In the last analytical chapter (Chapter 5:  
Truths: Debating the Enlightened Self) I  analyse several “credibility contests” 
between proponents of  enlightenment, and show that they imply different 
forms of enlightened selves again reflecting aspects of several familiar cultural 
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selves each with  different sensibilities, social propensities or modes of 
engagement towards the world.   
In the final chapter, I draw these three analytical chapters together to 
provide overall accounts of each enlightenment culture in terms of its 
idiosyncratic configuration of seekers, gurus, and enlightened selves.  I thereby 
highlight the very different consequential forms of selfhood which populate 
these enlightenment cultures, and thus why it is inappropriate to treat them as 
sharing a common ideology of the self or to speak generically of “the authority 
of the Self” as if it this phrase has a clear meaning or analytical purchase.  
Indeed, instead of concerning themselves with investigating whether or not 
participants’ notions of self-authority have any empirical validity, I suggest 
analysts might instead focus upon elaborating the practices of self-
configuration and expertise which mediate multiple selves.  Moreover, I argue 
that only by attending to the particular forms of selfhood which are found within 
such cultures is it possible to arrive at nuanced assessments of their potential 
to challenge more mainstream, Western notions of a sovereign self, and thus 
assess their potential for social change.  I close my text by revisiting my 
tangential aim of addressing the antagonistic Academic and Spiritual quests 
which have driven this research.    
 
A note on titles and names  
 
There is no single participants’ term or title which all of the gurus/ 
speakers/authors/teachers/facilitators I have studied use to describe 
themselves, though all are united by virtue of addressing the topic of 
enlightenment in what they do and say.  Guru is an Eastern term with rich and 
varied meaning and significance within orthodox religious traditions notably 
strands of Hinduism and Sikhism.  The term has no direct equivalent in the 
West, though in popular usage it has become almost synonymous with 
“expert”.  Cohen is the only one of my research participants who describes 
himself as a guru, though perhaps with the exception of Saunders all are 
commonly regarded as “gurus” by their audiences.  I devote an entire chapter 
to “gurus” later, and identify them as having a particular kind of expertise and 
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association with teachings on enlightenment not enjoyed by others who may 
teach on their behalves.  However, to avoid initial puzzlement on the part of my 
reader I should explain that I describe Cohen, Gangaji, Parsons and Saunders 
as “gurus” in acknowledgement of their expertise on the subject of 
enlightenment, and in default of there being a more apt term which captures 
this commonality, not in the sense of confirming or denying a particular and 
highly reverential religious status or in implying they all share the same social 
identity category, for they do not.  
Throughout, I refer to teachers of enlightenment by either their surnames 
or, where they are more often known by them amongst participants, by their 
“spiritual names”.   I have adopted this academic convention to avoid confusion 
(as all teachers are also authors, whom I cite in conventional Harvard manner) 
and also the impression of familiarity which first naming tends to convey and 
which some readers may find uncomfortable.   To “gurus”, all of whom I think of 
in either first or spiritual name terms, this may appear discourteous though it 
does afford them the same (dis)courtesy as academic conventions allow 
academic authors.  Other participants, I refer to mostly by first name, save 
where a non-guru takes on a role analogous to that of a guru and is discussed 
extensively in my text, in which case I refer to them by surname to again avoid 
seeming familiar. I have not anonymised teachers of enlightenment or such 
analogous helpers.  However, save where their true identities are matters of 
public record or otherwise impossible to disguise without distorting the research 
materials, I have taken steps to anonymise other participants in events which I 
have studied.   
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Chapter 1 Awakenings
1
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________ 
1.1 DIGEST 
 
What better place to start my study of enlightenment cultures than with a 
course which I can study in my home town of Glastonbury.  Stephen 
Saunders’s “Holigral” (a business partnership,  and an abbreviation of “Holistic 
Integral”, two terms often applied to contemporary therapeutic, ecological or 
spiritual endeavours) combines notions and terms from quantum theory,   fringe 
psychotherapy, neuro-lingusitic programming (NLP), world religions,  and many 
other sources to form an eclectic bricolage which promises  permanent 
personal change rendering further personal development course attendances 
unnecessary.  Saunders agreed I could record a week course, subject only to 
“delegates’” consents.    Questions:   Lots.    What counts as enlightenment on 
these courses?  How is it attained?  Is it ever contested?  Is it researchable 
using empirical methods? What social roles or identities are relevant here, and 
how are they constituted? What might be common to other enlightenment 
cultures?  Might this “data site” suggest research questions I have not yet 
thought of, or designs other than the succession of case studies I envisage 
conducting?  Does this site point to particular research objects, other sites, or 
methodologies in addition to the focus on text and persuasive rhetoric I intend 
to supplement with ethnographic elaborations?  Should I continue to lay out my 
research site by site, or collate similar research objects from different sites into 
more thematic chapters?  What might those themes be?  
______________________________________________________________ 
                                                 
1 This ethnographic chapter adopts a subtitled structure similar to the chapters of Desani’s 
fictional classic  All About Hatterr  (1972 (1948)) which describe the central character’s 
(Hatterr’s) encounters with seven successive gurus, and comic attempts to apply their 
respective teachings on “Living”.  I have departed from Desani’s structure by including two 
“Instruction” sections rather than one,  since unlike Hatterr my encounters with any teacher or 
guru are throughout undertaken under the auspices of other teachers, my supervisors, who 
encourage me to make use of such encounters towards scholarly rather than spiritual  ends.    
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1.2 INSTRUCTION (1):   
Excerpt from emails between Saunders and I in early 2006, mostly on 
the topic of my information sheets and consent forms, in which exchanges 
Saunders volunteered guidance on how I might go about my research.  The 
first from Saunders is dated 25 April 2006: 
 
“Regarding research, normally there are experiments (or 
measurements), a seeking of commonalities and key exceptions and a 
process of modelling what happens.  In ‘awakening’, what an interesting 
concept.  First, what does the word itself mean to at least 30 different 
people - and most importantly to you?  Awakening to what?  Is it a 
moment or a process and if so how long?  Is [it] something repeated or 
one-off, does it reflect steps in consciousness or just one step?    
‘Awakening experiences’ - how does one distinguish these from 
transcendental meditation or should one?  Are there other experiences 
in life that might be so counted?  how does this relate to experiencing 
‘grace’?  etc 
  
“I have a process that appears to model how mind creates and recreates 
and it might help the study6” 
 
From my reply of 25 April 2006: 
 
“I’m not into experiments, more observations of sorts, but like your own 
observations on awakenings as a topic.  And if the process you mention 
might be a, or your, handle on that notion I would indeed love to hear 
more.  If it is possible to somehow study awakenings or the practices 
surrounding them that would be good – and as you say, what does the 
word itself mean. Which is why I try to give alternatives like 
enlightenment, lucid living, and so on.   That’s all kind of my topic, 
though not in a dictionary sense. And words might not be the best way to 
capture or represent it.” 
 
In his email of 26 April 2006 Saunders added: 
 
“I believe that a wide-ranging, even comprehensive, study of ‘awakening’ 
can only be for the greater good of humankind (and other species too!). 
  
“The process would be a way to get a handle on it, by no means the only 
way.  Direct experience, possibly videos of people in awakened states, 
and in the end some form of words will be required for academic 
acceptance, however inadequate.  A series of definitions for each of the 
associated terms you mention (enlightened, samadhi, lucid living, 
awakened, ...) would help - perhaps they are different - some of these 
would refer to the experience of awakening and some to living in 
‘elevated consciousness’ whatever that may be defined as ...” 
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And on 18 May 2006 Saunders was even more specific:  
 
“My thoughts are along the lines we discussed: 
  
1. Define the terms for the critical/key words like:  awakening, awake, 
enlightened, samadhi, and particularly the measurements you propose 
to take. 
  
2. Find ways to separate your ‘measurements’ into training, test and 
verification data sets as we discussed. 
  
3. How many clues or cues to wake-up does a person have before they 
‘get it’ and wake up?   Search for what was happening before the 
moment of awakening - these are the critical starting conditions to find if 
you are to produce a way of enabling people to wake up ‘despite 
themselves’. This might to back several months (or even years), and will 
require disciplined modelling. 
  
4. The ‘clean questions’ for interviewing and modelling: 
  
The following questions can be used, typically in the sequence as below, 
where [x] denotes the content of what is being explored (last answer): 
  
And do you have a sense of [x]? 
And do you have a sense of [not x] / [complement of x]? 
6. [Saunders gave further suggested questions and guidance on how to 
deliver them]” 
 
1.3 INSTRUCTION (2)  
From my academic supervisor at the time, Malcolm Ashmore:  
“Forget Ken Wilber2, and all the rest3.  Academics don’t cite them as 
authorities.  Your authorities are Sacks, Garfinkel, Lynch46. And 
                                                 
2 Wilber is a prolific American writer outside academe whose works on religious, spiritual and 
philosophical matters appear to have a more popular than academic appeal.  Wilber (1997) has 
developed a complex model of consciousness, as well as, literally, “a theory of everything” 
(2001).  He has devised four schematic quadrants (the intentional, behavioural, cultural and 
social) and described the notion and imperative of development or evolution along categorical 
measures within each quadrant.  Although whether his works are cited as learned texts or 
exemplars of  popular spirituality seems open to authorial choice,   Wilber himself engages 
critically with academic approaches.  From his perspective, these are generally not “integral” 
rather are situated at varying developmental levels within a single quadrant, and thus are 
lacking in comprehensiveness (see Wilber 1997, 2006).  Interestingly, Wilber (1997) suggests 
that “in some cases, a change in consciousness on the part of researchers themselves is 
mandatory for the investigation of consciousness itself”.   
3 “The rest” referring generically to the gurus, spiritual teachers and authors of the emic 
literature I was reading at the time.  I was noticing some overlap between primary literature and 
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everything you encounter is ‘data’.  I notice you’ve been using quotes 
around the word, I’m not sure why?  Your job is to analyse whatever you 
take to be data.  Not to reproduce it in lengthy expositions, however 
tempted you feel.  That’s for other’s to do.  Your job is analysis.  But if 
someone you’re studying has suggestions about how to do your 
research, I hope you’ll use them somehow6” (Paraphrased, of course) 
 
 
1.4 PRESUMPTIONS 
Saunders’s above comments suggest not only an empirical, positivistic 
project, but one using methods or “processes” employed on his courses, such 
as asking “clean questions”.   It seems possible the suggestions also reveal 
something of how he had set about devising his own techniques, since 
enlightening others was after all his livelihood (much later I learnt the course I 
was studying was regarded by Saunders and his colleagues as a work in 
progress, and a step in their refinement of their own teaching techniques and 
team).  However, the instructions clearly are at odds with those of the academic 
“Master” who supervised the early stages of my research, who encouraged me 
to  analyse everything or anything participants  produced to me – including 
Saunders’s suggestions. 
Where my academic supervisor differed from Saunders however was in 
offering no such simple guidance on what “analysis” meant.  This was, it 
seemed, something for me to decide upon for myself.  Saunders’s suggestions 
implied there were distinctions to be made between various kinds of 
“enlightened” states, which may be detectable, measurable, and studyable as 
objective phenomena.  The payoff, to Saunders, was the possibility of 
identifying ways of inculcating enlightenments in others even “despite 
themselves”. None of these things were my research aims. Nor was I keen to 
devise my own definitions of participants’ terms, which after all drew upon 
varied ancient and overtly “religious” sources, which have already been the 
subject of voluminous theological debates.   
                                                                                                                                              
academic literature on “the self”.  Malcolm frequently reminded me I should be using these 
different literatures, well, differently; one was my topic, the other my resource.  
4 That is, Harvey Sacks, founder of conversation analysis, Harold Garfinkel, founder of 
ethnomethodology, and Michael Lynch, an ethnomethodologically inclined sociologist of 
science. As my study progressed, I settled upon several other academic authorities. 
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Rather, I began in an inductive frame of mind, though steered by my 
above “questions” I was open to refining my focus given the field experiences 
and “data” I might obtain.   I was ready to “analyse” anything I encountered in 
the field which seemed pertinent to enlightenment (or similar seeming notions) 
across a range of settings. I envisaged that a good part of my analysis would 
involve using well established research methods of  recording people going 
about their normal activities (here, those associated with enlightenment), 
transcribing significant seeming episodes,  and further interpreting or analysing 
those transcripts in order to identify the practices upon which the phenomenon 
of enlightenment depended, and to assess its sociological significance.  These 
were early days, and I did not want to anticipate my findings right from the 
outset. But certainly, although I would participate to help gain access to field 
events, and gain understanding of them, I was not there to become enlightened 
myself, by anyone’s reckoning.  I did not even see that as a possibility.  
Although as my meditation teacher Joseph later commented, that would 
definitely be something to write about if it happened.  So I would participate a 
little, but mainly observe and study and adjusting my gear could provide 
occasional “escapes” if needed, and bolster a field identity as a researcher.  
Ideal.  
 
1.5 LIFE-ENCOUNTER 
 
1.5.1 Authentic Leadership 
 
While working as a solicitor in Somerset, I took up Ki-Aikido and 
eventually became the assistant teacher at Sensei Mike Jones’s Glastonbury 
Aikido club.  Mike introduced me to Saunders in 2006 while as part of a 
Masters dissertation I was researching the “spiritual biographies” on the 
Glastonbury Trust’s website, which Mike ran. My elderly mother and brother still 
lived in Glastonbury at the time, and their hospitality made visiting people in the 
town simple, and allowed me to catch up on family things.  
Saunders was from the outset interested in my research and keen to 
help.  Following our emails and a couple of meetings with him, in October 2006 
  - 31 - 
I set off with as much of Loughborough University’s audio/video equipment as I 
could borrow from the Social Science Department, and enough digital tape to 
record all of Holigral’s  7 day “Authentic Leadership” course. An earlier version 
of the course had been planned for a series of weekends, and called  
“Awakenings”, but this had been cancelled due to a shortage of attendees.  
Saunders has assured me on the week course several attendees would 
actually become enlightened (or as he put it “fully awake”), and that there would 
be no problem with consents.  In readiness, I sent him consent forms to 
distribute to attendees  whose identities he kept confidential prior to the course, 
not least because numbers were uncertain and he did not want to deter people.  
Saunders thus acted as “gatekeeper” - I had no direct contact with other 
participants before meeting them. 
Saunders had explained the content of the cancelled “Awakenings” 
course was very similar to the “Authentic Leadership” course, though the latter 
was more intense as it was full time, over seven long days.  His A4 sized leaflet 
explaining the latter described it as follows: 
 
“The Authentic Leadership Retreat 
A 7-day personal journey into the wholeness of mind, body and spirit 
that underpins the world’s greatest leaders. 
We fuse 4th Generation NLP with ancient wisdom, over 7 themed days, 
to create the kind of inner leadership that simply inspires others to 
follow. 
Authentic means “the real thing”.  Leadership implies direction, vision, 
purpose, followers and a journey.  The greatest leaders inspire simply 
though being themselves and living their vision every moment of every 
day.  
This ability comes from being whole in and of yourself.  You have to do 
the hard yards of personal development to believe fully in what you do 
and say. 
We have created a new form of healing and psychology – the 4th 
Generation of Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP).  Instead of change 
“being done to you”, you can now be helped to transform yourself, and in 
revolutionary short timescales. 
This is not a course for the faint-hearted.  As well as further 
developing your excellence and transferring this into your other life 
areas, you will address your dark side or shadow, and you will be 
transcending and including them to become whole, authentic and at 
peace with yourself.” 
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Taking the course was a serious financial commitment. In 2006 it cost 
£950  (by mid-2009 its price was £1,995).   The price included food, but not 
accommodation.   Saunders did not charge me for the course, though I agreed 
to pay for my food which accounted for a good amount of the price as most 
meals were taken in nearby restaurants.   I remain very grateful to Saunders for 
allowing me to join the event in this way.   
 
1.5.2 Friday:  setting up 
 
Holigral’s offices were in a covered shopping arcade in Glastonbury, 
called Abbey Mews, towards the “top end” of the High Street, which is overtly 
less colourful with fewer “New Age” shops than lower parts.  One side of the 
entrance to the arcade was a second hand  shop, and the opposite side a 
vacant shop unit which was being worked upon during the week.  Inside the 
arcade were several small shop units, including a computer shop and a shop 
selling  esoteric cards and prints called  “Vortex”. “Vortex”  gave quite an 
impression to the arcade -  its placard on the High Street pavement was an 
enticing  bright purple swirl and the front of its shop a colourful collection of 
eclectic alternative artwork.  Holigral’s offices were at the far end of the 
arcade’s “tunnel”, past a decorative old fashioned street lamp reminiscent of 
the border to Narnia, and at the top of a straight stairway. Holigral occupied all 
of the units at the top.  The metaphor of ascension was obvious and remarked 
upon by many throughout the week.  My perception of physical invocations of 
the fictional world of Narnia, the Vortex shop and the stairway to Holigral’s 
offices gave me an otherworldly impression of Saunders’s offices before I 
entered them.  
On arrival there I met Josie, Saunders’s partner and one of the trainers 
on the course.  She was beginning to set up the office space ready for the 
course.  Saunders arrived from a lunch meeting and the level of activity 
increased.  The office space formed a horseshoe around the central stairwell, 
and seemed to have been recently painted, a light creamy shade.  Moving 
clockwise around the shoe, first there was the administrative space – a largish 
area with a wall flanked by desks and four or five computers including 
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notebooks and a large central table with a fruit bowl and papers strewn across 
it.   Two doors led out of this area, one to toilets and a kitchen, and the other 
straight into a large open training room, which had its own door to the kitchen 
and another door to a private room, which overlooked the training area through 
an internal glassed window.  The kitchen also had a doorway to the private 
room, though it was rarely opened.  The private room contained two small 
chairs and a large white reclining chair which Saunders described merely  as 
“very important”. 
The arrangement of each item of furniture was deliberate and intended 
to  assist the running of the course. I helped move tables and chairs with 
Saunders directing until the training area contained a central flipchart, eight 
chairs for “delegates”, a large table by some coat hangers, and some 
comfortable reclined chairs and a bookcase. This shelved many popular books 
on spirituality and personal development, including Ken Wilber’s Collected 
Works, Beck and Cowan’s Spiral Dynamics,  and several books on “neuro-
linguistic programming” or “NLP”.    
Ornaments were minimal, and several had spiritual connotations. In the 
corner where I set up my tripod there were 2 crystal balls, one clear and one 
black, together with several small singing  bowls with their wooden sticks.  Two 
pairs of Tibetan prayer chimes were placed to hand, and used by Saunders  
throughout the week to call the group together like a school bell.  A large box of 
tissues seemed to me out of place, though it turned out that it pre-empted the 
occasional tears later in the week.  
Having arranged most of the furniture, I accompanied Saunders to the 
supermarket to get some fruit and biscuits.  On the way, he  “briefed” me that 
none of the delegates were “local”, and three were from overseas.  He had 
arranged for translations of his flipcharts with this in mind.  He explained one of 
the delegates was already in a “highly awakened state”. Also, that having 
discussed this with the other trainers, they all felt I should join in with the group 
as well as doing my research and recordings. I was agreeable to this, as I had 
felt awkward about sitting on the periphery throughout, thought I would still 
have the equipment to fiddle with if I needed a time out, as my supervisor had 
suggested.   
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We would meet next at the 100 Monkeys Café  after seven pm for the 
first group meeting and meal. We would eat here a lot through the week.   I was 
a little apprehensive about getting everyone’s consents to being recorded as I 
had not known some people might need translations.  Saunders reassured me 
this should not be a problem, and we would deal with the forms tonight. 
 
1.5.3 First night 
 
When I arrived at the 100 Monkeys, several tables had been joined 
together.  Saunders was with several of the five trainers who helped him run 
the course, four of whom were female.    Aside from myself, there were seven 
“delegates” enrolled on the course, five of whom were female. There was one 
(mixed sex) couple.  Everyone seemed to know I was a researcher though 
several asked how I had managed to persuade everyone to agree to being 
recorded.  I became increasingly uneasy as it dawned on me that everyone but 
Saunders and Josie seemed a little  apprehensive about being recorded, and 
some even seemed surprised about the possibility. 
At about 8:30pm Saunders signalled that we should all make our way to 
Holigral’s offices.  The arcade was a short walk up the high street, and the 
trainers had keys to the entrance doors which were otherwise locked shut after 
shopping hours. 
We slowly filled the training room.  Saunders was centre stage by the 
flips.  Course participants directly faced him, sat in a semi circle. I had the 
rightmost seat from Saunders’s perspective, and several trainers sat to my left, 
out of the semi circle.  The atmosphere was relaxed yet a little formal.  A few 
people kept glancing at the video camera I had previously positioned in a 
corner. I concluded it was highly unlikely everyone was really happy about  
being recorded.    
Saunders gave a brief introduction to the course, and introduced  his 
own confidentiality agreement copies of which he handed out with my 
information sheets and consent form.  He indicated I would be saying 
something about my forms.  I was by now positive this was the first occasion 
when most or even all of the delegates had seen my form.  I noticed some 
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heads shaking, and puzzled and worried looks from delegates to whom I had 
not yet spoken.  Not expecting this to be most people’s first introduction to my 
research, and resigned by now to abandoning all thoughts of making 
recordings, I summarised my interest in “awakenings” and  what I had 
proposed to do, though emphasised research ethics and that if one person 
objected to video recording during the week this would probably make it 
impossible to video record anything.  I felt very much the outsider, and more so 
as a small chorus of replies made points about video recording interfering with 
group dynamics, and being the difference between some staying or going 
home.  Some complained partly to me and partly to Saunders that this should 
have been mentioned before today.  I quickly confirmed that in view of such 
feelings I felt it inappropriate for me to record anything, unless anyone 
approached me afterwards. 
 Saunders then suggested everyone should now think about if they 
would still be happy for me to participate in the course, like the rest of them.  
After brief reflection, and for me a tense silence, one of the group spoke up and 
said there was nothing wrong about that, that it would be fine for me to join in 
like “us”.    Glances and nods all around suggested this was unanimous.  One 
delegate then asked me to say what I felt about how they had been asked to 
take part in research.  I answered that I was surprised they had not understood 
much about this before, as though I also understood why Saunders had 
decided for this all to be discussed in person I would have preferred to have 
explained about my research much sooner than tonight, as doing it this way 
was awkward. My research did not just require recordings, and I was grateful to 
be able to continue by joining in and doing the course.   
Nevertheless, this was an awkward beginning. I felt distant from the 
group. Several people sympathised with me during the week over the way in 
which the course started for me, and told me their views of me had changed.  
But at the outset, I felt intrusive, a tolerated  “spy”. 
While I had always intended to participate in the cultures I was studying, 
these early exchanges changed the form that participation would take.  I no 
longer had the  “escape”  of my equipment, nor would I be getting any 
recordings or transcripts to analyse later.  Instead, while I could write up notes 
and observations overnight, circumstances were encouraging me towards a 
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much deeper immersion in the field than I had envisaged, and my “data” was 
now going to be wholly ethnographic.  Moreover, this changed my relationship 
with Saunders considerably. Saunders was now more than a participant in my 
research. As a course delegate, I felt I had become his pupil in some way.  To 
borrow terms Saunders used, he was now my facilitator, trainer, or coach and I 
his client.  
With everyone content for me to remain, Saunders’s forms were signed 
but mine were not.  Saunders’s forms prohibited revealing “personal details” of 
other people, without their permission, so this account is largely limited to my 
own experiences and interactions with Saunders and completely anonymised 
others (save for Josie and Saunders, who gave written consents). 
Saunders also handed out some “code of conduct” notes which asked 
that people use genuine “issues” in group exercises.   
Then, the course really seemed to get underway.  Saunders asked us all 
to say, in turn, why we were here.  He wrote the answers on a flip chart, with 
some commentary.  One delegate’s reason was that he wanted “answers”.  
When it came to my turn, still affected by the consent form business, I said for 
me the question was more like “why am I still here?”, and the answer to that 
was probably “because I feel invited”.  This was met by quite a bit of laughter 
and smiling from everyone else (perhaps I could participate?).  I then added 
that “I too want some answers”.  All of this was written  on the chart, with a 
numeral “2” drawn underneath “I too”, with Saunders commenting to the group 
and other trainers that perhaps there are two “Is” here. This did not make much 
sense to me at this time. 
At the end of the introductory session, Saunders asked if his team could 
photograph those of us willing for his own “before and after records”.  There 
were nods from most of the group though not everyone eventually agreed to 
this.  One of the trainers, Frank, stated loudly, and I think with some humour, 
that he wondered if I would mind this.  His question prompted some uneasy 
laughter from the group which seemed to rise when I answered “how could I 
possibly say no to that?”  (Maybe I really could join in?). 
Walking home that night, with the video camera and the rest of my 
recording kit, and a lever arch file of printed course notes, it dawned on me that 
I had been  stunned by the consent form business.   Perhaps best not think 
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about it?  I was not angry with anyone who had vetoed my recording – in their 
shoes, I would probably have done the same.  Was it that I thought I was 
wasting my time now?  I knew I would not be making  recordings.  But 
Saunders had said long ago that as part of my research I might need to have 
“direct experiences”. While I never set out to adopt his methodological 
suggestions, were they now being forced on me by these circumstances?  
Maybe this was always going to be  his gift to me?  It was Saturday tomorrow, 
so nothing to lose by one more day I thought.  And I can spend time with my 
mother and brother.   
 
1.5.4 Saturday 
 
“Day 1: Moving into Right Relationship:  Why are you here and what do 
you want? Learn whole-body communication”. 
 
Each full day of the course had a title in our “programme”, though 
Saunders rarely made reference to them.  Days generally started at 9:30am, 
finishing at about 10 pm with about an hour for a group lunch and dinner.  
Between breaks, time was usually spent with Saunders explaining the theory 
and setting a task, and with us working in twos threes or as individuals on the 
tasks.    Or else there might be a walk to some local site, such as the Tor or 
Abbey, during which we were also asked to work on mental exercises set by 
Saunders.  Although we all had a lever arch file of notes, Saunders never 
referred us as a group to anything in this file, save to mention the notes were 
out of date.   
This morning,  people greeted me as if Friday had not happened.  But I 
still felt there was an ambivalence towards my presence.  This feeling was 
emphasised when, in the kitchen,  one of the group told me she had dreamed 
about me wearing the exact same shirt I had put on only that morning (my 
favourite polo shirt with an unusual  flowery collar).  In her dream she had 
heard noises at night then got up to find me looking for food in her kitchen.  We 
talked about the dream and she said she did not really react  to my presence, 
rather I was “just there” and  on finding me she wasn’t startled but just  “woke 
up”.  I had never met the dreamer before the course, and this story made me 
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uneasy.  Dreaming of someone in one’s home might imply some sort of 
intimacy, but  the dream was ambivalent,  I was  “just there”.   It reminded me 
of  Marcus’s (1956) suggestion that a common feature of women’s “stranger” 
dreams is that an initially threatening seeming stranger, who may have 
somehow invaded the dreamer’s personal space, presents the dreamer with an 
opportunity for her spiritual or personal development. I felt like Marcus’s 
stranger, but was not sure what else to make of the dream as it seemed to 
have finished before running its course.  
Today, one of the main tasks was for each person to represent an  issue 
personal or troubling to them on white A1 sheets using coloured pens.  This 
artwork was to be placed anywhere around the entire office space, using white 
tack.  Then, Saunders or another trainer would ask each  artist  questions 
about it, and for the answers to also be drawn, either on new sheets or added 
to the (accumulating) picture(s).  Trainers split their time between participants, 
who distributed themselves in different corners and free spaces throughout the 
training and office areas.   They would check on each of us periodically, and 
occasionally engage us in intense personal discussion, which entailed a series 
of slowly delivered questions such as “can you draw it?”; “and is that in the right 
place?”; “and are you in the right place?”; “and what do you know?”; “and what 
does it know?”, “and is there anything else?”  The trainers seemed remarkably 
reluctant to comment on the pictures, just keen to elicit more and more artwork. 
There were later sessions when we were coached in using such questions, and 
given templates for asking them, but at this stage of the course they seemed 
bizarre to me.     
 Obviously, I needed to have an “issue” for this task.  I was there to 
study enlightenment, so I chose something which seemed relevant to that.  For 
many years I had been intrigued by philosophical arguments about solipsism 
and the “problem” of the one and the many.  As an undergraduate I had been 
fascinated by phenomenological theories of intersubjectivity, such as those of 
Husserl, Schutz, and Berger and Luckmann.  I was intrigued about how such 
deep philosophical problems were seemingly short circuited in enlightenment 
cultures, so that assertions that we are all  “connected” or “one” may seem self-
evident.  However, such views are contrary to sociological perspectives which 
treat people as separate social beings, able to see themselves as distinct from 
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others and communicate and attribute meaning to things, because of social 
worlds and in particular languages which pre-exist each individual.  Even if 
such symbolic systems are somehow negated, I did not see how this might  
reveal we are ontologically “one”.  At least not without a leap of faith.   In 
enlightenment cultures the relationship between the one and many is often 
expressed by a cinematic metaphor,   where “we” are likened to the screen on 
which various separate actors are projected (as well as the audience, projector, 
scenery, and so on)  rather than just one character.5 I represented these things 
by drawing the seating, screen and projector of a cinema theatre, with a one 
night screening of a film and in the audience the writer, director, a viewer,  the 
projectionist, and an actor on the screen. I wanted to know how they all might 
be “one”. 
Saunders and Stacey questioned me on my drawing, which I stuck with 
white tack on the glass panels overlooking the stairwell.   By then others were 
sticking their pictures on other walls, ceilings, windows, and doors.   What was 
the “right place” for each person’s artwork was much constrained by where 
other people were working.  It seemed an unspoken “rule” that everyone was 
allowed so much private space, and no one stuck their pictures on top of 
anyone else’s picture.   
I spent most of  Saturday afternoon gazing at this picture, and my 
additions to it, responding to questions from Saunders or other facilitators.  
Some seemed to finish this activity quickly, progressing to work on 
“whole body communication” in the office room.   
In the course of the afternoon, while I was engrossed in my drawings, 
two distressed, tearful delegates briefly took refuge in the training area.  This 
seemed to confirm how insensitive it would have been to leave a camera 
running permanently in that room as I had hoped.    
By early evening, it seemed that everyone apart from me and one other 
had “completed” the drawing exercise. I was feeling frustrated with the 
repetitive, nonsensical questioning.  One particularly annoying question was 
                                                 
5 This cinematic metaphor features vividly in the 2004 “documentary” film,  What the Bleep Do 
We Know!?, which attempts to integrate scientific and more esoteric knowledge while both 
marvelling at the mysterious aspects of existence and promoting a world-view in which 
everything is not only all connected but people are able to actively shape reality.   My 
formulation of my issue was sincere, though influenced by having watched this film only a few 
weeks earlier. 
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along the lines of “is there anything else?”  Clearly there could always be 
“something else” to say, and the questions had no foreseeable end as even my 
firmest answers were met with the same question.  It seemed unending, and I 
became annoyed at myself for my own choice of issue. 
Near dinner time I explained my  frustration to Saunders and asked if I 
could be excused from the evening meal and session afterwards.  I could not 
see any point in more questions and just wanted to reflect on my  issue without 
questions.  Saunders agreed, though suggested I think about  the various 
people  in my drawings that night, and record my dreams as they may help 
resolve my dilemma.  Some chance, I thought. 
Walking back to my mother’s, I received a telephone call from an old 
school friend inviting me to dinner with him and  two other friends.  I hesitated 
about this diversion, as I wanted to write up some notes from today, but I was 
seriously considering giving up the course as a wasted research opportunity 
and so decided to make use of what might be my last night in Glastonbury for a 
while by meeting up with my friends.     
My friends and I met in Taunton, and over food shared news and 
memories.  What I told them of my day had them open mouthed – to them it all 
seemed incomprehensible and they wanted to know much more than I could 
tell.  Their own tales of management problems and legal cases seemed dull in 
comparison.  I had to go back, even if it might not give me materials for my 
research this time, there may be others.   
 
1.5.5 Sunday 
 
“Day 2: A Sense of Self:  Finding and integrating your many minds and 
aspects of self, releasing your potential energy to be used effortlessly”.  
 
When I woke I wrote out the only dream I could remember.  An edited 
version of my note is below: 
 
I was in a school-like building, on my way to lunch with a few friends. 
Lots of people, dressed as un-uniformed college students  were milling 
around, though I also had the feeling of being back at school.  The large 
dining hall had many circular tables.   I sat at a table where it looked like 
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several of my classmates had already settled, including my good friend 
Patrick. Patrick was a very practical school friend whom I had known for 
many years, though we had lost touch over ten years ago.  I said hello to 
one or two of  my friends as I sat.  As soon as I was seated, I opened a 
book I had with me and began studying a full page outline of a man’s 
body, which was annotated with different bright coloured areas rather 
like a chakra chart of some sort.  While I was looking at this picture, 
Patrick leant over to look at it too.  He remarked, disapprovingly,  “You 
don’t need any of that”.  I felt he was right, but continued to study the 
picture. 
 
The illustration I was studying was the sort of picture anyone at Holigral 
might have drawn on an A1 sheet.  I surmised that my dream meant that I had 
thoughts that the course was either unnecessary to me or not “practical”.  But it 
was more complicated, for though I admired Patrick’s practicality, I often had 
thought this came at the expense of other things that were important to me. We 
came from very similar class backgrounds, both our fathers being skilled 
factory workers.  While I worked and saved for a few years after finishing 
school before going to university, Patrick had worked in skilled occupations and 
saved steadily and was married with his own house shortly before I became an 
undergraduate.  I had ambivalent feelings about Patrick’s “normal” seeming life 
–  at times I envied him, other times I did not.  I was looking forward to 
discussing this with Saunders, though a little embarrassed that the dream may 
indicate negative feelings towards the course. 
The day began with a session on what “authenticity” meant.  We 
discussed this in pairs, as before noting our thoughts on A1.  I mentioned my 
frustration from yesterday to my partner, who seemed to know how the 
question sequences or “processes” of the course worked,   and she offered to 
try to resolve it for me.  Sceptically, I agreed and the questions started up 
again.  This time though, the facilitator said something like “look, different 
people work at different speeds, I think they were going too slow for you.  Let’s 
try it quicker.  Now, I’m going to ask you this 6 times:  is there anything else?”  
Our conversation then ran something like this: “no” “and is there anything 
else?”  “no”  “and is there anything else” “no, nothing else” “and is there 
anything else” “well, yes, there might be, but I don’t know what, so no, nothing 
else”  “and is there anything else”  “no” “and is there anything else” “no” and is 
there anything else “no, nothing else”.  Knowing there would be an end to the 
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series of “anything else” questions was all I needed to steam through them.   
Also I did not feel so pressured to add something new each question, as 
previously.  I was then asked several further questions, again multiple times.  
The content and pattern of questions was different from yesterday, and we 
whizzed through without me drawing anything.  Soon, my partner was telling 
me this was the final question:   “and what do you know now?”. I did not have 
an “answer” to my issue, but felt hugely relived  and said something like  “I 
realise I may never answer this issue, and there may be no answer, but that 
does not bother me as I am happy to keep asking as long as the issue seems 
important to me which it still is”.  “Thank you” said the trainer.  I was done!  
What a relief.  No more frustration.  I glowed about this for hours after.  I then 
noticed that Saunders had been listening in on the perimeter of this discussion, 
and was looking on approvingly.  No need to discuss my dream I thought.   
When I talked about this later with one of the group, it struck me that like 
me she did not seem to have resolved her issues from yesterday either, just 
come to accept them.  I wondered if  issues were not being solved at all here,  
more rendered less bothering in some way. 
Later that day, Saunders explained to the group how the questions were 
intended to work.  The whole business about drawing our issues was part of an 
approach borrowed from the psychotherapeutic techniques devised by New 
Zealand psychotherapist David Grove,  intended to create a focused, trance 
like engagement between the “client” and their artwork/issue which throughout 
the questioning become more and more engrossing to the client.   The non-
leading nature of the questioning, and its style of delivery, was also designed to 
create a relationship between the “client” (questionee) and the “practitioner” 
(questioner) in which the practitioner elicits responses from the client to enable 
them to progress through an interactional trajectory already envisaged by the 
practitioner which is not dependent on the substance of the answers but other 
qualities (like, does the answerer appear to be  wavering).     The client’s 
artwork, the space in which it is positioned, and potentially anything now within 
the client’s attention, are regarded as “psychoactive” to the client.  The theory 
was that changing things in the client’s psychoactive space can lead to 
corresponding consequences in the client’s self, in particular a re-integration of 
fragmented aspects of the self which are theorised as having splintered away 
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due to life events or  traumas. A key feature of yesterday’s question sequences 
was that they  were supposed to lead the client to a “wobble” in their answers, 
identifiable by the skilled trainers as perhaps a momentary hesitation,  after 
which client may become firmer minded thus signalling to the trainer that that 
the client has undergone an inner change. There is then a rebuilding in which 
the client’s sense of self is reconstructed to accommodate this change.  The 
overall process Saunders described as “emergence”, likening the changed self 
or “I” to a phoenix arising from the questioning process.  Saunders mentioned 
that this sort of change does not just relate to a psychic “self”, but has very 
physical implications as when in “cooking” the client’s DNA is as a 
consequence rearranged, giving a physically measurable heating sensation. 
Being engaged in this sort of exchange with another person was referred to by 
Saunders and several facilitators as being “in process” or “processing” 
someone.   
Strange and new though all of this was, even if I was not understanding 
this correctly it all made sense and I could see my own experiences as 
explicable in terms of Saunders’s account of “processing”.   Now I felt I was 
making real progress.   Later that day, Saunders gave us all printed instructions 
on how to administer such a series of questions, which he called “the mini issue 
buster”.  
Now knowing something of how the procedure worked, I again doubted 
my own issue had been fully resolved even though the sequence had run to its 
conclusion for me.   I had merely decided I could live with my puzzlement. I 
discussed this with Saunders.  He explained that sometimes the downside of 
hastening people through a process is that their thinking minds may  move 
quicker than  other levels of understanding.  I commented that such “fast 
tracking” as Saunders called it  seemed to have made me happier to live with 
the issue, without “really” dealing with it.  Saunders agreed this was possible.  
Later that day, I booked myself in for a “1-2-1” session tomorrow with Saunders 
to revisit the issue I felt was still live as I was now more troubled by it than 
when I had started.  I was now much more  “wanting answers” than thinking of 
my research, writing up my field notes in the evening requiring a very deliberate 
effort. 
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1.5.6 Monday 
 
“Day 3: A Sense of Other: Develop experiential understandings of the 
world as a mirror for self-development, how acceptance and forgiveness 
work in practice, with authentic feedback”.   
 
Monday began with some more theory from Saunders about how our 
perceptions may mirror our selves, and an exercise encouraging our 
acceptance and forgiveness towards others.  This was followed by a slow walk 
up Glastonbury Tor, largely in silence as each of us mentally worked through 
lists of all the people we might have encountered whom we wished to now 
forgive in order to also benefit our selves.  On the way down the Tor, I talked 
with one of the trainers, Frank, about Ken Wilber’s theories of consciousness 
and “spiral dynamics”,  about which he seemed to have considerable 
knowledge.  Then it was back to mentally forgiving people – I think I still have a 
long list to work through. 
After we had all returned to the training room, Saunders selected two 
people to demonstrate what he later called a duality/non-duality exercise, Sam 
and Tania.  He produced a Chinese doll and said the exercise was rather like 
mixing up the tops and bottoms.  It  involved two partners looking into each 
other’s eyes, while a third person slowly gave instructions to one of them.  The 
instructions went something like:  “look into Tania’s eyes, and see the Sam that 
Tania sees”, then “now look into that Sam’s eyes, and see the Tania he sees”, 
and “look into that Tania’s eyes,  and see the Sam that Tania sees”.  And so 
on. The couple ended up beaming all over their faces, and were then asked to 
help the rest of us through this experience, which Saunders said he would not 
describe more or name for us.   
By this time, there were people with whom I felt much more intimate than 
others – and people I felt sure this would not work for me with.  Happily,  Jane 
asked me if I would “play” and I readily agreed, though thinking this was 
probably going to be easier for her than me.  Tania stood beside us and slowly 
repeated in a soothing, mantra like manner, “Keith, look into  Jane’s eyes and 
see the Keith that she sees6now look into that Keith’s eyes  and see the Jane 
that he sees6.”.  At first I felt awkward gazing into Jane’s eyes.  But soon I was 
not really focused on her eyes, but on imagining what she or I was seeing, as if 
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from a perspective which was shifting between layers of regressing images 
created by two facing mirrors, and between each mirror.  I lost all sense of 
whether I was looking at myself or Jane, or which level of reflection I was 
looking from.  I was no longer distinguishing between myself, Jane, or our 
regress of images.   When I became conscious of Jane, she seemed to be 
rocking back and forth, almost falling into me.  I felt I was moving too.  
Everything in my peripheral vision seemed to blur, and a pleasant soft focus 
tainted everything  I could see.  Perhaps I had simply closed my eyes.  I had 
completely lost track of from whose eyes I was looking or what I was looking at 
or seeing.  I felt myself stumble and we  broke out of the exercise as I again 
became aware of the room and of seeing “normally”.  I said something to try to 
excuse what I thought would be a very strange appearance, like “whoa, that 
was amazing.”  I was quite hot and my legs a little rubbery.   
We then reversed, and I was surprised that this did not seem to work for 
Tania, and she appeared a little disappointed in saying so and tried again 
several times.   Another couple trying the exercise then invited me to join them.  
One of them was sure it would not work for her so her partner agreed to try it 
with me.  Whatever happened did not seem to start up so quickly for me this 
time, but soon I was disappearing again into a regress of alternating images 
that blurred together.  My second partner broke off before me, this time, 
commenting that she was getting it but not like I was.  I think I was grinning. 
Looking back, this exercise seems rather like getting lost in a loved 
one’s gaze, something which I have never experienced with near strangers.    
Saunders’s demonstration with Chinese dolls and the partners who were also a 
“couple” may have cued my recollections of such experiences, but my  
experiences at Holigral were not the “same”.  There was not so much a sense 
here of loving another, but of being that other.  It was a very pleasant and also 
intimate experience, and a little embarrassing to recount.  I wanted to do this 
more, but time ran out and soon we were working on the next task, of 
formulating our current life mission statements and placing them somewhere on 
A1. 
Making up a mission statement for myself was something completely 
new to me.  After much thought,  I wrote mine in red ink, and placed it over the 
door to Saunders’s private room – one of few clear spaces: 
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“To know the essence of myself, others, the world, and any connections 
between them, and to live a good balanced life with regard to those 
things” 
 
Saunders then conducted several pre-booked 1-2-1 sessions, while the 
rest of us refined our mission statements by using the computers to look up 
words and ideas, or simply chatted.   
When Saunders surfaced at about eight thirty,  I was stretched out on a 
couch, still pondering my mission statement.  He asked if I still wanted a 1-2-1 
and I said yes.  After respective trips to the toilet and each of us grabbing some 
biscuits and a drink (these sessions sometimes last for several hours) we were 
in the private room.  I was a little disappointed that Saunders took the 
“important” white chair.  My place was on a “normal” chair, with some blank 
paper and pens at my feet.   
At the time, my motivation for being there was definitely not my 
research. I explained that my dream and issue I had planned to discuss with 
Saunders no longer seemed important since my experience with the duality 
exercise that afternoon.  I said I would like to build on that experience.  
Saunders said “Yes, of course”. I explained that the exercise had worked better 
for me with some people than with others, and I wasn’t sure why.  He asked me 
where my sense of self was, and I answered that it was behind and around my 
body.  He asked how far it extended.  I answered that from mediation I had 
learned while doing aikido, I could extend it out quite a long way, even 
visualizing beyond the planet, though it got quite diffuse at long distances.  I 
said I did not think distance was a barrier to the experience working or not,  as I 
could close my eyes and imaginatively have the experience thinking of my wife 
in Loughborough. Saunders commented “good, distance is an illusion anyway”.   
Saunders asked me to draw the experience I would like to work on, 
which I did by drawing a head with little people in each of its eyes, with people 
within their eyes.   He asked me then to draw any barriers – though I could not 
do this and said something like “distance is irrelevant, and there are no physical 
barriers, and the person is irrelevant as they don’t need to be here, so any 
barriers might be in me”.  
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From this point, my memory of the questions Saunders asked, and my 
answers, is very imprecise although I wrote my diary only about  two hours 
later.  Part of the “process” involved him asking me questions about how far 
into the past my sense of self stretched and where was I then.  I answered to 
the point I was about three or four,  playing in the back garden at home. He 
asked me to draw this.  I drew an aerial view, including my brother and parents.  
Before then, I had little recollection at all.  
Saunders’s questions then took me back before this, till I was in the 
womb, and before I was conceived.  By this point I think I was staring rather 
fixedly at my drawings, occasionally looking up to Saunders, still reclined in his 
chair.  My sense of self at these times was rather disembodied, I was 
thoroughly engrossed in Saunders’s questions and my drawings.    I remember 
losing any feeling I was sat in a room with Saunders, as a body or in a body.  I 
was engrossed in imagining existing without a body.  It was like daydreaming 
while holding a conversation simultaneously.  I remember making some 
intuitive leaps, and saying something like - if I existed before my body then my 
body could be like a widow through which an I distinct from my body can 
experience the world.  And if that was the case, maybe I could look through 
other “windows”.  Or every “window”.  So simple.  This seemed how we were all 
connected.  There was no need to wonder about this any longer.  
This all sounds like stretching my own metaphors, though at the time my 
metaphors were being talked about as if they were “real” by both Saunders and 
I. (This being very much a feature of interactions “in process”).  Nevertheless, 
putting words to whatever I experienced during Saunders’s questioning  does 
not seem to capture those experiences well.  Whatever I type seems 
embarrassing and inaccurate.  Saunders’s questioning and occasional 
comments and glosses gave me the impression he was steering me towards 
knowledge that was new to me, though not him.  The interaction was a unique 
one, involving me in recounting very personal events and thoughts from and 
about my past,  yet clearly for Saunders was aiming us towards a recognisable 
completion point.  Describing my experience during this interaction now does it 
violence. The closest I can come to capturing it is to suggest it felt like the relief 
one gets from solving a long-troubling or serious problem of great magnitude, 
coupled with a very strong feeling that the solution had always been starring 
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one in the face. While this experience was necessarily personal to me, and its 
prompt was my interaction with Saunders, I also do not doubt that it has also 
been influenced by the prior events on the course as well as my exposure to a 
multitude of potential influences, from Castaneda’s anthropological fictions read 
in my youth, to my more recent and purposive reading into popular literature on 
spiritual enlightenment.  However, whatever the influences upon me, they  did 
not matter to me at the time.  What seemed most important was a feeling that 
something big had happened, and this feeling was confirmed (and probably 
encouraged) by Saunders’s comments and reactions.   
I laughed as I attempted to explain my “realisation” to Saunders. I was 
almost embarrassed that this had only now occurred to me.   I became more 
aware of the room in my happy embarrassment, having been previously 
focused almost exclusively on my drawings and conversation with Saunders.  I 
was very hot – “cooking” as Saunders described it.   He told me that was my 
“big one”, and that I should not move around much just yet as my DNA 
rearranges itself through my system.    He seemed very happy, and left me in 
the room.  When I got up,  still very hot, Saunders was in the kitchen, beaming. 
I thanked him for whatever had just happened and said that words were failing 
me.  He said something like, “well, you wanted to do research on awakenings 
didn’t you?” and beamed again.  Some people seemed to have left and 
Saunders worked the doors so I could leave too, to hurry off down the now lit 
High Street feeling duly enlivened and wondering what else the course could 
possibly have in store.  
  
1.5.7 Tuesday 
 
“Day 4: Your Psychological Environment: It is time to unveil your 
perceptual filters, unwrap the layers of protection and find your hidden 
resources and inner strength”. 
 
At least some of the group seemed to have heard something of my 
“awakening” when I arrived the next day.  Early that day, Saunders  told me  I 
had now achieved much of my mission, and that some people with experiences 
such as mine simply do without any such statement.  He also mentioned that I 
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might just “go back in the Matrix” as if nothing had happened.  I left my 
statement on the private room door, though it was even less  significant to me 
than previously.  I never changed it before taking it down on the last day. 
Saunders’s reference to “the Matrix” lingered with me.  The film was 
mentioned on several occasions during the course, as a metaphor 
distinguishing an illusory world from what is real, or truth.  Such references 
underlined for me the extent to which Saunders’s theories borrowed eclectically 
from diverse sources:  Ken Wilber; therapy/counselling; quantum physics; spiral 
dynamics; the list goes on.  Yet whatever his “authorities”, Saunders appeared 
to be producing  “results”.   As days passed, several others began beaming and 
I surmised they too were having “big ones”. 
Although Saunders explained that nothing else would be as significant to 
me as what happened last night, giving no particular reason he encouraged me 
to participate in further course activities. Today, these included an exercise 
involving writing out important life events on large “post it” stickers, placing 
them around the offices, and being given questions and directions about them 
by one of the “facilitators”.  This was followed by some tuition and practice in 
administering a particular  “issue-buster”-like series of questions on each other, 
working from a script.  Thus, we each took it in turns to be “facilitators” 
ourselves.   
The afternoon was mostly taken up with a trip to Glastonbury Abbey and 
myself and another delegate who missed this session on Saturday night were 
coached on “mirroring”.  This entailed gaining an empathic understanding of 
what state of mind a person may be through amongst other things mimicking 
their posture.  
Back in the training room, Saunders then set a group task he described 
as connecting us with our ancestral past.  This task began with us working in 
pairs, with the “practitioner” asking the “client” to picture where their father 
stood in relation to themselves, then their  father’s father, and so on back six 
generations.  Then likewise with their mother, mother’s mother and so on.  After 
we had each decided where various ancestors stood, we marked their position 
on the floor with post its and stepped between ancestral positions, then were 
asked to draw the shape they formed.  While I was answering a questions 
about my post-its from a facilitator, Jane, I became aware of some frantic 
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whispering from Saunders and some others near the kitchen. Jane spoke 
quietly with Saunders then asked me to join her near the kitchen by couch.  
They asked me to look at my picture and what it looked like to me from there.  It 
seemed to from the shape of a large bird of prey, with my own sketched outline 
as the body, my mother’s and my father’s lineages as respective wings, and my 
children as thick extended legs.  A “classic” bird of prey image, according to 
Saunders.  Saunders asked what sort of bird I thought it was – and I answered 
immediately an eagle.  I remember thinking not only of the shape before me, 
but also of  The Emerald Forest, a 1985 film, in which actor Powers Boothe’s  
spirit animal was an eagle.  I had always liked that film.    Jane then explained 
how she had spent several years learning from the Wolf Clan of a tribe of North 
American Indians, the Saanich, and was qualified to teach about totem 
animals.  She asked what the eagle meant to me.  I explained soaring high, 
looking down on the world, then added, swooping to kill.  Jane stressed the 
eagle only kills to protect or feed itself or its family, and as a totem animal it 
mainly symbolised seeing the big picture, or a grand perspective on things.  I 
felt pretty good about that.  She talked also about how totem animals are 
symbols and metaphors which can help from time to time, reminders of 
different ways of seeing the world and coping with things. 
Others, though not everyone, were informed of their totem animals, both 
mythical and real.   My eagle seemed so apt to me right then, reminding me to 
keep an analytic distance from what was happening in the course whilst also 
swooping in to engage with the exercises.  I could not help but dwell upon how 
it had been revealed to me through social practices, involving post its, 
drawings, and whisperings, rather than an hallucinogenic revelation like in The 
Emerald Forest.  Yet social or not, there was no debate about what it was.  This 
it seemed was for me to say.  To me there was no doubt, and I was very 
pleased I had not drawn something which looked like a less elegant creature.    
That evening I joined some of the trainers and one of the other 
delegates for some drinks after the training ended.  Most people in the group 
seemed to be heading straight back to their guesthouses every night – the days 
were after all very long and taxing.  Our conversations ranged from cars to the 
enlightenment industry. It struck me how ordinary these people were, in spite of 
their unusual livelihood.  
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1.5.8 Wednesday 
 
“Day 5: Returning to Your Source of Creation:  You roll back to why you 
made yourself as you are, in many life areas, and then start the process 
of choosing who you will be”. 
 
By now, according to Saunders we were all at different points in our 
progression through the course.  This seemed to me in part an inevitable 
consequence of the staggering of “1-2-1s” around group activities – even if 
everyone was on the brink of a “big one” when they started, they had to  wait 
their turn.  
This morning Saunders and the trainers worked mainly with those who 
were not yet  “cooked”.   While this was happening,  Saunders asked that I 
review my mission statement again now I had my totem animal to consider.  
Saunders suggested that I draw my statement pictorially, and he seemed to be 
emphasising I should focus upon the words in my statement concerning my 
self, others and the world.   On a sheet of A1, I drew  a figure for myself, with a 
person to either side behind me and three people in a semi-circle in front of me 
(this is how they appear to me now  - when drawing these surrounding “others” 
were just drawn around my own body).  I then drew a green circle around all 
the figures to represent the world.  I stared at this drawing for what seemed like 
an hour or so. Nothing else was coming to me.   Saunders  saw the picture and 
again seemed to become excited.  He asked me to look at it from a distance – 
this time the image I quickly saw was of a face – my body the nose, and others 
arranged roughly as eyes and a mouth.  Like my eagle,  I would not have seen 
this without prompting, but having been prompted it was so obviously a face.  
Saunders was animated now – “draw the rest of the body” he said, adding as 
he left me to this “this is the only thing that’s between you and total 
enlightenment”.   
I was puzzled by this remark.   I had by Saunders’s reckoning already 
awakened, and was according to him at the human developmental stage on 
Beck and Cowan’s spiral diagram (which featured in his flipcharts) of 
“transpersonal non-dual”, that is towards the top end but not pinnacle of this 
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model of evolutionary development.    I did not know what might come next. 
Maybe he is always dangling carrots, I thought.   Anyway, I  had given myself 
wholeheartedly to this course and seemed to be getting results, and I wanted to 
see where this would lead.  Working in the now vacant private room I turned my 
world into a head and using a total of  seven A1 sheets added a torso, arms 
and legs.  All over this body I drew smaller people and worlds,  in which were 
other people and worlds, increasingly smaller in size.  Everyone was in 
everyone else,  so to speak. The picture ended up looking like a large boy in 
spaceman pyjamas reminiscent of figures on my bedroom wallpaper when I 
was a child. 
Saunders asked what was around the larger person.  Quickly, I drew a 
series of pictures zooming out from the large body, revealing it to be itself a 
small body on  larger body, and eventually a  dot surrounded by what looked 
like nothingness, which could be part of another body or world.   Saunders 
disappeared for about 10 minutes, in which time I lay on my drawing, as I had 
seen others do, which seemed oddly appropriate and comforting.  I also got up 
and scrutinised it from several angles, hoping for a possible revelation.  Nothing 
came to me. 
It was now lunchtime and Saunders said we could pick this up again 
after lunch.  “Processes” were routinely broken with such time-outs.  After 
lunch,   while most of the others went on a walk to Chalice Well as part of 
another exercise or process, Saunders stayed with me and another delegate 
working on her own pictures in the training area.   
With the others gone, Saunders  said he could  see what my drawing 
was, and asked me to look at it from the feet end, and from a distance.  At first I 
saw a column, then a tunnel.  Saunders agreed with the second interpretation 
but not the first.  “Yes, that’s it – walk along it.” My drawing was positioned so 
“my” legs pointed out of the private room into the training area.  So I walked 
back and forth, from head to legs, several times.  Again, I cannot recollect the 
exact questions and answers which our interaction involved,  though I 
remember it did not seem rigidly scripted.  At some point,  I commented that the 
head was like a quiet cave, and at the end of the tunnel of “my” legs was the 
world we are in now, with its activities, which included the other delegate quietly 
working on her own pictures.  Saunders asked me to stand on the edge 
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between the tunnel and the world, which he later called my “cosmological 
boundary”, bolstering the sense I had that I was doing far more than walking 
along a large sketch.  As I stood there, midway between the quiet tunnel and 
the world of the training room I felt more and more distracted by the other 
delegate, whose every  rustle seemed deafening.    Then,  realizations seemed 
to occur to me quickly.  There was nothing inherently distracting about the 
noises – I was making them distract me.  And these distractions were keeping 
my attention in the room even as I travelled down the tunnel.  Now, as I walked 
down the tunnel to my head/cavern, the noises faded and were less distracting.  
As I walked back into the room, the same noises were there but no longer 
distracting.  I could bring the quiet feeling from the cavern with me.  I 
recognised that the cavern was a very quiet and still aspect of myself, and the 
world could be either just as still or distracting; it was how I made it.   The 
tunnel and boundary were no longer significant.   I understood them as only as 
real as I thought them to be. I was in the cavern, and the world, and nothing 
was distracting me from either now. Inside and outside, everything and nothing 
all seemed the same. It was like enacting a Zen koan.  I was the point I had 
drawn, and all of the drawings. I was back in the room, smiling, there was 
nothing more to say.  
Saunders asked how I felt, rather than what I “knew” this time.   I noticed 
I was sweating again.  I said hot, but not as hot as the other night.  Saunders 
said something like “yes, that was your big one.  But you needed this also.  And 
what happened with Josie” (meaning my totem animal).  I explained how the 
person in the background, Kate,  throughout seemed to become an important 
part of what happened for me, and really emphasised for me how strongly 
distractions in the world pull one away from a quieter, calmer place and 
understandings.  Kate laughed, and apologised that  she had been as quiet as 
she could.  Saunders mentioned that sometimes even the quietest sounds can 
seem incredibly loud, as they had to me.  Saunders then pointed out it was 
probably too late to visit Chalice Well, so suggested I walk somewhere I would 
like to be in the town. 
Sitting alone in a High Street coffee shop, I wallowed in my recent buzz 
although was more than a little puzzled about exactly what I had just achieved.    
I  felt I had been through another important experience and that I had somehow 
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gained a deeper intuitive understanding of my relationship with the world, yet to 
put it into words seemed a violence, banal, even embarrassing.  I also 
pondered how difficult it would have been to experience such things if I were 
simply filming someone else, and through filming I would probably have formed 
the impression that people’s experiences here were only discernible as  they 
talked them up to be.  I was convinced there was something happening on 
Saunders’s course that had a reality my recordings would not have captured.    
Nevertheless, my own experiences had taught me that making progress 
in these enlightenment inducing processes required competences which did not 
come to me easily.  I had needed to work on genuine “issues”,  drop any 
expectation that facilitators would supply me with an answer to my issues, and 
become passably competent in answering strange and repetitive questions.  
From  later discussions with Saunders, and from my experience of the 
incompleteness of being fast-tracked, I also learnt that he did not regard all 
issues as the same, and considered some sorts of issue were more suited to 
particular “processes” than others.  While with very little overt tuition, I had 
picked up what was required and had even been given some practice in asking 
such questions of others, there was a vast difference between being on the 
receiving end of such techniques and being able to administer them to others to 
produce “big ones”.  Selecting an appropriate process, or even adapting it or 
supplementing it with unscripted dialogue, appeared to be craft skills which 
Saunders had not reduced to a master template, or at least not one he had 
taught me. 
Towards the end of the day, one of my fellow delegates, Chris,  
suggested to me that “real” enlightenments happened outside the deliberate 
environment of the course, spontaneously, as had his,  rather than through 
engineered processes.   It seemed that Chris was implying some sort of  
hierarchy of awakening experiences, or a distinction between “real” 
enlightenment and implicitly false or lesser enlightenments.  This discussion 
nudged me out of my role as participant.  I felt unable to argue with Chris about 
this, not that he seemed to be looking to argue, and not because I thought my 
enlightenment was genuine, but because his comments reminded me that I 
should not take a position on that.   According to the methodological 
agnosticism Berger (1969: 100) has argued is necessary for sociological 
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research into religious matters,  the validity of my research subjects’ truths or 
beliefs were not only outside the scope of my investigation, but it was 
unnecessary and inappropriate to comment on them.6   Fortunately Chris did 
not seem to be looking for an argument, just sharing his own beliefs.    This 
conversation was however the first of many similar conversations I had, 
including with friends, Saunders, and people from other research settings as 
well as academia, in which distinctions were made between the real, true, or 
genuine spiritual enlightenment of one person (usually the speaker or their 
teacher), and the implicitly non-genuine, deluded, incomplete or fake 
enlightenments of other people (usually someone portrayed as a false teacher).  
At the time, it reminded me that my research required that I should not become 
lost to my own experiences; rather their relevance lay in what they contributed 
towards my understanding and analysis of the enlightenment cultures I was 
researching.   
 My conversation with Chris prompted me to note that whether or not 
Saunders’s processes resulted in “real” enlightenments by any other standards, 
participation in them was such a pleasant experience with a definite buzz at the 
end, that thoughts of making such comparisons or even being academically 
agnostic towards them had not occurred to me at the time.  In talking with 
Chris,  I became less engrossed in my experiences and thought of them more 
critically, as a researcher again, recognising that although “big” it was unlikely 
they would be my only experiences of enlightenment during this research, and 
that they all relied on Saunders’s involvement, making sense in terms of the 
eclectic bricolage of ideas he alone seemed able to command.  As Chris had 
pointed out, my “enlightenment” was anything but spontaneous.  
   
1.5.9 Thursday 
 
“Day 6: A New Dawn (The Phoenix Arises): Release all the unwanted 
baggage, unfulfilled desires and perhaps even come to peace with your 
shadow?  Then, unroll the new you!” 
 
                                                 
6 See also the discussion in Cox (2003), who in favours of methodological agnosticism asserts 
that the “study of religions is not the study of God”.  By “religions” Cox specifically includes 
“[s]o-called ‘new age’ movements”. 
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Today, Saunders suggested I write up my experiences for my research, 
so I added considerably to my nightly diary.  After spending an hour or so on 
my notes, I joined some of the others in the admin room looking for further 
inspiration from Saunders’s books or internet searches.  Later, sat in the 
training area, a fellow participant Joy sat by me and asked if I was doing 
anything. She was still clearly thinking of her “issues”, and brought her drawing 
which we discussed.  Soon, I found I had inadvertently become  “facilitator”, 
asking questions like “and what does that space know?”.   I saw in her issues 
great similarities with my own, and felt tempted to give her an account of my 
experiences or something like “advice”.  But the thrust of Saunders’s teachings 
were against giving advice, everything said by the practitioner had to be 
“clean”.  Saunders was moving around the offices and I caught his eye several 
times.  I tried to gesture him over, as I felt I was getting embroiled in Joy’s 
serious issues and at risk of  somehow steering her in ways with unclear 
consequences.  He understood what was happening and gestured me several 
times to continue.  I felt honoured that Joy had chosen me for this discussion, 
and I stayed with her until we hit a point which to me seemed to crystallise her 
issue to the extent I thought Saunders could work with her to give her a similar 
experience to my “big one”.   I did not wish to attempt this, as I was not sure 
that it  would be for her good.  I therefore excused myself from her briefly, while 
she was engrossed in her drawings, and sought out Saunders and gave him a 
summary of what had happened.  Saunders told me that since I had started this 
process with Joy, I must stay with it unless she is agreeable to someone else 
taking over.  He said I should explain to Joy why I felt someone else might take 
over.  This I did, explaining that I wanted to continue but thought she had come 
to an important point, similar to one of my own, and I felt that Saunders would 
be better able to help her from here onwards.  She quietly said something like 
“yes, that’s okay Keith, if you think that..”  I told her I would stay, unless she 
wished otherwise, then handed over to Saunders. 
Joy’s drawings were reinterpreted by both her and Saunders, and more 
sheets of A1 were used.  It was both interesting and pleasing to see several 
realisations occur to her, and her expression and tone seem to lighten with 
each one.  I felt more than a little disappointment when she did not seem to 
arrive at a “big one” just a shift in her way of conceptualising her issue. In 
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writing this up it occurs to me that I seemed to have been accepted by Joy and 
Saunders as having attained not only a “big one”, but passable skills or 
expertise in performing the rudiments of what was needed to do likewise for 
others.  Nevertheless, I was also genuinely in awe of Saunders’s own much 
greater expertise, and convinced that unlike him I would certainly make  
mistakes.   
The highlight of today came after lunch  and was a trip to Stanton Drew 
stone circles, near Bristol, during which Saunders set everyone the task of 
discerning the “correct” way to approach the stones, and of being sensitive to 
whatever we might feel here, while suggesting the stones were animate and 
very knowledgeable.   I was impressed with Saunders’s knowledge of the 
history of this site, and ability to find it through a maze of country lanes.  Like 
trips around more local sites, Saunders encouraged people to discover or heal 
themselves not only through his processes, but with the “assistance” of the 
places he was showing us.   
I had never been to Stanton Drew  before. It comprised one large stone 
circle with a smaller circle and other nearby stones.  We stopped at a country 
pub on the way, each meal time becoming more enjoyable.  It may have been 
partly that people were becoming more at ease with each other through time, 
though a frequent topic of conversation now was how bright, happy, younger, 
or “different” each of us was seeming to the others.  One of the delegates who 
had objected quite strongly to being filmed told me that he thought I had 
changed the most of all the group.  Maybe I had thrown myself into the course 
too much I wondered.  It seemed my enlightenment did not make me sensitive 
enough to the stones, however, as somewhat inevitably I approached them in 
the wrong way.   
Back in Glastonbury, the late afternoon and early evening task was 
again to continue working on our mission statements. Feeling that I still did not 
want a mission statement had the advantage of releasing me from agonising 
over my statement and I chatted to others and sampled Saunders’s library.  As 
most people had their own “big ones”, meal time conversations became 
increasingly jovial.   I left shortly after today’s evening meal, as several others 
also drifted out, being thoroughly content not to work at an exercise I did not 
feel I needed. 
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1.5.10 Friday 
 
“Day 7: Manifesting Your Future, Now: After a week of increasingly 
intense self-development we pace you back into a return to reality and 
how you are going to actively live the next part of your life”. 
 
Today is the last day.  Yesterday’s work on our mission statements 
resumed, and by now almost everyone had resolved their issues with the 
trainers.  I took down my mission statement, binning it, then thinking of my 
research I decided to keep it along with my other A1 sheets muddled in a pile  
with other people’s sheets.   Some had already tidied away their drawings, as 
keepsakes, and some pictures still adorned the walls and floors. 
I thought again of my research.  The course was nearly over.  I did not 
want to trouble people now for interviews, but perhaps later and perhaps 
another course?  I wanted to know if the trainers were still willing. 
I talked to Josie, who wanted to know what I might say about the course 
in my research.  Two delegates  joined in with our discussion.   I said I was 
thinking of writing my dissertation as a process for the reader, which they all 
thought interesting.  One commented that people like to read personal stories, 
and he would be most interested in reading my story.  However, I pointed out 
that my write up would not be journalism, but I was interested in people’s 
interactions, practices, the meanings they gave things not so much those I 
gave them.  Josie indicated they (Holigral) would help more, and we left it that I 
would get in touch with them again after my family holiday next week (also in 
Somerset, close to Glastonbury).  I was now becoming the researcher again, 
and people seemed interested in how the course might have changed me and 
my interests, and what I might write about the course and the trainers and 
delegates. The awkward discussions about consent forms and recordings 
seemed very distant.  
Just before lunch, a person Saunders and some of the other delegates 
and trainers had often mentioned arrived:  David Grove.  From talking to others 
I had gleaned he was a psychotherapist who had developed the idea of “clean 
language”, and who often stayed with Saunders and Josie. He had brought 
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what looked like a large child car seat on a stand with a pivot, a “therapy chair”, 
or “The Chair”.  The whole seat could be rotated forwards and backwards 360°.  
“David”, as everyone called him,  quickly became engrossed in conversations 
with several of the trainers and one of the delegates who he obviously knew 
well.   
That afternoon, Josie and Saunders introduced David as a pioneer in 
“clean language” who had contributed greatly to their own work.  The chair was 
a recent innovation he had worked on with Saunders.  It was designed to allow 
clients to be repositioned in space to obtain different views of any issues.  
When in the chair, clients wore electronic sensors which trailed wires 
connected to a laptop, which projected its screen to a nearby white door so we 
could all see.  Readings included graphs and numbers for temperature, 
respiration, blood volume pressure, and  heart rate. Josie and Saunders had 
previously explained that they did not know exactly what to make of the 
readouts, though they seemed to confirm the notion of “cooking” at various 
times 
David demonstrated the chair on a succession of volunteers.  Not 
everyone had time for a “go”, however, and as a non-paying guest I did not 
volunteer myself.  People would be asked to draw an  issue, place it where they 
felt it should be to put it in  “psycho-active space”, and then they would be 
strapped into the chair.  Once secure, they would be rotated slowly forward and 
back by a person either side of the chair, while David directed and led the 
“clean” questioning.  Some questions would be asked while the volunteers 
were completely inverted, and sometimes David would ask his audience to 
recite questions with him.  During these demonstrations, David pointed to 
computer readings as evidencing shifts in the client’s mental sense of self or 
views of their  issue.  The readings were taken to evidence internal changes 
including mental regressions to pre-linguistic states, and permanent shifts in a 
person’s sense of self or view of a personal issue. Everyone who volunteered 
got out of the chair looking somewhat flushed and dazed, and reported having 
changed their view of something.  There were also a few  aches and pains as 
the chair was not very comfortable and I was not too bothered to have missed 
trying this, especially so soon after lunch and after all I felt pretty much issue-
free.    
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The group’s last meal (or last supper as some of us called it) was spent 
in a local Indian restaurant.  We talked happily across tables about taking our 
new selves home.  Someone remarked again that I seemed to have changed 
the most, though I thought it was she who had changed much over the week.  
We agreed that perhaps we were each projecting things onto the other.   There 
was some talk about enrolling for further courses Saunders ran, on how to 
perform his processes.    With a couple of half promises to be interviewed by 
me in future, farewells were exchanged as we rushed from the restaurant in 
time for some to get to see a stage hypnotist show in nearby Taunton. 
Saunders and Josie had  joked about how nervous the hypnotist  would be if he 
knew there were a group of NLP practitioners in his  audience. I had decided to 
spend the rest of this last evening with my mother and brother, before heading 
back to Loughborough the next day, so  promised to call in over the next week 
or so to pay Saunders for this last supper.  I liked the idea of paying for the last 
supper, and it was probably about the same as my food for the week.    
 
 
About a week later, when I returned to Holigral to pay my food money,  I 
asked Josie about the hypnotist’s show.  She explained how it had been good, 
and that she and some of the others had delighted in working out how many of 
the tricks were performed through  suggestion, relying on their knowledge of 
persuasion and influence from NLP.  This reminded me of my conversation with 
Chris about some enlightenments not being “real”.  While I did not see Holigral 
“awakenings” as the product of some form of hypnosis-like induction, I did see 
them as the outcome of deliberately engineered practices, particularly ones 
which Saunders oversaw, conducted, and could explain drawing upon a variety 
of idiosyncratically combined ideas from quantum physics to Ken Wilber.  The 
most remarkable thing to me was not the unquestioned bricolage of ideas used 
to explain what he did,  but that his “processes” appeared to produce 
superficially similar experiences in a number of people, and within a remarkably 
short space of time.  People resolved different issues, but most ended up 
glowing, happily accepted they were now “awake”, and in Saunders’s terms 
had both left themselves and become whole and embodied.   For some, 
Saunders’s techniques “worked” so quickly that providing them with other 
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activities became somewhat of an issue for Saunders and the facilitators, 
notwithstanding the various excursions.   I wondered how it might be that I and 
others had so readily not just accepted we were reintegrating our previously 
fragmented selves,  and thus awakening, but came to feel this as a change in 
ourselves. I had never even thought of myself as fragmented before this week.  
I  was also puzzled that each person was left to devise their own post-
enlightenment mission statements with little prescriptive guidance.  So 
conceivably each person’s enlightenment might prompt them to act differently 
in the world, and even at odds with each other.    My phoenix had finally risen.  
I was ready for the “real” world again.  I had more questions and issues to 
address in my research.  
 
 
When I returned to Holigral to do some recording at a subsequent run of 
this course, I did so as a Holigral  “graduate” (this was the term Saunders and 
other facilitators used).   Saunders  gave me a certificate to record my earlier 
completion of the AL course.  I did not expect a certificate, or know one was 
granted after the course.  It does not record any “enlightenments”,  that would 
no doubt be ridiculous, but in keeping with the term “graduate” denotes a 
credential.  The credential seems based, again to my surprise, on the hours I 
spent on the course which are recorded on the document along with my 
attainment of the status of a “coach” in Holigral’s techniques.  The weight of the 
certificate as a qualification is perhaps all the greater since it has two 
signatories, Saunders and another facilitator with whom I had worked, Frank.  It 
is the sort of document one might display in a wall frame at a place of work.   
The worth of  the certificate to me though is that it confirms I had been treated 
no differently to anyone else that week, and had come out of the course with as 
good a  “credential” and  as those I would otherwise have simply studied.  
While   I know my  enlightenment on the AL course is unlikely to  count as the 
same thing elsewhere, or be exactly the same as the enlightenments of other 
Holigral graduates, it also means something to me.  Not least, that I now knew 
much more about my topic than when I started, although not in a way which 
would be easy to relay in my thesis.  
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It was also obvious that each person’s Holigral enlightenment or 
awakening is rather different in “content”, though similar in appearances (like 
outward hot flushes, grinning, and laughter).  That different people’s 
experiences might be seen as examples of the same “thing” is a rather fragile 
consequence of the course itself.   As one of the facilitators, Frank,  later 
suggested to me, thinking I might be doing this,  it is difficult to conceive how 
anyone might identify and measure enlightenments because each person’s 
enlightenment comes out of different issues and life stories. Yet ironically Frank 
shared Saunders’s view that what Holigral was doing was providing such 
enlightenments.  Enlightenment, it seems, can be both multiple and singular.   
 
NOTE TO PAULA AND MALCOLM (#1) 
 
I’ve tidied this ethnography as you both seemed to like the draft I wrote 
for Malcolm straight after the course.  For my thesis, if I need to cut words this 
would be the easiest chapter to loose, but  I’d like to keep it as it shows some 
of the “bricolage”, innovations, and real possibilities for  instant enlightenment 
available in  contemporary enlightenment cultures.    It also throws the reader 
into the thick of one such culture, and shows some of the problems of 
researching that culture, including problems of gaining access and what 
unexpected consequences gaining access may bring.    I could follow it with 
similarly structured writings about the other cultures I have researched (Andrew 
Cohen’s evolutionary enlightenment, Gangaji’s satsangs,  Tony Parsons’s  non-
duality talks).  That would give a chapter structure very similar to Desani’s All 
About H. Hatterr (1948 (1972)), or other more contemporary “odysseys of 
enlightenment” in which interviewers or fictional protagonists move from guru to 
guru, making their own spiritual progress as they do so (e.g. Brown1998; Mehta 
1994; Thompson 2002).    However that would probably make my thesis 
argument difficult to elaborate, and my whole text would read more like a 
pastiche of my own spiritual quest, when really it is sociological research. 
Therefore, although I’ll keep this as the main ethnographic introduction, I’ll write 
other chapters more conventionally.  So the next will be a literature review and 
will flesh out how my thesis calling for greater focus upon “the self” in studies of 
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contemporary spirituality addresses recent academic literature in sociology and 
religious studies.  I’ll also say some more about my methods and introduce my 
Seeker Self voice, which hopefully will preserve some of the ethnographic 
“truths” which would otherwise be difficult to convey in analytic writing.  Not 
least because they are often at odds with those writings.  
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Chapter 2 My Academic and 
Spiritual Quests  
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As a sociological study of spiritual enlightenment outside of established 
religions, my research touches upon literature from several academic fields, 
especially sociology of religion and religious studies.  Distinctions between 
these academic traditions are not relevant here, though my own literary and 
methodological bias is sociological. A more pertinent quality of my study, rather 
than its pedigree, is its spiritual or religious subject matter.   This chapter 
therefore begins with a discussion of some literature which suggests there is a 
particular difficulty in social studies of religious subject matter, that of “distance 
and engagement” or honouring the “Tao-daimon” (Neville 1996), and then 
moves into a consideration of the nature of the “spiritual quest” which my multi-
sited ethnography imposed upon me.   At this point, the text is interrupted by 
the literary voice of the Seeker Self, who in dialogue with a now distinct 
Academic Self is presented in this and subsequent chapters as a way of 
addressing albeit not solving the “Tao-daimon” problem.    
Much as the Seeker Self would like to launch straight into seekership 
activities, my thesis argument requires me to first spell out the academic 
literature which I am addressing, and how my thesis is intended to contribute to 
it.  While there are few social science studies of enlightenment per se, as an 
aspect of popular spirituality it has figured in many cross-disciplinary writings.  I 
divide my discussion of this potentially vast literature  into two broad categories, 
identifying prominent studies under each heading. I denote as “macro” literature 
that which is more concerned with distilling cultural level popular religious 
phenomena, such as identifying the nature and ideology of cultural movements, 
from more “micro” studies which are more focused upon the nuances of 
particular occasions, interactions, or texts in some way concerned with 
enlightenment.   
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I suggest that both macro and micro researchers have identified a 
central concern with the self or identity in their subject matter, though approach 
it very differently.  Macro studies have tended to homogenize diverse materials 
and imply there are common notions of selfhood, the self, or “authority of the 
Self” across popular spiritualities, giving seemingly diverse activities and beliefs 
ideological coherence.  On the other hand,  micro studies which employ 
methods capable of extricating nuances in such notions have not been 
employed in a comparative manner, and have tended to remain locked in their 
own detail or else simply interpreted as supporting or challenging larger 
“macro” themes.  The result is that the different meanings given to participants’  
terms such as “seeker” and “the self” have received little systematic attention 
from analysts, who often use the same terminology in their analytical writings.  
Though recent work by scholars such as Sutcliffe (2003) and Wood (2007) has 
problematised now familiar academic conceptions of “seekers” and “the 
authority of the Self”, the sheer variety of seekership activities and forms of the 
self in spiritual pursuits has escaped empirical attention.  This is a particularly 
significant gap as while “the authority of the Self” has long been regarded as 
the defining feature of New Age and popular spiritual ideology, there is 
considerable uncertainty about whether it exists and what it might mean to both 
participants and analysts.   
Arguably, the black boxing of the self within sociology of religion recently 
reached its pinnacle when  Heelas  suggested the term “self” should be 
avoided by analysts because of its variety of meanings  (Heelas 2008:  237 n. 
1). This is a strange recommendation, since Heelas (1996) previously regarded 
“the authority of the Self” as a participants’ notion and in even earlier work on 
“indigenous psychologies” appeared fully conversant with the idea that 
participants’ different views of the self provide social scientists with a research 
agenda (1981).  It is in sympathy with Heelas’s earlier position that   I argue the 
self should be made an appropriate if not central topic for analysis in studies of 
contemporary spirituality. I suggest that adopting a conceptually informed 
analytical approach to the self as it is made pertinent to participants across a 
range of “seeking” activities, provides a new way of making sense of the 
bricolage of activities within the contemporary spiritual milieu, in particular 
those activities I have designated as “enlightenment cultures”. 
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My thesis offers  two main contributions to academic understanding of 
these cultures.  The first is substantive.  I suggest that while enlightenment 
cultures may share a common lexicon and concern with truths about the self, 
seeing them collectively as exemplars of a generic new type of spirituality or 
treating their members as generic seekers obscures their variety. Although they 
share certain terms (like enlightenment, seekers and oneness) these terms 
often have different meanings, and  are woven into different practices.  I 
suggest that if enlightenment cultures are distinguishable from each other by 
virtue of their respective configurations of the self, these difference should be  
explored analytically and their consequences considered.  Exploring the ways 
in which seekers, gurus and truths are configured and interrelated across the 
enlightenment cultures I examine offers promise for a less generic and over-
homogenized view of the spiritual milieu.  It also provides a more empirically 
sound basis for  assessing the possibility that particular enlightenment cultures 
might  inspire social change through challenging or replacing  prevalent forms 
of selfhood. 
The second is tangential and methodological.  The Seeker voice and 
preceding ethnographic chapter represent the “Tao” of my research without 
claiming the “methodological agnosticism” common in studies of religion, 
especially constructionist ones  (cf. Beckford 2003). Indeed, while I began this 
research by asserting my own constructionist agnosticism in my  consent 
forms,1   it soon occurred to me that if sustained throughout my ethnographic 
research such agnosticism would overtly challenge participants’ beliefs or else  
invite justified critique from them along the lines I “hadn’t got it”, or  had “missed 
the point”.  Where a researcher’s agnosticism is eroded, however, colleagues 
may criticise their work on the basis of a lack of objectivity which, at its 
extreme, involves allegations of having “gone native”. 2  I address such issues 
by acknowledging and representing this research as involving both an 
academic quest and a spiritual quest.   
 Below, I explain the nature of my two overlapping quests. 
                                                 
1 See Appendix 1 for sample consent forms.  The first page of the form I gave to “gurus” states: 
“This research is relativistic in that no set of beliefs or practices will be treated as superior to, or 
more correct than, any others”. 
2 Consider, should I have presented myself as dubious of or ambivalent towards my 
“enlightenment” during the Holigral course, or if I participated in that event as every other 
“delegate” how should I portray my “enlightenment” now? 
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2.2  My Academic Quest and the “Tao-daimon” 
 
Biographically, this study owes much to my familiarity with subject matter 
I was surrounded by while growing up in Glastonbury, and have continued to 
explore throughout my life. My broad objective was to investigate the 
sociological significance of enlightenment, as it is actually produced, debated, 
or contested across a range of concrete occasions involving different people 
through examining a range of  interactions and textual materials. Enlightenment 
has for some years been regarded by academics as one aspect of the “New 
Age movement” (see below), and more recently scholars have identified it or 
related concerns with spirituality or ascertaining the truth of one’s self with 
broad contemporary shifts entailing a discernible “spiritual revolution” (Tacey 
2004), “grassroots spirituality” (Forman 2004), or  “progressive spirituality” 
(Lynch’s 2007).   My interest was not so much in testing or discrediting such  
work by investigating minutiae,  but in approaching similar subject matter 
differently, by examining and theorising the practices and forms of social beings 
actually configured within enlightenment cultures.  
I should stress that my project did not arise from any desire on my own 
part to “become enlightened”.   Nor did I initially consider the ultimate truth of 
any views or teachings about enlightenment to be an appropriate concern for 
my study or indeed sociology in general. Early into the project, I came to see 
that such an agnostic stance,  commonplace in studies of religion, assumes a 
dualism between the  concerns, discourses, issues, concepts, and worlds of 
analysts and those of participants.3  In anthropological terms, this dualism is 
expressed as the emic-etic divide, which rather loosely might be regarded as 
the distinction between “our” (etic, or analysts’) and “their” (emic, or 
participants’) concepts, practices, and concerns.4  However, ethnographies 
such as my week long AL course at Holigral broke down this distinction,  as I 
actively pursed whatever enlightenment that research site offered.  I therefore 
                                                 
3 On the prevalence of methodological agnosticism amongst researchers of religions, see 
Beckford (2003).  For an argument for the irrelevance of such agnosticism, since the study of 
religions is not “the study of God” rather human “traditions”, see Cox (2003).  
4 On the emic-etic divide see the canonical discussion in Headland et al. (1990). 
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needed to rethink the etic-emic divide as it applied to my project.  I concluded 
pursing my research placed me on two separate quests:  an academic quest 
(AQ) to produce my thesis, and a spiritual quest (SQ) in which, like a spiritual 
tourist, I travelled between different “sites” of enlightenment, chasing the 
elusive goal of a single, final enlightenment which would end such “spiritual 
seeking”.  
The overlap and distinctions between AQ and SQ, and their tensions, 
became an unanticipated aspect of my research.  Such distinctions were  not 
just my own but was in various ways invoked by participants (such as when 
while researching Holigral Saunders suggested my enlightenment might render 
my research redundant), academic commentators (such as a Professor who 
stressed to me that I should be clear that in talking about enlightenment, I do 
not imply that I share my subjects’ views), and family members (who hoped that 
if I did become spiritually enlightened, it would be after finishing my dissertation 
and not involve disappearing).5 
My field situation is aptly described by Neville’s (1996) eloquent 
discussion of “distance and engagement” in religious scholarship,  which he 
portrays through a  metaphor,  “the Tao-daimon”.  “Tao” is the Chinese term for 
path or way, and  “daimon” refers to Socrates’s reticent  inner voice as reported 
by Plato  (ibid, 153, n.1). According to Neville, scholarly objectivity, although 
perhaps peculiar to the West, requires maintaining a distance from the 
materials being studied, while one must also engage with them in some way 
during one’s study.  In religion, researchers often need to follow a path or Tao 
before even gaining access to materials they then need to critically distance 
themselves from as part of the activity of producing academic works.  He 
concludes that rather than deny the Tao aspect of research ever existed, 
“religious scholarship requires methods of honouring the Tao-daimon.” 
In the next section, I discuss the “Tao” of my research. 
 
 
 
                                                 
5 The lawyer character in Coplan’s film Echos of Enlightenment (2001) literally disappears from 
everyday reality after his enlightenment.  
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2.3  The nature of the spiritual quest  
 
The notion of pursuing a “spiritual quest” towards one’s enlightenment 
has become culturally commonplace. Joseph Campbell (1993) describes this 
quest in terms of the core narrative structure of the hero-myth, or “monomyth”, 
which he traces back to antiquity and argues now orders our lives on an 
individual level.6 Put briefly, the monomyth structure entails a heroic character:  
being called to adventure; crossing a threshold; undergoing tests; facing a  
supreme ordeal; attaining rewards such as his own divination; returning to the 
world; and bestowing his boon upon the world, to restore it.   Campbell 
suggests that in modern times cultural myths have come to be regarded as 
“lies”, but the monomyth is still important as it now falls upon individuals to 
enact their own mythical journeys. (op. cit.:  esp. 391). 
While the notion that we all have a spiritual quest to fulfil is 
commonplace, the “spiritual” is notoriously difficult to define. Orsi (2005: 187-8) 
rather simply highlights the term’s normative usages in distinguishing  “good” or 
“true” religion from  “bad religion”.   King (2009: 3) however points to a deeper 
sense of the word “spiritual”, highlighting that it has no direct equivalent in non-
Western languages, though “has become a code word across a wide religious 
and secular spectrum to refer to many different experiences and practices”. 
The notion of questing, that is of deliberately pursuing or seeking existential 
truths, is central to this deep view of spirituality.  As van Ness (1996: 5) puts it 
in his introduction to a text of collected academic papers titled Spirituality and 
the Secular Quest :   
 
“6the spiritual dimension of life is the embodied task of realizing one’s 
truest self in the context of reality apprehended as a cosmic totality.  It is 
the quest for attaining an optimal relationship between what one truly is 
and everything that is;  it is a quest that can be furthered by adopting 
appropriate spiritual practices and by participating in relevant communal 
rituals”. 
 
According to Roof (1999: Ch 1; and 46), we live in a  “quest culture”, in 
which various forms of spiritual quest  “give expression to the search for unity 
of mind, body, and self”  (1999: Ch 1; and 46). In this sense, I came to see my 
                                                 
6 Campbell (1993:  30-34) even accommodates the famous enlightenment of Gautama Buddha 
in this structure. 
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flitting between research sites as amounting to an  über spiritual quest in which 
I was not only discretely sampling and comparing different teachings of 
enlightenment, but in some overall sense trying to achieve my own through  an 
“odyssey of enlightenment” like that of Desani’s Hatter (1948 (1972)) or as 
echoed more recently in Brown’s (1998) and Mehta’s (1994) respective popular 
fictional guru-hopping  “spiritual tourists”.   
That in popular culture it is commonplace for successive episodic 
encounters with different gurus to be woven into a narrative of a protagonist’s  
own enlightenment as if they are all leading one in the same direction or to a 
similar truth is spectacularly confirmed by a recent popular text, titled The 
Quest:  Exploring a Sense of Soul   (Dawes et al. 2005; “TQ”).  This text 
maintains the appearance of an über-quest through uncritically orchestrating 
quotations and spiritual practices from sources as conceptually diverse as a 
Catholic Priest,  Tony Parsons and Andrew Cohen (ibid, 160).  The last two, as 
we will see, have very different views on enlightenment but in the popular 
sphere are perfectly presentable as if they supported a single  spiritual quest 
rather than many separate quests6.. 
SEEKER SELF [SS]:  Ah hem!  Sorry, but I really must speak up here. 
ACADEMIC SELF [AS]:  What?  Who are you? 
SS:  Need you ask?  Neville’s “Tao-daimon” caught my ear.  I remember 
Plato reports that at his trial Socrates described how from childhood he had “a 
sort of voice”  that came to him occasionally, always to hold him back and 
never to urge him on.  This voice was not a voice of reason, as Neville seems 
to imply, but was a supernatural experience or divine guidance.  Since this 
section is meant to be about the   spiritual quest, why not make it about your 
spiritual quest and explain it from a spiritual perspective. You’re writing in the 
same dry way you’ve written the rest of this chapter.   I can help you here. 
AS:  Well, I do need to be analytical.  And as Leudar and Thomas (2000, 
esp. 15) have noted,  historically “voices” such as Socrates’s daimon have 
tended to be treated as spiritual or pathological depending on the cultural 
context.  Given this is a thesis, readers may understandably decide the latter. 
SS:  Please treat me as “spiritual” then!  And since you’re talking 
“popular”, as Elizabeth Lesser (1999: 3) puts it in her guide for seekers,  
"Writing about the spiritual search without writing about oneself is like writing 
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about a road trip and never mentioning the car.” So I suggest you, or I, 
shouldn’t just be writing about TQ as if it confirms the idea that many quests 
might add up to one,  but instead explain here how TQ figured in your spiritual 
quest – what was its appeal to you?   
AS:  I see what you mean.  I’m saying my AQ and SQ are different, but 
I’m muddling them up already.  Perhaps you’re right - I may need to write the 
spiritual quest more personally. 
SS:  Yes.  But you can’t!  You need to write an academic text and your 
supervisors are demanding “analysis” from you.  Though they seem to have 
different ideas of what this means, to write about your research’s spiritual 
aspects would certainly risk destroying its academic nature.  Assuming you 
want to try to honor Neville’s Tao-daimon, I can help with that if you allow me to 
chip in now and again.   
AS:  Maybe.  Giving each quest a separate voice at times might work. 
However, I need to have some analytic distance between myself and my 
subjects76 
SS:  But you don’t have “subjects” while you’re on your spiritual quest!   
AS:  I see my problems now.   When I’m writing for my AQ, I have to 
bring some agenda absent from my materials and inspired by relevant 
academic literature.  I’m going to work that bit up more later on.  But this 
distancing makes it difficult for me to relay or address my own experiences. By 
not doing that, or not doing it well, I’m immediately offending the Tao-daimon. 
Not to mention how my analytical aspirations might interfere with my 
participation itself.  
SS:  How about you still doing most of the talking or writing, as this is a 
thesis, but let me point out when you seem to offend any “way”, or my 
experience of it? You could also let me loose a little more in your ethnographic 
accounts? 
AS: And you could give an alternative view which makes mine seems 
less “privileged” (Mulkay 1985). Hmmm.  Having you here as a distinct voice 
                                                 
7 See Danziger (1990) for a discussion of how the construction of human  “subjects” has been a 
key aspect of the historical development of psychology.  The argument may, I suggest, be 
extended throughout the social sciences.  
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would let me concentrate on my more analytical concerns. [Aside to Reader:   
And of course,  I could edit him out completely if it doesn’t work out.] 
SS:  Great.  My first suggestion is that you stop analyzing the TQ, and 
let me explain why it appealed to me as a seeker, so our own reader learns 
something about the spiritual quest. 
AS:  Alright. 
SS:  Thanks.  The most inspiring thing about TQ is that is shows 
different authors are all pulling the same way.  I find that heartening. I’ve 
attended so many talks and read so much, but still I can’t decide who to follow 
or who is right about enlightenment.  I was beginning to think there was no end 
to it.  And then reading TQ I realized that everyone is basically saying similar 
things, and one can pick and choose between them and still not miss the main 
point, of advancing in one’s own quest.  I also liked the guidance on setting up 
groups of people also interested in TQ, to work from the book6 
AS:  Hang on.  “The Quest” implies there is only one quest but many of 
the people it cites offer very different quests.  I wanted to argue that the book 
shows there is a common notion of there being such a thing as a spiritual 
quest, but actually it presents yet another form of seeking and finding... 
SS:  That’s cynical.  But6Oh no.  If you’re right, I’ve yet to find the right 
“path” haven’t I? 
AS:  I don’t think I can help with that.   
SS: But you can’t just rubbish the whole idea of pulling different 
teachings together and leave me unable to decide which path to follow?   
AS:  Look, this is all very 1980s.  We’ve got into one of those flippant 
“’second-voice’ device” exchanges that were done to death in early “new 
literary form” writings (see Woolgar and Ashmore 1998; Pinch and Pinch 1998).  
I really need to get back to my serious thesis. I think we’ve both said enough 
about the spiritual quest for now, and I’m happy for you to be its voice. 
SS: Okay [Quietly, to Reader:  Though  I’m still hoping for some help in 
finding my own spiritual enlightenmentH.] 
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2.4  The “field” of enlightenment studies 
 
 
Although enlightenment has not previously been approached as a 
sociological topic in its own right, references to it (or such commonly associated 
terms as awakening, waking up, self-realization and so on) figure in a wide  
range of social research and academic writings.  Academic writings on religion, 
especially the New Age8 (see below), self-help, psychology, therapy, literary 
theory, social theory, the self, and consciousness studies often mention 
enlightenment.   Since I shall review a large selection of works, it is helpful at 
the outset to mention how my study will contribute to them.  
My thesis offers two types of contribution. Firstly, it aims to be a 
substantive contribution to literature in sociology of religion and religious 
studies.  In particular it addresses a tendency I will identify in  the literature on 
contemporary spirituality which I consider below  to “black box” the self, so that 
even when identified as being a source of authority to participants, the self 
escapes analytical scrutiny.  I also address a related tendency, that of 
homogenizing diverse practices and beliefs so as to portray a bricolage of 
activities as if they share a common ideology in which the precise meaning of 
the self to participants becomes irrelevant or assumed to be the same. While 
such analytical strategies underpin certain assessments of the potential for 
contemporary spiritualities to bring about social change,  I suggest that 
describing and analyzing practices by which selves are configured and the 
nature and sensibilities of those selves may provide a sounder basis for more 
nuanced assessments of whether or not specific enlightenment cultures contain  
scope for encouraging social change or new forms of selfhood, or primarily 
support the status quo. 
Secondly, most of the scholars I discuss do not overtly attempt to 
address Tao-daimon tensions or otherwise treat as problematic their own 
position as agnostics,  believers, or converts in the phenomena they research.  
I use the Seeker Self voice to address such issues in my own research.  This 
                                                 
8 Like Sutcliffe and Wood, post,  I regard the New Age as a term used within certain networks 
which is of doubtful use as an etic notion.  However, like Barker (1989:  189).  I also consider 
the term does not require a single stable referent, but is intelligible still because it relies on what 
Wittgenstein termed  “family resemblances”.  I have not put New Age in quotations  throughout 
because I consider it no different in this respect from any other descriptive term.  
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tangential aim is a methodological choice arising from the ethnographic nature 
of my study and recognition that it has entailed overlapping spiritual and 
academic quests on my part as outlined above. 
In subsequent chapters, I shall attempt to traverse the  micro and macro 
through elaborating differences in practices, discourses and embodied 
experiences across different enlightenment cultures and will  show important 
differences in the forms of self and expertise found in them. In so doing I will 
address certain themes already in academic literature,  in particular those 
relating to seekership, the authority of the Self, and the notion of there being a 
New Age or alternative milieu of some sort which may subvert mainstream 
forms of life or selfhood. It is to this literature which I now turn.  This literature 
relates primarily to the controversial research topic of the New Age.  I begin 
with a section on literature which is pitched broadly at the cultural or macro 
level (although typically such studies begin from local ethnographies).  The 
second grouping of literature is of studies which focus on the minutiae of 
interactional or textual enlightenment practices.   
 
2.4.1 Cultural level studies of enlightenment 
 
2.4.1.1 Campbell’s milieu 
In 1972 Campbell (2002 [reprint]) wrote a seminal paper in which he 
introduced the notion of “the ‘cultic milieu’”.  Campbell defined this milieu as 
“the cultural underground of society”, including “all deviant belief systems and 
their associated practices” (ibid, 14).  He considered it was comprised of 
ephemeral groups and activities, but nevertheless portrays  it as  “a single 
entity”.  It is unified by its putative members’ common deviant position and 
cause in attacking orthodoxy, overlapping communication structures (including 
magazines, books, lectures and meetings at which beliefs and practices are 
discussed and disseminated), and a common ideology of seekership (ibid, 14-
15).  The beliefs of the milieu include the notion of unity with the divine being 
attainable by all, and that “no matter how diverse or how many versions of truth 
there are, all can lead to the same all-encompassing truth” (ibid, 16).  
 - 75 - 
Campbell identified three types of seeker in this “society of seekers”:  
adherents; those actively questing; and passive consumers (ibid, 19).  These 
“seekers do not necessarily cease seeking when a revealed truth is offered to 
them” (ibid, 18). Instead, institutions and ideology supporting seekership make  
the milieu self-sustaining.   
Campbell’s notion of “milieu” provided a much needed paradigmatic shift 
in sociology of religion, away from the “cult” as a dubious unit of analysis, to the 
wider context in which such groups come and go.    However, Campbell’s 
theorizing of the milieu lacked a comparative aspect.   As Kaplan and Lööw 
(2002) note, adopting an historical perspective, a “dedicated underground of 
true seekers of esoteric, and very often, forbidden knowledge” may be found 
within every society.  It is therefore unclear how this milieu might be any 
different from earlier social forms. Moreover, it is through avoiding detailed 
accounts of practices within the milieu that Campbell was able to present it as a 
unified entity.  Indeed, although he notes there is a “multiplicity and diversity of 
paths to spiritual enlightenment”, he homogenized this diversity by claiming it 
“supplants the distinction between believer and unbeliever with the conception 
of degrees of ‘seekership’” (ibid, 15).  Conversely, his assertion that there is a 
“basic seekership belief that truth (or enlightenment) is an esoteric commodity 
only to be attained after suitable preparation and a ‘quest’”  is diluted by an 
acknowledgement that this belief “exits outside the purely mystical religious 
tradition6even in the context of the pursuit of worldly success, health, or 
consolation” (ibid).  While Campbell’s work offers insightful understandings by 
theorizing beyond empirical materials to the wider cultural context, it  also 
illustrates the disadvantages of such theorizing. Without comparisons it is 
unclear if the cultic milieu is as new or distinct as Campbell suggests.   
 
2.4.1.2 Heelas on Self Authority and New Age 
The second canonical study is Heelas’s (1996) book The New Age 
Movement, in which he draws upon a vast range of materials from his own 
reading and fieldwork.  He acknowledges owing much to Campbell for notions 
of degrees of involvement with the New Age, though he defines the New Age 
Movement not in terms of an ideology of seekership, but “what is taken to be 
 - 76 - 
the authority of the Self” (ibid, 221, my emphasis). The italicised words are very 
important, for Heelas is easily misread as implying “the Self” is the source of 
“authority” in everything New Age.  Elsewhere Heelas’s phrasing is less careful, 
oscillating between the perspectives of analyst and participant.  Writing from 
the latter perspective, he describes a theme running through all New Age 
practices and literature,  which he terms “Self-spirituality” (ibid, 2), in which 
“Perfection can be found only by moving beyond the socialized self – widely 
known as the ‘ego’ but also as the ‘lower self’, ‘intellect’, or ‘mind’ – thereby 
encountering a new realm of being.  It is what we are by nature” (ibid, 19).  
New Agers, according to Heelas, see mainstream society as having 
indoctrinated people so they do not live as “authentically human” (ibid,  18).  To 
reach the God within, or the realm of “authentic experience”, one has to deal 
with “that great barrier or stumbling block the ego” (ibid, 20).  Meditation, 
psychotherapies, shamanic magic, fire walking even, and other practices are 
used to “exorcize the tyrannical hold of the socialized mode of being”, to break 
through the ego to “the other side” (ibid, 20).  The attendant “Self-ethic” 
encourages individuals to regard themselves as not only their own sources of 
guidance and truth, but as responsible for their lives and everything that 
happens in them (ibid,23-5). 
Heelas’s Self-spirituality is an impressive and demonstrably accurate 
analytic concept produced by an informal “grounded theory” approach (see 
Glaser and Strauss 1967). The concept is also nuanced, allowing for  variations  
along a “Weberian spectrum”.  Between poles of those seeking “the best of the 
inner world” and “the best of the outer world” are those who want the  “best of 
both worlds” (ibid,30). Likewise, there are variations between the details of New 
Agers’ spiritualities, as well as their ontologies.  Some see themselves as the 
primary or sole locus of spirituality, and others as somehow positioned within a 
“cosmic order”.  For the former, “the world beyond the individual Self tends to 
be of a (relatively) precarious ontological standing”, as individuals are regarded 
as creators of their own realities.  This view is often linked with “prosperity- 
oriented” circles (ibid,35).  Heelas regards this position as distinct from that 
which emphasises “the inter connectedness or unity of the cosmic order”.  
Whilst the former renders the world precarious, the latter renders the individual 
(or rather individualism) so: 
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“The individuality of those concerned is – in measure – lost in the 
interconnectedness of things.” (ibid, 35-6).9 
 
Whether it is for achieving prosperity (ibid, 67) or some utopian ideal (ibid, 75), 
it is by “work” on the Self that New Agers strive to achieve change in 
themselves and their worlds. 
It is important to appreciate that while “Self-spirituality” is Heelas’s own 
(etic) term, it is formed by combining two (emic) terms found throughout many 
of the research materials and literary sources he has drawn upon dating back 
to the beginnings of his academic career. In the light of my earlier discussion of 
the spread of the discourse of spirituality within academe, Heelas’s term serves 
as a concise example of such penetration.  It is worth reflecting upon how and 
when this came about in Heelas’s academic writings, as it appears to 
accompany such a significant change in his work that we might speak of his 
work having at least two respective analytic approaches corresponding to 
distinct writing periods.  We might name those periods after the terms Heelas 
focused upon during each, the first being his “indigenous psychologies” or “self-
religions” period, and the second his “Self-spirituality” period. While Heelas 
(e.g. 2008) has since abandoned the term “Self-spirituality”, and in his current 
work talks of “spiritualities of life” or simply “life”, arguably constituting a third 
“life” period, for our purposes here this recent work continues the aggregating 
approach he adopted in his work on New Age and so  I shall not go into such  
finer distinctions.  
Not many years prior to introducing the concept of “Self-spirituality”  to 
sociology and religious studies, Heelas was directing his academic effort at  
identifying different categories of non-traditional religion, especially what he 
termed “self-religions”, and explaining their relationship to wider society (Heelas 
1981; 1982; 1984; 1991(1988)).  He argued that such religions “offer 
participants the experience of god.  What they experience is themselves, the 
god within.  The self is divine” (1991(1988):  167).  Heelas identified several 
                                                 
9 It should be noted that Heelas’s observations rely on characterizing rather extreme dual 
positions of “either” – “or”  - for some participants there is no inconsistency between asserting 
oneness and also that they create their world as orderly, as espoused in modern “prosperity 
consciousness” thinking, as typified by Byrne’s multi-media promulgations of The Secret 
(2006).  
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“self-religions” in both the US (principally, California) and UK, and took pains to 
distinguish them from other kinds of “new religious movements”  (in ways which 
need not concern us here, though see Heelas 1982 and 1984).  Around the 
beginning of this period, he was also writing on the subject of “indigenous 
psychologies” (esp. 1981).10 I return to the subject of indigenous psychologies 
in Chapter 5, though here it is sufficient to note that Heelas considered that all 
societies possess many such psychologies, and that  within each may be found 
distinct views of psychological matters and especially the self.    Heelas was a 
little ambivalent about whether “self-religions” only feed off or actually create 
“indigenous psychologies”.  He claimed that “A considerable number of 
indigenous psychologies have developed and institutionalized as new ‘religions’ 
of the inner self” (1981: 4).  He further argued that such self-religions did not 
simply allow their participants to explore their selves in  an “unstructured, 
unstable, uncertain, and private” manner, but drew upon different indigenous 
psychologies to provide “models for conceptualising and organising the 
exploration of the self”  (1982:  75, original emphasis).  The self or selves 
participants experienced within such religions was never uncovered under a-
social conditions or free of prior models, and while not perceived by participants 
in this way from a sociological standpoint always involved social processes the 
upshot of which Heelas described as “socialising the subjective” (ibid, 74-8).   
Heelas’s 1996 text, however, did not specifically define its subject matter 
as “self-religions”, rather “an eclectic hotch-potch of beliefs, practices, and 
ways of life” (1996:  1).  Yet while seeming opposed towards describing “New 
Age” as a religion in any “traditional” sense (ibid, 23), one of his conclusions 
was that “The New Age shows what ‘religion’ looks like when it is organized in 
terms of what is taken to be the authority of the Self” (ibid, 221). In the very 
next paragraph Heelas also refers to “a spirituality based on the – experienced 
– authority of the Self” (ibid.). It appears that while Heelas was already 
grappling with the problem of pinning down distinctions between the spiritual 
and religious in an etic sense, in 1996 he had not resolved those distinctions 
within his own work.  At the same time, his interests were also shifting from 
analytically exploring  how different self-religions make use of different cultural 
                                                 
10 As a disciplinary domain and object of study, “indigenous psychology” is still a developing 
field.  See for instance the papers collected in Kim et al. (2006). 
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models of the self, to the task of discerning characteristics which might make a 
distinct analytically justifiable collection or “movement” out of his “hotch-potch”. 
The latter goal of course shares a similar aim to that of several authors and 
supposed “spokespeople” of New Age ideas (e.g. see Button and Bloom 1992; 
also Hammer 2004), and arguably entails the “social construction” of “New 
Age” (see Frisk 2005).   
Against this backdrop, there are three interesting aspects to Heelas’s 
shift in terminology from “self-religions” to “Self-spirituality”, which I suggest 
overall indicate an analytic adoption of aspects of the discourse of spirituality.  
First, the substitution of the word “spirituality” for “religions” reflects how many 
participants and writers in the popular spiritual field describe their own activities 
and beliefs.  As Sutcliffe (2005) has noted, “spirituality” is a dissident discourse, 
and in the popular sphere is often defined in ways which draw contrasts with 
orthodox forms of organised religion. (Also, as mentioned previously,  Orsi 
(2005) has highlighted that the term “spiritual” may be used rhetorically by 
participants to distinguish “good” from “bad”  forms of “religion”). Secondly, the 
terminology has changed from speaking of religions in the plural, implying a 
collection with differences, to “Self-spirituality” in the singular, implying a 
collection with sameness. This reflects a well-known notion within popular 
spirituality that all religions really point towards the same truth.  In the popular 
sphere, this is known as the perennial philosophy (see Huxley 2004 (1945)). 
Thirdly, the capitalisation of the word self is itself characteristic of the discourse 
of spirituality.  In earlier writings on “self-religions”  Heelas chose not to 
capitalise the term “self”, whereas in his 1996 treatise The New Age Movement, 
as well as substituting the term “spirituality” for “religions” to the right of the 
hyphen, to its left Heelas elected to always capitalise the term “Self”.  This 
capitalisation of the word “self”, and absence of quotation marks around such 
capitalisation,   is significant as it is not just analogous to how many adherents 
of traditional religions capitalise words like “God”, but reflects a grammatical 
tendency within the discourse of spirituality which is evidenced by many 
contemporary popular authors and teachers on “spiritual” topics.  As Heelas 
himself notes much later, the capitalisation of “self” is a marker which serves to 
“signal the universal” (2008:  237, n. 1). While the term “Self-spirituality” may 
suggest a “spirituality” with universal, homogenous features, in subsequent 
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chapters I will  show that it rather obscures the variety of (small “s”) selves or 
“indigenous psychologies” with which any such particular expression of  
spirituality, as discourse of and relating to the self,  may be concerned. 
The homogenising tendency of Heelas’s term “Self-spirituality” not only 
marks a turn away from considering the nuances of particular selves and their 
associated indigenous psychologies, but also directs attention away from 
considering how “authority” may be played out within particular “New Age” 
activities.  Though he stresses the supposed authority of the Self and 
importance of personal experience for New Agers, Heelas does not examine 
the nature of this authority and experience in specific instances.  For example, 
he notes that New Age “epistemological individualists” encounter “voices of 
authority emanating from experts, charismatic leaders and established 
traditions being mediated by inner experience” (ibid, 21).  But in his discussion 
of “the role played by spiritual experience”, he does not question the accuracy 
of many New Agers’ simple insistence “that the key to their being New Age lies 
with experience” (ibid, 191).  While his analysis implies he takes that statement 
at face value, he clearly does not wish to be read that way as he also remarks 
that an experience “might6validate the meanings which (the researcher 
claims) helped construct it in the first place” (ibid,  my emphasis). Heelas work 
thus carries a further tension caused by his identifying “Self-spirituality” as a 
feature of all of his materials, and implicit ambivalence towards the veracity of 
its faith in experience. 
In his recent work, Heelas calls for “better ethnographic evidence” of 
contemporary spiritual activities, and directs an even keener academic eye 
toward a social notion of authority when he observes that work on the self is 
performed not only through (impliedly personal) experiential practices, but in 
social situations, where the “expertise of spiritual virtuosi” as well as exchanges 
with others reduce the extent to which New Age religion is a matter of personal 
choice (2008: 16, 126).  However, he still clearly wants to avoid either 
analysing or questioning the accuracy of such statements.  This is partly 
because to an extent Heelas intends to take participants at face value. Thus, 
he states: “We don’t have to believe the ontological truth of what [participants] 
report, but it is appropriate to take their word” (ibid, 93).  Nevertheless, when it 
comes to what participants say about the self these intentions seem to create 
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difficulties for him. This is illustrated by Heelas’s current disfavouring of the 
expressions “self-religion” and  “Self-spirituality” in favour of various sometimes 
“interchangeable” terms like “spiritualities of life” which do not incorporate the 
word “self”.   Heelas claims this is because he considers that the term “self”  is 
no longer used so much by participants, and also because it has “too many 
individualistic connotations” (2008:  17; 237, n.1).  Although Heelas’s academic 
approach thus still involves self-consciously incorporating aspects of 
participants’ discourse of spirituality into his own academic writing, this still 
comes at the expense of homogenising his materials and even avoiding 
treating “individualistic connotations” as worthy of investigation.  
 
2.4.1.3 Sutcliffe and seekership 
  Our third key New Age study is Sutcliffe’s Children of the New Age.  
Sutcliffe (2003) aims  
 
“6to reconstruct the lost history of ‘New Age’, incorporating Foucauldian 
genealogy, reflexive ethnography and an anthropological approach to 
popular reading practices.  It aims to reconfigure ‘New Age’ studies from 
the ground up, thereby closing down stale avenues for good and 
opening up a new set of problematics for future work.  To accomplish 
this I move regularly between a broad lens and close, detailed study.” 
(ibid, 4) 
 
From close scrutiny of both textual materials and his own ethnographies, 
Sutcliffe concludes that following a “hermeneutical shift” in the early 1970s, 
assisted by cultural developments such as alternative religions, the “do your 
own thing” countercultural ethos, diffusion of personal growth and human 
potential pursuits in popular culture, and the decline in “grand narratives”, the 
term “New Age” changed from being an “apocalyptic emblem” to being a 
“humanistic idiom” (ibid. 29-30; 195).   Sutcliffe contests the “hegemonic view” 
(ibid, 9)  that the New Age is a ”movement” – rather he finds a diffuse 
collectivity of questing individuals (ibid, 223).  Whilst still used today as an 
idiom, it has become “the joker in the pack of modern religion,  a ‘wild’ card that 
can be made to mean exactly what its users want” (ibid, 130).  Even as emblem 
the term has been applied to a bricolage of activities (ibid, 4;111),. Nowadays, 
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however, the term is most often employed idiomatically.  It can also have 
negative connotations:  Sutcliffe quotes Spangler and Thompson’s (1991: 31) 
comment  that “to be called New Age today is the kiss of death intellectually, 
academically, and professionally” (Sutcliffe, 2003:  128).    
Sutcliffe preserves a notion of “New Age”, albeit in parentheses, 
deconstructs it as an entity, and directs attention towards the individuals who 
populate it, that is “seekers”.  He states: 
 
“The typical actor in ‘New Age’ is a religious individualist, mixing and 
matching cultural resources in an animated spiritual quest.  Standing in 
sharp contrast to traditional participatory roles in Anglo-American religion 
such as ‘member’, ‘communicant’, ‘congregant’ or ‘convert’, we can call 
this actor a ‘seeker’ and the sum of his or her cultural ploys ‘seeking’.  
The attendant social institution of ‘seekership’ raises issues of agency, 
identity, common culture, and impact.”  (ibid, 200) 
 
He notes that this “New Age” identity has been in the past restricted to a 
discrete group of individuals (ibid, 197).  Seekership has a history, largely 
located in the “unusual biographies” of an elite (ibid, 201).  Reminiscent of 
Campbell’s comments on the modern heroic journey, Sutcliffe observes that 
societal changes and in particular globalisation have meant “the ‘spiritual quest’ 
is no longer the prerogative of the social elite6but is a populist norm” (ibid. 
203).  Sutcliffe distinguishes multiple from serial seeking, noting that the latter 
evidences a “hankering for certainty6not just to seek, but to find” (ibid, 204).   
Acknowledging that a movement of seekers is a contradictory notion, 
Sutcliffe articulates a collectivity of seekers through the groups, colonies and 
networks of his case studies.  He quotes York (1995) who regarded the New 
Age as being on the “cutting edge of a vast ‘emerging network’ of postmodern 
religion” (ibid, 210), though notes this notion of networking is hardly peculiar to 
seekers and it is not just for seekers that  values and norms are disseminated 
by newsletters, email, web pages, telephone trees and so on after parameters 
for behaviour have been established face-to-face  (ibid, 212).   
As mentioned in my introductory chapter, Sutcliffe also elaborates an 
“emergent ‘spiritual’ discourse” which characterises seekership (ibid, 216).  Its 
features are akin to Self-spirituality:   
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“First, it remains a dissident discourse, although increasingly in latent 
rather than manifest function.  The agenda is consistently one of finding 
or constructing an alternative to institutional religion; something other, 
something more, something better.” (ibid, 216). 
 
“Second, the instinct is lay and populist” (ibid, 217) 
 
“Third6the ‘New Age’ seeker is largely preoccupied with the rational-
functional application of spiritual skills.  She wants a spiritual practice 
that will do things, that will make things work, whether on the intimate 
scale of biographies and relationships or on the global scale of co-
operation and social unity.  Hence a problem-solving, ‘working’ approach 
to life characterises the ‘New Age’ ethos, emphasising short- and 
medium-term achievement of goals and the active creation of meaning 
in everyday life.” (ibid, 221) 
 
To Sutcliffe, it is the “seeker” which resolves the paradox of how such “a 
universalised lay spirituality, open to all, yet with no stigmatising label or fussy 
membership criteria”  is both “learned and transmitted” (ibid, 224).  However, as 
seekers are by definition hostile to institutional control, he sees any such 
spirituality as inherently unstable.  He concludes that “in structural terms”, 
seekers lack enough collective focus and mobilisation to make good their 
challenge to societal institutions (ibid, 224-5).   
Sutcliffe’s work redresses prior tendencies to unreflexively  assume the 
New Age is a researchable entity, and as such is a ground-breaking 
contribution to the field of New Age studies.  Sutcliffe achieves this 
breakthrough by  reconceptualising his field as seekership.   However, his 
analysis might be extended.  Although he devotes much effort to showing that 
“New Age” when used as an etic term is a  “fake” and subject to sorts of 
falsification which emic terms are not  (Sutcliffe 2005: 16), and relatedly that it 
is very much a term used within networks, rather than definitive of networks 
(Sutcliffe 2005:  211), he does not attempt to deconstruct the notion of 
seekership itself.  Indeed, when participants speak of “seekers” he seems to 
imply that the questing individuals concerned are essentially the same.  His etic 
distinctions between types of seekers relate more to the volume and intensity of 
a particular individual’s seeking, than the particular teachings, teacher, or 
activities which figure in it. His work therefore opens a space for future studies 
which explore such possible variations, as well as commonalities. 
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2.4.1.4 Wood –vs- self-authority 
 The fourth study I shall consider is Wood’s (2007)  Possession, Power 
and the New Age. Unlike the above scholars, Wood takes pains to point out he 
has no allegiances to any field like New Age studies.  He sets out with two 
aims: (1) to explain “how authority and organization are constructed and 
maintained between people in relatively informal religious groups and 
relationships”; and (2) to argue that “A distinct academic field of New Age 
studies should not exist, simply because no case has been convincingly made 
that an area of religious belief and practice that can be described as New Age 
exists” (ibid, 9).  These aims are interrelated, as Wood relies on quotes from 
writers such as Heelas, York, and to a lesser extent Sutcliffe, to argue that the 
New Age has been defined by academics largely by reference to supposed 
self-authority.   
Wood’s view of the New Age as a research object is very similar to 
Sutcliffe’s, though owing no allegiances to this field Wood’s critique reads as 
more scathing.  With particular reference to Heelas et al’s empirical work on 
“the spiritual revolution” (ibid, 61-2), he claims other researchers have 
“misinterpreted” their phenomena, or incorporated “folk models” into their work.  
I do not agree that Heelas et al. as having “misinterpreted” their materials, as 
that would imply there is an ultimate standard against which interpretations 
might be judged, but I do agree with Wood that the distinction between religion 
and spirituality in their work can be read as “theological, rather than 
sociological” (ibid, 61).  As I suggested above,  I consider that this is because 
of the unreflexive adoption of the discourse of spirituality into such academic 
work, making it  part of the phenomenon under investigation without addressing 
or acknowledging this quality.  The incorporation of spiritual discourse within 
academic discourse is not Wood’s topic, however. Thus, having identified 
conceptual foibles in the work of others, he sets out to correct prior 
misinterpretations by empirically researching actual “sources of authority” in 
New Age-like activities.  He argues that  “the only scholarly recourse is to 
research methods that examine the phenomena in their immediate social 
contexts, that is, to focus upon issues of power” (ibid, 176).   
Like Sutcliffe, Wood draws on Foucault, but not for his genealogical 
approach,  rather for his interest in subjectivation. Also, he incorporates 
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Bourdieu’s notion of types of capital, and builds a theoretical approach which 
when applied to his  four case studies (groups in a Nottinghamshire network 
which others might classify as New Age) yields a theory of how authority and 
status ambiguities may work in informal groups as analogues of class-based 
occurrences in wider “neoliberal” society.  Wood’s theorizing and argument are 
well put, though what I shall focus on is an aspect of it - his astute and repeated 
questioning of the applicability of “self-authority” in his cases.  He rigorously 
attempts to identify the actual sources of authority operative upon participants,  
and thus the sources of their subjectivation. This is a very innovative empirical 
focus, which although he presents as a critique of Heelas also opens and 
extends Heelas’s programme.     
Drawing on interview data as well as his ethnographic observations, 
Wood claims his cases are largely “nonformative” contexts, that is situations in 
which there are no clear structures of legitimation (which enable the 
management of experiences and related careers of participation, as found in 
formative authority structures).  He finds a multitude of authorities (including 
texts, authors, immediate group co-participants, and influences from other parts 
of “the network”) which “relativize” each other.  He claims “such [relativized] 
authorities are unable to act as a formative force” in participants’ lives (ibid, 
158).  
To Wood, “authority” appears to lie within  either the self (a notion he 
casts doubt upon, in postmodern fashion (ibid, 52), though he treats authors 
such as Heelas as suggesting authority may lie within a self)  or outside of the 
self in external influences.  However, contrary to his Foucauldian perspective, 
he seems to treat authority as a characteristic of people or texts. Such an 
individualised  view of authority is implied when Wood says that  “it is apparent 
6that strong, sometimes authoritarian, authorities exist in some social 
phenomena considered to be New Age6” (ibid, 70).  An individualised view of 
authority is also implicit in Wood’s notion of multiple competing authorities.  
This directs his attention away from the practices he set out to examine – those 
which lead to subjectivation.  It is of course possible that any apparent lack of 
subjectivation may indicate a disciplinary form of Foucauldian subjectivation in 
which the exercise of power is largely invisible to those who are subjectivized.  
As Foucault expressed, “it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is 
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amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual 
is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies” 
(Foucault 1979: 217). For instance, an individual, participating in several 
groups within the Nottinghamshire network may well perceive and speak of 
herself as sceptical and unpersuaded by particular authority figures or texts, 
though such an articulation of freedom is not at all incompatible with her 
subjectivation within either this wider network, or enclaves within it.  In short, 
Wood does not appear to appreciate that for Foucault, subjectivation works 
through practices not people. 
Nevertheless, Wood’s innovative and original approach fills a gap in the 
literature on the New Age by addressing issues of  authority and subjectivation 
in particular cases.  His work however encourages future explorations of power 
in a more nuanced sense, as although this might be Wood’s aim the manner in 
which he implements his project implies a restricted notion of power and 
authority.  Indeed, Foucault’s view of power is more complex than Wood 
entertains in his “borrowings”.    Wood’s analysis oversimplifies the operation of 
power and subjectivation by looking almost solely for visible sovereign modes 
of authority of which his participants may be aware, and which Foucault argued 
had been largely replaced  in modern society by “a grid of disciplinary 
coercions” (1980: 106).   In short, he does not pay enough attention to 
participants’ practices as modes of power and subjectivation. 
 
2.4.1.5 Frisk – mixing micro and macro? 
In all the above studies, authors abstract wider themes from their 
analyses of rather varied popular spiritual or religious phenomena.  Concern 
with such themes, either exploring them or debunking them, can distract 
researchers from the general issues of power and subjectivation which Wood’s 
work demonstrates are very important theoretical concerns (given the prior 
emphasis on “self-authority” in the research literature).  A concern for “big 
themes” can also interfere with narrowly focused scholarly enquiries.  This is 
illustrated nicely by the fifth and last study I consider at length in this section, 
Frisk’s (2002) study of “the Satsang network”, a term she invents to describe 
the overlapping heritage, audiences, and venues of the various “enlightened 
 - 87 - 
masters” who hold such meetings.  Frisk takes the word Satsang to mean 
“being with good/righteous companions”, although Gangaji is probably the best 
known contemporary Satsang-style teacher and she defines the terms as 
meaning “association with truth”, following the usage of H.W.L. Poonja who 
inspired her and many other Westerners to pursue Satsang “careers”  (De 
Jaeger 2000:  97-119; Hart 1995). My experiences of such meetings accords 
with Frisk’s:  typically,  meetings involve a speaker delivering a short talk to a 
seated, sometimes cushioned, audience, who through raising hands are 
selected by the teacher to ask questions, or make other contributions (“reports”, 
poetry or some other artistic performance). There are variations in format 
between events and teachers, and long periods of silence are common. Often 
the proceedings are video or audio recorded, and the recordings sold as  
DVDs, CDs, downloads, or incorporated into books. She notes that teachers 
are typically treated with reverence; there is active participation of audiences; 
the presence of much entertainment and laughter; and sometimes music and 
dance. Teachers all have their own “style”.  Some appear to  mock their 
audiences so that questioners “get the worst” of dialogues, others do not. 
 Frisk considers that Satsang teachers have a common “core” message, 
“that enlightenment is here for everyone at the present moment”, that all that is 
needed is for people to “drop all concepts, ideas and belief, even about 
enlightenment, leave the ego behind6and give up seeking.”  Thereby, “there is 
a total experience” in which “there is consciousness, nothingness, non-
individuality, no sense of self, emptiness, and God or the divine”. She observes 
“There is a clear emphasis that everyone is already enlightened – we only have 
to realize it”.   
Frisk theorises enlightenment as a redefinition of identity akin to 
conversion, arguing it requires the support and confirmation of others to be 
sustained.  While “the most common way to make enlightenment known is that 
a recognized enlightened person confirms another’s enlightenment in Satsang”, 
teachers are rather “vague” about their own enlightenments.  Nevertheless, she 
notes teachers’ website biographies and responses to questions often describe 
one or a series of inner experiences sometimes involving another teacher as a 
“catalyst”.   
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The detail of Frisk’s observation is impressive, and virtually each 
sentence of her ethnographic descriptions cut to the quick yet invite  book 
length elaboration.  But such niceties are quickly lost when she categorizes, 
rather than analyses her materials and draws upon a fairly standard array of  
themes from within sociology of religion, of which her network is presented as 
an example.  These include identity conversion, globalisation, adaptation of 
Eastern regions to the West, charismatic leaders emerging from defunct 
movements, the merging of the sacred and profane, and the descriptor 
“network” itself.  Her claim that Satsang represents an “adaptation” is 
particularly well detailed, though analytically and theoretically undeveloped.  
For instance, she describes Satsang as involving: an emphasis upon intense 
experiences and therapeutic work which bolster the personal self and create 
ambivalence towards an Eastern sacred self;   an emphasis upon the 
immediate availability of enlightenment, without arduous practice or 
intermediary goals; absence of world renunciation; and ambivalence towards 
the role of guru in favour of more egalitarian relationships between teachers 
and audiences.  But Frisk does not comment on any dynamics behind or 
significances of such adaptations.  By way of a contrastive study, Rindfleish 
(2007) shows how such detailed observations might be used in a more 
theoretically penetrating fashion.   She argues that  variations in the Eastern 
notions of ego-death in the texts of several  Western spiritual teachers, and 
ambivalent statements towards its necessity, are awkward adaptations made 
due to the incompatibility of Eastern views with Western individualism.  
Although Rindfleish may both underestimate the resilience of Western 
individualism in the face of overt challenges to it, and have an over idealized 
view of Eastern ego-death, her theorising offers a more conceptual description 
of her materials. 
Nor does Frisk pursue any of the puzzling features of Satsang which she 
so concisely describes.  For example,  little significance is attached to her 
astute observations about the occasional yet puzzling mocking of questioners 
whose participation is nevertheless relied upon and very much part of these 
occasions.  The implication is that this may be just a matter of particular 
teachers’ “styles” and not itself a telling feature of Satsangs.  However in my 
analysis of the very similar teaching of Tony Parsons in the following chapters, I 
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show that such mocking can serve serious social ends, and is associated here 
with a particular form of self not typical of all Satsangs.  
The upshot is that Frisk’s work is exemplary in showcasing structural 
features of Satsang events, but she does not have a methodology or theoretical 
framework which enables her to present her observations as more than 
descriptions.  Accordingly, she has no incentive to further explore the details of 
her materials or to explore their theoretical significance save as exemplars of 
big disciplinary themes.   
 
2.4.1.6 Big themes and the winds of change 
Before turning to studies which emphasise the “micro” even more than 
Frisk, I wish to  emphasise that a concern for “big themes” is to be found in 
many studies of popular spirituality.  A common emic and etic notion is that of 
the  “spirituality revolution”. Etic terms for this supposed “shift” vary, though a 
common feature identified by all authors is the role of individuals as authorities 
over their own truths.  As well as a “spirituality revolution” which favours the 
“God within” (Tacey 2004: esp. 82-4), terms include  “grassroots spirituality”,  
entailing a panentheistic ultimate reality that is accessible as one’s deepest self 
(Forman 2004: esp. 50ff), a “reflexive spirituality” which elevates “spiritual 
seeking” and places responsibility on individuals to “cobble together” their own 
religious worlds (Roof 1999: esp. 75), a “progressive spirituality” entailing a 
“sacralisation of the self” and its acceptance as the “trusted” source of  “divine 
truth” (Lynch 2007: esp. 55-7), and even a pervasive “occulture” characterised 
by an  “epistemology of experience”  (Partridge 2004a: esp. 75).     Participants’ 
rhetoric (often culled from publications) provides a fertile source of quotations 
which analysts can use as “evidence” of this shift, which can also be 
investigated by the creation of etic research instruments and empirical 
programmes (e.g. Heelas and Woodhead 2005).  This is of course not unusual 
– it is the way much social research proceeds. What I wish to emphasise is the 
multitude of writers who, reminiscent of Heelas’s notion of “the authority of the 
self”,  in their own ways portray a large collective of individuals united in their  
responsibility for their own truths. 
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Big themes also encourage analysts to speculate about the prospects 
various spiritualities hold for wider society. For example, while it is unclear if he 
sees this positively or negatively,  very recently Campbell (2007) has made a 
far reaching prediction about the future of Western society.  His “Easternization 
of the West” thesis is that owing to a variety of historic factors and cultural 
influences there has been a shift in ideal typical worldviews in the West, with 
Eastern  “metaphysical monism” eroding the West’s earlier “materialistic 
dualism” (ibid,   esp. 66-7).  This  Eastern worldview which has gained 
prominence in the West does not necessarily imply  collectivism or 
individualism, but while superficially it appears to embrace “epistemological 
individualism” (we are all free to pursue our own truths howsoever we please) it 
obscures the “fundamental significance of the underlying assumption of 
ontological monism” (ibid, 359).  In such monism, according to Campbell, each 
person, formerly unique in the eyes of God, becomes “merely one part of a vast 
universal entity that is all-spirit” (ibid.).  
 
“It is this essentially mystic strand that is likely to work powerfully in the 
years to come against the idea of a separate, discrete individual, as 
indeed it has done over the centuries in the East.  Thus although this 
worldview appears to be extremely individualistic – and indeed, as we 
have seen, in many respects it is – it also contains within itself the seeds 
of the final rejection of Western individualism” (ibid, 359-60). 
 
Warnings that the end of individualism may be drawing close are serious 
matters.  While Foucault has famously highlighted the recent historicity of 
“man” as an “invention” of human knowledge, and posited man’s eventual 
erasure, “like a face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea” (1970: 387), he 
was more inclined to pose questions about the possibility of man’s demise than 
answer them in imminent terms (1970: 386-7).  In a more pragmatic vein, 
Heelas has raised the issue of the ethical effectiveness of “self-spiritualities”, 
compared to orthodox religions. Echoing Kant’s view that humanity is too 
flawed to be able to keep to a moral code without belief in God (cf. Hammer 
2004: 337), Heelas suggests that if the source of authority lies in an inner realm 
which must be discovered by each person, then any individual person must 
discover it before it can function as a source of ethical guidance for them:   
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“Traditionalized ethics, it can be noted, work whether or not there is a 
truly existing religious realm.  All that matters is that people believe or 
respect religious beliefs.  The situation is not the same with 
detraditionalized monistic ethicality.  Whether or not it works ultimately 
hangs on whether there is an inner realm, serving to inform practices 
and life in general” (1996: 223 note 7). 
 
Thus, while their observations differ, both Campbell and Heelas 
importantly direct their sociological gazes towards the consequences 
contemporary spiritualities might hold for wider society.  I shall return to this 
issue in the concluding chapter.  In passing however I note that addressing 
Heelas’s final sentence in the above quotation through empirical means is 
problematic from both sociological and philosophical perspectives. Whether 
any “inner realm” might truly “inform” participants’ practices is beyond the 
determination of empirical sociology, and at odds with its constructionist 
tendencies. Though that is not to say sociologists might not treat such realms 
as sharing a similar form of reality to that conventionally attributed to the 
“social”.11 Philosophically, following Hume’s principal of “no ought from is”, it 
also seems highly debateable that whether or not different ethicalities “work” 
might boil down to the veracity of their ontological claims (cf. Hume 2007: 302). 
 
2.4.2 The micro structures of enlightenment 
 
The cultic milieu, Self-spirituality, and institution of seekership all 
illuminate the quest for enlightenment in penetrating analytic ways, but also 
gloss over the variety of ways in which such a quest may be pursued.  Wood’s 
interesting study of “the Nottinghamshire network” relied on ethnographies and 
interviews mainly to  critique prior scholars and disprove both the New Age as 
an entity and “self-authority” as a feature of activities associated with it.  On the 
other hand, recent (micro) studies suggest a larger repertoire of research 
methods by which the study of contemporary spiritual practices might proceed.  
Rather  than being methods which may prove other scholars “right” or “wrong”, 
these are methods which present very different generic perspectives on 
                                                 
11 Compare Harvey’s (2005: esp.Ch 6; 212) argument that taking animism “seriously” yields 
some fruitful insights into the nature of personhood, modernity, and “ways of living that are 
respectful and life-affirming”. 
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enlightenment cultures, implicitly prompting us to reconsider what is even 
meant by terms such as “self-authority”.   I discuss five such studies below. 
 
2.4.2.1 Preston’s Zen ethnography 
Whereas several of the “macro” studies, notably those of Heelas and 
Campbell,  attempt to incorporate apparently unbounded quantities of  
empirical materials, ethnography is a method more associated with  the 
detailed descriptions and theorizing of a small number of cases, often just one.  
A seminal ethnography of this sort touching on enlightenment is Preston’s 
(1988) ethnography of Zen practices at locations in Los Angeles and San 
Diego.  An “insider”, Preston exhibits his Tao-daimon tension in the following 
passage:   
 
“Although I do not want to argue that forms of spiritual experience and 
knowledge found in the zen setting are determined by structures and 
practices, I also do not want to argue that the concentrated states of 
bodymind (samadhi)  associated with zen practice (and other similar 
practices) are entirely independent of such practices.”  (ibid, 101) 
 
Preston’s study is very much a sociological account of his own experiences of 
Zen which refreshingly attempts to redress the “oversocializing” tendencies of 
other research (ibid, 143). He refers to Schutz’s theorising of multiple realities 
(on which see Schutz 1971) and argues that “the cultivation of unusual levels of 
concentration” in Zen practices entails “a specific form of experiencing oneself” 
(ibid, 112), that is “an experience of the self as witness to activities” (ibid, 121).  
Yet arguably, Preston goes too far in this attempt, and sacrifices his daimon to 
his Tao.  Rather than treating the revelations attained through such 
experiences as always to a degree socially conditioned, Preston claims they 
have an “objective” aspect which is “a neglected human capability that is 
pursued by others under a variety of rubrics”.  By such “rubrics” he specifically 
includes notions of the self from popular, religious, and academic conceptions, 
including transpersonal, existential, symbolic, and higher selves as well as 
Mead’s “I” (ibid, 135). He goes on to claim that the socially organized practices 
and techniques of Zen are “not essential for accessing this level of reality” (ibid, 
137). While he accepts there are “behavioural indicators” of Zen 
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accomplishments he tends to take teachers’ statements about the intuitive 
manner in which they claim to be able to evaluate performances at face value 
(ibid, 140-1).  Doing so is a key aspect of his presentation of Zen as a “special” 
set of practices, aimed towards revelations and experiences of an “intuitive” but 
“objective”, largely singular  “transcultural reality”, although the subtitle to his 
study suggests the more sociological view that such reality is always a 
constructed or “socialized” one (op. cit.: esp. 142-6). This study nicely 
illustrates a blending of academic and spiritual discourses, so that neither is 
afforded clear dominance within the text.  However, because the discourses 
are intermingled through the same authorial voice, we are often never really 
sure if Preston is writing as analyst, participant, or a hybrid of the two. 
 
2.4.2.2 Moore’s Zen conversation analysis 
The second micro study complements Preston’s study nicely. Moore 
(1995), like Preston, takes Zen as his topic though focuses on written koans.    
He argues that  “Dereification is the perception of the objects of the social world 
as socially relative and as dependent on human perception and activity” (ibid, 
719), and that Zen practices aim to achieve it  as they “direct students’ attention 
toward living experience, or durée  and away from reflective experience or 
intellectual thinking” (ibid, 719).  Moore also uses Schutz’s notions of multiple 
realities, and equates the meditative state of no-mind with living in durée as a 
pure form of the natural attitude.12    
Moore substantiates this argument by using conversation analysis (CA) 
to examine several written koans which record exchanges between Zen 
masters and students.   In koan training,  particular questions are presented to 
and pondered by students, where answers given by their masters may (to an 
outsider) appear incongruous, sometimes being apparently irrelevant  
exclamations or gestures.  Moore argues that such sequences where 
responses do not fit questions in a conventional sense are “unique” forms of 
“adjacency pairs” which oppose conversational norms and  thereby signal to 
students that the master is expressing “ultimate” rather than “conventional” 
                                                 
12 Moore’s use of Schutz is somewhat idiosyncratic.   To Schutz,  the natural attitude is a 
suspension of doubt in the world, and an immersion in durée is more a matter of a particular  
“tension of consciousness” than variation of the natural attitude. See Schutz 1970, 1971.     
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truth.13  By breaking everyday conversational conventions, Moore suggests Zen 
teachers expose the constructedness of social practices, in effect (though 
Moore does not put it thus), facilitating their students’ enlightenments. 
Moore’s analysis shows that the interactional practices of enlightenment 
may be analysed as any other form of interaction.  His use of CA on such 
materials is highly original and inspiring.  However in order to apply CA to koan 
practice, Moore departs somewhat from orthodox CA methodology in two 
respects.  Firstly, he treats koans as real interactions, disregarding their 
character as texts.  Secondly, CA is an inductive enterprise, which restricts 
interpretation of what speakers are talking about to what they say in their own 
talk.   Moore’s belief that his materials include sequences which convey 
ultimate reality cannot have come from his materials as his data does not 
mention this. This is more a “folk” understanding of the materials, as would be 
compatible with a “spiritual” perspective upon them.   I should emphasize that 
although Moore’s work might therefore not satisfy the rigours of “proper” CA,  I 
consider it original and impressively argued,  illustrating that even notoriously 
“purist” micro-methods may be adapted fruitfully in ways that retain the 
possibility for researchers to investigate social phenomena which 
conventionally those methods would not address.   
 
2.4.2.3 Stroud’s textual analysis 
The third micro approach to enlightenment focuses on the textual rather 
than interactional aspects of reported dialogues in spiritual texts.  Stroud (2004) 
analyses the dialogic and canonical Advaitin Astavakara Gita (AG) as a text 
which might enlighten its readers.  He applies Iser’s aesthetic-response theory 
and Fischer’s ideas on  narrative fidelity to explain how the supposedly 
ineffable message of the AG is conveyed through a form of narrative  
argumentation which relies upon textual indeterminacy.  A summary of Stroud’s 
analysis is particularly useful here since several of my research participants 
(Cohen, Gangaji, and Parsons) incorporate notions from Advaita into their 
                                                 
13 Adjacency pairs” is a term used by conversation analysts to refer to utterances which 
conventionally come in pairs, with different speakers saying each part of the pair.  Examples 
include questions and answers, and invitations and responses.  (See Hutchby and Wooffitt 
1998: 39ff for a detailed discussion of this term). 
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discourses, and claim an ineffable form of ultimate truth. (Saunders did not 
claim that his truth was ineffable or Advaitin, though Holigral’s quasi-therapeutic 
techniques are based upon the supposition that any individual’s enlightenment 
is likely to require their participation in skilfully applied practices rather than 
simply being provided with a “facilitator’s” own truth-claims.  None of the 
enlightenment cultures equate enlightenment with simply understanding their 
teachings or practices in a rational sense). 
The AG is a “traditional” text within the branch of Hindu religious 
philosophy of Advaita Vedanta, according to which ultimately everything 
(including one’s apparent distinct self)  is one substance, Brahman.  The text 
was probably composed by a follower of one of that “school’s” most prominent 
exponents,  Shankara (788-820 CE),  around or just after his death.  Stroud 
aims to show "how [Advaitin] claims are argued and supported by this 
narrative” (ibid, 50).  He claims the text is an “experiential multivalent  narrative” 
in that it involves "such deep levels of contradiction that a reader cannot simply 
pick what they want to be the cognitive ‘meaning’ of the story;  instead they 
must reconstitute the meaning of the text through consistency building between 
6.. conflicting value structures” (ibid, 59).  Stroud claims  that it conveys an 
ineffable message about non-duality which paradoxically cannot be expressed 
in (dualistic) language, that is experiential rather than propositional.  Stroud 
elaborates how  the text is organised to evoke an experience which is beyond 
dualities in its readers.  For instance, it includes such textual devices as 
"transcendental challenges" (ibid, 62), like  “Where is illusion, where is the 
world;  where is attachment or detachment;  where is jiva [a concept akin to 
soul] or Brahman [the divine all] for me, who am ever pure?”  Such phrases 
juxtapose but do not resolve previous contradictory value positions expounded 
by voices in the text.  Stroud suggests the AG thereby creates its own 
“narrative fidelity"; it may "ring true" to the experience it elicits from a reader, 
but does not express that inexpressible experience itself (ibid, 64):  
 
“6 one cannot persuade someone using the propositional assertion that 
a state beyond words really exists.  Words must be used to evoke such 
an experience, and not merely produce positions and arguments".  (Ibid, 
66). 
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He concludes: 
“While the mere reading of this text may not transform one into a fully  
enlightened individual, the microstructure of enlightenment can be felt , if 
for but a fleeting moment, by the process of truly interacting with this 
text."  (Ibid, 68). 
 
2.4.2.4 Sells on apophatic discourse 
Although Stroud does not cite these authors, his methodology is  akin to 
McHoul’s (1982,esp. 118ff) ethnography of his own readings, and 
ethnomethodological analysis of those readings, and Sells’s (1994) study of  
the apophatic (i.e. negating) discourse of negative theology. Sells’s work is 
worth dwelling upon as his analysis is similar to Stroud’s though perhaps more 
conceptual.  He argues that the point of  apophatic discourse is a “meaning 
event” in which the potentially infinite regress of discursive correctives, set 
against a kataphatic  affirmation, fuse with the perspective shifts of the reader. 
“Kataphatic”  is a theological term for that which has content, the opposite of 
apophatic. The content of apophatic discourse varies between religious 
traditions, so the kataphatic event may entail a positive affirmation of whatever 
is ineffable in the tradition concerned.   Such kataphatic events may be 
identified semantically but may not be paraphrased without doing violence to 
them and robbing them of their performative veracity (ibid, esp. 9-10; 215-6).  
Sells argues this meaning event is “a re-enactment (within grammar, syntax, 
and metaphor) of the fusion of self and other within mystical union”, an 
“anarchic moment” involving a fleeting removal of a prior delimitation, which is 
all too easy to “explain away” by succumbing to the temptation to state what a 
writer “really” means (ibid, 209).  The event has no paraphraseable meaning 
itself, but is dependent on its kataphatic context (ibid, 215). Sells suggests it is 
not for the analyst to decide whether or not that meaning event is “mystical”, 
though he also claims the event is a “mimetic reduplication of mystical union” 
uncovered in the act of reading (ibid, 216). 
 
 Sells, like Stroud,  eloquently highlights the violence done to the texts 
about enlightenment by analysts’ tendencies to paraphrase their meaning in 
non-apophatic language.  This latter approach (of doing violence) is however 
the norm amongst religious scholars, for example underpinning Hanegraaff’s 
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(1998) esteemed dissection and categorisation of an impressively vast 
compendium of supposedly New Age texts, in which he expressly addresses 
New Age ideas rather than practices, and concludes that the New Age is really 
Campbell’s cultic milieu having become self-conscious.  By dealing only with 
the overt content  of his texts, Hanegraaff disregards any “meaning events” 
they might contain, and how they are written to achieve such events.  
The strength and relevance of Stroud’s and Sells’s work is that they 
therefore extend our notion of practices of enlightenment from the interactional 
to the textual realms, and encourage consideration of the form of texts and 
textual exchanges within such cultures, as well as live interactions.  The trouble 
faced by such textual analysis is however that both Stroud and Sells assume  
“meanings” or “meaning events” are somehow locked within textual forms, 
ready to be revealed through analytic dentistry.  Stroud suggests a meaning 
lurking within his text ready to be revealed to those who read “truly”, whereas to 
Sells there is a punch line to be got which cannot be put into words.   These 
views are not the same, and both allow room for a more sociological 
consideration of the interpretative resources and discourses a reader brings to 
a text and which shape the meaning extracted from it.   For example, from the 
perspective of spiritual discourse such texts are designed to be read according 
to the conventions of that discourse rather than academic analysis,  so that 
readers may actually experience rather than deconstruct any “meaning events” 
within.  
 
2.4.2.5 Hammer’s rhetorical analysis 
The fifth micro study is Hammer’s Claiming Knowledge (2008).  This 
study treats texts as rhetoric, though more so than Sells or Stroud 
acknowledges the wider cultural context of their production and consumption.  
Hammer sets out to reveal the “discursive strategies” employed in a purposive 
selection of Western esoteric “movement texts” from 1875-1999. He claims: 
“The biography of the spokesperson is one facet of the construction of [an 
esoteric] movement.  The doctrinal and ritual texts of that spokesperson are the 
other”. He goes on: “It is in these texts that spokespersons attempt to 
authentically create and articulate their position within the discourse.  
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Occasionally, one physical text may contain both an autobiography and core 
doctrines.  More commonly, the biography of the spokesperson serves to 
rhetorically bolster the claims of the doctrinal or ritual movement texts”  (ibid, 
37-8). 
Hammer says his interest is not in “actual mechanisms through which 
Esoteric themes are constructed – the etic epistemology6but the emic or 
purported roots of Esoteric thought” (ibid, 16), that is,  emic epistemologies.  
The discursive strategies he elaborates address “the question of how 
movement texts claim to present authoritative knowledge”,  how the claims of a 
text are given “plausibility”(ibid, 43). Hammer identifies three discursive 
strategies in his texts, which seldom appear in isolation (ibid, 44).  They are: (1) 
appeals to tradition (ibid, Ch. 4); (2) scientism as a language of faith (ibid, Ch. 
5); and (3) the use of narratives of experience (ibid, Ch. 6).  Cutting across 
these discursive strategies Hammer identifies many rhetorical devices that 
writers use for persuasive effects.  They include  such techniques as reduction 
(reducing the complexity of something); pattern recognition (pointing to 
universal similarities); and source amnesia (the propensity to gloss over any 
processes of reinterpretation).  Like Heelas, Sutcliffe and indeed many other 
writers note, Hammer observes that in his literature personal experience is 
presented as “the ultimate litmus test” (ibid, 331).  However unlike other 
authors, Hammer presents his analysis as an  “exposé”, arguing that the 
narrative forms of his texts appear to offer readers opportunities to experience 
things for themselves, but really they covertly shape and cue readers’ 
experiences.14 
Arguably Hammer’s discursive strategies as well as his rhetorical 
devices are not peculiar to esoteric texts but are pervasive in many other 
literatures.  “Pattern recognition”, for instance, is an obvious feature of his own 
argument.  While Hammer does however seem aware that a strong 
constructivist view of science would make his own distinction of scientism 
difficult to sustain (ibid,  206-7), he is otherwise largely inattentive to his own 
epistemology and rhetoric.   
                                                 
14 Hammer’s views echo those of Katz (1978), who famously pronounced  “There are NO pure 
(i.e. unmediated) experiences” (ibid, 26).   
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Iwersen (2007), however, does consider Hammer’s epistemology and is 
rather scathing of it.   Her work highlights how Hammer may offend the Tao-
daimon.  She claims that “esotericism” is founded on an epistemology that 
differs fundamentally from that of academe.  She suggests Hammer’s work is 
positivist in that it relies on “the concept of a human subject” as an “individual” 
who is “able to perceive empirical sensations”, and that “the emic-etic 
distinction” endorsed by Hammer “is itself based on the notion of a researching 
subject scrutinising an object, and thus on Cartesian epistemology” (ibid, 7-8). 
She claims that empiricist methods are inadequate modes of researching 
Esotericism since it rests on an alternative and largely incommensurable 
conception “of the world – including the human being – as One” (ibid, 4).  
Moreover, Esoteric epistemology reveals knowledge through moments of 
intuition in which “the process of thought and the object of thought become 
identical” (ibid, 31).  She claims:  “At the moment of intuition, a person 
experiences truth, which means that intuition can never be replaced by mere 
information or instruction.  Moreover, the intuitive experience is not only about 
knowing a truth, but it is also a realisation of Oneness6” (ibid).  Like all 
epistemologies, she claims Esotericism addresses “the relation between 
sensory perception and thinking.  Esotericism solves this problem in the 
doctrine of Oneness (monism), by stating that perception and thought coincide 
within the intuitive act” (ibid, 38). 
The aspect of Iwersen’s critique I wish to underline is the possibility that 
Hammer cannot do justice to the epistemological practices he considers 
because his methods and assumptions are based on an alternative 
epistemological position opposed to that of esoteric thought. In short, Hammer 
and Iwersen are worlds apart.   
It is not just that Hammer, like other “positivist” research, ironicises 
participants’ revelations and intuitions by treating them as rhetorically cued 
while the analytical work which reveals this is presented as unproblematic truth 
or debunking exposé. This would be  merely a problem of “representation” and 
perhaps lack of “reflexivity” on Hammer’s part.  Iwersen’s key point is that 
Hammer seeks  to “understand” participants’ epistemologies only within the 
terms of his own epistemic culture, or as Gadamer (1994),  might put it: 
according to the “prejudices” of his  researcher’s “tradition”.   
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While Iwersen’s critique of Hammer points out their epistemological 
differences, it provides little basis for a reconciliation.  This is perhaps 
unsurprising since as Gadamer points out, researchers, like anyone within any 
historic “tradition”,   are limited in their capacity to interpret and understand by 
the initial  “horizons”  which shape their enquiry and the questions they ask, 
making “perfect enlightenment” (he seems to mean primarily in the sense of 
acquiring any certain knowledge, though we might regard it here as an 
approach which might satisfy both Hammer and Iwersen)  a “chimera” (op. cit.:  
esp. 378).  Gadamer’s attempt to understand understanding does not offer any 
prescriptive methods for overcoming such problems, though he favours 
studying traditions temporally distant from the researcher, to reduce prejudices.  
He also suggests the task of understanding is to “expand the unity of the 
understood meaning centrifugally”, so that “details” are in “harmony” with a 
“whole”. Accordingly, when considering texts “we try to transpose ourselves 
into the perspective within which [the author] has formed his views” (ibid, 291-
2).  From this perspective, as Iwersen implies, Hammer has simply failed to 
understand his “movement texts”6 
 
SS:  Now you’re talking. 
 
6However, from the perspective that Iwersen and Hammer are employing 
different discourses each favouring certain forms of knowing (insight or 
understanding through reason), it is not the case that Hammer has 
misunderstood his texts, but rather that he has understood them all too well.  
The incommensurability between his and Iwersen’s perspectives arises 
because Hammer’s understanding is dependent on his use of “empiricist” 
analysis or discourse, in ways which overtly challenges the truth claims of his 
texts (through his claims of “exposé”) and approach which focuses only on how 
their rhetorical features may persuade others, though implicitly did not convince 
Hammer.  
 
SS:  Hmmmm6 
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When researchers open themselves to the possibility of taking 
alternative epistemologies seriously, they risk, being read as going too far, as I 
have suggested of Preston. Of the works I have considered,15  Stroud’s is  the 
only one in which a researcher claims to have experienced his or her objects of 
study as might a participant in an enlightenment culture, that is, as genuinely 
moving or enlightening, and yet also manages to perform penetratingly micro-
analytic work.  While he  affirms Tao-daimon distinctions by implying that his 
experience is beyond the realms of analysis, as he claims it cannot be stated, 
his experience and analysis co-exist, the former rhetorically validating the latter 
and the latter ambivalent towards the truth value of the former. In this respect, 
Stroud’s analysis is very different from that of Hammer who appears to have 
been entirely unmoved by the texts he analysed.  In so far as Stroud’s work 
therefore relies upon the spiritual repertoire, it does so in just a minor way and 
largely relegates its own deployment of spiritual discourse to the footnotes.  
Spiritual moments, it seems, may be like  “reflexive” ones (cf. Ashmore 1989), 
that is they are less disruptive of empiricist writing if separated from the main 
text in some way, such as by inclusion in footnotes or other “paratext” (Genette  
1997), like in “Acknowledgements”.  
 
 
SS:  Yes, Stroud’s got it. And so has Preston. And does this count as a 
“spiritual moment”? 
AS: Well, maybe, on all counts6 Seriously though, the point I was trying 
to convey was that scholars needn’t necessarily equate analysis with 
agnosticism.   Though suggesting certain experiences are beyond the scope of 
analysis still seems to me like going too far6 
SS:  Oh dear- you really do think that everything should be analysed in 
some way don’t you?   
 
 
     
 
                                                 
15 There are of course other such examples, including notably Shaw’s (1994) feminist study of 
tantra.  
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2.4.3 Openings in the field 
 
The literature I have considered collectively portrays a diverse “milieu” 
comprised of a bricolage of diverse activities in which individuals seek 
existential truths.  The status of this milieu is  somewhat controversial within 
academe with regard to its overall coherence and whether or not it is (still?) 
distinguishable from wider society and if so in what manner. Campbell and 
Sutcliffe have insightfully identified seekership as being at the core of such 
activities, while Heelas discerned a common ideology of “Self-spirituality” and 
the supposed “authority of the Self”. Sympathetic to Sutcliffe’s nuanced 
deconstruction of the term “New Age”, in testing Heelas’s views, Wood found 
little empirical evidence of self-authority, rather a network of diverse activities in 
which different authorities cancelled each other out.  Nevertheless, he did not 
analyse aspects of this network in detail to discern the practices which may 
have shaped the “selves” of participants, nor did he theorise the nature of those 
selves in favour of theorising his network as a whole.  All research is 
necessarily constrained by its methods and aims, which in religious studies 
scholarship with the notable exception of Heelas’s early work on “self-religions” 
generally stop short of analysing differences in how enlightenment, seekers, 
selves or “the authority of the Self” might be constituted across different 
settings, in favour of identifying common features,  ideologies, or religiosities.   
This point is well illustrated by Frisk’s work on Satsangs, which is brimming with  
ethnographic details which are not analysed but are instead subsumed under 
big disciplinary themes which she uses her materials to illustrate rather than 
question.  
On the other hand, while again offering penetrating insights, the micro 
studies I have examined tend to focus on different concerns to the macro 
studies, whether as in Preston’s case ostensibly correcting academe’s  
“oversocializing” tendencies or as in the cases of Moore,  Stroud, and Sells  
remaining locked in the particular details of their cases thoroughly neglecting  
the themes and debates within sociology of religion and religious studies.  
While this is  no doubt because such scholars are from other disciplines, even 
Hammer’s textual analysis largely stands on its own, as an examination of 
rhetoric. 
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However, the micro studies I have selected all illustrate the amenability 
of “spiritual” phenomena and texts to much finer grained forms of qualitative 
analysis than sociologists of religion and religious scholars often tend to use.  If  
as I suggest the nature of the self in self spiritualities has been wrongly 
neglected and its variety under-researched, then such methods appear to 
provide possible ways of addressing this gap.   Indeed, so far as I am aware 
there has been no prior attempt to study a variety of practices and beliefs within 
the milieu in terms which address the variety of notions of the self, seeking, and 
enlightenment which they may contain. 
Following on from this last point, the lack of analytical focus upon 
varieties of selfhood across activities within the milieu, and tendency to 
subsume diverse activities under a common banner (such as the authority of 
the Self or nonformative religiosity)  also makes assessing the potential of any 
particular spirituality to promote social change rather speculative.  I suggest 
that assessment of the “revolutionary” potential of particular enlightenment 
cultures is an important aspect of religious studies scholarship, and that more 
accurate assessments are likely to be possible through closer examination of 
their practices and characteristic views of the self.  
I therefore suggest there is both scope and need for research which 
addresses the macro issues of sociology of religion and religious studies (such 
as the nature of the self and authority in spiritual pursuits, and the forms taken 
by seeking) through fine grained “micro” methods.  Oddly, this gap seems to 
have been created in part by the change in focus of a prominent and influential 
scholar in this field, Heelas. His early and inspiring work on “self-religions” was 
already moving in this direction, and without any methodological fetishism was 
already integrating analysis of micro occasions with wider social conditions 
through identifying and theorising which attended to the existence in any 
culture of differing indigenous views of the self. Heelas’s turn towards “Self-
spirituality”, however, encouraged him and other scholars to work in another 
direction.  This direction is more in sympathy with participants’ occasional 
references to  a “perennial philosophy”, or some  sort of “spiritual” movement or 
revolution.  This is because it sets out to glean features of a common 
“spirituality” and overlooks nuances in how similar terms or practices figure 
across different groups within any milieu, as well as any ideological dilemmas 
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or conflicts such nuances might generate.  In short, when studying “spiritual” 
topics, we need to be attentive to whether we are incorporating elements or 
presumptions of spiritual discourse into our analyses, or excluding them.  Either 
course of action is likely to have implications, including furthering the aims of 
spiritual discourse (as I have suggested some studies of contemporary 
spirituality achieve, inadvertently) or challenging those aims (as I have 
suggested of Hammer’s work).  Not every study need necessarily hold those 
discourses in tension, as attempted in this text. 
 
2.5  My thesis 
 
Addressing such openings in present literature,  my thesis is that aside 
from Heelas’s “self-religions” work,  previously scholars have both 
oversimplified and homogenised the variety of activities and beliefs relating to 
the self within enlightenment cultures,  and this variety is likely to be a fruitful 
topic for  empirical investigation.   I suggest  making the various forms of self in 
enlightenment cultures, and the interactional and textual practices by which 
such selves are configured, key topics of study is a promising way to research 
and make sense of  these cultures.  As such, it offers new insights into the 
nature of topical issues within academe, such as “the authority of the Self”, 
“seeking”, and the practices of expertise and self configuration by which such 
selves are invoked, relayed, and constituted.  From a sociological standpoint, 
there is a vast cultural history of prior forms of the self  (cf. Sandywell  1996: 
32-42), and I shall attempt to show the selves which populate different 
enlightenment cultures today reflect different discernible (though different) 
social or cultural configurations of the self just as Heelas identified in his “self-
religions” period.   Adding to Heelas’s approach, I suggest also that identifying 
differences between the selves found within different enlightenment cultures 
has explanatory value in that such differences may help account for 
antagonisms between proponents of differing cultures. It may also have 
predictive value if the different selves we find have different sensibilities or 
propensities towards wider society.  Thus, a benefit of attending to the variety 
rather than homogeneity of enlightenment cultures at the level of the self is 
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likely to be   an empirical basis for determining their respective potentials to 
generate social  change.   
 
 
2.6  The methodological role of the “Seeker Self” 
 
The “Seeker Self” voice introduced earlier is not relevant to the main 
arguments of my thesis, but it does serve particular methodological purposes.  
Since one of the methods by which I have studied these cultures is 
ethnography, I have engaged with my subject matter in ways which have not 
only provided useful guidance in identifying further materials or topics for 
analysis, but have involved me in participating in my subject matter as a bona 
fide participant.  The implication of this is that unless I have participated in a 
thoroughly inadequate manner, from a sociological perspective I will have 
opened myself to the possibility of self transformation in the field, and perhaps 
afterwards (see Davies 1999 esp. 17-25).  Indeed, I believe that  in pursuing 
the academic aims of my research, I have successively become all of the 
different seekers I later elaborate (and perhaps, more briefly, I have also 
occasionally  identified with some of their enlightened counterparts). Also, while 
conducting empirical sociological research may require that researchers adopt 
a “methodological agnosticism” (Berger 1969: 100), such agnosticism is not 
easily maintained in the field, at least not without either dishonesty or an 
ethnographic failure to adequately “surrender-to” one’s researched phenomena 
(cf. Wolff 1976, and below). While it would be rather self-absorbed to dwell 
upon the variety, detail, and depth of my own personal experiences as a 
seeker, that I have periodically agonised over the implications of my academic 
arguments for my personal seeking, that is from the perspective of those  I 
have studied, is important to convey. It is important because it is an aspect of 
Neville’s Tao-daimon tension, playing out within my own self, which I could 
either ignore or, as Neville behoves researchers, “honour”. I have chosen to 
honour it through the literary  voice of the “Seeker Self”, whose brief 
interjections, amongst other things, are intended as periodic reminders that my 
analysis involves taking a distance from my materials which I have not always 
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taken, but I need to maintain to pursue my arguments. These reminders are 
particularly pertinent as both my academic argument and subject matter (the 
enlightenment cultures) articulate different theories of the self.  The Seeker 
voice also serves to make explicit the incorporation of enlightenment cultures’ 
“spiritual discourse” within this text, other than as an obvious object of study or 
invisible textual import. 
 
 
2.7  A note about “researching selves” 
 
At its simplest, my argument is that there is a pressing need to 
tropicalize the various idealised forms of the self which populate enlightenment 
cultures, and how others may come to adopt them, as each has different 
cultural echoes and brings present dispositions to those who adopt it.  In  
presenting this argument, there is of course an ontological issue of the status to 
be afforded to any “cultural selves”. There is also a related  theoretical  
quandary about how to conceptualise  the various cultural configurations of the 
self I speak of given participants in enlightenment cultures have their own 
“indigenous” views of the self (see Chapter 5) and current debates about 
concepts of “self” and “identity” in social sciences (e.g. see Jenkins  2008; 
Benwell and Stokoe 2006).   Broadly,  my interest is more in “selves” than 
“identity” terms, as my ethnographic experiences repeatedly revealed to me 
aspects to both seeking and enlightenment that are somehow lost by treating 
“seeker” and “enlightened” as identity labels,  though this is not to deny such 
terms are widely used in this way. The ontological status I afford “the self” is 
best explained by outlining the three overlapping senses in which I use the 
term: as a felt sense; a cultural idealisation; and as a consequence of 
“polyvocal consciousness”.  
Firstly, as a felt self, the self is who or what one feels one is, including 
any sense of  one’s biographic, essential or ultimate nature.  This is a common-
sense meaning, similar to  Giddens’s notion of “self-identity”, as meaning “the 
self as reflexively understood by the individual in terms of his or her biography” 
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(1991: 244; also quoted in Adams 2007: 12), although without Giddens’s 
emphasis upon biography.  
Secondly,  as an idealisation of what one is, or may become,  which pre-
exists the individual and is not necessarily expressed or experienced 
exhaustively by them.   This idealisation may have characteristic propensities 
towards the world or other selves (e.g. wanting to improve the world, or just 
cope with it). Here, like Adams (2007:12), I wish to avoid naïve reification of 
any cultural self,  by emphasising that  its various manifestations are always 
inseparable from any “social, cultural, relational, discursive fabric in which it is 
constituted”.  Such selves are therefore not “ideal typical” selves in a Weberian  
sense.  To speak analytically of any such cultural self is therefore to abstract an 
idealisation of what a self may be from a larger, more fuzzy and complex 
cultural reality not all aspects of which may be spelled out in any “data” and so I 
will draw upon other academic and popular writings about the self as the need 
arises.  
It is important to stress that by “idealisation” I do not mean Weberian 
“ideal type”. According to Schutz (1972 esp. 176ff.), all everyday and 
sociological understanding is ideal typical in nature. However, while it may be 
possible to build the various seeking and enlightened selves which I identify in 
later chapters as Schutzian/Weberian  “ideal types” in a more rigorous or social 
scientific sense, my methodology does not require this and indeed doing so 
would exacerbate and complicate the already present tensions between my 
Spiritual Quest and Academic Quest, or Tao and daimon.  This is because, as 
Wagner (1978) has noted, as different approaches to sociological 
understanding  ideal type analysis and Wolff’s extreme form of ethnographic 
surrender, towards which I have aspired in the field, are opposing poles. Ideal 
type analysis “implies the subjecting of a chosen subject matter to a pre-
established matrix”, whereas Wolffian “surrender” and its associated “catch”, 
“implies the subjection of a social researcher to his subject matter” (ibid, 155). 
Taken to an extreme, either pole would entail the disintegration of the 
sociological venture (into an entirely “deductive” and “sterile” venture, or “going 
native” respectively), while combining approaches near either pole is also 
highly problematic as their competing aims are not easily reconciled (ibid, 157).      
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My approach avoids such extremes and conflicts as it entails treating the 
selves I identify in  “data” and wider  “cultural” (predominantly literary) materials 
as essentially idealisations formed out of discourses and practices which may 
be described and “analysed” using ethnographic and discursive methods and 
styles of writing, as well as  “surrendered-to”.  Of course, within academic texts 
which employ methods of textual/discourse analysis such as I have used, 
convention weighs against  “surrendering-to” one’s materials, or even 
supplementing them with thick ethnography. On the other hand, since 
Schutzian/Weberian ideal types are first and foremost analytical constructs the 
possibility of “surrendering” to them is more  deeply problematic. At best it 
would yield “catches” several steps removed from those which might be 
obtained from surrendering to the actual phenomena being researched. In 
short, while Wolffian surrender seems to me more of an “ideal” aspiration than 
achievable method,  it is not necessarily inconsistent with other analytical 
methods likewise targeted at  whatever  has been “surrendered-to”.  Bearing in 
mind the tangential aims of my thesis, avoidance of ideal type analysis  and 
combination of Wolffian,  ethnographic, and discursive methods has the 
additional  benefit of sustaining and foregrounding  Tao-daimon tensions 
between academic and spiritual discourses, and thus in relation to the 
researched phenomena and materials themselves. What I have  “surrendered-
to” in this research is certainly not my own analytical or etic “ideal types”.  
The third sense in which I use the term self is introduced more 
extensively in Chapter 4 as a heuristic in analysing practises of experiential 
expertise.  Here, I adopt an analytical view of the self drawing upon Volosinov’s 
(1973) and Bakhtin’s (1981) polyvocal view of linguistic consciousness to help 
explain how gurus’ discourses of the self may be constitutive but not 
determinative of seekers’ (felt) experiences of their self, and thereby guru’s 
experiential expertise. This view implies any felt sense of self or cultural self is 
never an individual’s only available sense of self, although as I will elaborate 
some discourses of the self are conveyed in ways which seem more inclined 
towards monopolising an individual’s consciousness than others.   
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2.8  The Quests revisited 
 
SEEKER SELF:  Before you  move on, I should mention that I think your 
thesis and themes will make it difficult for me to talk about my own spiritual 
journey.   
ACADEMIC SELF:  I’m sorry, but you aren’t my topic.  This text is 
intended to be academic.  If you want to write at length about yourself then 
you’ll have to do it elsewhere. Sorry to sound tetchy, but as we agreed, you can 
help out when there are things relevant to my research which I cannot easily 
express.   
SS:  If you surrendered properly, in the spirit of Wolff’s “surrender-and-
catch” (1976), you wouldn’t need me here at all. 
AS:   I think you’re good to stay.  Wolff’s idea, to make sure we are on 
the same wavelength here, was that by “surrendering-to” researched 
phenomena, researchers may gain “catches” which offer deeper insights into 
their topics than reliance on conventional methods might otherwise allow, 
though at the risk of the researcher’s own self-change. The form of those 
catches may be somewhat unexpected, perhaps a poem, or other artwork.    
Wolff had rather grand aspirations for surrender-and-catch, even suggesting 
that it might serve as a way to address the global predicament brought about 
by “the possibility of our ending all of our lives”, that is the destruction of 
humanity (2002:  72-4). While Wolff (op. cit.) envisaged the possibility of 
combining surrender-and-catch with more “empirical” means to achieve this 
aim, it would be difficult to reconcile his method with the somewhat positivistic 
methods I have settled upon for my  analysis, as this seems the best way of 
adding to the literature I’m addressing. I would rather use any “catches” quietly, 
to stimulate my further enquiry, analysis, or writing. 
SS:  I don’t see any problem with Wolff’s approach.  I’m perfectly 
prepared to fully surrender myself, especially if it means I might become 
enlightened (or help save the planet).  
AS: Well, you say that now6 But let’s talk some more when we have a 
concrete issue to debate, like what I’m going to say about seekers in the next 
chapter.   
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SS:  Yes, let’s talk about something more specific next time.  I’m looking 
forward to what you might say about seekers, though expect we may disagree 
on rather a lot.  I’d better go fetch us a jug of water and some glasses. 
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Chapter 3 Configuring the Seeker 
 
  
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter focuses upon the neglected multiplicity of forms the seeker 
may take in enlightenment cultures.  I show that this multiplicity may be viewed 
analytically as the consequence of different practices by which seekers are 
configured in local settings, which draw upon differing wider cultural and 
historic notions of the self.  This contributes to my larger case for the 
reinstatement of the self as an analytical focus in contemporary studies of 
spirituality and religion by highlighting a variety of seeker selves with very 
different sensibilities. 
 
3.2 The neglected multiplicity of the seeker 
 
Since Campbell’s canonical paper in 1972, sociologists of religion have 
generally embraced the notion of there being a “cultic milieu” populated by a 
“society of seekers”.  This echoes popular books which refer to seekers as if 
they were a generic breed.  For instance Button and Bloom’s (1992) edited 
collection The Seeker’s Guide:  A New Age Resource Book is often cited by 
academic scholars, and  addresses its readership generically as “seekers”, 
whilst also  implying its entire eclectic contents should appeal to such seekers 
while being somehow associated with “New Age”.   
As Sutcliffe (2003, 2008) has argued, “the seeker” is an important 
identity term facilitating an individual’s participation in disparate seeming 
activities, including those taken to be “New Age”.  Nevertheless, the seeker is 
often written or spoken of in a casual manner, as if distinguishing seekers from 
non-seekers were unproblematic.    This vernacular usage is echoed in 
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research literature, where the term “seeker” is frequently imported into analyses 
focusing upon the particular personalities, biographies, or experiences of a 
cohort of participants labelled in this way.  Walliss’s (2002)  work on the 
Brahma Kumaris is a good example of this tendency, as he devises his own 
typology of seekers based on their expressed motives and orientations towards 
their tradition, being users, drifters, and searchers.  An alternative typology is 
provided by Sutcliffe (2003:  202ff), who distinguishes serial, or sequential,  
seeking from multiple seeking, in which seekers pursue many paths 
simultaneously.  The term has also been used to label an epoch, Roof’s (1993) 
baby boomers being a “generation of seekers”.  Their propensity to seek 
appears also to have been inherited by  Wuthnow’s (2007 esp. 13-16) post-
baby boom “bricoleurs” or “spiritual tinkerers” (2007 esp. 13-16).   
Warburg (2001) is the only scholar I have found who grapples with the 
conceptual implications of the term seeker having varied meanings.  She  
begins her report of seekership in the Baha’i movement by noting that 
distinguishing seekers from non-seekers is a rarely addressed conceptual 
difficulty in sociology of religion.  She turns the concept into a “sociological 
variable” by devising attitude and behaviour based criteria for distinguishing 
seekers from non-seekers, regardless of their own labels, so that interestingly 
not even all of the “converts” she considers are categorised as former 
“seekers”.      
I share Warburg’s concerns about the term “seeker”, though unlike her I 
do not think these should be addressed by  more rigid  sociological categories.  
Instead,  I attempt to reconceptualise the traditional approach of using the term 
“seekers” as an emic or etic identity term for research subjects. Instead, I 
explore the ways in which particular idealisations, settings and practices 
produce seekers.   
In the sections below, I begin reconceptualising the seeker  through 
drawing upon Woolgar’s (1991) notion of the “user” of computer technology 
being “configured”.   Just as the expectations that developers of a technology 
have of imagined users are translated into that technology, so I argue 
idealisations of the seeker are apparent in the “spiritual technologies” within 
enlightenment cultures. These spiritual technologies are not esoteric, but the 
local discourses and practices of particular settings.  My descriptions and 
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analysis of seeking therefore involves accounts of how seekers are 
“configured” in several particular settings.   
This chapter is arranged as follows.  Below I elaborate in more detail the  
heuristic of the configured seeker.  Using this heuristic, I then consider how, in 
turn,  four contemporary gurus configure their seekers at particular events I 
have studied through participation and also research recordings. The first three 
events (of Cohen, Gangaji and Parsons), are superficially similar public talks, 
typical of their different speakers.   The fourth case  (Holigral) is an example  
from a longer workshop style event,   included to show how the analytic 
metaphor of the configured seeker may be more widely applied.    I attended 
each event, in every case “becoming” the seeker I identify.  I begin each case 
with a short vignette providing background and a summary of relevant 
teachings. For each case, analysis is structured around two themes. Firstly,  an 
ethnographically informed account of transcribed materials showing two 
conceptual aspects of configuration of the seeker:  (1) an idealisation of what 
the seeker is like (which is usually apparent from the discourse produced at  
each occasion); and (2) local practices and features of each occasion or setting 
which encourage others to adopt or enact this idealisation.  The outcome of this 
conceptual “pincer movement” on each occasion is analogous to how 
idealisations and practices configure users of computer technologies in 
particular ways, to create ideal users. Importantly, we will see that between the 
different occasions our users, or seekers, are configured differently.  Secondly, 
I argue there are analogues to the idealised seekers I identify in contemporary 
theories of the self.  Having considered each case in this way,  since configured 
seekers represent and echo  differing  selves, I highlight the consequentiality 
and possible  incommensurability of each particular configuration of the seeker.  
Here, I  draw upon Hoskins and Leseho’s (1996) claim that different metaphors 
of the self bring different practical  implications for those who adopt them  (in 
their case, for counselling practice, in our cases, for what the respective 
seekers should do).    Finally,  I  acknowledge that the concept of “the 
configured seeker” itself relies upon a self-trope, here idealised and enacted 
through my own textual practices.    Hopefully, however, my authorial alter ego 
will save this work from the personally and ethically unwelcome plight of 
implying a superior view of selfhood to those of my research participants. 
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SEEKER SELF:  That alter ego being me? [Aside to reader: Though 
really the Academic Self is the “alter” here].  I again welcome the opportunity to 
speak here, though I hope you won’t use me to lead our reader down some sort 
of postmodern hole.    
ACADEMIC SELF:  Er, I hope not. You are a suspicious fellow.   If I was 
going to do that, there wouldn’t be much point in either of us saying anything, 
now would there? 1 
SS:  OK.  Great then.   I do hope that what you say will be useful to me  
in finding the best kinds of seeking.   
AS:  I think you are going to be disappointed.  But let’s see6.. 
 
 
3.3 The seeker as configured user of spiritual technologies 
 
In his ethnography of computer usability trials, Woolgar (1991) uses the 
metaphor of the computer as text, located in processes of writing,  construction, 
reading, and use (ibid, 60-1).  Woolgar “plays” with this metaphor by using it to 
describe how various people (including engineers, architects and managers) 
are involved in activities whereby “the user” of a machine is “configured”.  
There appear to be two aspects to configuration, as Woolgar portrays it, 
although he does not emphasise this distinction.  Firstly, the user is defined in 
articulations of “what the user is” like, such as those which are tested and open 
to revision in the empirical trials. Such users  may not correspond to “real” 
users,  but are idealisations of an imagined user. Secondly, parameters for the 
user’s actions are set through the text of the machine (and its manual).  The 
machine is central to both aspects of configuration:  “The user’s character and 
capacity, her possible future actions are structured and defined in relation to 
the machine” (ibid, 89). Woolgar is not suggesting that the machine wholly 
makes its own users, but that it sets idealised possibilities for how its users 
                                                 
1 Cf. Fuchs  (1992; 30-1), who  suggests that sociologists who are “reflexivists” at some point 
need to abandon their relativism and embrace realism, to justify saying something, or else they 
may as well remain silent.   
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might (or if they are to use the machine as the machine as text requires must) 
be. 
Woolgar presents his metaphor of the machine as text as an oddity, 
though his view that machines may mould their users is echoed in other work 
on human-computer interaction (such as Turkle’s (1996) observations about 
the different sorts of users which different operating systems require).  This 
view reverses the logic of conventional computer-speak in which computers are 
configured to suit their users.  Although  in this sense Woolgar treats the  
machine, as it is written and read, as an  active agent in the configuration of its 
users, he also sees it is part of a process in which it is continually re-written and 
read by others involved in its development, including its users. 
 I suggest Woolgar’s view of the machine’s user as involved in a process 
of configuration may be fruitfully applied to “the seeker”.  To speak of the 
configuration of the seeker, is therefore to describe how the seeker as user of a 
spiritual discourse, practice, event, or other “technology” concerned with 
enlightenment, may be idealised and moulded locally.  This approach, like 
Woolgar’s, reverses conventional wisdom which inclines us to think of seekers 
coming to spiritual events, teachings, or traditions with certain prior 
characteristics which define them as seekers.   Adopting this heuristic 
encourages us to become interested in the idealisations, practices and 
activities by which persons are configured as users of specific spiritual 
technologies. 
The metaphor of the configured seeker may be new, but the notion of 
participants being shaped in interactions by idealisations supplied to them or 
features of the interactional settings is better established.  This is for example 
reminiscent of the little used social scientific concept of  “altercasting” (cf. 
Malone 1995).  This entails “projecting” an identity to be assumed by other(s) 
with whom one is interacting, which is congruent with one’s own goals.  
Weinstein and Deutschberger suggest this is a basic technique of interpersonal 
control (1963: 454).   Pratkanis (2000) points out that  altercasting is not 
necessarily negative for  it can open up new ways of seeing oneself (ibid, 225).  
Yet he too sees it as a very effective persuasive strategy.  That individuals’ 
“performances” may be constrained by aspects of settings including room 
layout, décor, other “props”, and any “instructions” was perhaps most famously 
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elaborated by Goffman  (e.g.1990: 32ff). Finally, Heelas, in his work on 
“indigenous psychologies” (1981) and “self-religions” (1982) argued that certain 
religious groups “socialised the subjective” experiences of their participants by 
providing models of the self, drawn and adapted from those in wider culture, 
which participants were afforded opportunities to practice and express to each 
other.  There are therefore many conceptual tools which might be applied here.  
I favour Woolgar’s metaphor because it combines fine grained analysis of 
discourse with expositions of (ethnographically researched) practices, and 
embraces a sociological view of the social actor as always defined by and 
embedded in social settings.  However, since  Woolgar’s own analysis 
suggests though does not theorise the sociological implications of there being 
many possible differently configured users in different corporate settings, I shall 
supplement it with Heelas’s (1982) inspirational approach of following 
descriptions of practices with theorising about the cultural selves which seem to 
have been drawn upon in each configuration of the seeker.      
This view of the seeker as configured encourages a change of direction 
in contemporary empirical work away from traditional research into seekers’ 
attitudes and biographies and towards investigating particular versions of 
seekerhood as it is idealised and enacted within particular settings.   
 
 
3.4  The cases 
 
 
3.4.1 Cohen – the postmodern self 
 
 
Andrew Cohen teaches through several charitable companies, with his 
headquarters in Massachusetts. He has departed considerably from the 
teachings of his Indian guru, H.W.L. Poonja (“Papaji”).  Cohen has a 
small number of live in students, and his teachings are circulated 
through various media, including free and subscription online materials,  
and group activities including telephone conferences and retreats.  
Cohen portrays himself and his followers as on the leading edge of 
cultural and spiritual development or evolution.    His international 
magazine EnlightenNext (prior to 2009, titled What is Enlightenment?) 
includes interviews and articles about a multitude of contemporary 
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spiritual teachings while promoting his own. His teachings are elaborate, 
involving graphical  models of selfhood, theories of evolution,  and 
prescriptions on living “authentically”.   He speaks of a ground of all 
being,  and also an evolutionary impulse propelling everything in the 
universe towards higher states of evolution.  Whilst ultimately he sees 
every person’s  nature as one without a second (the Brahman of 
Advaita, or THAT), he also portrays individuals as divided between an 
Authentic Self in tune with this evolutionary impulse  and its antithesis, a  
personal and narcissistic Ego. The Authentic Self and Ego pairing was 
not a feature of his own guru’s teachings. These components compete 
for volitional control of an individual. He currently emphasises the 
cultural aspect of selfhood, describing the prevalent cultural self of the 
West as “the Postmodern Self”,  lacking in philosophy,  sense of duty, 
happiness, and overall purpose.  When the Authentic Self gains control 
of an individual,  they become a purposive vehicle through which the 
evolutionary impulse expresses itself, operating for  the betterment of 
“the whole”, and the evolution of consciousness/culture (Cohen uses 
these terms synonymously). A minority of people “on the leading edge” 
may lead this  evolution/revolution in consciousness/culture.   
 
 
Cohen’s talk took place one evening in October 2007 at EnlightenNext’s 
London premises.  I first visited here in April 2007, when the first thing that 
struck me was the business like character of the premises double as a 
conference venue.   Clean and modern, there is a large reception desk and 
foyer area in which there is seating and a small offering of Cohen’s publications 
on display. The publications appear to be produced through an in-house 
publisher, and paratextual advertisements in them direct readers to Cohen’s 
organisation and centres around the world.   
Cohen’s talk was given on the fourth floor, in a cleanly decorated large 
room which seemed just about full with around 100 people, some still suited 
from work or otherwise dressed smartly.  There were no pictures of gurus on 
display and people used chairs.  Cohen however stood throughout, while being  
video recorded by EnlightenNext unobtrusively from a small balcony. The 
arrangement of the chairs suggested a lecture, though Cohen seems distracted 
by note taking and occasionally asks note-takers to stop.   
The setting, room layout, and multitude of people seating themselves 
and waiting, chatting between themselves, begin configuring the seeker long 
before Cohen’s talk commenced. I shall focus upon  the obvious lecture format 
of the event and how this places particular requirements upon attendees, to 
perform as competent audience members. 
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Any public talk entails both a performance for and by the audience.  As a 
very minimal kind of audience requirement, there is Goffman’s view that 
audiences to public  events have “very limited obligations:  to pay the fee, sit 
more or less quietly, show interest and appreciation during the performance, 
and clap at the end” (1975:540). I suggest that Cohen’s talk, like the other two 
talks  I consider later, requires somewhat more than this as the nature of the 
event as a whole was unashamedly purposive.   Where performances are 
recognisable as persuasive in some way, the range of behaviours normatively 
open to audiences expand from Goffman’s short list to encompass ways of 
indicating whether or not and  to what degree one has been  “persuaded” (e.g. 
by clapping, laughing, cheering and the like throughout the event cf. Atkinson 
1984).    Goffman also views audience behaviour as social action which can be 
locally refined.    He observes that where “the performer is of a highly sacred 
status and cannot trust himself to the spontaneous tact of the audience” then 
speakers may deploy devices for ensuring audiences behave and respond 
appropriately (that is, “impression management”).  One such device considered 
by Goffman  “6is to outline beforehand for the audience the line of response 
they are to take to the performance”.  Goffman acknowledges that “When this 
kind of briefing occurs6it becomes difficult to distinguish between performers 
and audience” (1990: 222).  Where one aim of a performance is to persuade, or 
to obtain recruits or consumers, we can therefore expect speakers and their 
“team” (Goffman 1990: Ch 2) to make such overt efforts to ensure audiences 
know how to participate “properly”.  In Woolgar’s terms,  such efforts and  
briefings are configurative.    
With these points in mind, one recurrent  feature of public talks by 
spiritual teachers is their “introductions”, usually by a representative of the host 
venue.   I suggest the host’s introduction at public talks of any kind plays a key 
role in informing audiences about how they should behave throughout the 
event, rather like comedy compères ensure audience involvement in stand-up 
comedy (Rutter 2000).   I therefore begin my analysis with the speaker who 
introduced Cohen.  
I have attended two of Cohen’s talks, and both were introduced by Chris 
Parish, who added to the business like nature of the occasion by describing 
himself as the “managing director” of London’s EnlightenNext.  He referred to 
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both himself and the audience as “us postmodern folk”, and described Cohen 
as “the real deal” and a “living example” of his own teachings (these being  
important attributes for a guru – see next chapter).  Parish also made the 
recruitment aspect of the event clear by describing EnlightenNext as6  
 
 
Extract 3.1  Cohen London Talk 001 190107 23m45s 
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CP:  [EnlightenNext is] more than an 
organisation it’s really a movement. 
It’s a movement that’s attempting to 
create a different culture a 
different consciousness really trying 
tuh create a different ethos.  To 
create a  more authentic future so 
it’s like something like I feel is 
more like a sort o’ snowball we wanna 
get rollin’ so that the more people 
the better and we have lots of ways 
and things we’re doing we’re offering 
in order to do that and we want more 
people to join in this in this 
evolutionary movement and if you’re 
interested there’s you can find out 
about that downstairs afterwards.   
 
 
 
While this makes it clear that recruits are sought, the “ways” and “things” 
offered are not elaborated and are left for anyone interested to follow up after 
the talk.  The seeker here is a potential recruit. 
Cohen took the small stage area next.  He described his talk as  “an 
introduction to the teaching of evolutionary enlightenment”, indicating that he 
will talk first and take questions if there is time at the end (in fact, he did not). 
This statement importantly “briefed” the audience in the instructional manner 
Goffman describes.   The obvious implication is that interruptions were 
unwelcome.   
Suited and as business like as his surrounds, Cohen started by 
recounting how early in his teaching career he noticed shortcomings in others 
who shared similar enlightenment experiences to his own, and observed that 
few people today know how to be happy or think philosophically about life, its 
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meaning or purpose, and the great potential for wasting one’s life.  His talk 
seemed to meander, occasionally backtracking as if points had been forgotten. 
As an aside, he clarified what he meant when he talks of “human beings”.  His 
elaboration of this term is important, as it is here that Cohen begins to build an 
idealization of his current audience: 
 
Extract 3.2  Cohen London Talk 001 190107 52m45s 
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C:  … when I make general statements like 
human beings I’m only referring to 
the kind of people that come to see 
me.  So the kind of people that come 
to see me tend to be the individuals 
who would be considered just to make 
huge sweeping broad strokes 
individuals at the  leading - 
individuals who are on the leading 
edge.  Which means- it- which means 
many of the things that I’ve 
described before that most of you are 
very educated and have experience- 
and are experienced and experienced 
un-unprecedented freedoms and and are 
relatively speaking have been able to 
do more or less anything you wanted 
to do.  Except maybe go to the moon.   
 
 
 
Cohen  portrays “the kind of people that come to see me”, and ipso facto 
his audience, as “on the leading edge”, privileged by their education, 
experiences, and freedoms. That the audience are a smart crowd is not just an 
idealisation in Cohen’s discourse, for the same impression is conveyed through 
the clean, business-like and minimalist modern décor of EnlightenNext’s venue, 
Parish and Cohen’s smart suits, and Parish’s introduction of himself a 
“managing director”. This builds a flattering image of the  entire audience, 
though in later extracts we will see that Cohen also portrays them (en masse) 
as lacking several important things, including  philosophical understandings.  
This more negative, lacking characterisation of his audience is conveyed 
through the notions of their being “postmodern”,  or exemplifying “the 
postmodern self” (which I shall abbreviate to the PMS;  Cohen does not use 
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this abbreviation).   Although Parish had earlier referred to himself and the 
audience as “us postmodern folk”, the first mention of a distinct PMS was in 
Cohen’s following remarks:  
 
 
 
Extract 3.3  Cohen London Talk 001 190107 39m00s 
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C:  I’m speaking about what what does it 
mean for the postmodern self to to 
actually have cultivated  a very um 
comprehensive and um a very 
comprehensive philosophical 
perspective or orienting world view 
that really helps us to make sense 
out of human experience.  That really 
helps us to um helps us to helps us 
to make important decisions and even 
helps to make decisions that aren’t 
that important. 
 
 
By posing a rhetorical question about what it might mean for the PMS to 
possess a philosophical perspective or world view which may help make 
decisions, Cohen implies that the PMS is lacking these things.  Although Cohen 
does not simply assert  that his audience all possess this self, he guides the 
audience towards this perception of themselves. How Cohen’s speech works 
rhetorically in this manner can be seen using Goffman’s (1975:  469ff; 1981) 
concept of “footing” (that is the shifting stance interactants take to themselves 
and others).  Above,  Cohen’s “footing” shifts  from  “I” (line 1, first person 
singular subjective),  talking of  “the” PMS  (line 2, non-possessive noun, an 
entity), as cultivating a philosophical perspective to help  “us” (line 7, first 
person plural objective, encompassing Cohen and audience).  These footing 
shifts reposition Cohen from talking about himself (the agentive talker) and the 
PMS as separate entities,  to addressing an audience to whom the term 
“postmodern”  has been applied by both Parish and Cohen, to “teaming” with 
the audience through “us”. Cohen is therefore claiming the PMS is as much his 
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as his audience’s here while oddly and without explanation attributing it with 
human features and an entity like status.   
Later,  Cohen gets more specific about the attributes of the PMS: 
 
 
Extract 3.4  Cohen London Talk 001 190107 40m45s 
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Audience: 
C: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Audience: 
C: 
Audience: 
C: 
 
For for  most people I meet their 
relationship to life is very 
personal. What I mean very personal 
it tends to- we tend to to think of 
our own life as a soap opera.  And 
the star of the soap opera is us.  
Right? And and and so the uh the the 
post the postmodern self tends to 
tends to live in a self-created 
psychological world where where the 
personal self is the star of some 
kind of drama that’s not really very 
interesting. [((laughs?)) 
        [((Laughs)) 
Uh its not really very interesting 
but of course we feel because we 
because we experience such uh intense 
emotions you know we resume that what 
we are experiencing is important and 
inherently meaningful because we 
experience an enormous degree of 
emotional intensity round this 
particular drama that we find 
ourselves the star of but that 
doesn’t necessarily mean there’s 
anything deep or profound or 
inherently meaningful about the 
story.  Wouldn’t you agree? 
((sparse agreements)) 
That was polite agreement. 
((laughs)) 
But you know I’m right so ((laughs)).  
So, so what I’m trying to do…  
 
  
 
This extract begins with exposition of an activity of the PMS:  it  self-
creates a world for the personal self to star in an uninteresting drama.  
Implicitly, the PMS is here treated as agentive and somehow distinct from an 
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equally undefined  “personal self”.    Notice the audience’s laughter at line 14 
above seems uneasy and unclear as to its referent.  It is positioned just after 
the characterisation of the personal self’s drama as “not really very interesting”.  
There is no clear joke structure here, and no laughter or prior humorous cuing 
from Cohen, making the audience’s laughter seem ambivalent.  It might 
indicate a serious exposition is being treated as humorous,  or perhaps unease 
at what could be heard as Cohen insulting his audience (i.e. by implying they 
lead uninteresting “soap opera” lives, lines 1-13). Cohen seems to treat the 
audience’s reaction here as unsupportive, recycling some of the talk which 
generated the laughter (“it’s not really interesting”)  with a qualification (”but...”) 
and a footing shift to again align with the audience (“we...”).   At lines 15-28 
Cohen builds a contrast between experiencing life as important and meaningful 
and it actually being meaningful.  When he invites agreement with his 
elaboration,  there is (still) virtually no positive response from the audience (line 
29).  
Cohen addresses this lack of affiliation not with further explanation or 
attempts to persuade, but by commenting on the sparse agreement itself, 
thereby tropicalizing the hitherto tacit expectation of active audience 
participation at this event.  By stating the response was “polite” he avoids 
treating it as indicating disagreement.      This is met with some audience 
laughter,  and rather than providing further explanation he states “But you know 
I’m right so”, before laughing himself then continuing with his narrative.  He 
thus treats the lack of overt agreement as not indicative of any real 
disagreement or misunderstanding. 
This analysis highlights  that while delivering a monologue, Cohen is 
sensitive and responsive to how his audience is receiving his talk, but although 
he checks they are tracking him he defuses rather than engages with possible 
disagreements or misunderstandings, thus portraying his own views as 
unproblematic.   Potential for disagreement or lack of understanding is 
embedded  in a laughter rich environment which leaves unresolved and 
obscures the audience’s possible disaffiliation with Cohen with regard to the 
characteristics of the  PMS, and by implication, themselves.   
As Cohen’s monologue continued, he offered further idealisations of 
contemporary life.  One such idealisation was that existential questions are not 
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addressed by a PMS preoccupied with its soap opera concerns.  He 
emphasised the importance of addressing existential questions such as “who 
am I?” and “why am I here?”, by both caricaturing those who put aside such 
questions (mockingly, he mimicked “Well that’s very important I really should uh 
give that some attention some time”) and an anecdote about a sick 
acquaintance who having become familiar with Cohen’s views described their 
sickness as  “the best thing that ever happened to me because it’s forced me to 
get serious and to take my whole life seriously”.  Such accounts have obvious 
rhetorical impact:  they draw upon the common trope of a personal trauma 
providing the occasion for a life changing realization, which those hearing of 
must see as both epistemically warranted and coloured with the same 
seriousness and veracity as the trauma.  (Which is not to say such realizations 
may not be sincere or true, just this is how we tend to hear them).  Interestingly, 
here the truth the ailing friend was reported to have realized was not a radically 
new understanding of their own lives, but the importance of Cohen’s teachings.  
This anecdote was not presented as a story of someone else’s understanding 
of enlightenment,  but  as evidence of the veracity of Cohen’s views.     
After Cohen had finished, exiting without taking questions,  Parish again 
addressed the audience, underscoring the spiritual and recruitment aspects of 
the talk by mentioning that if what Cohen had said had “moved” or “affected” or  
“really resonated with you” there were still places on Cohen’s “intensive” 
tomorrow which would go “deeper”, be a chance to “transform” and get an 
“experiential sense about what the universe project means”.  There were 
queues to those taking names. 
Cohen’s talk thus addresses an audience of attentive listeners who are 
set an active role, required to indicate they are following the speaker,  but 
without raising or pursuing any questions. Such skills and behaviour play an 
important role in configuring this seeker, and are wholly mundane and familiar 
to us.  Participating in this audience requires little more overt involvement than 
Goffman suggests, but the structure and content of the talk imply also a 
processes of configuration.   The idealisation of the PMS and its manner of 
presentation encourage the audience, in following Cohen’s talk, to identify with  
the PMS.   The talk is organised persuasively to encourage audience members 
to accept the term “postmodern” as a possible identity, and to recognise 
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attributes of the PMS (such as having an existentially empty soap opera life, or 
failing to address existential questions one (now) knows to be important) as 
their own.  The pragmatics of the lecture occasion are entwined with and 
enable the delivery of these idealisations.  This is not without contradiction, 
however, as the seeker here is required to be both a passive recipient of the 
talk (not interrupting or asking questions), and an active processor of its content 
(capable of agreeing with Cohen, and  being “stirred”).   
Before leaving Cohen, it is important to dwell on the omission of explicit 
definitions of the PMS, when it seems so pertinent to establishing the relevance 
of his teachings to this audience.  I suggest that the talk makes sense without 
such explanations because the PMS is already so familiar, as a cultural trope.  
The term “postmodern” is widely used outside of spiritual discourse and its 
imprecision makes it seem generic and innocuous. In both its  nomenclature 
and attributes, I  suggest that Cohen’s PMS neither owes its nature to any 
spiritual tradition nor is it presented as revealed to Cohen in any form of 
epiphany (it does not feature in autobiographical accounts of his  
enlightenment).  It is instead appropriated from both popular culture and 
academic writings.   
The PMS has numerous academic analogues.  For instance, writing on 
popular culture,  Grossberg (1997:145ff) suggests that the widely varied 
discourses of postmodernism cohere in presenting us with nihilism, 
meaninglessness, or lives without transcendence, though he also sees the 
other side of this state of affairs  as being new possibilities for and sites of 
“affective empowerment”.  Perhaps  even closer to Cohen’s concept of the 
PMS is Jameson’s (1993) Marxist view of postmodernism as a dominant 
cultural form, in which individuals not only lack “cognitive maps” which inform 
them of their identities and how to act, that is, of  who they are and their 
purpose in life, but have become sceptical and intolerant to the possibility of 
adopting such maps. Jameson’s (ibid, 92)  call was for an imprecise new 
“invention and projection of a global cognitive mapping”, which like Cohen’s aim 
for a revolution in consciousness and culture seems to leave his audience “all 
dressed up with no place to go” (to quote Grossberg op.  cit).  Nowhere, 
perhaps,  but “downstairs6”  
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3.4.2 Gangaji – the storied seeker 
 
Gangaji (born Antoinette  Roberson) is an American spiritual teacher 
who shares Cohen’s guru, Papaji,  though has remained closer to that 
guru’s style of teaching and claims a direct “lineage” through Papaji to 
another Indian guru, Sri Ramana Maharshi. Gangaji has a charitable 
Foundation based in Aukland, Oregon.  She travels internationally to 
host talks and retreats, some “silent”, appears regularly on US Cable 
shows, and has a program aimed at US prisons. Her teachings are also 
available in books, CDs, and DVDs, mostly culled from her live events 
(e.g. Gangaji 2007).  Her live events are referred to as satsangs 
(described below). Her  key admonition to seekers is that they already 
are that which they seek.  The seekers with whom she speaks are often 
troubled individuals.  Gangaji maintains that if they “stop” their “stories” 
they may recognise they are already “free”, and the source of all 
wisdom, clarity, and beauty is the stillness of their own self.  Individuals 
do not need to be saints or engage in practices to (re)discover the 
stillness within through  which one may instantly realize the truth of who 
one is.  There is nothing new to be taught or learned since this 
knowledge is always present and already known – though it may be 
simply confirmed.  We can at any time turn attention to this stillness 
within, stop the stories of our lives, and thus realise who we are, THAT, 
stillness itself.  
 
 
In May 2007, Gangaji gave two evening “satsangs” in a lecture theatre at 
Kings College in London, preceding a weekend retreat at the LSE which was 
sold out by the second night.  The evening talks were pay on the door and 
although there were still some empty seats well over a hundred people 
attended both nights. The setting and fixed seating was clearly that of a lecture. 
However, the stage area had been adapted.  There were tables used to form a 
book stall to the left of the stage (looking from the audience),  prominent video 
camera centre front, with another “stall” for people to buy or order recordings to 
the right of the stage.    The arrangement of the stage itself was what made the 
event an obvious “satsang”.  At such events, the stage area usually contains 
two or so chairs, placed either side of a table on which there may be water, 
flowers, and a picture of the satsang holder’s guru and possibly their guru.  The 
chairs are angled slightly towards each other and otherwise towards the 
audience, one taken by the guru and the other by a succession of selected 
audience members. 
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The format of satsangs varies slightly between teachers, occasions, and 
the possibilities of each venue.  Because of this, and because at public 
meetings first timers are common, it is common for the ideal order of the event 
to be spelled out.   
 At the evening talks I attended, Gangaji was introduced by Katherine, 
the person who organises her events in the UK. Focusing from hereon on the 
second event, this introduction involved several “announcements” including: the 
importance of entering details on a circulating contact list to be notified of future 
events;  that DVDs and  CDs of the event are available from the producer who 
had a stall to the right of the stage  and that there is a release form for people 
who have conversations with Gangaji on the stage; that “there’s a bookstall 
obviously as well”; Gangaji’s upcoming events;   and a call for people to hold 
video satsangs in their homes, a “simple” and “lovely thing to do”.   Notice the 
audience is addressed here so humanely and cosily – the   procrastinating, 
empty lived generic postmoderns of Cohen’s event seem entirely absent, and 
in their place a more homely audience. Yet the audience is still configured, 
albeit differently. Very unlike Cohen’s talk, Gangaji’s audience is addressed as 
including two types of participants:  those who speak with Gangaji and those 
who do not.  The “release form” is relevant only to the former.  A further  
importance of this to how the local seeker is configured, is that the entire 
audience is implied to be active here – anyone might speak with Gangaji.  
More details of the “process” of the evening were given later: 
 
 
Extract 3.5  Gangaji London Satsang 201 170507 9m42s 
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Kath: Um, the process of the meeting is 
that Gangaji will come in.  We will 
start with a silence, for some few 
minutes.  And then she will speak.  
We don’t know how long for.  And then 
she will invite people to ask 
questions or come and speak with her.  
Uh, and that’s how it goes.  Uh, and 
at the end of the meeting we ask you 
to wait please in silence a few m- m- 
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11 
12 
14 
15 
minutes to allow Gangaji to depart. 
So, I hope you enjoy the evening and 
I will go and fetch (Gangaji in a 
while). 
This description outlines and idealises the audience’s future performance 
during the event, though does not say anything about the topics the audience 
might discuss with Gangaji. After this extract there was no further speech 
addressed to the entire audience and pervasive audience silence till Gangaji 
spoke just over 16 minutes later.  Of those 16 minutes,  approximately  8 and a 
half passed while Gangaji entered and then sat silently, facing the audience, on 
stage.2  Long meditative silences of this sort are common in satsang events, 
such silences being a staged adaptation or performance of  the “silent 
teachings” of Indian traditions. Godman (1985: 105ff) observes that Sri 
Ramana Maharshi (with whom Gangaji claims to be in direct lineage) gave both 
verbal and silent teachings, the latter involving “a spiritual force, which seemed 
to emanate from his form6 which automatically quietened the minds of 
everyone in his vicinity. The people who were attuned to this force report that 
they experienced it as a state of inner peace and well-being; in some advanced 
devotees it even precipitated a direct experience of the Self”.   Employing such 
silences is thus a way of enacting lineage,  though also requires some 
audience co-operation.  Indeed, as I note later, an aspect of Gangaji’s 
teachings are that we are all “stillness”.  Such long silences also entail an 
enactment of this key aspect of her teachings about human nature, allowing the 
entire audience to participate in this stillness.  
Notice that the host’s introduction did not tell people what to discuss with 
Gangaji.  It was Gangaji’s short talk which provided this topical impetus, and 
moreover helped ensure audience members’ questions and self-realisations 
were both resolvable, and achievable,  within short staged encounters.    Here I 
shall focus upon her idealisation of the seeker through her own 
autobiographical accounting and how this contributes to the  configuration of 
the seeker during this event.   
                                                 
2 Timed from the audio record. 
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In her talk, Gangaji gave a longish account of her own “spiritual search” 
for enlightenment, and eventual meeting with her guru,  and his instruction to 
her to “Now don’t do anything.  Just stop”.  She recounted that she had “heard 
that before”, but this time, in his “grace”, and realizing that her guru was “talking 
about stopping everything.  Which meant stopping the story of me”, she 
managed to “really stop”, to “just be still”.  Her anecdote culminated in a 
detailed description of what stopping her “story of me” entailed.  I have 
reproduced the end of the account below:  
 
 
 
 
Extract 3.6  Gangaji London Satsang 201 170507 36m.23s 
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Gangaji:  And there was a stopping.  And in 
that stopping (    ) there is quite 
naturally a recognition of what has 
always been (solved).  What has 
always been here.  What is always 
fulfilled without any (pain) 
fulfilling it.  What is at peace 
without any peaceful occurrence 
necessary.  And it was absolutely, 
and continues to be, absolutely 
astounding.  It was so familiar 
because it was my self.  And yet it 
was so astounding that that’s where 
everything I had been looking for was 
all along.  And in the discovery of 
it I simply had to stop the telling 
of the story of me looking for it.  I 
had to be still.  And in the 
willingness to be still I recognised 
the truth I am always still.  I am 
stillness.  I am the awareness that 
is still.  When the emotions arise, 
when the events change, when the 
opinions appear.  Personality 
appears.  Awareness remains as it is.  
In peace.  Conscious of itself.  And 
conscious of itself as beingness.  
And that to me is what satchitananda 
really means.  And that’s really 
what’s available.  For everyone.  At 
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31 
32 
 
 
least everyone in this room.  Or you 
wouldn’t be here or be back. 
The above extract does much to configure the audience.  Key features 
of the narrative are that it confirms through Gangaji’s example both the 
possibility of “stopping” one’s story (line 1) and what happens when this occurs 
(the rest of the extract).    Upon “stopping”, Gangaji describes herself having 
recognised or discovered  peace, which seemed both astounding (as it was 
always here,  and involved contradictions such as being “at peace”  without any 
“peaceful occurrence”) and familiar (for it was her self) (lines 3-12). She 
suggests that this discovery attained through her “stopping” itself meant she 
“had to stop the telling of the story of me” and be still (lines 15-18).  Yet she 
also refers to her “willingness” to be still, and says this prompted a list of 
(further) recognitions, including of her nature as stillness and the true meaning 
of “satchitanada” (a Hindu religious-philosophical word formed from three 
Sanskrit terms translatable as  being (or truth),consciousness, and bliss) (19-
29).3  Gangaji makes this anecdote overtly relevant to her audience in an 
instructive sense by stating   “6that’s really what’s available.  For everyone.  At 
least everyone in this room” (lines 30-31).  In short, the anecdote configures 
Gangaji’s audience in relation to her, as she stood in relation to her teacher.  
The audience is not just positioned as hearers of her assertions, but  as people 
who may enact and make the same discoveries, realisations or recognitions for 
themselves. 
This  (discursive) configuring of the audience as storied seekers as 
Gangaji was to Papaji’s “teacher” figure, positions herself as now the guru.  
Audience members are thus encouraged to see themselves as seekers who 
                                                 
3 Following Gangaji’s pronunciation I have transcribed the term as “satchitananda”, though it 
seems likely Gangaji is referring to a term more conventionally written as “saccidananda”. This  
term is associated with Advaita Vedanta schools of Hindu religious philosophy, and  its 
common translation as “being, consciousness, and bliss” (e.g. Johnson 2009: 274) understates 
the extent to which it is also taken to denote the realization of the unified nature of absolute 
reality and also the self.   Although Gangaji uses the term, she does not explain its Hindu 
origins, significance, or meaning. 
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might converse with a true guru, as Gangaji did, and actually enact Gangaji’s 
portrayal of enlightenment during the event.  All that is required to do this is to 
converse with Gangaji.  However while people are thus implicitly invited to 
make their own discoveries, the recordings of them doing so were at outset 
clearly explained to be things  which those running the event  want to use as 
their own.  Episodes and encounters in which others might stop their own 
stories are thus clearly marked as destined to be woven into the still unfolding 
story of Gangaji’s own public meetings and future publications. 
The configuration of the seeker here is less easy to separate analytically 
from the guru’s truth claims than with Cohen’s talk.  The storied seekers  
portrayed through Gangaji’s autobiography seems both an idealisation 
available to configure her audience, and a key aspect of her truth claims.  I 
wish to leave considering truth claims to a later chapter, though it seems 
important  to mention here that Gangaji recounted a further anecdote, in which 
she reported a line from a play she attended that afternoon, which “could have 
come right from my teacher”, that “You don’t have a life. You only have a story”.  
Gangaji commented that “If you don’t have a story. Even if a story 
appearsHThen you are life”. This quote and Gangaji’s addition to it suggests 
an overt congruence between her view of the self and modern literature.  It also 
suggests that it is somehow beneficial to live one’s life without having a story, 
even if it appears one does.  This is congruent with remarks made by her 
elsewhere to the effect that she encourages people not to identify with their 
stories, rather than live without stories (e.g. see McNay, undated).  I mention 
this because otherwise Gangaji may be misinterpreted as suggesting once 
stopped, people may continue to go about life without any form of self story 
whatsoever.   
Although Gangaji professed to have no teaching, her autobiography and 
overt guidance to her audience about what they might say to her (i.e. questions 
or reports) cast them as seekers as she once was, whilst also indicating what 
they might experience and become.  Indeed, that the audience’s personal 
discoveries are expected to be of universal not idiosyncratic or conflicting truths 
is made clear in the subsequent extract, which follows a little later:  
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Extract 3.7  Gangaji London Satsang 201 170507 45m07s 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
 
Gangaji:  So I invite your questions and your 
reports so that we can each of us 
discover what’s the truth.  Not 
because someone has told us it’s the 
truth or we hope it’s the truth.  But 
because it’s possible to directly 
experience it.  In the way that 
removes all doubt.  Even if doubt 
appears that there’s no place that 
doubt can stick.  That there’s a 
recognition  I am.And that amness is 
not limited to this particular form.  
It senses I am. So I’m not asking you 
to remember anything I say.  In fact 
I’m usually very disappointed when I 
hear what I’ve said and it comes back 
to me sometimes years later in the 
form of a teaching. ...  
 
 
While I have already noted that Gangaji does not address her audience 
as Cohen did, by portraying them as if they all share membership of some 
elusive but well known category (like “postmoderns”), what comes across 
instead is that the biographies of her audience are completely irrelevant.  Her 
call for them to “stop” applies regardless of their histories, types, or 
propensities.  Yet obviously, for Gangaji’s advice to “stop” to hit home with her 
audience, they first need to see themselves as doing something.  Gangaji’s 
autobiography provided an obvious activity to stop, the activity of seeking, and 
her explanations suggested any self-story was stoppable.   
Gangaji’s talk served as a briefing for the staged encounters which 
followed, each person selected either giving a short report (or performance) 
which endorsed her truth as their own, or presented her with personal issues or 
dilemmas,  which she would address by questions prompting stage speakers to 
recognise what they are really looking for is stillness, which if they stop they 
already have.  There was a lot of joy and laughter, often before the people 
selected had said much at all. 
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Gangaji’s events configure her audience in various ways.  The 
physicality of the occasion required stage performing seekers, with  much in 
common with audience volunteers in general - stage encounters becoming part 
of the speaker’s performance.  These particular encounters have obvious chat 
show and therapeutic overtones:  the arrangement of stage seating, the 
personal life problems raised as topics, and the guru’s questioning leading to 
resolutions.  Indeed, therapeutic overtones are such that Gangaji’s website 
offers a prominent rebuttal:  “It is essential for anyone attending a meeting or 
retreat with Gangaji to know that the Gangaji Foundation does not offer 
psychotherapy in any form.”4 The substance of stage encounters is not left to 
chance as the audience are configured and rehearsed into the stillness which 
lies behind their otherwise storied nature.   The staged episodic encounters  
require a storied seeker who has yet to “stop”.  This seeker has many cultural 
analogues, especially in notions of “the storied self”. 
The storied self is to be found in narrative approaches in philosophy, 
psychology, psychotherapy, and literary theory.  It is now so familiar that even 
with opportunities to ask questions no one challenged Gangaji on the notion  
one was constantly producing one’s own story.  Within academe,  philosopher 
Owen Flanagan (1991:  149) suggests “A self is just a kind of life that has a 
beginning, a middle, and an end that are connected in a traditional story like 
manner”. Eakin (1999) draws upon a variety of perspectives within philosophy, 
neurology, psychology and autobiographical literature (including ethnography) 
in order to provide an eclectic slant on “how our lives become stories”.  That 
our lives are storied is often taken to be truism, or at least valid assumption, of 
narrative perspectives across the human and social sciences (cf. Benwell and 
Stokoe 2006 for a review).  A key feature of this academic storied self is that its 
story is never ending.  As Eakin puts it,    there may be no such thing as an 
“unstoried self” (op. cit.: 126). That people do make sense of their lives through 
narratives is relied upon by much social research, such as that in which life-
history narratives may be elicited and/or analysed to show if and how differing 
narratives may be associated with particular  social phenomena or changes. 
Furthermore, the importance of narratives to our social and psychological well-
                                                 
4 http://www.gangaji.org/index.php?modules=content&op=typeofevent viewed 3 March 2010. 
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being is emphasised in narrative therapies which actively encourage clients to 
re-story problematic aspects of their lives, using narratives of themselves as 
means to gain power and foster a healthy identity (e.g. White and Epston 
1990).  The actual content of this storied seeker’s story seems of little interest 
to Gangaji – certainly the audience are not configured as sharing the same type 
of story, like Cohen’s soap opera postmoderns.  What is important is the 
seeker’s storied character, and configured capacity to stop that story. The 
possibility of a self beyond such stories (or indeed of living an enriched life in 
the absence of commitment to a coherent story) is a radical departure from 
such academic storied selves, though the storied self itself is a familiar friend. 
seekerhood as it is idealised and enacted within particular settings.   
 
3.4.3 Parsons – the comic “me” 
 
Tony Parsons  is an English author and public speaker on non-duality, 
sometimes referring to his own view as similar to Advaita Vedanta, or in 
a more branded style as “The Open Secret Approach”.  In public talks, 
reproduced in his texts and CDs, he has a distinct and direct 
confrontational dialogic style, in which he continually ironicises 
conventional personal pronoun usages, frequently correcting 
conventional speech and asserting the non-existent or illusory 
(“apparent”) nature of  people, time, choice, and free will.  He claims no 
lineage or teacher, though is one of a small number of mutually 
supportive contemporary authors and speakers on non-duality who 
share a similar perspective, many of whom are associated with Non-
Duality Press of Salisbury, England.  Parsons’s teachings are available 
as public dialogues, at short talks or longer retreats in England and 
internationally, and in texts, CDs and DVDs largely comprised of such 
dialogues (e.g. Parsons 2007).  Like Gangaji his emphasis is on 
revealing an ontological truth  rather than any recipes for spiritual 
practices or how one should live. The  seeker to Parsons is also a 
storied character, though more driven and comic than for Gangaji.  
Driven by a desire to return to childhood oneness which cannot be 
conceptualised, this seeker searches for something missing but 
indefinable and in the activity of searching does not or cannot realise 
what is utterly obvious once recognised.  That is the truth that there is no 
seeker, only oneness.  This comic search can take many forms, both 
material and spiritual, including the pursuit of enlightenment.  Parsons 
offers no spiritual practices and  claims his talks are the worst place for a 
seeker to be.  However more positively he offers the possibilities of an 
end to seeking, the “melting” or “popping” of selves,  and of “basking in 
boundlessness”.   
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In 2007 Tony Parsons gave an afternoon talk at the Matara Centre at 
Kingscote, a village in rural Gloucestershire, as part of their series on “spiritual” 
themes.  The centre is primarily a wedding venue, and its website describes it 
as an architectural blend of “ancient and modern, east and west”, which 
eclecticism is reflected in the events it often hosts.  The talk attracted local 
people as well as others like myself who had to travel many miles and navigate 
unfamiliar lanes. 
Parsons’s talk was given in a large room, seating around eighty  people, 
with chairs arranged in rows in a rough semi-circle facing him and his hosts.   
There was no chair for questioners, so the geography was more like Cohen’s 
than Gangaji’s talk.    A table near the entrance became a display for several of 
Parsons’s books and discs, and during the break he placed printed flyer sheets 
on chairs promoting another of his events.  Parsons worked his own audio 
recorder, allowing me to use my own. 
The host, “David”, was clearly familiar to many in the audience, and his 
initial introduction described the talk as the third in a series.  After a brief 
address from the founder of the centre, David introduced Parsons using several  
jocular anecdotes.  These anecdotes contributed to the configuration of the 
seeker at this event.  Again, I am treating the configuration of the seeker as a 
theoretical notion which has two aspects:  idealisation of the seeker and 
practices by which others see themselves as idealised seekers.   I begin with 
all the host’s lengthy humorous anecdote about himself and Parsons, which 
presents a particular caricatured view of seeking which most if not all the 
audience appeared to understand very well; this joke received the most 
audience laughter of the entire event and I did not see anyone not laughing at 
its punch line.  
 To introduce Parsons presents a problem, in that his confrontational 
style and claims that his message cannot be grasped render any attempt at 
summarising him problematic and inaccurate and open to subsequent 
correction by him.  Using humour sidesteps the possibility of getting it wrong, 
since humour does not favour being taken literally.  Where humour is conveyed 
through a recognisable joke form, it also  requires active audience engagement 
in the tasks of solving its puzzle and of showing understanding (cf. Sacks 
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1978:258-61).  From an analytic perspective, therefore, humour may be a 
fruitful source of information about participants’ worlds and understandings.   
The anecdote I consider portrays Parsons giving David  advice in 
response to David’s puzzlement over why enlightenment never happens to him.  
I  have reproduced the anecdote in full below, using Jefferson notation (see 
Appendix 2) as this enables me to convey and recreate some of the subtle 
timings and inflections which contribute to  the talk’s joke structure and 
reception:  
 
 
Extract 3.8  Parsons Kingscote Talk Pt1 401 111107 15m15s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
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29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
David: 
 
 
 
D: 
 
 
D: 
 
 
 
Audience: 
D: 
 
 
 
D: 
 
 
D: 
 
D: 
 
 
 
 
 
D: 
 
 
D: 
 
D: 
 
 
 
 
I. - I hadn’t met (.) Tony until  
today but I had >spoken to him< on  
the ‘phone.  
   (0.6) 
an’ I think this a sort of insight  
into (.) u:m. 
   (0.6) 
in- into Tony.  and. suddenly one  
day when I was- (.) I dunno (0.3)  
lost in ˚hh dreams in the office  
an’ ‘phone rang.and (u[m) 
                      [((cough)) 
Tony Parsons here an’ I uh- (0.2)  
re:ally couldn’t sorta (0.4) think 
>who it could’ve been< 
   (0.7) 
((swallowing intonation)) anyhow. 
eventually the penny dropped.  
   (0.8) 
a:nd um:  
   (0.6) 
the reason for the phone call was 
that we had a mutual friend (0.3) 
who uh we used to meet a(t)- uh (.) 
meditation group when we lived in 
Hertfordshire. 
   (0.7) 
an’ she’d gone on (>to him<) an’ 
we’d. obviously had a conversa:tion 
   (0.5) 
um the previous week. 
   (0.7) 
about (.)  moments of enlightenment 
and this sort of thi:ng an’ I said I 
don’t know why you know this >never 
happens to me.<   
   (0.6) 
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38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
 
D: 
 
D: 
 
Audience: 
D: 
 
D: 
 
Audience: 
D: 
 
D: 
 
Audience: 
 
D: 
 
 
 
Audience: 
D: 
Audience: 
D: 
 
 
 
 
D: 
 
D: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
D: 
 
 
 
 
And um. 
   (0.7) 
>so< this Tony Parsons came on the 
‘phone.(0.4) an’ she said- (0.3) 
(cough))he said >we’ve got a mutual 
friend< 
   (0.6) 
and she sa:ys (.) you don’t know 
why: it >never happens to me (0.4) 
huh hu[h 
      [um.  and what I said.- 
   (0.6) 
what I say say says Tony (.) is 
there isn’t any me: 
(huh huh) 
   (0.3) 
umm. (.) now I suppose really (.) 
in the zen tradition >that would’ve 
been a moment of enlightenment  
f[or me !but (.) 
 [(heh) 
that [>never happens to  
     [((rising general laughter)) 
me:< so:: 
((all or nearly all of audience 
continues laughing for 4.0s, D’s next 
turn overlaps laughter: just as it 
quietens slightly)) 
>anyhow< I- it is: h (um) 
((laughter more rapidly quietens)) 
I’m ve:ry delighted that Tony’s (.) 
come.  (0.3) um- and (it-) you-re 
going to have something which is- 
>some of you who know him might know< 
but you will find that it is 
uncompromising ˚hh and challenging 
   (0.7) 
he loves questions.  he loves to be 
(.) challenged. (0.4) but anyhow 
let’s-  hear what Tony Parsons has to 
say (.) but just >before we start  
 
 
David presents the joke as offering an “insight” into Parsons.  My 
analysis attempts to reveal how this insight is both funny and instructional, as 
these features are related. Key semantic features of this joke are  the formulaic 
phrase “never happens to me”, and incongruous ways of interpreting “me” 
(here, as a conventional self-reference in speech or communication, and as the 
illusory object of spiritual or philosophical enquiry).   The narrative relies on 
reported utterances to three levels of “embeddedness” (i.e. quotations within 
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quotations, see Goffman 1975, 1981), while the semantics of the joke favour 
that every reference to the phrase “never happens to me” should use the same 
personal pronoun, “me”, rather than “him” or “you” whenever cited, regardless 
of whose speech is quoted by whom. This is achieved partly by David always 
marking/enacting  this phrase as a direct quotation by speeding up slightly (the 
“>”  and “<” symbols), and partly by preserving the lexical form of the phrase 
even where this makes the joke grammatically incorrect.  The  first mention of 
this phrase is at lines 35-36,  where David quotes himself, so the “me” here 
reads as a direct quotation of his speech to the “mutual friend”.  Compare this 
to lines 45-46, where David is quoting Parsons quoting back to him what their 
mutual friend told Parsons of this same conversation.  There are several 
conventional alternatives to “me” either Parsons or the mutual friend might 
have used. The friend may have said to Parsons “David says it never happens 
to him”, and in relaying this to David we might expect Parsons to say something 
like “You said it never happens to you”.  What was actually said is immaterial, 
what is important is that in telling the joke David has to select between ways of 
reporting talk and at line 46  uses the phrase “never happens to me” in his own 
report of Parsons’s speech even though he begins his report of Parsons 
speech in a way which makes this inconsistent grammatically; “she says you 
don’t know why6.” suggests “it doesn’t happen to you” would be appropriate.  
Such lexical choices are however consistent with building “never happens to 
me” as a catch phrase.   
In the joke, Parson’s report of his view (“what I say”) that “there isn’t any 
me” introduces an esoteric or philosophical perspective on the ”me” of David’s 
catch phrase, which hitherto seemed a straightforward self-referent. Notice that 
Parsons retains the notion of an “I” (himself), while denying  a (generic) “me”. 
This advice does not so much answer David’s question, as render it redundant.  
David’s “Now I suppose”  is spoken outside of the time frame of the joke, from 
his standpoint now as raconteur.  He reflects on this advice as potentially 
enlightening for “me” (54-7). Again, this serves to emphasise the conventional 
view of “me”, here  as a candidate for enlightenment.  However this in itself 
indicates that David has not taken on Parsons’s advice and the two 
incompatible views of this pronoun stand juxtaposed.  At this point there is 
some laughter in the audience, suggesting people may already be projecting 
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the punch line, which follows rapidly as audience laughter rises.  “But that 
never happens to me” (lines 57-61) is delivered as previously with an upped 
tempo, the rapid switch between incompatible perspectives on “me” being the 
climax of the joke and ostensibly met with more raucous laughter than 
otherwise occurred throughout the event.  
After the laughter subsides, David’s introduction glosses what is to come 
in terms Parsons himself uses – “uncompromising” and “challenging”.  He also 
states: “He loves questions.  He loves to be challenged”.  The audience is thus  
cued to anticipate opportunities to question this enthusiastic answerer, and 
instructed as to the appropriateness of doing so.   
The joke configures the seeker in two main ways. First, it provides a 
demonstration of a comic seeker.  The seeker David portrays throughout is also 
obviously naive. From misconstruing Parsons as a “spiritual teacher”, to not 
understanding enlightening advice when it is given to him, David’s seeker is a 
likeable buffoon.  Telling this joke about himself however, with such linguist 
precision, suggests rather the opposite of David (allowing for the paradoxical 
point that in Parsons-speak there is no David and no such thing as an 
enlightened person). Secondly, the joke draws upon and reinforces two 
incompatible views of personal pronouns, and implicitly the self.  The first is to 
see personal pronouns as signifiers with referents; the second is to see them 
as signifiers without referents. Following the joke rehearses the audience in 
these incompatible schemes, and in switching rapidly between them. Getting 
the joke requires the audience to switch between these two perspectives, and 
so far as I could tell everyone at the meeting (bar Parsons) laughed at the joke, 
and thus “got it”. Getting the joke might not have been treated as a sign of 
enlightenment, though is impossible unless one makes the interpretative 
oscillation between contradictory perspectives on personal pronouns I have 
described.   
That Parsons’s performance relies on contradictions and encouraging 
audience questions is apparent from his po-faced (Drew 1987) response to 
David’s introduction. Parsons could have endorsed or elaborated aspects of the 
joke, but instead only takes issue with it. 
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Extract 3.9  Parsons Kingscote Talk Pt1 401  111107 17m30s 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
 
David 
 
Parsons: 
Audience: 
Parsons: 
 
… I’m privileged to introduce Tony 
Parsons  
Thank you. 
((Clapping))  
So, maybe I should be uh very clear 
right away, after that announcement.  
That I’m not an enlightened person.  
And as far as the Open Secret is 
concerned, there is no such thing as 
an enlightened person.  The two 
things don’t come together.  
Enlightenment and a person. 
 
 
Note that “the Open Secret” is a term used by Parsons for his own 
teachings.  Parsons goes on to explain how seeking begins and drives seekers.  
He states that “separation” occurs when another object, usually one’s mother,  
appears as distinct so there is no longer “wholeness”.  Freewill, choice, action, 
time are all beliefs attributable to the sense of illusory separation which 
continues into  adulthood.  Soon after separation occurs, a seeking for lost 
wholeness arises. He explained: “everything that people do is actually a longing 
for wholeness or some sense of comforting the individual for a sense of loss”.  
Whilst Gangaji’s account was of her own seeking, Parsons’s exposition is 
largely third person here, bereft of autobiographical detail.  He identifies “the 
seeker” as predisposed towards teachers and teachings with methods and 
processes which fuel his or her search and thus separation.  His own message 
is  “absolutely so simple and obvious that it can’t be seen by the seeker” as 
“This is a message about timelessness and the seeker lives and functions in 
time because seeking is about finding something”.  But there is release of sorts, 
and “liberation”, the word Parsons uses as an alternative to enlightenment, 
entails “the awakening from the dream of being separate.  But  no one 
awakens.  So there is no such thing as a personal awakening.”  The brief talk 
demolishes the possibility of enlightenment as sought by David’s caricatured 
seeker and which the audience clearly understood.  It was replete with remarks 
that were incongruent or contradictory and encouraged questions: “there is no 
person sitting in this room”; “no one is talking to no one”; “we’re not here to find 
a state of peace, stillness, silence.  We’re not here to even find a state of 
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awareness”; and there is no time, choice, action and individuality are all just 
“apparent”.  Such remarks contradict normal expectations, as does the 
following conclusion to this address, to the effect that the words spoken at the 
meeting are unimportant:   
 
 
Extract 3.10  Parsons Kingscote Talk Pt1 401  111107 30m45s 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
 
Parsons: I wouldn’t take too much notice of 
what’s being said (here).  It’s not 
important to make a mental list.  The 
most powerful thing that happens in 
these sor- these meetings and 
everywhere of course but in the 
meeting when there (are people) 
gathered together is a sense of this 
contracted state of being someone, 
melting and exploding and expanding 
into boundlessness. That is 
liberation.  Liberation is 
boundlessness. 
 
The seeker here is primarily an asker of questions.  Faced with the 
incongruities which began with the host’s anecdote, and continued through 
Parsons’s denials of personhood and other fundamental everyday concepts, 
and his brief assertions of “oneness”,  there is much to question.  As for the 
focus of such questioning, the initial joke and Parsons’s talk rehearsed the 
audience in tracking unusual pronoun usages, encouraging them to be very 
attentive towards Parsons’s and their own self references.  An obvious upshot 
is a proliferation of questioning about perceived inconsistencies, such as 
between Parsons’s insistence there is no one in the room, and his own 
appearance at the prearranged event.  Also, why does he give such talks if 
there is no Tony Parsons or no free will? Parsons deals with such questions as 
if his answers were also rehearsed, sometimes beginning to answer a 
questioner before even addressing them personally or locating them in the 
audience. Parsons himself remarked upon the predictability or sameness of the 
questions at his meetings, though appeared to take no steps to minimise such 
repetition, like by addressing recurrent questions in his monologue.  
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The monologue’s brevity was also remarkable.  It lasted 13 and a half 
minutes out of the 1 hour and 11 minutes between its beginning (after David’s 
introduction) and a coffee break.  When he resumed, Parsons was centre stage 
for a further 1 hour and 7 minutes, leading off by stating: ”So, I’m not going to 
make any more speeches, so  if anyone wants to ask (anything)”.  The event’s 
domination by question-answer exchanges was clearly deliberate on Parsons’s 
part, though also required audience co-operation. His uncomfortably long 
pauses and conventionally incomprehensible and self-contradictory statements 
encouraged questions throughout the event.  
The seeker here is idealised as attached to its “me” but entrenched in 
false dualisms, searching and quest(ion)ing adding to this entrenchment. This 
seeker idealisation is thoroughly ironic, though to see the irony one needs to 
appreciate the alternative perspective on “me”, that it is illusory.   
The idealisation which this seeker calls to mind is perhaps the most 
familiar of all.  It is the “me” of conventional speech, the cornerstone of social 
life. This “me” is reminiscent of Hall’s  “Enlightenment subject”, which is “based 
on a conception of the human person as a fully centred, unified individual, 
endowed with the capacities of reason, consciousness, and action, whose 
‘centre’ consisted of an inner core which first emerged when the subject was 
born, and unfolded with it, while remaining essentially the same6” (Hall, 1992: 
275). While Parsons’s assertion that “there is no me” seems the very antithesis 
of Descartes’s legacy, it has no meaning or function without the sovereign 
subject.  The difficulty of relaying such an alien message is recognized by the 
host’s use of a joke which both avoids being wholly accountable for inevitably 
failing to adequately summarize Parsons, and highlights that his message 
contradicts conventional speech and thought.  
 The seeker as “me” is  comic because like all seekers it began as the 
oneness it seeks, and retains that nature, but fails to see this while committed 
to gaining enlightenment, this being something which requires a sense of self to 
pursue or think worth pursuing. The relentlessness of this seeker, and vast 
number of activities which may count as seeking, suggest the familiar generic 
seeker of much popular and academic literature.  The multi-tasking “seeker” 
addressed by Button and Bloom’s (op. cit.) guide (and similar texts, e.g. Lesser 
1999) is characteristically assumed to be interested in a huge range of 
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seekership interests.  Likewise, in academic literature, I have already 
mentioned Campbell’s (2002) paradigmatic account of the self-sustaining  cultic 
milieu.  He  portrays a society of seekers, where ideology and institutions 
support and encourage seeking, to the extent that “seekers do not necessarily 
cease seeking when a revealed truth is offered to them” (ibid, 18).  There is 
always another truth to pursue.  These academic and popular seekers too rely 
upon taken for granted dualistic notions of the sovereign individual, working 
upon themselves, remaining the same seeker while shifting between pursuits. 
Put simply, this seeker is everywhere there is a “me”. 
 
 
3.4.4 Holigral- the fragmented seeker  
 
 
Saunders, his wife, and several other people  make up “Holigral”, a 
business partnership with Saunders as the main innovator.   Holigral 
provides small group therapeutic/life skills/personal development 
courses,  including a 7 day experiential “Authentic Leadership” course 
during which attendees may attain enlightenment. Courses run in 
Glastonbury and other venues in England, as well as internationally.  
Saunders caters in particular for life coaches and therapists who may 
incorporate  his techniques in their own work/businesses.   Saunders 
has combined ideas and practices from such sources as neuro-lingusitic 
programming, David Grove’s approach to psychotherapy,  and Eastern 
religions, with many scientific overtones.   He  has published a paper 
book of Mind Tricks (2008b), and has a website which hosts other free 
self-/electronic-publications (e.g. Saunders 2008a). His teachings 
include therapeutic techniques and theories which explain those 
techniques.  The techniques include scripted forms of questioning, 
delivered in a manner intended to induce a trance-like focus in 
recipients, and to assist “clients” resolve their own personal “issues”.  
Emergence of a transformed or more integrated or whole self is 
considered to be an upshot of these sequences, and when accompanied 
with existential realisations may be viewed as enlightenment. Seekers 
here are course  “delegates” or “clients”,  who are regarded as having 
personal issues which may be traced back to the fragmentation of their 
selfhood in trauma or interactions with others.  Holigral’s “processes” 
allow delegates to  re-embody dissociated self-fragments to produce a 
transformed, more integrated,  whole self.  Holigral also provides 
pragmatic help for people with phobias or who want to improve their  
commercial/sports performance.   There are some esoteric overtones, 
such as claims to provide healings  simply through proximity to 
Saunders or another “awakened one”.   
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This final example of configuration practices corrects any impression 
that configuration is limited to public talks by considering a week long Holigral 
“authentic leadership” (AL) course like that described in Chapter 1.   After that 
ethnography, on another run of the course, I was allowed by everyone to make 
my own recordings.   I shall draw upon such materials from a course in late 
2006,  in Glastonbury. 
A promotional leaflet for the course promised the following: 
 
“ A 7-day personal journey into wholeness of mind body and spirit6 
 
“Finding and integrating your many minds and aspects of self6 
 
“This is not a course for the faint-hearted.  As well as further developing 
your excellence and transferring this to other life areas, you will address 
your dark side or shadow, and you will be transcending and including 
them to become whole, authentic and at peace with yourself.”  
(Source:  Holigral AL leaflet, 2006-7)  
 
 
The leaflet promised certainties (“you will...”).  The implied reader of the 
leaflet, with “many minds” and not yet “whole”,  is elaborated and theorised  
throughout the AL course manual laid on the chair of each course delegate 
from the very first training room group meeting.  But this manual was rarely 
referred to during the course, aside from references to its outdatedness.   
Saunders’s self-theories were delivered as the course was underway, 
sometimes as post hoc explanations of how earlier experiential exercises had 
worked.  It is therefore appropriate to begin with such activities, and how they 
may configure seekers. 
Like many therapeutic or medical encounters,  the AL course begins with 
people being asked to articulate what they want from the event.  Any such 
articulations become objects of scrutiny and the beginning of a reflexive enquiry 
into one’s own selfhood.  On the course I participated in, this initial question 
was answered aloud by each delegate.  On the two subsequent “beginnings” I 
attended delegates were not asked to disclose their answers to the group, 
rather to commit them straight to paper.  Once this question was asked, any 
oral responses were seized upon and became accountably writable, even if not 
an expression of wants. This connotes  psychotherapeutic traditions which 
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attach significance to casual remarks.   Here is an extract from the first evening 
of an AL course in 2006,  picking up after delegates had been pointed to 
coloured pens, spray mount, and A1 paper had been distributed (I was asked 
to do this initial exercise on every course I studied).   
 
 
Extract 3.11  Holigral Glastonbury AL Day0 Pt1 011206 9m10s 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
 
Saunders: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ken: 
Saunders: 
Ken: 
Saunders: 
 
 
 
 
Anne: 
Saunders: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Kate: 
 
Saunders: 
Group: 
Saunders: 
 
Group: 
Saunders: 
 
 
 
 
Kate: 
Saunders: 
Anne: 
Saunders: 
You’ve got the whole space here. Uhm.  
Find a space you want to be your 
space and bear in mind that things 
grow.  So, space yourselves out.  
We’ve got the room in there, we’ve 
got the room in there, we’ve got that 
area, we’ve got here, we’ve even got 
the kitchen and the loos and if you 
really want to work in those areas. 
((indistinct)) 
So, sorry? 
((indistinct)) 
Oh I’ve worked in the kitchen with 
someone.  (Haven’t had people) 
working in the loos. Not yet.  You 
ever know. Someone might have an 
issue that needs working in the loos 
((laughs)). 
So you’ve got spray mount, uh,  all 
this stuff. So literally, what I want 
you to do, is to write on your paper, 
and if you need more sheets then 
there’s a stack of sheets there.  
Everything you want from this week. 
(Okay/thank you).  Got that? 
I haven’t given this any thought at 
all. 
Fantastic. 
((laughter)) 
So that’s the first thing that goes 
on. 
((laughter)) 
“I haven’t given this any thought at 
all”.  So just literally put 
everything you want, ahmmmm, on 
(that).  So that’s the starting 
point. 
So (indistinct) 
Off you go.  Find a space. 
Find a space. 
Find a space.  A bit of wall or floor 
or ceiling.  
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Inviting delegates to disperse around the entire office unit to find “your 
space”, and to keep in mind “things grow”, makes it quite clear that people are 
expected to use more than one sheet of paper and work in their space for a 
while.   The instructions fragmented the group, each person doing as the others 
yet in a way unique to themselves.  What each person produces is 
conceptualised as their “issue” (line 17), which is treated as the true 
determinate of where they work (some may “need” to be worked on in toilets).  
This is very early into the course, and already psychotherapeutic terms like 
“issue” are being used by Saunders.   Interestingly, no one questioned this  but 
rather the group splintered as people quickly claimed space and set about their 
tasks.   
Once each delegate had produced and positioned their personal text,  
Saunders or another “facilitator” would question them about it.  Typically 
delegates would then ponder their works for a while, then answer orally 
sometimes having to wait for the facilitator to return.  They would then be asked 
to add their responses to their developing artwork as further writing or drawing.  
As the cycle repeated drawings grew and spread to cover walls, floors, 
furnishing and parts of the ceiling.   The questions asked were scripted,  in both 
form and delivery, though there were several available scripts.  One  script was 
that of “scaling”  which, to simplify, involves repeatedly asking “and what goes 
around that?” until a person’s drawings “zoom” out visually until the entire 
drawing-scape takes on a recognisable shape,  like a form which has personal 
significance, or perhaps a reflection in one’s eye.    
Thus, very brief instruction, spatial separation,  the deployment of 
mundane physical tools (pens and A1 sheets which can spread to cover large 
surfaces and on which personal issues are represented), and engagement of 
each delegate on individual textual work fragmented the group before there 
was any idealisation of the self as fragmented. Progress through this activity  
required one to constantly embellish one’s artwork, but did not require people 
to think of themselves as fragmented while producing artworks. Nevertheless, 
this activity fragmented the group and was later explained by Saunders in a flip-
chart presentation, as involving the reintegration of previously fragmented or 
dissociated aspects of ourselves. 
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Saunders’s explains why the course begins this way in his “tools and 
techniques” manual, which accompanies another of Holigral’s courses, by 
referring to it as a way dealing with everything delegates want from the course: 
 
“So, why do we start retreats by asking delegates to write down 
everything they want?  A good question.  Because if we can scale 
around all this, then they can be free of all those things in one go!”  
 (2007: 50) 
 
 
However, this does not explain Saunders’s  above keenness for a delegate to 
commit to writing  “I haven’t given this any thought at all”.  It is however clear 
that so long as delegates write something, facilitators may go to work and 
encourage the snowballing artwork characteristic of a person with issues.5 
Configuration has two movements to it.  My consideration of the 
idealisation of the seeker as fragmented was deliberately brief because the AL 
course begins with activities, and only later are these activities supplemented 
with “theory”.   Saunders’s theories of self were quite complex, as outlined in  
Chapter 1, and following this order of events enabled activities to be 
undertaken without theoretical conflicts interfering with them.  Once his theories 
had been introduced however, there was scope for perceived mismatches 
between theory and practices, or the self as idealised and self-perceptions.   
Below, I focus on an activity undertaken after Saunders had explained 
his theories using flipcharts and diagrams. For  Anne,  the activity did not easily 
relate to Saunders’s theories about the self.  Below is a picture of Saunders 
and Anne, several days into the course. Note the eclectic “props”, especially 
the singing bowl under the left flipchart and Buddha by the chair.  From an 
analytic standpoint, visually as well as in their discourse and practices,  Holigral 
appear to exemplify Wuthnow’s (2007) bricoleurs.   
 
                                                 
5 Some of Saunders’s “processes” do not require clients to draw or answer questions – simply 
to indicate when they have answers. Such facilitation is said to be “content free” and to carry 
the advantages of reducing and intrusion of facilitators’ reality into clients’ realities, thereby 
protecting the facilitator from the client’s troubles, keeping a client’s issues private,  and 
bolstering the sense in which clients resolve their issues from their own resources. 
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Photo. 1:  Saunders and “Anne” 6 December 2006. 
“Anne’s” face has been digitally blurred. (Image is copyright Keith Abbott 
2011. Please do not copy or reproduce it.) 
 
 
Anne is undertaking an activity using yellow “post its” to represent 
ancestral relatives and exploring her perceived relationship with those 
ancestors from different perspectives. A goal of this process is a reappraisal of 
these relationships and related transformation of herself (to oversimplify). Her 
posture and gaze are directed towards post-its on the floor.  She appears 
perplexed because while the physical acts required are simple (writing names 
on post its, placing them on the floor, and walking from point to point, then 
moving them and repeating several times), she is struggling to understand 
each part of the exercise in terms of Saunders’s theory of self-change.  This is 
represented graphically in the picture he is pointing towards with his left hand.  
It portrays a person’s self traversing several numbered stages, midway 
encountering a  “wobble” or crisis, perhaps there taking a new perspective, 
after which previously dissociated aspects of self including from one’s ancestral 
past may be integrated.  The current self metaphorically immolates, and a more 
complete self emerges phoenix like.  Saunders’s right  hand is indicating 
generally towards several of Anne’s post-its placed both in and out of shot, 
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while his left is relating their position and Anne’s movement between them over 
time to positions on a graph which schematically represents his  theory of self-
transformation or re-integration. (The visible “dip” on the graph represents a 
“wobble”). This is an instance of a (local) self-theory being directly translated 
from Saunders’s representation to Anne’s symbolic and meaningful action. 
Anne’s satisfactory completion of the exercise came after several more minutes 
of concentrated effort when while performing the activity she visibly eased as it 
came to make sense to her in terms of the self-theory. Once able to enact the 
self (transformation) of the diagram, Anne did not express any more difficulties 
with this exercise or the theory.    
That seekers here are idealised as fragmented but capable of 
reintegrating their fragments has obvious analogies with psychotherapeutic self 
models.  Saunders acknowledges the influence of psychotherapist David 
Grove, with whom he collaborated until differences arose between them in 
2006.   The idea  of  a fragmented self which may become more integrated, 
whole or complete through therapeutic interventions is however not unique to 
Grove. Hoskins and Leseho (1996) identify this as one of several current 
metaphors of the self in counselling theory.  They liken this self to “the board of 
directors of a large firm”.  Its best known instance is Jung’s account of a 
multitude of archetypal personalities under the directing role of the ego (op. 
cit.). Saunders’s views seem even more realist - he describes self-fragments as 
each being  “a separate entity6until integrated”6.   However, such “real”  
ontological status seems at odds with other of Holigral’s practices and 
discourses which suggest non-dual truth claims.  The Buddhist connotations of 
Siddhartha’s statue and occasional assertions of affinities with Buddhism by 
Saunders  seem superficially more congruent with a more “empty” self. Again, 
Holigral seem to exemplify a bricolage approach to enlightenment.  However, 
while there may be  other selves to be found here, it is the fragmented self of 
psychotherapy which seems most pertinent to the configuration of the seeker.   
  
 
                                                 
6 Saunders’s AL Course Manual (2006: 74). 
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3.5 Seekers all revved up, but where to go?  
 
Different idealisations of the self are not just different rhetorical fictions, but 
carry very real consequences.  This point is made clear by Hoskins and 
Leseho’s (1996) discussion of how different “metaphors of the self” from 
academic literature carry very different implications for counselling practice.  
For example, metaphors they consider include: the  “unitary self”, which treats  
the self as a central core, with outer layers to be peeled away through 
counselling; the “integrated self”  analogous to a board of directors, which need 
to pull together or be controlled by the equivalent of a chairperson, such as 
through gestalt therapies; and a “narrative self” approach which encourages 
clients to produce  new self-stories which exclude prior problems (they also 
consider theories and approaches towards  “possible”, “empty”, and 
“internalized” selves). They argue that counsellors need to be aware that 
choices of theoretical metaphors may predispose certain treatments rather than 
others, and that different clients and problems may be more suited to differing 
metaphors.  For example, an integrated self approach which encourages 
patients to accept all parts of themselves may not be appropriate where 
particular sub-selves are “undesirable” (ibid, 250).  They also emphasise the 
different ethical overtones of differing models, arguing that “Each metaphor has 
assumptions about the best way to live within the metaphor” (ibid, 251).   
Before concluding this chapter, I shall therefore briefly consider some of 
the personal and social consequences of the four main idealisations of the 
seeker I have identified in the above cases.  (I emphasise that we are here 
concentrating on idealisations of the seeker, not the sort of enlightened self the 
seeker may become, which is considered more in Chapter 5).  
First then, Cohen’s postmodern self.  With its sophisticated but empty 
life, this self exhibits the “ontological insecurity” Giddens (1991) associates with 
late modernity.  Indeed, Cohen’s configuration of his audience might have been 
inspired by Giddens’s sociological account of late modern life as beset with 
“personal meaninglessness” and “existential anxiety” in which “ontologically 
insecure” individuals lack answers to “existential questions” such as “What to 
do? How to act? Who to be?” (ibid, 9; 35 ff.).   Giddens sees such individuals 
engaged in a  lifelong “reflexive project” of the self, in which without  “tradition”,  
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they constantly strive to address existential questions in successive pursuits, 
turning to experts such as counsellors and therapists at “fateful moments” for 
their self-identity (ibid, 143).  Giddens notes dismissively that “Religious 
cosmologies may play [sic] upon [existential] anxieties” (ibid, 50), though I do 
not see Cohen “exploiting”  such anxieties rather as configuring his audience to 
have (or become aware of) them, to convey the importance of his teachings. 
This smart group of anguished seekers already stand out from the crowd, and 
their similarity and specialness is preserved throughout Cohen’s teachings by 
the notion that he and his audiences are (already)  “on the leading edge”.  Such 
seekers can enact their membership of this cultural vanguard by participating in 
the organised (r)evolutionary activities of EnlightenNext (although  what this 
might entail is left vague, at least at this meeting).   To not do so would be to 
return to one’ soap opera. 
The storied seeker which Gangaji may “stop” also populates Giddens’s 
(op. cit.) view of late modernity,  though to Giddens it is the lack of any 
continuous life narrative which is a problem, not its presence.  To Giddens, an 
absence of  biographical continuity is something  towards which people should 
aspire, for as when modern life generates biographical interruptions or 
discontinuities, this can be problematic for an individual, even pathological.     
For Gangaji,  all of her seekers have stories though their content is not 
important or pre-categorised by her, as for instance Cohen portrayed his 
audience’s stories as “soap operas”.  Unlike in therapy where a storied self 
might be approached with a view to producing a better story, Gangaji’s radical 
departure from narrative therapy is her emphasis upon the possibility of 
stopping all stories of oneself.  This seeker therefore requires practices which 
allow for such stopping.  The silence at the start and finish of her meetings and 
the stage encounters are all such practices and occasions,  and I consider 
them in more detail in the next chapter.  Wanting to change or improve the 
world in any organised manner does not figure here, all that this self must do is 
“stop”.  There is no cultural vanguard here.  
Parsons’s seeker appears similar to Gangaji’s storied seeker, but more 
of a comic character, unable to see what is obvious for looking.  So long as this 
seeker seeks, he or she may entertain and amuse others,  even if they have 
fully “melted” themselves.  Providing any “treatment” for such comic seekers is 
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problematic, as virtually any communication or practice might be construed as 
encouraging seeking in general and/or addressed to someone who is no one.  
Parsons addresses such irresolvable contradictions partly through humorous 
acceptance and embellishments and partly by  portraying his meetings as 
occasions where it is not the words which are important, but  the possibility of  
“a sense of [this] contracted state of being someone, melting and exploding and 
expanding into boundlessness”. The meetings themselves are therefore 
occasions where some people may cease being this comic seeker.  However, 
like the comic seeker, Parsons’s audiences are  encouraged to  take an active 
questioning role during his talks. One audience member seemed particularly 
alert to the extent to which the meeting relied on an audience of non-“liberated” 
questioners. He displayed and drew attention to this understanding rather 
eloquently, by breaking a one and a half minute silence between questions by 
asking the following largely rhetorical and humorous question. That the majority 
of the audience erupted into laughter suggests they also understood this. 
 
 
Extract 3.12  Parsons Kingscote Talk Pt2 402  111107 1h 7m 10s 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
Parsons: 
 
P: 
 
P: 
 
 
X: 
 
 
 
P: 
 
…nothing matters anyway. 
  (40.5) 
°This is all there is° 
  (5.0) 
>Just this<.  >What’s happening<.  
Breathing. Seeing. Moving. Thinking.  
  (1m 30.0s) 
When two people who are (.) liberated 
get together: is there: (.)much for 
them to talk about? 
((Audience [laughter)) 
           [“Yes (  ) (aware there 
is).  And they still can have friends 
who have no idea wh- what they- (what 
they’re talking about)... 
 
 
(Notice that the question does not challenge Parsons on whether or not 
he is a liberated person, and that here Parsons’s po-faced answer implies 
acceptance there is such a category of people, and that he may be one of 
those people or at least has knowledge of conversations between such 
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(liberated) people, as well as such people and their non-“liberated” “friends”.  
The answer seems as odds with some of his earlier assertions that there is no 
such thing as a person, and so appears to sacrifice attempts at consistency for 
quickly re-directing the humour back towards the questioner, or more generally 
“friends” of liberated people.  Parsons’s exact response is however difficult to 
discern in my recording, hence the brackets in the transcript.)  
To cease being this comic seeker, the seeker must either speak as 
Parsons or not at all, and speaking as Parsons in any event cannot be done 
consistently using ordinary language as the joke statement that “what I say6 is 
there isn’t any me” illustrates.  This seeker is particularly discouraged from 
doing anything aimed at becoming enlightened, and even regularly attending 
his or similar meetings would seem a form of comic seeking.  Literally, this 
seeker has nowhere to go. 
Holigral’s fragmented seeker is consequential in that like Hoskins and 
Leseho observe of the fragmented self metaphor, it  requires practices aimed at 
making it whole.  Once whole, the promise is that it should be better than it was 
before in work, play, sport, or any other life activity. But since further 
fragmentation is always possible, in spite of Saunders’s wish that his graduates 
will not need to do a similar course again, it seems this self may always  have 
components to integrate, just as Saunders is continually refining his 
“processes” for self-integration and transformation.   Although contradicted by 
Saunders’s hopes for his graduates, this seeker is idealised in a way which 
allows for a lifetime of therapeutic self-re-integrations.  The fragmented self is 
therefore disposed towards occasions where it may enter further therapeutic 
relationships as client, in order to attain wholeness,  seeking out other 
therapists and in re-enacting Saunders’s techniques becoming also a therapist 
to itself.   Organising into a vanguard is not necessarily incompatible with this 
self, though the narrative means by which it may reintegrate itself weigh against 
its prospects of ever being “no one” or ceasing the stories it is encouraged to 
tell of itself. 
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3.6 Discussion  
  
I have shown four different configurations of the seeker each of which is 
prominent in four respective events concerned with spiritual enlightenment. The 
four seekers are very different, being respectively postmodern, storied, a comic 
“me”, or fragmented.  The configurations occur not only through an individual 
teacher’s discourses and practices, but by the activities of others, including 
introducers, as well as aspects of the settings.  The latter rely on audiences’ 
familiarity with a wide variety of non-spiritual cultural forms (e.g. lectures, 
workshops, stage performances, giving legal permissions). There is never a 
single agent behind the configuration of any seeker, and moreover each 
configuration relies on idealisations of what the seeker is like which have 
analogies in popular and academic self theories. These idealisations were 
never questioned,  even when opportunities allowed, and suggest very different 
life trajectories. 
These materials and their analysis through Woolgar’s metaphor of the 
configured user offer an alternative way of approaching the conceptual 
difficulties of identifying or differentiating “seekers” I raised in relation to the 
academic literature outlined at the beginning of this chapter. There are several 
analytic pay offs to this approach, especially as part of a multi-sited strategy.   
First,  this perspective is sociological and analytic in that it does not simply 
describe events, as does much modern “micro” sociology characteristic of the 
“practice turn” in academe (cf. Schatzki 2001).  Rather, like Heelas’s early work 
on “self-religions”, it treats  local practices as relying upon and relaying wider 
cultural tropes relevant to how people see themselves and others.  Such tropes 
are both limiting and enabling.   Secondly, it is congruent with participants’ 
terminologies while being theoretically informed.  Thirdly, as Woolgar’s 
metaphor is transferable, so is the methodology of identifying cultural 
analogues for configured seekers. Treating other social identity terms as 
configured users of spiritual, religious or other  discourses or practices may be 
fruitful.  For instance, one might explore how religious identities such as 
Muslim, Sikh, or Christian are likewise configured in different ways in different 
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settings, with possibly different consequences.  There is scope for further 
similar research within my materials and across other such sites.   
The configured seeker, and the several different seeker selves and 
trajectories elaborated here are also relevant to the literature reviewed in the 
previous chapter in four key ways.  Firstly, through a “micro” approach  I have 
revealed something of the multiplicity of Self-spiritualities through the 
multiplicity of seeker selves which populate them.  For any possible instance of 
Self-spirituality one could enquire into the nature of the self/selves concerned, 
rather than view “Self-spirituality” as undifferentiated and simply aimed at 
surpassing a generic “socialized self” (Heelas 1996: 19). Indeed, this seems a 
theoretical and methodological priority. Secondly, if we do not enquire into the 
nature of the selves within any enlightenment culture, then attempts to pin 
down “self-authority” (e.g. Wood 2007), seem premature (see Chapter 4 
below).  Thirdly, each site researched might be viewed as a bricolage, and this 
impression is heightened if one spans the sites.  However, whilst the term 
bricolage suggests a certain arbitrariness and disorder, all the sites share a 
concern for enlightenment and are similar by virtue of their deployments of 
familiar albeit different self tropes. In spite of any apparent sense of “bricolage”, 
the sites thus share a common form of orderliness.  Fourthly, seeing the seeker 
as configured approaches seekers at a different level of abstraction to other 
seekership studies, such as those of Sutcliffe (2003: 200) and Campbell 
(2002).  Sutcliffe’s generic view of the seeker as “a religious individualist, 
mixing and matching cultural resources in an animated spiritual quest”, seemed 
congruent with the idealised seeker of Parsons’s event, but not so much other 
events.   Campbell’s cultic milieu, with its ideology and institutions of 
seekership, and Sutcliffe’s recent (2008) emphasis on a seekership habitus, 
are likewise of a higher order. Such higher level theorising is necessary in 
social science, as it provides accounts of how enlightenment cultures fit wider 
society.  However, such theorising can also attend to and be informed by 
empirical studies of the particular, and again studies of configured seekers (and 
their idealisations)  may assist theoretical advances by linking “macro” self 
theories with “micro” practices in particular settings.    
Applying this approach across settings suggests two empirical  
characteristics of enlightenment are that it may not require any particular 
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idealisation of the self as a starting condition, and particular enlightenment 
cultures are characterised by their emphasis on different (seeker) selves, 
selected from a larger cultural bank.  This goes some way towards accounting 
for the proliferation of different teachers and approaches to enlightenments 
associated with similar supposedly “perennial” “truths” (e.g. of oneness). One 
problem faced by any teacher of enlightenment is how to distinguish their 
teaching from others.  One way of doing so suggested by this analysis is 
through different configurations of the seeker, using different but common self 
tropes. Addressing relentlessly seeking comic-mes, postmodern, storied, and 
fragmented  selves distinguishes teachings by distinguishing their attendant 
seekers. 
Finally, the upshot of this analysis for prospects of achieving social 
change through work on “the self” seems optimistic.  Giddens has speculated 
that  “The reflexive project of the self might 6 be the very hinge of a transition 
to a global order beyond the current one” (op. cit.:  223).  He also claims that   
disciplines such as sociology and psychology, as well as therapy and 
counselling,  are “centrally involved6in the formation and continuity of the self”  
(ibid, 33).   I am reminded also of Hoskins and Leseho’s remark that  “Human 
sciences have the daunting task of having to define and therefore shape the 
postmodern self of the next century”  (1996: 251). If, as this chapter has shown, 
enlightenment requires one to see oneself as a typecast seeker, whose role 
has correlates in various academic self theories,  then academics should think 
carefully before introducing new metaphors.  An obvious possibility is that  the 
new academic selves of today may configure tomorrow’s spiritual seekers, and 
thus what such seekers may become. 
 
 
SEEKER SELF:  I’m disappointed.  What use is this chapter do me?  
You haven’t said which of the teachers were the best, brainwashers, or a waste 
of time.  You haven’t helped me or other seekers at all.  If anything, you’ve 
implied that us seekers have no essential characteristics, but are somehow 
concocted afresh at every spiritual meet-up, out of pop-culture self theories.  
That’s pretty insulting. 
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ACADEMIC SELF:  I’m sorry you see it that way.  But I don’t see any of 
the folk I researched as “brainwashers” and I’m not comfortable with speaking 
of seekers unless they’re configured in some way.  Indeed, I share Travers 
(1992a) view of Cushman’s famous (1986) research on the “recruitment-
indoctrination” processes of cultic groups.  Cushman portrayed a “besieged 
self”, subject to thought reform techniques (of the sort famously described by 
Lifton 1989).     Travers distils from Cushman  an “‘ideal’ recruitment-
indoctrination interaction” (ibid, 189).  His thesis is that interaction always 
entails this same  conversion process,  in which selves are continually made 
available both internally (experientially) and externally (to others). This process 
moves through the recruitment of selves which are “wholly constituted by a 
conversion process” (ibid, 211); indoctrination in which there is a “homicidal 
reification of prior self” (ibid, 214); conversion in which old selves are 
renounced and new ones described as being who the convert has been all 
along (ibid, 225); and a post-conversion “selective retrospective”, in which the 
past is refigured to suit the new identity (ibid, 225).  Travers’s key point is that 
to interact at all, is always to “risk” conversion (ibid, 232). So yes, you could see 
the configuration of the seeker as the beginnings of “recruitment”, but this adds 
nothing to my analysis.  Moreover, I suggest Cushman is wrong to treat selves 
as  ““wholly constituted” within interactions, and I hope I have illustrated that 
error by my discussion of the cultural analogues.  
SS:  But again, how does this help my seeking? 
AS: It isn’t intended to, but it may give you a new perspective.  You 
might pay more attention to how different teachers portray seekers and wonder 
about where you may find similar views.  Are they views you’ve had of yourself 
previously?  What makes them ring true?  Without the guru’s teachings, what 
else might you do to “better” this view of yourself?  How might other views of 
yourself encourage you to act or see yourself or even “your self”?  I’ll warn you 
though, once you see yourself as configured, spiritually you may become a lost 
cause.  
SS:  OK, that might weed out some rotten apples.  But  I think what 
you’re saying might be more significant to me than you let on.  Trouble is, I  
can’t see myself as determined or shaped by every teacher I ever visited.  That 
seems ridiculous.  Surely I’ve always been me. 
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AS:  You’re really sounding like David’s “me” joke now. Seeing  yourself 
as the “same” throughout all of your seeking might be a “story” perhaps? 
SS:  Now we’re coming to it.  You’re saying I’m not the same me, aren’t 
you? 
AS:  I’m saying there’s another way of seeing yourself.  Through  
Woolgar’s metaphor, and Heelas’s notion of indigenous cultural self models. 
SS:  Gotcha!  You’re playing guru here aren’t you?  You’ve waffled on, 
with lots of pithy stories and transcripts,  which admittedly caught my eye at 
first, but you’ve simply been using this chapter to configure your reader to 
accept your own version of Woolgar’s configured user.  Which is another “free 
floating” self theory, and not even his or yours. And I suggest it is a highly 
consequential and ethically undesirable one.  It denies seekers have any 
essential self-nature, conflicts with the truths and self-models you’ve been 
researching, and ignores its own historical character as a borrowed theory, not  
even unique to Woolgar (didn’t Foucault say the same sort of thing?). It even 
leaves future researchers with little to do other than describe and analyse other 
“enlightenment cultures”, by imposing on everyone else the very same soulless 
and self-serving configured über-self idea you’ve used here.  You’re suggesting 
a rather empty self, I must say.  
AS:  That’s an impressive critique.  You’ve summed up my argument 
well, but I’m afraid you haven’t got the full implications.  For you, it seems 
understanding me is not enough.  Perhaps you are looking to find what 
Grossberg (op cit.) termed “affective empowerment” here?  You seem to want 
me to help you become something other than a seeker, a “finder” I think you 
might call it, and you seem to think there is something self-defeating about a 
self-exemplifying argument.  Maybe, to quote Parsons, “all there is, is this”. 
SS:  I’ve nothing against a self-exemplifying argument, in fact I quite like 
that. But I’m troubled that you’re not suggesting any way of getting beyond the 
configured self you’ve set up.  That self seems virtually indestructible, but is 
very counter intuitive. Unlike the seeker selves you’ve talked about. And I 
remember you said it was just a metaphor.   I’m confused.  What do you really 
think of the self, of your self,  and have you got that view from secretly following 
one of  your spiritual or even academic gurus?  
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AS:  Well, I haven’t rambled on about my own beliefs about “the self”  
because using Woolgar’s metaphor and drawing upon cultural self theories, I 
haven’t needed to.  That said, I have myself been configured at the events I’ve 
described here, and many others. Taking up the role of a spiritual tourist, or 
“multiple seeker”, was what helped me notice first hand that “I” was addressed, 
treated, idealised, and required to act very differently across different research 
sites.  But you’re right, I do have beliefs about the self, though I’m trying to 
restrict myself to only elaborating what is significant to my subject matter and 
analysis.  Nor am I attempting to  test any theoretical view of the self, or invent 
new ones.   Woolgar’s metaphor just nicely portrays what I lived through at the 
events. and assists me in relating these events to wider social tropes of the 
self.   
SS:  Hmm, so you’re not going to tell me how  you view the self? 
AS:  You really are persistent.  Look, in the next chapter I make use of a 
polyvocal view of human consciousness which you might say implies an 
essentially dialogic form of self, and weave that into an exploration of the affect 
you might find lacking in my own analysis through focusing on gurus’ 
“authority”.    I see the view of  the self I rely on here as fully compatible with 
Woolgar’s notion of configuration.  While I don’t believe in polyvocality as some 
form of ultimate truth of the self, maybe we could continue this debate into the 
next chapter? 
SS: OK.  Though I will say that Woolgar seems very “Zen” in his  
thinking. I rather  think many of you constructionists (that’s what you are?) are 
would-be Madhyamaka Buddhists, without their conviction, sense of truth, and 
ethical and religious compassion.  You constructionists see everything as only 
meaningful in relation to other things, revel in language games,  and treat 
nothing as  having any essential qualities. That is, as empty.    But I’m not really 
sure you are a constructionist any more, as this configured seeker metaphor 
suggests selves are permanently impermanent,  but bolted on to people by real 
practices of some sort. And really,  Giddens, Woolgar, and even a little Wolff 
(that’s why I’m here, right?)?  It seems like you’re trying to “outguru” the gurus 
by employing some bricolage of your own.  
AS:  I assure you I’m not.  Though we really should “talk guru” now.... 
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Chapter 4 Gurus as Experiential 
Experts 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter adds to my argument that the self may be a fruitful focus of 
attention in studies of superficially similar spiritualities by addressing the tricky 
subject of the relation between “the authority of the Self” and authority “outside” 
of the self. After outlining my argument, discussing literature on expertise from 
science and technology studies, and introducing Bakhtin / Volosinov’s 
sociological account of polyvocal consciousness, I draw upon materials 
recorded at three occasions at which “gurus” teach live audiences. I analyse 
these occasions in terms of how gurus’ special “expertise” and respective 
discourses of the self impact upon audience members’ “polyvocal 
consciousness”. This chapter illustrates very generally that the discourse of 
spirituality is a varied discourse, accommodating and integrated with numerous 
different practices of expertise and experiences of affect,  as well as we cultural 
configurations of the self (as we saw in the last chapter).  I argue that the co-
presence of what might be seen as opportunities for self-authority and other 
forms of interaction, including pedagogic encounters, may on the one hand 
seem paradoxical,  but this co-presence plays a key part in enabling the 
constitution of gurus as experts, and the affective experiences of their 
audiences as meaningful in terms of a guru’s teachings.  
4.2 The problem of “who is in charge?” 
 
 
The literature on the New Age and self-authority discussed in Chapter 2 
reveals a tension.  As Heelas (1996) identified in his seminal study, a 
characteristic of “New Age” is appeals to the authority of personal experience. 
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However, as Wood’s (2007) attempt to debunk Heelas through locating 
“authority” within others suggests, experiences in which “the Self” figure are 
often inherently social matters, arising or being expressed in social 
relationships, communicable teachings, public texts, learnable practices.  
Today, in common parlance, certain of those others are called gurus.  There is 
no direct English equivalent of this Sanskrit term. It has however entered 
popular usage and is defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary (eleventh 
edition) as: 
 
“1 a Hindu spiritual teacher. 
2 each of the ten first leaders of the Sikh religion. 
3 an influential teacher or expert: a management guru”. 
 
(Soanes and Stevenson 2006: 636; bold emphasis added) 
 
Taking the lead from this definition, in this chapter I shall examine how a 
selection of people regarded by audiences as gurus present themselves as 
experts. In doing so, I offer contributions to academic literature on the nature of 
“authority” in contemporary spiritualities as well as to literature on the nature of 
“expertise”. 
My argument follows the 2 parts of this chapter. The first part is a  
literature based argument drawing upon  prominent studies of contemporary 
spiritualities.  I suggest the “authority of the Self” is under-theorised in Heelas’s 
(1996) canonical work, and under analysed in the otherwise methodologically 
refined critiques of Wood (2007; 2009). I highlight Partridge’s (1999) refinement 
to the notion of  self-authority,  as an aspect of  “epistemic confusion”  in “new 
age thought” where there is also emphasis upon other authorities.   I suggest 
this tension is not as problematic as Partridge suggests, and that discussions of 
authority generally may be reformulated in terms of “expertise”, and that 
researching practices of expertise provides an empirical  means to explore 
“authority” .   
Previous research has not approached gurus as experts, so some 
conceptual clarification of “expertise” is required. The academic approaches to  
“practices of expertise” I draw upon are Mieg’s (2001; 2006) “interactional” view 
of expertise, and the constructivist  approach to expertise adopted within 
science and technology studies (STS) (e.g. Wynne 1992;  Hilgartner 2000). I 
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suggest gurus have an “experiential” form of expertise, which in differing ways  
inculcates and shapes the experiences of others.  Since STS research does 
not offer a theoretical approach to subjective experience and the self, I also 
draw upon a sociological theory of the self which facilitates considerations of 
authority.  This is the dialogic, polyvocal conception of consciousness of  
Bakhtin (1981) and Volosinov (1973).1   
In the second part of this chapter I use these views of expertise and 
consciousness as analytic lenses in exploring  ethnographic and recorded 
materials from live performances of three case study gurus introduced 
previously: Cohen; Gangaji; and  Parsons. I will focus upon the different 
practices by which  a guru’s personage is associated with the subjective 
experiences of others.   
I conclude by elaborating how my analysis adds to debates about the 
nature of authority in “New Age” pursuits, in particular Heelas’s (1996 esp. 21; 
211) insight that the “voices” of others are “mediated” through “inner 
experience” or what participants take to be “the authority of the Self”, and 
Partridge’s (1999) observation that “new age thought” is beset with a confusion 
between epistemological individualism and its authoritative practitioners.           
 
 
4.3 PART I:  Gurus, Experts, and Selves 
 
4.3.1 Charismatic authorities in academic and popular 
literature 
 
Academic and popular literature shares an approach to gurus which 
affords their public personas more attention than the social practices which 
constitute them. In popular writings, gurus may be true, false, distant, close, 
present, absent,  alive, departed,  generous or reluctant (cf. Narayan 1974).  
With but a few exceptions they are always people.2 As people, their personas 
                                                 
1 It is uncertain whether Bakhtin authored Volosinov (1973). 
2 One notable exception outside the popular sphere is the multi-authored Sikh Guru Granth 
Sahib, or “Guru Book”.  Within Sikhism this text is treated as if it is a distinct personage.  See 
Singh (2008) for an illuminating discussion of the special status afforded to this sacred text.  
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are the popular topics of guru-hopping odysseys of enlightenment (Thompson 
2002; Desani 1972),  exposés (Tarlo 1997, van der Braak 2003, and Yenner et 
al. 2009 on Cohen), celebrations (e.g.  Wombacher 2008 on Cohen; Terrell 
1997 on Gangaji), and attacks on “bad gurus” in general (e.g. Falk 2005:  453).  
Academics likewise tend to treat gurus as having fixed attributes by which they 
are gurus, such as that they are “Enlightened Masters” (Rawlinson 1997), or 
“revered teachers”  with different “special knowledge” but similar “psychoses” 
(Storr 1997).   
This essentialist tendency is reminiscent of the view of gurus as 
charismatic authorities found in studies of the New Age discussed in Chapter 2.   
It brings problematic consequences for social research.  
First, it tends to stifle research agendas.  References to charisma in etic 
and emic discussions of gurus encourages us to think of authority in terms of 
the personal qualities of individuals rather than the social settings and practices 
in which charisma is enacted or attributed. The notion of charisma is 
nevertheless attractive to analysts,  for as Barker (1989: 13) observes,   “New 
religions are rarely initiated by committee”, but more often by persons believed 
to have “special powers or knowledge”.  The stifled agenda is implicit in 
Barker’s comments here, for  if being perceived as having “special powers or 
knowledge” may be of foundational  import to certain spiritual teachers then the 
means by which this perception is fostered and maintained must have  
sociological significance. Even when academics attempt to address such 
topics, it is difficult to resist the ingrained tendency to black box guruhood.  For 
instance, Forsthoefel and Hume (2005:4) preface their collection of papers on 
Gurus in America  with a declaration of interest in how the identities of 
particular gurus are “constructed”, but the papers which follow, although  
informative,  are not the promised analyses of identity construction. 
A second trouble is that the term “authority” itself is a common political 
concept, implying an improper exercise of power over issues of truth and 
behaviour.  As Turner (2006:  165) points out, “one usually thinks of authority in 
contrast with truth”. This is rather antagonistic towards spiritual gurus regarded 
by others as purveyors of truths.  Acknowledging gurus as persons regarded by 
others as having “special powers or knowledge” is not necessarily antagonistic 
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and again encourages research into the occasions and practices which 
reinforce this aspect of their identities.  
A third  and more technical trouble is the confusion which can arise  due 
to different meanings being given to the term authority within academic 
debates, and with it the issue of how best to approach the notion empirically.     
This trouble is worthy of lengthier consideration. “Authority” has foundational 
import within sociology, given its prominence in Weber’s work (1978).  Weber’s 
term was Herrschaft, which  does not translate easily into English, possibilities 
including both “authority” and “domination”.  He defined it as “the probability 
that a command6will be obeyed by a given group of people” (ibid, 53).   As 
Roth points out in his recent translation of Weber, Weber’s emphasis on 
legitimate forms of Herrschaft  indicates a more complex meaning as in 
practice he treats authority as entailing a “structure of superordination and 
subordination” resting on a “variety of motives and means of enforcement” 
(Roth, in Weber op. cit.: 61-62, n. 31).  While Weber’s notion of “authority” 
figures in sociology’s heritage, contemporary scholars of spirituality rarely claim 
more than a passing allegiance to Weber.  The only study I have cited in which 
an author analyses empirical materials using an explicitly Weberian framework 
is Campbell’s (2007) work on Easternization. Frisk’s (2002) deployment of 
Weber is more typical of contemporary scholarship in this field – her 
observation that her “satsang network” is characterised by the emergence of 
“charismatic leaders” from “institutionalised religions” serving to interpret her 
materials in a Weberian light without dissecting their “charismatic authority” 
itself.  
The nature of authority in contemporary spirituality has recently  become 
very topical.  There is little doubt that Heelas’s (1996) study firmly associated 
the notion of “the authority of the Self” with a myriad of diverse spiritual pursuits 
for a generation of scholars.   As recounted previously Heelas observed that  
the New Age rests upon “what is taken to be the authority of the Self” (ibid, 221, 
my emphasis),  though was  populated by not only seekers but “voices of 
authority emanating from experts, charismatic leaders and established 
traditions” (ibid, 21; 221).  In spite of superficial affinities between such 
statements and Weberian terminology,  in theorising such observations Heelas 
does not claim to be performing Weberian analysis.  Instead, he is being  
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faithful to his participants’ perceptions and accounts of  “the authority of the 
Self”.  He does not take this participants’ view at face value, however, 
introducing his analytic notion that other possible authorities are  “mediated by 
inner experience” (ibid, 21).  The problem is that this theoretical move suggests 
a rather realist view of both selfhood and authority figures, but  as Wood (2007: 
esp. 63) points out in his critique of Heelas, Heelas is not clear about what he 
means by “the Self”, so what he means by “the authority of the Self” is equally 
imprecise.   In contrast, Wood addresses this perceived shortcoming in 
Heelas’s work by beginning his own ethnographies with a Foucauldian  account 
which sees selfhood as a consequence of subjectivation in social practices and 
interactions.  This discussion provides the backdrop to his empirical attack 
upon the “sociology of spirituality paradigm” which he claims is characterised 
by the view that “the self exercises its own authority” and “the theoretical 
presupposition that a distinction can be drawn between external authority and 
self-authority” (2009:  238; 240). His critique locates “authority”  outside of any 
constructed “Self”, in  social practices and relations.  Nevertheless, Wood 
exhibits a degree of gerrymandering between both sides of  the dualistic notion 
of authority he attacks, retaining a commitment to notion of “external” or  “social 
authorities”, by which he means “experts” and  “leaders” rather than “learners” 
(2009:  243; 246).   While these “social authorities” may figure in the practices 
and interactions he directs attention toward, his ethnographies and analysis 
tend to present such social authorities as given, that is, as somehow formed 
prior to the practices and interactions he considers.  Wood thus ends up 
treating  people (and texts) as possible  authorities, rather than elaborating how 
they come to be regarded or constituted as such in the interactions or practices 
to which he directs our attention (e.g. 2007: 93-4).  His analysis is not wrong, it 
simply does not go as deeply as his agenda   suggests it should.   
This third trouble with the notion of authority behoves analysts to treat it 
the term itself very carefully.  It should also be remembered that the apparent  
tension in studies of “New Age” phenomena between external authorities and 
self-authority is first and foremost an empirically discernible emic tension.  
While Heelas first brought this tension to the attention of academics, Partridge 
(1999) has argued that “new age thought” itself is characterised by such  
tensions.  He describes these as being between the ideal of “epistemic 
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individualism”, according to which one should recognise only truths derived 
from personal experience,  and the “epistemic trust” one may place in gurus 
and texts who purvey such truths.  He suggests the result of such tensions is  
characteristic  “epistemic confusion” within New Age thought and practices, 
which is likely to increase as the essentially modern, individualised pursuit of 
truth within such activities mixes with postmodern ideas such as those of a “de-
centred self” and disdain for authority figures and master narratives.   
That Wood did not find such tensions is surprising – the meditation 
group he researched for instance involved taught practices which cultivated 
personal experiences the meanings of which were discussed socially.  The 
reason for this seems to be Wood’s critical agenda and commitment to 
theorising his network as a whole.   However, I disagree with Partridge that 
such tensions might suggest “new age thinking” is necessarily “confused.” 
Partridge’s negative appraisal seems based upon a familiar academic 
perspective upon “common sense” thinking in general. This perspective takes 
“The existence of such contrary beliefs ... as evidence for the hopeless 
confusion of common sense, and the need for methods and rigours of science 
to clear up matters once and for all” (Billig et al. 1988:  16).  As the reader may 
surmise from my discussion of “spirituality” in previous chapters, viewing “new 
age thought” as a “lived ideology” (Billig et al. op. cit.), we should not be 
surprised if it contains statements and ideas which generate dilemmas, debate, 
and thought.  
Returning to Wood, it worth delving deeper into his treatment of 
authority, as it is not so much his intentions but implementation which are 
problematic.  Wood acknowledges that participants’ “religious experiences and 
senses of self are shaped through their interactions with authorities”, but  
argues that in his network “those authorities are unable (singularly or in a 
group) to shape these in a formative manner” (2007:  156).  These conclusions 
involve a sleight of hand, which reveals an under theorising of authority and 
under analysis of materials.    In the  ethnographic occasions Wood  examines 
where he allows for the possibility that subjectivity may be “shaped” by 
authorities,  his analysis is at its most powerful in discrediting other scholars’ 
essentialist notions of seemingly absent self-authority.  But when he steps back  
and views his network as a whole,  such as through participants’ interview 
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accounts (which he does not elaborate in much detail), he takes the fact of their 
multiple relationships and that  they express themselves using multiple 
narrative types (not only from within the network but characteristic of their class 
and religious backgrounds) as evidence of no “strong” self-identification with 
authorities “or any amalgam of them” (2009:  241). In Foucauldian terms one 
might argue that the network reaffirms an insidious form of subjectivation in 
which the self is constituted as apparently undetermined by any individual 
authority figure by virtue of each person’s “multiple seeking” (cf. Sutcliffe 2003:  
204-8), which activity itself requires and sustains the multiple authorities.  
However, Wood’s commitment to a critique of self-authority and theoretically 
modelling his network means his analysis of practices of authority stops short, 
not addressing how Heelas’s important notion of authorities being “mediated 
through the authority of the Self” might play out.   
Wood’s work  has taken debates about the nature of authority in spiritual 
pursuits forward both conceptually (by highlighting tensions and paradigmatic 
thinking in prior work) and empirically (by emphasising the need for careful 
focus upon occasions and practices where authorities  may figure).  
Nevertheless,   I have shown his analysis faces difficulties moving between 
levels of analysis (i.e. individual subjectivation and the entire  network).   
Implicit throughout his work is also a tension between a postmodern denial of 
the self and emphasis upon “contextualization”, and treating social authorities 
as pre-given entities which are somehow enfolded into the self.  
Bakhtin/Volosinov’s concepts of dialogic or ployvocal social consciousness and 
authoritative discourse provide conceptual means to address both authority and 
subjectivation in ways which avoid such difficulties, and I shall briefly return to 
the light they may shed on Wood’s materials below.  Before doing so however, 
I shall discuss how STS views of expertise may assist this exploration of 
authority by providing useful conceptual and methodological approaches to 
gurus as special kinds of “social authorities”, that is, as “experts”.3 
                                                 
3 STS is largely unconcerned with developing theories of the self.   Nevertheless, the dialogic 
view I am adopting here has some affinity with   Latour’s (2005: esp. 207-218) conception of 
Actor Network Theory, in which  the human actor is a “gathering” or “network”, enabled to “act” 
through “downloading” “pluggins”  circulating  in  social ether (“plasma”).  Using ANT’s 
terminology would however complicate and confuse my analysis, which is not an ANT study, 
whereas for purposes of illuminating subjectivation and authority in spiritual practices 
Bakhtin/Volosinov integrate much  better. Saukko (2008) likewise deploys Bakhtin/Volosinov in 
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4.3.2 Who is an expert? Adding gurus to the periodic table 
 
On a cultural level, Beck and Giddens have respectively commented 
upon the proliferation of expertises in contemporary society.  However they 
speak of two rather different types of expert.    Beck sees scientific experts 
playing a key role in our “risk society”.  In this society,  people are more than 
ever affected by risks and possibilities beyond their immediate experience and 
cognition, and thus are “dependent on the external knowledge” (emphasis 
removed) of experts  (1992:  53).  To Beck, people do not have a free hand in 
choosing such experts, rather it is experts who “choose the victims” (ibid, 54). 
Giddens however emphasises the increasingly prominent role of therapists and 
counsellors to whom individuals may turn at  “fateful moments” when their self-
identity  is  unsettled or in transition. While Beck’s experts relay knowledge of 
external risks invisible to others,  Giddens’s experts serve as catalysts for self-
change in individuals’ on-going reflexive project of working on and constructing 
their selves (1991, esp. 71, 143).   Both theorists treat involvement with experts 
as a common feature of  contemporary life, although the nature of the 
expertises concerned appear very different.  
In spite of this proliferation of experts, there is an obvious problem of 
definition.    As social psychologist Mieg (2001; 2006) observes, almost anyone 
can act as an expert in the right circumstances  (2006: 745).  Mieg’s solution is 
to examine the “form” of encounters between experts and others, which he 
says takes a common interactional shape, “the expert” (ibid, 744). He argues 
that  “we need to understand expert  as a form of interaction rather than as a 
person” (2001:  43). In expert interactions,  “somebody explains a matter (what, 
how, and/or why) to someone else”.  An expert is a role played out in such 
interactions, what counts as “expertise” being “relative to the performance 
criteria applied in a particular context” (ibid, 746).  To Mieg, “the distribution of 
expertise in an interaction has to be regarded as a joint construct achieved by 
the participants” (ibid, 746).  As experts are constituted in interactions so are 
“non-experts” (ibid, 746).  We may liken this to the configuration of the seeker 
implying  configuration of the guru, just as  notions of expertise require a non-
                                                                                                                                              
her recent analysis of discourses of anorexia, and I am indebted for her “enlightening” 
inspiration.  
 - 169 - 
expert  “layman”.  The “main constituting process” of Mieg’s expert is an 
audience’s or client’s attribution of expert status (2001: 56ff).  Such attribution 
relies on assumptions that whatever an expert has is obtainable by others, 
given time and application, so that the expert’s “truth” is “what I could know 
myself if I had enough time to undertake the necessary experience” (2006: 748-
50).  To Mieg, the attribution of expertise and its underlying assumptions are 
however not apparent to participants, who embroiled in expert interactions 
commit a “fundamental attribution error” by overestimating the personal aspects 
of expertise (e.g. training) and underestimating interactional factors (e.g. role 
relationships and group influences) so “information and explanations provided 
by an expert are6attributed to a stable dispositional property of that person – 
his or her expertise.  The context of expertise is systematically faded out” (ibid, 
751).   
The traditional view of gurus as charismatic authorities I outlined above 
predisposes analysts towards committing a similar “attribution error” to that 
described by Mieg.  Treating gurus as “charismatic authorities” bypasses the 
interactional forms and attributions and many other aspects of, to use Wood’s 
term, “contextualization”,  by which they are constituted as experts.   
Mieg’s “relative” or “contextual”  view of expertise is echoed within the 
sociological research tradition of STS.  From the 1980s onwards, STS 
researchers have amassed empirical studies on scientific practices and 
knowledge and over recent years have come to increasingly tropicalize the 
notion of scientific expertise.  STS is however not unified in its approach to 
expertise, and may be divided into two broad approaches: constructivist and 
normative. I shall make only passing reference to the normative after outlining 
the constructive. 
Constructivist STS researchers tend to approach expertise 
ethnomethodologically, as a participants’ category, as something constituted 
when and through the practices whereby it is attributed (e.g. Lynch 2004).  A 
noteworthy study of this type is Wynne’s (1992) work on Cumbrian sheep 
farmers affected by fall-out from the 1986 Chernobyl  disaster.  The farmers 
had first-hand experience of local farming conditions and the behaviour of their 
sheep, whereas the scientists advising them were unfamiliar with such things 
and generally ignored the farmers’ input.  Wynne focuses upon issues of trust 
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and credibility between scientists and farmers, and from interviews with the 
farmers describes   various “lay criteria for judgement of science” such as:  
does the knowledge work?; is attention paid  to other available knowledge? 
(e.g. that  of the farmers); do scientists admit their mistakes?; and what are 
their social/institutional affiliations?  Noteworthy aspects of Wynne’s work are 
that it highlights  the need for empirical studies to unravel the nature of 
expertise as it is enacted or performed  in particular settings, that expertise is 
not the sole province of scientists, and like Mieg’s work it emphasises the form 
such performances may take whether or not identity terms such as “expert” are 
actually used. 
Whilst not an ethnomethodologist, Hilgartner (2000) serves as a good 
example of this tradition.  He argues that scientific expertise or credibility may 
be viewed as a “performance”.  Hilgartner applied Goffman’s dramaturgy to 
scientific writing, emphasising that credible expert authority is constituted 
through “dramaturgical cooperation”, collective work which shapes the 
experience of audiences.  This work includes persuasive rhetoric and 
performances (in which scientists construct personae which rely on “’identity 
norms’ befitting a person of their status”) and  “strategic impression 
management” (in which audiences experiences are influenced by  “information 
control”,  selections between information that is made public and that which is 
not).  
Collins and Evans represent the contrasting normative approach to 
expertise within STS  (e.g. Collins 2004, Collins and Evans 2002, 2007).  Their 
research entails  mapping different types of  expertise(s) by reference to a 
conceptual “periodic table of expertise”, with gradations from “no expertise”, to 
“interactional expertise”, to “contributory expertise”, and  the notion of “meta 
expertises” (that is, expertise in judging other expertises by reference to 
conventional meta criteria such as credentials, relevant experience, and track 
records).    
The pertinence of “contextual” approaches to expertise such as those of 
Mieg, Lynch, Wynne and Hilgartner is that they encourage careful attention to 
the details of expert practices. While there is a tendency in some academic 
literature to ignore or denigrate gurus’ expertise (such as by viewing them 
primarily as producers of  consumable commodities, e.g.  Rindfleish 2005, 
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Carrette and King 2005), approaching  gurus this way inspires empirical 
consideration of the forms their expertise may take from the  “bottom up”.    
My analysis is not an exhaustive attempt to catalogue all aspects of 
gurus’ expertise, but it does suggest a new addition to Collins and Evans’s 
periodic table.  I shall focus upon how a guru’s persona may become 
associated with subjective experiences of others so that a guru seems 
personally creditable for such experiences or “enlightenments” – I term the 
accomplishment of this association “experiential expertise” and as we will see 
unlike Mieg’s “expert interaction” it refers to the effect (and indeed affect) rather 
than form of interactional practices.  I argue understanding the operation of 
experiential expertise in any particular setting is important to understanding the 
operation of “authority” in that setting.  This approach attends to one of the 
most conventionally recognised aspects to guruhood – as Tollini (2007: 426, 
my emphasis) observes of Buddhist Master Dogen, his “legitimacy is based on 
the certification of his lineage from a Chinese master and on the transmission 
of enlightenment from mind to mind.”  It also takes up the task of investigating 
empirically non-scientific epistemologies which emphasise subjective insights 
and realizations (cf. Iwersen 2007).   
 
4.3.3 Selves as voices 
 
 
The final tool with which I shall approach materials here is the polyvocal  
view of the self of Bakhtin and Volosinov.  Rather than seeing the self in 
sovereign, traditional, or centred terms, that is as a kind of unique core within 
each of us  to which we may be “true” (cf. Hall’s Enlightenment subject, 
discussed in the previous chapter), this view approaches the self not as an 
entity, capable of “mediating” the “voices” of others, but as composed of such  
voices.  To Volosinov (1973:  esp. 12-13), all discourse is ideological and 
derived from the social group or period in which an individual interacts.  It 
makes up an individual’s consciousness, through becoming adopted in their 
external and  “inner speech” (ibid,  esp. 14-5). Changes in grammars  (including 
linguistic “styles”)  likewise reflect and “refract”  socio-historic conditions and 
carry consequences for “linguistic consciousness” (ibid, 125ff;  158).  
 - 172 - 
“Authority” may thus be viewed  as a process, as, in Bakhtin’s sense, a 
persuasive or authoritative discourse associated with another  comes to be 
assimilated as one’s own (1981: 342-9). Rather than emphasizing agentive 
features and dispositions of human “authorities”, this view also sees certain 
propensities as residing in discourses themselves.  Importantly, the discourses 
we will be concerned with in this chapter may be regarded as discourses of the 
self in that the assimilation of these discourse into polyvocal consciousness not 
only provide ways of interpreting the world, but  also interpretative schemes 
and resources which both assert and provide ways of understanding one’s own 
true and essential nature, that is to say, one’s “self”.  In this respect, each 
discourse is based on the premise that people who are not already familiar with 
its particular view of the self and adept in its associated practices are not who 
they think they are (and with that inherently disempowered or alienated from 
their true nature in ways described within each discourse).  Furthermore, from 
the perspective of each such discourse, so long as individuals remain outside 
of that discourse they have  little hope of changing this situation. 
To complete this “toolkit”,  I will also make use of Bakhtin’s (1981:  272-
3; 425) theory there are two opposing forces in language, centripetal or 
homogenizing forces and centrifugal or decentralizing forces.  In the former, the 
impetus is towards a single voice or discourse, as in certain poetry; in the later 
a multiplicity of voices may co-exist, as in the modern novel. One way the 
practices of gurus may be distinguished is through the respective weights 
afforded to centripetal and centrifugal movements in any authoritative 
discourse, thus mitigating against the tendency to see “authority” as resting in 
the personage of any individual guru.    
It is not only through growth in interest in Bakhtin’s work that the notion 
that we truly are polyvocal, meaning that this is the nature of our selves or 
human consciousness,  has risen to prominence within both academe and 
popular culture throughout the late twentieth and early current centuries.   A 
similar view is also for example taken by Berger when, writing on the social 
construction and alienating nature of religion, he describes human 
consciousness or the self as having two aspects, the socialized and non-
socialized.  While the socialized aspect comprises the “’voices of 
consciousness’”, which may enter “internal conversation”, the latter entails 
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“bodily processes” so that consciousness as a whole is never “totally 
socialized”. To Berger, the objectification of the self to itself involves a form of 
“alienation” when its social basis is forgotten or “lost to consciousness”  (1969:  
83-4).  At a societal level, Gergen (2000b:  206) speaks of there being an 
empirical “shift from the centred self to polyvocality, a condition in which the 
individual is capable of holding a multiplicity of views, values, and statements”.  
In the popular sphere, noticing its uses in various forms of psychotherapy, 
Merzel (e.g. 2007), a contemporary Zen teacher, has incorporated 
performances of polyvocality into his teachings of enlightenment by calling 
upon his audiences and readers to enter dialogues with him and themselves by 
speaking about the self from the perspective of one of many voices, such as 
”The Master”, “No-Self”, and “The True Self”, thus becoming less identified with 
any of their possible “voices”.  I  am using the notion of polyvocality here as I 
used Woolgar’s notion of configuration, that is as a heuristic in my analysis.  In 
this sense my usage of polyvocality follows the manner in which Saukko (2008) 
employed the concept in her sociological analysis of the “anorexic self”, though 
the notion itself is presently in vogue in the other ways I have mentioned.  
  
In the rest of this chapter,  I discuss three live performances in which 
gurus’ experiential expertise is constructed through very different practices. For 
each, I concentrate upon elaborating how discourses are associated with 
gurus’ personas and the experiences of their audiences, and thus how their 
expertise is  constituted through this association. I suggest maintaining this 
association is a fundamental aspect of gurus’ performances.  
 
SEEKER SELF:  Hmm, I think I see your argument here.   And thanks 
for giving a clearer idea of what you think about the self. I quite admire Merzel’s 
work.   (I know, just an “heuristic”6.).  I’m a bit troubled by what Berger has to 
say though since I can guess you’re going to tell me that gurus who help 
people see who or what they really are, are somehow tricking them into 
mistaking just another social voice for their true nature, which, let me guess, is 
really just a combination of social voices and bodily processes.   I also like the 
idea of treating gurus like scientific experts. That seems very respectful. But, 
you also seem  sympathetic to STS work which treats scientists as merely 
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performers. I’m a bit confused. Also, you seem to be suggesting there is a way 
to tell which gurus are more authoritarian than others, which sounds useful to 
me,  but what happens if the most authoritarian ones are the ones who are best 
able to enlighten followers?   
ACADEMIC SELF: You’ve thrown quite a lot at me here.  Let me just say 
that your comments about the implications of Berger’s views are spot on, 
though he himself avoids going so far by maintaining that from a sociological 
standpoint the “ultimate epistemological status” of religious truth claims and 
experiences should be “rigorously bracketed” in favour of “methodological 
agnosticism”  (op. cit.: 88; 100; 179ff.).  I can see you’re going to make it 
difficult for me to get away with that, though you may need to bear with me 
since  according to Berger the sociological venture depends on it. 
I’m glad you like the sound of  Collins and Evans’s work.  They portray 
the complexity of what expertise is currently taken to be very well, but their 
normative approach does not very well accommodate non-scientific expertises.  
More spade work is needed before that is attempted.  And “constructivists” are 
very good diggers.  
As for who is more “authoritarian”, this is not what I mean. Nor do I aim 
to identify the “best” guru in any sense.   All of the “gurus” I consider teach 
through a wide variety of means and occasions, so analysis of the occasions 
here will not apply to every teaching occasion of each respective guru, and it 
would be antithetical to my analysis to construe it as applying to any guru 
“themselves”.  What I offer is a way of comparing different practices of 
expertise, which associate gurus’ personas with their audiences’ experiences.   
This may help you choose between occasions (courses perhaps) rather than 
gurus.  But my analysis is most relevant to academic debates about self-
authority and studies of expertises in general. 
SEEKER SELF:  Okay, I’m still interested.  But don’t forget, the “what” of 
this sort of thing is more my bag than yours.  I’ve seen your early drafts of this 
chapter – you don’t say much about your own experiences in favour of 
recounting micro pauses in talk and other dull stuff like how chairs were 
arranged.  If you’re arguing gurus are somehow experts through being 
associated with people’s experiences,  surely you should recount your own.  
And if you have trouble doing that, then  let me do it. 
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ACADEMIC SELF: I do wonder which of us is calling the shots in this 
text, but I take your point. We both “surrendered” to these events in Wolff’s 
(1976) sense but you seem to be able to write about “catches” that I  find 
embarrassing,  awkward, or irrelevant. Let’s try this.  For each event, I’ll outline 
the structure, you explain how you got your “fix” (as Saunders once put it to 
you), and I’ll then pick out some recorded or ethnographic details for analysis 
and relate your experiences to expertise and possible “authority”. It’d help if you 
would mention how if at all you “experienced” any guru or other teacher figure 
at each occasion. We’ll start with Cohen. 
SEEKER SELF:  Great! [Types] “Participation in this event was rather 
like being in a succession of different events6” 
ACADEMIC SELF:  Hang on, me first! 
 
4.4 PART II  Performances of expertise 
 
4.4.1 Cohen: speaking as the Authentic Self  
 
I have selected this event because it is  different from all of my other 
materials in that it relied not only upon  oscillations between group activities 
and pedagogic input, but the punctuation of “experiential” events with videos of 
Cohen, who was not physically present.  It is a one day course on “Enlightened 
Communication“ (“EC”), led by  Chris Parish, EnlightenNext London’s MD and 
a senior “core” student of Cohen.  The course took place in EnlightenNext’s 
London  building, in February 2008. On Cohen’s website, EC is described as a 
“new”, “authentic” and  “unique form of communication”, resulting from being 
“catapulted into a higher state of consciousness”, and moreover something 
which can be “learned” and indeed “must be practiced by all committed 
individuals who strive to come together beyond ego for the sake of the 
evolution of consciousness and culture” (Cohen 2008).    
There were around fifty people on the course, with varying familiarity 
with Cohen’s teachings. The structure of the course was timetabled and 
orchestrated throughout by Parish. At the outset, Parish explained the day 
would involve EC, but first some “context” and “background” was needed. 
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The day  included two small group activities, one before and one after 
lunch.  We were asked to restrict our discussions during breaks to the matters 
being taught, rather than anything “personal”.  Before and after each activity, 
Parish gave talks to the group.  He also showed video clips of Cohen 
addressing other audiences before and after the morning exercise, and again 
before the afternoon exercise.   Three clips were played in all.  Before the final 
clip, Parish also played several audio recordings of comic sketches he and 
another of Cohen’s students had enacted, illustrating “awkward customers”.  
These were caricatures of types of people who over the years Parish had 
identified as having difficulties in “getting” Cohen’s teachings.   The day ended 
with everyone seated in a circle participating in an EC discussion, the “seed” of 
which was a quotation from Cohen’s website which Parish read aloud.  
SEEKER SELF: Participation in this event was rather like being in a 
succession of different events, though it did eventually all come together at the 
end.  The first video of Cohen was a 10 minute summary of his teachings. He 
explained his distinction between “personal” and “impersonal” or “evolutionary 
enlightenment” and that his current work was dedicated to “showing people 
how6through coming together we can invoke an intersubjective field of 
enlightened egoless consciousness and begin to engage in the context of 
egoless consciousness itself”.  He saw this as “the evolution of enlightenment”, 
not requiring us to give up our “capacity for individuation” which was the “gift of 
evolution”, and having implications for the “evolution of culture on the leading 
edge”.  Parish could  have provided a shorter summary, I’m sure.  I grew 
impatient watching this clip, as I knew this background and wanted to get stuck 
into the meat of the course.    
I really perked up when Parish set the first small group exercise. We 
were asked to experience and discuss the “part of our self” which was “beyond 
our personal story”, a “basic sense of being”, “the ground of being”, or “not 
knowing” which was “outside the stream of time”. This experience was to be 
“foundational” to everyone actually attempting EC later.  
Everyone seemed to find this first exercise very easy. My group did not 
discuss Cohen nor Parish as gurus or at all, but simply got into a conversation 
about accessing such a “place”, and how speaking about it took us out of the 
place but we wanted to then go back, “deeper”.  We all seemed to have some 
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direct experiences of getting “beyond our personal story”. One woman in my 
group remarked on how good it was to simply be able to talk about such things 
with others, and how remarkable it was to be talking like this to people we 
barely knew. I enjoyed this and was my group’s spokesperson for the feedback, 
looking equipped for the task with my notebook and recorder.  
Parish’s subsequent talk and the second Cohen clip, about the nature of 
consciousness, seemed to pass very quickly.  In this clip, Cohen emphasised 
that consciousness was the “ground of our experience at any moment”, 
entwined with our culture but also a “feeling of being”.  He defined 
enlightenment as “the experience of consciousness beyond ego”.  Straight after 
the clip, Parish suggested that what we had covered so far was “one important 
aspect”, a “foundation” for EC that provided a new motive for mediating - 
making one “available” for “communication beyond ego”.    
After lunch, Parish played his “awkward customer” sketches.  These 
were both funny and informative.  I felt a bit like the guy whose ego trait was 
“already knowing”. I should have opened up more to the first clip.  Parish 
followed up these sketches with a third video of Cohen, this one on “not 
knowing”.  I paid a lot of attention to that, following the sketches and thinking of 
my earlier impatience.  I was bothered that all the constructivist literature I had 
read would make it difficult for me to experience the Authentic Self. In the clip 
Cohen explained his view that the degree to which people are unaware that 
they believe they already know about such things is a serious barrier to their 
development “at higher levels”. 
Although enthused by this clip, during the second small group exercise 
in which we were asked to talk with each other from the Authentic Self  I said 
very little as even in my Wolffian “surrender” I could not get much sense of 
talking “from” my confused notion of a constructed Authentic Self. I had not 
surrendered enough, I thought.  However, when I let go of the idea of having to 
find “it” I felt I did have things to say:  about its elusiveness.  My contribution 
was to share my feeling that thinking one has found the Authentic Self 
immediately contains it and loses it (meaning it becomes a form of already 
knowing).  This seemed to encourage a collective grappling with language’s 
insufficiency in containing reality. Parish was in my group, and endorsed my 
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view of language as playing a part in the creation of reality, but added that its 
expression was inspired by something else, that could be felt, like an “impulse”.  
From comments in the feedback session afterwards there seemed 
consensus  that the first exercise was “easier”, whereas the second was a 
“learning experience”. Parish added to this by afterwards showing slides of the 
Ego and Authentic Self in separate diagrams,  each with different labelled 
features.   
During the EC discussion,  I still did not feel comfortable speaking “from” 
an aspect of my self I was not sure existed. I also did not want to interfere with 
the event or risk passing on my “doubts” to others. I said nothing during this 
event, though followed the conversations and shared the feeling of 
“communion” others spoke of both during and afterwards.  However, I did not 
share the view of the Authentic Self as an “entity” expressed by one woman. 
As for how I experienced any gurus, I did not think about this at the time.  
Parish was obviously running things, and is a very good and inspiring speaker.  
He was working with ideas that weren’t all his, but was a  “pioneer” and 
“developer” of EC and  knew how to get it to work.  Cohen for sure is inspiring, 
and it was a lot like he was there too.  I’ll definitely attend more of his talks as 
he makes me feel so enthusiastic and positive about trying to improve the 
world.    
ACADEMIC SELF:  My analysis will focus upon two related aspects of 
this event:  its groupiness and its punctuation with videos of Cohen.  
First, groupiness.  Learning EC had been portrayed as problematic 
because  it could not be reduced to a technique, and required both 
“background” and “foundational” experiences before it could be attempted. 
These experiences were acquired and articulated in the two small group 
exercises. 
Ice-breaking self-introductions,  group exercises,  feedback about what 
“we” experienced,  and a talking circle are recurrent features of “personal 
development” and “spiritual” workshops. They figure in emic manuals targeted 
at   “facilitators” (e.g. Hunter et al. 2007). An aim of small group facilitation is to 
foster a sense of community amongst attendees.  While the concept of 
“community” is a notoriously troublesome one in the history of sociology (see 
Hillery 1955), Barker (2006) identifies it as an important consideration in 
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researching “religious identity”, and modern ethnographies of “alternative 
gatherings” have tended to emphasize a complex and mutually constitutive 
interplay between dichotomous notions of self and community.  Tavory and 
Goodman (2009), for instance,  highlight the complex and contradictory 
relationships between participants’ interview and spontaneous statements 
about self and community in an Israeli  Rainbow Gathering, where at times the 
communal became incorporated in definitions of selfhood.  I will attempt to 
show the interplay between “self” and “community” at the EC event.  
There was so much simultaneous talk in the room during the small group 
discussions that my recordings are almost useless, so I must instead draw 
upon my field notes and recollections.  In my own group no one mentioned  
Cohen or Parish by name, but people used their  terminology to describe their 
feelings. There was talk of an “impulse”, and an imperative “urge” to express 
something.   This was unsurprising, as the groups had prearranged 
memberships, each including at least one person familiar with “evolutionary 
enlightenment”  teachings.  Nevertheless,  the first exercise (i.e. talking from 
the Ground of Being), made sense to everyone, even if  quite unfamiliar with 
Cohen’s teachings, and one did not need to use technical terms taken from 
Cohen’s earlier video to  perform it.  It was as if we were given scope to talk of 
meditative experiences however we wished.  In my group, this freedom of 
expression resulted in our talk not always staying strictly on the topic of the 
exercise, speaking from the Ground of Being.  One woman for instance brought 
up her home life, commenting enthusiastically about being able to talk with 
strangers about things she did not even talk of at home. These remarks 
suggested that the woman had been having or recounting experiences which 
were nothing new to her.  In feedback from  spokespeople afterwards, 
comments about feeling “connected”, and reaching a “place”, which was 
“home” were  common. While no one mentioned notions of “authority” in these 
discussions, one might argue that this exercise allowed for a high degree of 
“self-authority”, in that people were not corrected by others in how they 
described their experiences, and moreover there was a strong sense people 
were reporting things already familiar and personal to them, even if rarely 
spoken of before.  
 - 180 - 
While the first exercise seemed to permit free expression,  the second 
exercise was more focused, requiring people to identify with something more 
particular to Cohen’s teachings before speaking -  the “best part of themselves 
which only wants to evolve”, the “Authentic Self”. Parish joined my group a little 
into the exercise, perhaps noticing our relative quietness this time. (My 
recordings, though still mostly unintelligible, confirm the overall volume of 
discussion in the room was audibly lower than before). In this second exercise 
other people’s  talk about the Authentic Self served as an overt guide  to how 
the exercise might  be performed, and for me what I might think and say of my 
own experiences.  Both exercises involved rehearsal and tacit instruction in  
Cohen’s terminology, but this was more noticeable in the second.  Hearing 
others talk of their experiences using Cohen’s terminology, and using it to 
describe one’s own experiences, resulted in a communal negotiation of what 
“we” each were experiencing, rather than any one person being told what they 
experienced. That one’s own experiences could be subtly redefined in this 
environment is illustrated by Parish’s remarks in my group during the second 
exercise, to the effect that my own keeping quiet could itself be authentic.    
While “evolutionary enlightenment” was not the only discourse of the self 
from which people drew in group discussions, it was the only  one reinforced by 
Parish and his helpers.  In the EC discussion proper, noticeable  efforts were 
made to favour this discourse when alternatives arose, such as in this extract in 
which Parish is commenting on remarks made by another participant, “Bob”.  
Bob had previously won murmurs of support and even a “wow” from earlier 
remarks,  but Parish treated his statements as problematic. While Parish 
seems to be struggling to portray Bob as having missed something important, 
Bob interjects a brand new notion with memorable catchphrase quality, “the six 
billion I” (an allusion to the population of the world being ontologically unified): 
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Extract 4.1  Cohen London EC PM 230208 26m51s    
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Group: 
Parish: 
 
 
 
Group: 
Bob: 
Group: 
Frank: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Group: 
Frank: 
…. I think what you just just said 
definitely jus’ sort of really (0.4) 
somehow sort of captures that whole 
in- interplay ….((Approx 10 seconds 
omitted)) …..and obviously wh- (the 
way) you’re speaking the same thing 
(0.2) and yet (0.6) so it’s 
individual and yet it it’s also one 
at the same ti[me 
              [huh huh 
an’ that’s- that’s I think the. the 
new- you know the interesting 
dimension between you know (0.8) one 
and many or 
((yeah; mummers)) 
the six billion I 
((mm hmm hah hah)) 
and also that’s part of the 
developmental process so it’s not 
just (0.2) you know the- uh there’s 
six billion people who are here now. 
you know but it’s since the big bang 
that one (0.4) evolutionary focus- uh 
so.  my development is the 
development of not just the six 
billion (0.7) beings now but it- it’s 
[you know of 
[yeah 
consciousness itself you know 
 
Although Bob’s interjection gets approval within the group, another person 
(Frank) immediately takes over Parish’s interrupted attempt at correcting Bob, 
succinctly parodying his view as “here now”, and deploying stock phrases from 
Cohen’s teaching such as “developmental process”, “big bang”,  “evolutionary 
focus”, “development”, and “consciousness itself”.   
Within group discussions, therefore, while there was little sense of any 
one person dominating the talk,  what did figure noticeably  was the vocabulary 
of evolutionary enlightenment, to the extent alternative vocabularies were at 
times corrected and some tasks, such as the second exercise, made little 
sense without using the vocabulary.    
The second feature of the occasion I will analyse is the punctuation of   
group exercises with video clips of Cohen. That  Parish might have 
summarised each video clip suggests something more than their technical 
 - 182 - 
content or vocabulary was important. Their inclusion and its manner are directly 
relevant to the constitution of Cohen’s experiential expertise here, and Parish’s 
hierarchical relationship to it.  The manner of inclusion of each clip was 
somewhat self-deprecating of Parish’s own expertise,  implying that Parish 
deferred to Cohen as a better expert than himself.  More significantly,  each clip 
was a realist portrayal of Cohen’s expertise, and the placement of the videos in 
the order of pedagogic events inserted Cohen’s virtual persona at points where 
people were expected to experience phenomena described in his teachings 
(especially the Ground of Being and the Authentic Self). 
Latour’s notion of  “iconophilia” provides a good way of analysing the 
content of the videos. By this, Latour  means “respect for6the movement of the 
image” (1998: 421).   Latour notes that when people point to features “re-
presented” in another media  (such as locations on a map) the steps necessary 
to refer to the real, absent feature collapse, so that a gesture towards the “re-
presentation” seems to refer unproblematically to the absent feature itself.  
Moreover, Latour points out that where such representations travel 
geographically, they need to be changed (into “forms”), at least some features 
remaining constant between successive transformations (in cartography, for 
instance, Latour suggests it is the measurement of angles which is conserved).  
Latour claims people as well as information may travel in this way (ibid, 429), 
and that which  features remain constant and which are discarded in such 
travel may be of analytic interest (ibid, 426).  I shall focus upon two things 
which “travelled” in these videos:   the expert interactional from, and a particular 
discourse of the self. 
The clips Parish chose portrayed Cohen doing exactly the things 
expected of experiential experts interacting with non-experts:  giving biographic 
credentials, recounting his relevant experience, and alluding to an appropriate 
track record of having followers.  These interactions were  Mieg’s interactional 
“expert”, with Cohen himself asserting authorship over “Evolutionary 
Enlightenment”.    What was preserved and presented of Cohen was his image 
animated as expert in settings with  audiences  very similar to the one in which 
the clips were being played (which was also being video recorded by 
EnlightenNext helpers).  The re-presented and current settings were almost 
transposable. Although no one could mistake the recordings for the real Cohen, 
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in essence he was made as present as he had been at the recorded 
happenings, except of course he was unavailable for further questions. During 
the video clips people seemed as attentive to virtual Cohen as were each re-
presented audience.  
Of course, Parish did not show videos just because they confirmed 
Cohen’s authorship, expertise or guruhood, but because the content of the clips 
provided “background” for performing EC.   Cohen’s talks elaborated a 
discourse of the self which rendered EC an understandable and distinct 
phenomenon.  For example, the summary and history of “evolutionary 
enlightenment” provided by the first clip highlighted the importance of notions of 
the “impersonal”, “evolutionary” and communicative aspects of Cohen’s 
“teachings”, while the second emphasised an ontology in which consciousness 
and our essential nature were described as “one”.   
That these clips were deployed very close to exercises in which 
participants were to experience phenomena referred to in Cohen’s teachings 
was of particular import in associating Cohen with people’s experiences.  The 
first and third clips came  immediately before small group exercises, and the 
second shortly after the first exercise.  This made Cohen’s virtual persona and 
his articulation of the discourse which made sense of each exercise proximate 
to those exercises, so that each  exercise involved participants experiencing a 
conceptual aspect of Cohen’s teachings. The only exception to this was the EC 
discussion itself. Here, Cohen’s authorship of the discourse was asserted and 
proximity to the event established through Parish’s chosen “seed” for the 
discussion being a “quote of the week” from Cohen’s website.  This quotation, 
which Parish read from a printed sheet of A4, was presented as if, like the 
video records, it was literally Cohen’s words.  In its recitation, Parish became a 
conduit for the voice of another.  The quotation itself  was a series of 
unqualified assertions which drew upon many of the technical terms introduced 
through the day by parish and Cohen’s videos.  To give an impression of the 
conceptual density of this quote, and its vocabulary and style which by this 
point seemed familiar and unquestionably identifiable as Cohen’s, I have 
reproduced the first few sentences from it below. Notice that in a very concise 
manner both lexically and grammatically it reifies the Authentic Self and 
contrasts it with an equally reified “personal” self.   
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Extract 4.2  Cohen London EC PM 230208 07m43s 
 
Parish: (Reading) “The Authentic Self within the individual is not 
separate from the creative impulse that initiated this whole 
evolving universe, and it has its own agenda. The agenda 
of the Authentic Self is not the agenda of the personal 
separate self-sense. At times it may seem like your 
agenda, but in the end there's nothing personal about that 
pure, passionate aspiration to awaken, to create, to 
become, to evolve6”  
 
(Simplified transcript. Italics highlight terms/concepts which regularly 
feature in expositions of Cohen’s teachings, where they have technical 
meaning and significance and are at times topics of great elaboration). 
 
 
To round off, the groupiness of this occasion resulted in people 
articulating their experiences within small and large groups, with freedom  to 
voice experiences as one wished being progressively curtailed throughout the 
day. This sense was bolstered by Parish’s request that during breaks people 
should not discuss the “personal” but remain focused on what we had been 
doing,  so we might all go “deeper”.  The tensions suggested are analogous to 
those between self or “individuality” and community or “solidarity” at the 
Rainbow Gathering researched by  Tavory and Goodman (2009). They define 
the “individual” as “practices which emphasise the centrality of the actor in the 
social setting”, whereas “solidarity” denotes “those that stress connectivity and 
the relational” (ibid, 266).    From the outset, there were tensions at the EC 
event.  Some activities seemed to emphasise “the individual”, even Heelas’s  
“authority of the Self”,  by allowing people to experience aspects of Cohen’s 
teaching for themselves, by themselves (such as by introspectively connecting 
with the Ground of Being or Authentic Self before speaking of either). Others 
diluted self-authority with the communal (as in small group discussions or 
feedback reports), or opposed it outright (as when Parish requested us to avoid 
discussing the “personal”).  The effect of these tensions mitigated the sense of 
being one’s own authority, as the group discussions diffused any sense of there 
being an individual authority present.  
 - 185 - 
There is however an important difference between the EC event and 
Rainbow Gathering – the videos which interspaced experiential activities. The 
videos presented a personified voice as part of the “background” needed to 
perform EC, being the same voice otherwise “mediated” through Parish’s 
pedagogy and deployed in small group discussions with others.  As the 
comments of the lady in my first group suggested, this mode of expression was 
not conventionally suited to everyone’s home life (at least presumably not the 
homes of those whose families were not all familiar with or outspoken about 
“spiritual” matters). Furthermore, at least in the first exercise, it seemed to 
overlap or at least not prohibit other ways of describing meditative experiences. 
However, the scope for free expression became increasingly curtailed through 
the succession of group activities, early toleration of  meanderings and talk 
which departed from the technical vocabulary we were being schooled in by 
Parish and his media presentations contrasting with the collective “corrections” 
of discrepant terminology in the final EC discussion. 
Authority here is locatable more  in a discourse or style of speech than 
any person.  As Bakhtin (1981:  342-3) explains, the word that requires us to 
“make it our own”, without modification or play,  is the “authoritative word”.  
Bakhtin notes that the authoritative word may be “indissolubly fused” with a 
person, and here, that person is Cohen, the fusion of the authoritative 
vocabulary used to articulate the experiences of course attendees with his 
virtual persona forging the link between “him” and people’s experiences crucial 
to establishing his experiential expertise in spite of his physical absence.     
Cohen’s association with the experiences of people at the event, defined and 
articulated through a vocabulary which he was portrayed as having authored, 
was bolstered by structural features such as oscillation between tuition with 
videos, and experiential activities in which success depended on experiencing 
and reciting aspects of the vocabulary. The overall process of the event was a 
transition from relatively centrifugal (decentralizing) to  centripetal 
(homogenizing)  (ibid,   272-3; 425) ways of self-expression and reference.  
Authority was played out as the voice of Cohen was re-produced and inserted 
in video form by Parish, thus becoming more prominent as people’s self-
expressions were progressively steered in line with it.   
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4.4.2 Gangaji: from being still to being stillness  
  
Here I will draw upon two London talks by Gangaji which I attended in 
May 2007. Each followed the same format. I will draw upon the second 
evening’s talk save where I mention otherwise.  
The talks were in a large lecture theatre at Kings College, London, with 
an audience of over 100 people.   The stage was flanked by two stalls, one 
selling books and another for ordering recordings of the event.   The stage had 
two wicker chairs upon it, at roughly ninety degrees to each other facing the 
audience.  Gangaji sat on the rightmost chair, to the left of which was a small 
table with flowers, water, and a photograph of H.W. Poonja (“Papaji”) (c1910-
1997).  To the right of the other chair, used by audience members, was a 
similar table also bearing flowers, water, and a photograph of  Ramana 
Maharshi (1879-1950) (whom Papaji claimed had been his guru). There were 
flowers at the foot of each table.   
On each night, the initial silence lasted approximately 15 minutes, about 
8 minutes passing while Gangaji sat on stage with her eyes closed.  She gave 
a brief talk, before selecting a succession of audience members to speak on 
stage with her from their raised hands (one guest short circuited this procedure 
by walking directly onto the stage). Guests spent between 6 and 24 minutes on 
stage, during which they asked “questions” or gave “reports”.   Gangaji 
addressed the audience directly during and between such encounters, and at 
the end.  There was a further silence as she exited.   
SEEKER SELF:  What was great about both evenings was that Gangaji 
ensured everyone got something from them – it wasn’t just that some were 
chosen while others watched, but like she said, we were all “chosen”.  The first 
taste of this came before she spoke.  When the theatre quietened to a silence 
as she entered from the back, walked on stage, and sat facing us silently for 
eight minutes, I felt a real sense of taking part in something special.  Like most 
people, I closed my eyes for much of the time, wallowing in the oasis of 
quietness.  Like a  performance of John Cage’s 4′33″, otherwise inaudible 
sounds became conspicuous though I did not follow them, instead allowing 
myself to be enveloped by the silence. It was a very restful experience, and it 
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seemed as if the silence emanated from Gangaji, for she was the one who 
could and did eventually break it to greet everyone. 
On the second night, Gangaji said a lot about her own search for 
enlightenment and how it ended when she followed Papaji’s instruction to 
“stop”. She explained that though we were all different, what she had 
discovered in stopping her story was available for everyone to experience 
tonight.  She said she had “no teaching”, and made it clear that it would be in 
having and listening to conversations with her that we might discover what she 
had with Papaji. As she put it   (the Academic Self has asked me to leave in his 
titles and timed pauses, for some reason): 
 
 
 
Extract 4.3  Gangaji London Satsang 201 170507 43m15s 
 
“So, I have no particular teaching. I have just our meeting. (0.5 seconds) 
That’s what we have. (1.5)  The conversations that happen here.  Just 
the resonance that happens here. (0.9) Or the lack of resonance for 
some people. (0.9) The emotions that may get evoked. (1.5) The peace 
that may get evoked. (0.8) Just the uh Gestalt (0.6) of our meeting. (2.3) 
Together as one self. (1.0) In this, (0.9)  together as individuals. (2.1) 
Serving each other in some  mysterious, (0.6) perfected way 
((Approx 1m 7s: anecdote about a play she saw earlier)) 
So I invite your questions (1.9) and your reports so that we can (0.9) 
each of us discover what’s the truth.(1.4)  Not because someone has 
told us it’s the truth or we hope it’s the truth.  But because it is possible 
to directly experience it. (2.6) In the way (0.8) that removes all doubt. 
(2.0) Even if doubt appears,  that there’s no place that doubt can stick. 
(2.0) That there’s a recognition I am. (2.0) And that amness is not limited 
to this particular form. (2.0) It senses, I am. (4.2)” 
 
Gangaji tended not to ask people’s names, but  was very intimate with 
her guests. Gangaji and her guests were seated within reach of each other, 
and frequently she would rest her right arm on the guests’ chair. Occasionally 
her hand would rest nonchalantly on a guest’s arm, play with their clothing, or 
even twiddle their hair. The topics guests raised were varied personal issues, 
including:  troubles controlling schoolchildren; guilt; being God (again); self-
confidence; fear; and feeling stagnant. Almost all guests had questions for her, 
or problems they wanted her to comment upon. One guest from the first night 
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however gave his reason for being there as “My beating heart told me it was 
something that (needs?) to be expressed”, and thanked Gangaji with “gratitude 
beyond words” for “confirming homecoming”.  He read a poem he had written, 
in which he spoke much of resting in “silent stillness, deeply blessed”.  It ended 
on a humorous note, prompting appreciative laughter from Gangaji and the 
audience.  
Just before her last guest she made it clear that the conversations she 
was having were in a sense everyone’s: 
 
Extract 4.4  Gangaji London Satsang 201 170507 1h46m16s 
 
“You hear your own self up here, right? These questions, are not 
somebody while you’re waiting for your turn or- (1.3) Don’t you hear how 
it’s really (1.5)  finally gets back to the same question.  It’s definitely the 
same answer.” 
 
Gangaji did not spell out this “same question” or “answer” here, but 
these seemed obvious at the time. The questions always boiled down to “who 
am I?”   Gangaji rarely asked people this exact question, rather assisted others 
to perform what she called “self inquiry” through questions and prompts 
spanning several minutes of talk. She never explained her method, but the 
pattern of her questioning and prompting was clear, involving asking people 
what they wanted,  then what it would give them, and suggesting  any “stories” 
or fears which seemed obstacles could  be stopped or surrendered to.  
Allowing her guests time to introspectively attempt such “stopping” on stage, 
the pattern typically ended with guests acknowledging having identified silence 
or peace in themselves or troubles, or simply sighing contentedly, smiling 
widely or laughing. Gangaji would then summarise or make general points 
arising from  the conversation to the audience.   After the last guest, she 
underlined a common  upshot to such enquiry by describing a group of 
prisoners she had addressed as coming to the “same discovery”, that   “at the 
core, at the root, [is] pure unadulterated consciousness. Aware of itself. And in 
love.”  
I was left with more a sense of tasting a personal truth than any 
techniques to practice. The silences at the start and end of the events were 
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very calming, though it was the staged conversations which grabbed me. 
Regardless of people’s problems, they were all led to conclude for themselves 
that peace, stillness, silence, a sense of being more than whatever  “story” they 
were embroiled in, was always accessible.   Anticipating the realisations people 
might have I felt myself urging people towards them.  While watching others in 
this way, I also reflected on my own stories, in particular the story I was living 
out through my research.  I could no longer identify with that story, this was not 
“who I am”, but then  nor could I identify with any story of my own 
enlightenment.  While the Academic Self thinks he was keeping me from 
raising my hand, I really had nothing to say.  Aside from thanks. And after the 
first night,   I chased after Gangaji as she was leaving the building, and burbled 
something embarrassingly inarticulate to that effect, adding that the event had 
been “beautiful”.   
ACADEMIC SELF:  As with Cohen, I wish to focus upon how Gangaji is 
associated with the experiences of audience members. 
 Clearly, her events are very different from the EC course in that  
Gangaji is physically present and not teaching on behalf of someone else 
(indeed, she claimed to have no teaching at all). Her own virtual gurus are  
deployed merely as  credentials,  static photographs which never in themselves 
become the focus of collective attention.  
Gangaji is personally associated with the experiences of audience 
members at this event at two levels.  This association works differently at the 
level of the entire group, relying here on practices of “silence” or “stillness”,  to 
how it works with regard to particular audience  members, where she performs 
an embodied form of guided  “self-inquiry” . 
First, silence. An aspect of Gangaji’s message is that peacefulness, or 
stillness, is always available to us and unites us in being our common nature. 
Gangaji is renowned for her emphasis on “silence” and “stillness”, holding 
many “silent retreats”, and more than any other teacher I consider she appears 
to enact this quality and her performances require others to do likewise.  The 
Seeker described his perception that silence or stillness emanated from 
Gangaji.  There are two particular aspects of the event which encourage that 
interpretation.  Firstly, there was the initial  silence cued by Gangaji’s presence 
which was unusually long for a public event. Secondly, Gangaji’s style of 
 - 190 - 
speech was slow and characterised by many pauses – as illustrated in the 
monologue reproduced by the seeker self above. Both types of silence were 
available to the audience as a “Gestalt”, to echo Gangaji. 
The upshot of both orchestrated silences and Gangaji’s pause-laden 
oratory was that an association was forged between Gangaji’s stage presence 
and silence.  Here, I shall focus upon the more striking initial silence. This first 
long silence had been scripted by the host, and described simply as “a silence”.  
The silence was not only created by the host’s instruction, as by sitting on 
stage, facing the audience, and  without any greeting simply closing her eyes 
and remaining silent, Gangaji’s actions made it clear the silence which started 
as she entered was supposed to continue.  Like the first exercise on the EC 
course, to perform this silence, as part of the audience, did not require much or 
even any knowledge of Gangaji’s teachings. Unlike the EC event however 
people were not asked to narrate their experiences whilst silent – this silence 
was a total absence of “external voices”. While this left everyone free to think 
as they wished, there was no impetus to think at all. No instructions were given 
other than to be silent; even the abbreviated discourse of  “inner voices” 
(Volosinov 1971) was excluded.   The unconventional length of time the silence 
lasted,  with no discourse or activity to fill it, made it an affective event, devoid 
of words but strikingly “restful”.   
In her opening talk Gangaji did not explain the significance of the long 
silence explicitly, but was emphatic about the significance of silence or stillness 
to her and her teacher, recounting that with Papaji, she had recognised that “I 
am stillness.  I am the awareness that is still.”  Being noticeably silent herself 
was therefore an embodied  performance of her own message.  Beginning with 
a long silence and elaborating it later as everyone’s common nature, meant 
that audience members had been provided with experiences which could be 
interpreted retrospectively through Gangaji’s discourse before that discourse is 
delivered.   
Secondly, there is “self-inquiry”. Whereas Gangaji’s presence is 
associated with silence at the level of the entire audience, she offers individuals 
selected for stage a more animated intense seeming experience, available to 
those off stage only vicariously.     Frisk (2002 – see Chapter 2 ante) has noted 
that in satsangs “a recognized enlightened person confirms another’s 
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enlightenment”, though she did not explore the mechanics or forms of such 
confirmations; we might say she did not consider the “micro-structure of 
enlightenment” (Stroud 2004).   I argue that such interactions as I will describe 
not only affirm (and constitute) guests’ enlightenments (though the term was 
not used to describe them at the time), but also provide expertise affirming 
opportunities for Gangaji, who appears to not only inculcate experiences in 
others, but to contemporaneously share those experiences.  
“Peter’s” stage interaction with Gangaji provides a good example as he 
was one of the very few guests who questioned Gangaji about (his) 
enlightenment. His first statement on stage was that “This is going to sound a 
bit silly”.  He stated that “I wanted to ask you about guilt”, but explained he had 
“a lot of success in following” what Gangaji had said about “going into the core”, 
during the prior guest’s appearance.  He continued: 
 
 
Extract 4.5  Gangaji London Satsang 201 170507 1h15m53s 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
 
Peter: 
 
 
Audience: 
Gangaji: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P: 
 
G: 
 
P: 
G: 
P: 
 
 
 
 
 
Yeah, so now I’m here, and I’m not 
really sure why and maybe you can 
help (huh huh) me. 
((Laughter)) 
You don’t need a reason.  (0.3) Maybe 
you’re just here. (2.7)   I mean 
really, you just gave a report. (1.3)  
You had some question about guilt.  
But actually when you followed (0.3) 
what was being demonstrated (1.3)  
that question was no longer here if I 
understood you correctly. (1.3) 
Yeah. 
   (1.3) 
What is here? 
   (5.8) 
There seems to just be an I-ness. 
An I-ness 
Yeah. Uh- Not specific to anything 
just I don’t know some sort of an I-
ness. some sort of I-ness.  (1.3) It 
doesn’t seem to be relevant to 
anything (0.3) at all. 
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Although the audience’s laughter at line 4 treats Peter’s opening as 
humorous, Gangaji takes him seriously, construing his talk as a “report” of his 
question’s disappearance due to his following what she had previously 
“demonstrated”.  The pauses at lines 14 and 16 are noticeable, Peter seeming 
to carefully consider what Gangaji is saying.  Her question at line 15 does not 
pursue why he is here, but invites him into existential speculation by asking 
“what is here?”  Peter takes this question to be asking him to narrate his  self-
perception, though he  seems tentative, the  5.8 second pause suggesting 
thinking time, and qualification “there seems” appearing to test the appropriates 
of his remark about “I-ness”.  The term “I-ness” is a variation of  Gangaji’s 
earlier phrase  “am-ness” (above).  Gangaji’s repetition of this term without 
query encourages Peter to elaborate more on it, repeating it as he does so, 
now clear that he is on track for getting Gangaji’s “help”. 
This short sequence illustrates an audience member adapting things 
said earlier during the same event to articulate his experiences on stage. This 
suggests Peter is  a well configured seeker, already narrating himself through 
adapting aspects of Gangaji’s earlier discourse.  The extract below picks up the 
conversation after only a further 3 minutes, during which Peter has referred to 
himself as an “awareness6that’s speaking” that is being turned away from “this 
I-ness” by a “little guilt thing” that while here on stage is “saying you don’t want 
to use up all the time”. His reference to his guilt as the “final barrier” suggests 
he is presenting himself as if primed for enlightenment: 
 
 
 
 
Extract 4.6  Gangaji London Satsang 201 170507 1h19m47s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
P: 
 
 
G: 
 
 
 
G: 
 
 
G: 
….It’s it’s it’s almost like  the the 
t’ say final barrier? 
   (1.8) 
What if you don’t fight with that. Or 
you  don’t even call it guilt.  And 
see then how far  
   (0.6) 
it can take you away from this 
awareness.   
   (1.9) 
We- we still get to measure it.  
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P: 
G: 
P: 
Audience: 
 
 
 
P: 
Audience: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
G: 
Audience: 
G: 
 
 
 
G: 
 
 
G: 
 
 
G: 
 
G: 
 
   (2.9) 
How far it can take me [away? 
                       [This little 
guilt voice. 
   (1.2) 
it’s like if you don’t fight that, 
you say, OK, yah, maybe I am taking 
up too much time. And then just check 
to see how far you are actually from 
this awareness. 
   (7.2) 
((Gangagi is sat smiling towards  
Peter, with her right hand resting on 
left/rear of his chair.  Her  smile 
becomes open mouthed after Peter 
smiles and utters “Oh”)) 
Oh. HUH HUH HUH.  Heh. Huh huh huh.= 
=hah  hah [hah. 
          [heh. 
((Laughter)) 
((P’s laughter sounds “fitful” or  
“forced”))  
   (0.6) 
Huh huh huh huh [huh. 
                [((Laughter)) 
((Throughout their mutual laughter, 
Peter’s and Gangaji’s eyes are 
interlocked and Gangaji leans towards 
Peter)) 
   (4.2) 
((Gangaji beams and shakes her head 
while looking at P, whose gaze has 
not left her)) 
Excellent. 
((Laughter)) 
Then you- you have an instantaneous 
experience of what the substance of 
this voice is.   
   (2.5) 
What the reality of (0.4) whatever 
the statement is that follows it. 
   (1.5) 
Without having to go to war with it 
or follow it. 
   (3.8) 
That’s what inquiry is. 
   (1.5) 
It’s really inquiring into what’s the 
reality here…. 
 
 
Peter’s moment of enlightenment appears to come around line 28, 
marked by his “Oh” and subsequent laughter.  Conversation analyst Heritage 
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(1984)  has noted “oh” is used in talk as a “change of state token”, marking  its 
user’s changed epistemic status in a particular context, though “Oh” seems 
somewhat meagre as a marker of an epiphany. Peter’s subsequent forced 
sounding laughter connotes the “redeeming laughter” conventionally taken to 
signal self-transcendences (cf. Berger 1997).  Gangaji’s own beaming and 
laughter overlaps with Peter’s, as the audience too joins in.  By echoing Peter’s 
laughter and mirroring his smile, Gangaji not only encouraged further affective 
displays, but appeared to be sharing Peter’s experience, joining in with any 
“redeeming laughter”, enacting her own enlightenment.  Gangaji’s assessment 
“excellent” leaves no doubt that Peter has received his “help”. 
It is significant in my analysis that Peter never articulates the meaning of 
whatever experience or realisation preceded his “Oh”. Rather, having narrated 
his own experiences to this point, Gangaji then takes over and formulates the 
meaning of his experience for him, addressing the audience rather than him 
(see last extract, lines 47-60).   Unlike participants in the EC discussion, he is 
not called upon to (re) produce any authoritative discourse, rather his role is 
now to produce no discourse at all, becoming  the object of Gangaji’s 
elaboration.  Through narrating the experiences of others in this way, Gangaji 
articulates their meaning for guests and audiences alike, in so doing implying 
her own familiarity with such  experiences – that they are generic, nothing new 
to her,  not unlike her own. 
Stage guests like Peter have different relationships with Gangaji than 
spectators to their encounters.    As well as being questioned and instructed by 
Gangaji, they are much closer to her than most audience members and through 
touch and intimacy with Gangaji on stage experience her in a sensory, 
embodied manner not available to the seated audience.  That Gangaji’s 
physical touch is part of her performances associates her physical personage 
with the affective displays of her guests.   That physical intimacy is a 
conventional and significant aspect of Gangaji’s performance was made clear 
when the guest following Peter asked Gangaji to place her hand on his arm and 
“apply a bit of pressure”, before commenting “alright, cool, thanks”, which 
prompted audience guffaws. What was incongruous about this behaviour was 
not that Gangaji touched the guest as he requested, but that the guest asked 
for this and acknowledged it so nonchalantly.  
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Peter’s encounter with Gangaji nicely illustrates that the personal 
experiences and performances Gangaji engenders from her stage guests are 
qualitatively different from those associated with the audience wide silence at 
the outset and end of the event.  There were no exclamations or laughter 
during or immediately after the audience wide silences, suggesting that no one 
had any profound realisations during such silence, or at least did not feel 
inclined to articulate them.  On the other hand, everyone who spoke with 
Gangaji on stage appeared to display varying degrees and types of affect 
towards the end of the conversations.     
Returning to the issue of authority, any analysis needs to take account of 
the multiple aspects to the occasion, in particular the different ways it engaged 
the audience as a whole, and stage guests. The long initial silence was a 
structural feature of the occasion which associated Gangaji’s presence with 
silence or stillness, also providing everyone with a personal taste of stillness.   
This initial silence was characterised by a complete absence of any discourse 
though subsequently Gangaji’s introductory comments equated stillness with 
everyone’s essential nature.  There was thus an authoritative line, a discourse 
of the self which portrayed it as storied, but capable of stopping and dissolving 
into stillness.  This discourse with its associated practices of guided “self 
inquiry” was not concerned with the nature of any other discourse or story, just 
with briefly “stopping” all other discourses. The audience as a whole was not 
required to recite this discourse, and there were no checks on whether or not 
they were so able.  Likewise, stage questioners were not expected to 
spontaneously reproduce Gangaji’s discourse, though  interactionally they were 
guided by her to enact “discoveries” of stillness which she rather than they then 
elaborated.  Enacting the discourse was not simply a matter of saying the right 
thing, or keeping quiet when appropriate – there was a visible affective, 
experiential aspect to stage encounters captured by the affective and epistemic 
connotations of Peter’s “oh” and subsequent laughter.   
Gangaji’s discourse does not seem the authoritative word in the way that 
Cohen’s discourse centripetally resisted departures from itself.  The discourse 
of stillness instead has an impetus to travel centrifugally, mixing with other 
discourses it might “stop” momentarily and  permitting variations,   Peter’s “I-
ness” being an example of this.  But like Cohen’s discourse, there is a 
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resistance to summary by others here, and this resistance is relatively greater, 
operating both  logically (owing to the  antipathy towards “stories” implying that 
if one is too precise about this discourse, it will become one itself) and 
rhetorically (through the emphasis Gangaji placed on not having a teaching, to 
the extent of expressing shock that things she has once said sometimes come 
back to her as if “teachings”).  Even those whose experiences Gangaji guided 
did not need to produce it.  The embodied, sensory aspects to Gangaji’s 
experiential expertise bolster the sense in which her discourse, and 
unexplicated technique of self-inquiry, are locked into her personage. The 
upshot is a rhetorical and  enacted checking of centrifugal tendencies, and 
impetus towards a centring  of this otherwise accommodating discourse in 
Gangaji herself.  This makes it difficult to analyse expertise and authority here 
solely in terms of polyvocality. 
Nevertheless, this is a discourse which travels.  Not only is the “satsang 
phenomenon” widespread (cf. Frisk 2002), but Gangaji herself has inspired 
others to embark on satsang carers (e.g. Terrell 1997).  But although Gangaji’s 
denials of a teaching and sensory aspects to her performance create obstacles 
to the centrifugal tendencies of her discourse of stillness by associating it with 
her physical personage, rather than literary authorship as in EC, such barriers 
are permeable. Denial of any teaching also implies that her topic, “stillness”,  is 
a self-evident truth, over which there is no authorship and about which anyone 
may speak.  Indeed, there is an aspect of these events which allows others to 
speak authoritatively about stillness without usurping Gangaji – by their 
“reports”. “Reports” allow audience members to display having made Gangaji’s 
non-teachings their own without usurping her role as teacher by teaching in 
their own rights.  The Seeker mentioned an audience member who asked no 
questions at all but instead recited a poem he had written.  Frisk (2002) noted 
such entertaining performances were common in her satsangs, though did not 
theorise their significance.  I suggest such “entertainment” is compatible with 
my analysis of expertise because it enables people to indicate they have “got” 
something from a speaker such as Gangaji, and even re-produce fragments of 
any non-teaching, though without being literal, and at the same time 
demonstrating personal affect.  Producing an inspired poem, song, or piece of 
music implies the producer has been moved, and likewise provides opportunity 
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for others to display appreciative affect, in ways which do not usurp the teacher 
or non-teaching.  
The scope for “self-authority” and expression varies here, depending on 
which aspect of the event one considers.  As in the EC event, there is a 
movement, from an “easy” affective aspect (the initial silence available to 
everyone), to a more intense one (the stage experiences, available only to 
those questioners who volunteer and are selected).  Gangaji’s orchestrated 
silence and sensory stage encounters encourage affective responses of 
differing kinds, which participants are not called upon to articulate for 
themselves, though may choose to do so by giving “reports”.  The poetic 
contributor I have considered illustrates a propensity implicit in Frisk’s study of 
satsangs for non-literal contributions which reinforce the affective aspect of the 
event, underlining that Gangaji’s expertise involves the inculcation of affect in 
others. 
  Gangaji’s authority rests upon the extent to which through delivery, 
rhetoric and sensory encounters she embodies this discourse and its affect, 
and has a privileged position as their means of articulation and transmission. 
Affects born in interactions are however collaborative productions, and derive 
their meaningfulness from associated discourses assimilated and adapted 
within dialogic consciousness. The subjectivating aspects of these pleasant 
occasions should not be understated: the Seeker Self seems to have been 
notably overwhelmed with gratitude towards Gangaji’s personage, while 
enacting some sort of affect through chasing after her to garble his thanks.  
 
4.4.3 Parsons: the game of being no-one  
 
Our last event  is Parsons’s 2007 talk introduced in the last chapter. 
Recapping briefly,  it  took place in the Matara Centre near Cheltenham,  
as one of a series of spiritual talks by various speakers.   The venue serviced 
conferences, retreats, weddings and the like, and its décor mixed Eastern and 
Western themes. The large, level room seated  80 or so guests sat on plush 
chairs, arranged in semi-circular rows facing the “stage” area (which was really 
not a stage), where Parsons stood throughout.  There were no pictures of 
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gurus, or chairs for stage guests. There were some flowers, but not so as to 
frame Parsons.   Parsons unpacked his own books and CDs and displayed 
them on a table behind the audience.  Parsons spoke for only about 8 minutes, 
after which he took questions for about 50 minutes.  There was then a 20 
minutes tea break followed by another hour of nearly solid questions, aside 
from a long lull in which he gave a short announcement to the effect “all there 
is, is this” then allowed the silence to continue till the next question came.  
Throughout, questioners remained seated and anonymous, and Parsons 
remained “front stage”.  He mingled with his visitors during the break, during 
which refreshments were served in another room, returning to the main room 
early to distribute flyers for an upcoming talk.   
Parsons claimed what he spoke of could not be expressed adequately 
by words or comprehended by “the mind”.  Nevertheless, his core ideas are 
simple to state. There is no such thing as a person; the separate self with which 
we identify is only “apparent”, an “illusion”.  “The seeker” is  caught up in the 
illusion of their personhood and think things happen to them, whereas it is more 
correct to view things as just “arising” out of “being”,  “nothing”, or “oneness”.  
Parsons prefers the word “liberation” to enlightenment, and defines it as the 
sudden and permanent loss or death of one’s illusory “me”.  “Awakening” is a 
temporary “glimpse” of liberation. Unfortunately for “the seeker”, anything that is 
done with a view to attaining “liberation” will perpetuate the illusory “me”. 
SEEKER SELF:  I was not surprised that Parsons’s “talk” was so brief 
and the bulk of the time was taken with questions.  Most of his publications are 
made up of edited transcripts of his public talks and give this impression.4  
Unlike Gangaji’s event, where questioners were selected, took time to 
get to the stage, then held the floor for up to twenty minutes,  here questioners 
would simply address Parsons from their seats, sometimes raising their voices 
without first getting his attention. Many were answered before they had finished 
and even before Parsons had located them in the crowd. These exchanges 
were “rapid-fire”, sometimes questions or answers lasting only moments, whole 
exchanges being over in a matter of seconds, Parsons waiting through long 
silences for his next questioner. Occasionally, a brief dialogue might ensue, 
                                                 
4 For example, Parsons (2003; 2005; and 2007). 
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though this never lasted more than a few minutes.  Audience members never 
addressed each other during these sessions. However, some audience 
members did address Parsons in ways which seemed as much intended for 
their fellows as him -  for instance, by directing jokes at Parsons or offering 
anecdotes which had helped them understand his or similar messages.  
The topics of many questions fired at Parsons seemed to repeat. There 
was a sense of questioners struggling to make sense of what he said.  Parsons 
himself alluded to the repetitiveness of questions at his meetings. Recurrent 
themes included:  asking clarification of Parsons’s terms (e.g. liberation/ 
awakening); asking about how his assertion he is no one squares with aspects 
of his home life or former seeking;  querying the apparent contradiction 
between his insistence there is no point in doing anything and his holding talks 
on the topic; and relating his comments to other religious/philosophical 
teachings such as Taoism.  
Parsons’s style of answering was such that often he would not answer a 
question directly, but instead take issue with the form of the question which 
when corrected either dissolved or led the questioner to ask a different one.  He 
seemed fast and remorseless in taking questioners to task in this way. 
After a tea break strolling around the grounds and talking to two people 
enthused but perplexed by Parsons’s “stark honesty”, I found myself troubling 
over a question which occurred to me as the event resumed.   Parsons used  
the notion of being “no-one” or “nothing”, interchangeably with “being”, 
“beingness”, “oneness”, or “everything”.  If the concepts did not overlap, then I 
may have missed something important; if they did, then at least I had not.  I 
tried to state my question in a way which would not incur Parsons’s immediate 
correction, but inevitably I chose the wrong words and Parsons interrupted to 
correct me before I finished.  I persevered and eventually got my question out, 
receiving an  answer which left me happy that I had not missed something, 
though a little bruised that I had needed to be corrected. His correction 
highlighted that one needed to be very precise about how one spoke about the 
unspeakable here. The Academic Self will produce a transcript of this 
exchange later, so I will say no more of it here.  
Parsons said in his introduction that “words” were not the most important 
aspect of his meetings.  He said they involved something “energetic”. My 
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experiences here were not “energetic”, but this event was nevertheless a 
memorable, emotive experience. The volume of questions Parsons handled, 
and regularity with which he highlighted a questioner’s assumption of 
separateness, entrenchment in stories, or commitment to seeking, gave a 
predictability to the exchanges different from Gangaji’s staged encounters and 
more akin to a series of jokes all following a similar formulae.  Rather than 
willing questioners to “get it”, since no one ever did, I felt myself anticipating 
Parsons’s corrections of their phrasing, much like anticipating the punch line of 
endless iterations of the same joke.  Each joke or correction had a jarring 
aspect:  questioners were here trying to understand what seemed 
understandable enough to Parsons,  yet were repeatedly knocked back, their 
questions left hanging, due to some issue Parsons had with their form.    I also 
enjoyed questions which baited Parsons, waiting for the question which might 
unravel the contradictory tapestry he had woven, but he was equally swift at 
defusing such attacks, responding to serious ones with humour or 
acknowledgements of not knowing, while answering more overt teases 
seriously, maintaining his role as producer of the event’s humour, even about 
himself. 
This all made for a bruising but amusing time.  But it would of course be 
against the thrust of Parsons’s blanket denial of personhood to suggest “I” 
came away from it enlightened, or at all. 
ACADEMIC SELF:  The Seeker’s final comments suggest he was 
fortunate to survive that event.  They also highlight an impetus for people to 
emulate Parsons’s style of speech.  My analysis of Parsons’s expertise will 
explore why that arises.  
On the other occasions I have considered, a more elaborate vocabulary 
of the self is alluded to, here however Parsons used few conceptual terms.  
Several (“enlightenment”, “liberation”, “awakening”) he defined, though some 
terms (“oneness”, “being”, “nothing”) he did not.  As well as technical terms, 
Parsons also used a noticeably modified grammar.  I  argue that Parsons’s 
experiential  expertise was constituted not through the authorship of his 
discourse, or embodied sensory aspects of his delivery of it, but by his  
linguistic skill in responding to questions swiftly and pre-emptively, deploying 
aspects of his discourse in ways which  unsettle the  sovereign Enlightenment 
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sense of a personal self (cf.  Hall 1992).  Through constituting an impossible 
persona,  and interactional expertise in responding to questions in a corrective, 
contradictory, undermining style, Parsons personally became responsible for 
the unsettling experience of participating in this event, especially as a 
questioner.  
First then, I shall elaborate the impossible persona Parsons presented. 
The audience was not left much work to do in defining Parsons by the 
phraseology he brought to the event, as his host had done so jokingly earlier, 
and he himself did so in answer to questions where questioners tried to catch 
Parsons out using tu quoque reasoning  (Ashmore 1989:  Ch 3),  such as the 
following: 
 
 
Extract 4.7  Parsons Kingscote Talk Pt2 402 111107 54m10s 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
N: 
 
 
 
 
P: 
 
Audience: 
If I were to say to a friend I’m 
going to see- hear Tony Parsons at 
the ‘Tara next week. And they say oh 
yes, who’s he, what- what does he do?  
What do I say to them? 
You just say he’s someone who says 
he’s not there and neither are you. 
((Laughter)) 
 
 
This question is pertinent because if, as he says, he is “no one”, that leaves the 
questioner with the difficulty of describing Parsons to others. Parsons’s 
response is swift, with no appreciable “thinking time”, and is treated as 
humorous by the audience because of the incongruity involved in “someone” 
saying both he and “you” (the questioner’s friend) are not there, when that he is 
reportable as saying this to a friend who is there to hear the report suggests 
otherwise.    
 Likewise, in this next extract the questioner is applying Parsons’s earlier 
insistence there is no point to anything to the present situation in which he is 
delivering his talk:  
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Extract 4.8  Parsons Kingscote Talk Pt1 401 111107 43m.05s 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
F: 
 
P: 
Audience: 
P: 
F: 
So why do you come and tell us about 
it? 
I don’t come and tell you. 
((Laughter)) 
And you’re not here either you see 
Yea(h) (heh) (heh 
 
The general audience laughter here at line 4 is only explicable if we interpret 
Parsons’s reply at line 3 as being similar to the denial of the “never happens to 
me” joke.  That is, as a denial of his “I”.  Parsons extends this joke to the 
questioner, whose laughing “yeah” indicates she is able to apply this unusual 
view to  herself.  
Exchanges in which Parsons is tested for consistency to his own 
assertions are common in this event. Their significance to my analysis is 
twofold.  Firstly, their humorous reception suggests a local grammar and 
discourse which overlaps normal language use and in which it makes perfect 
sense for someone to deny their own presence, agency or existence, even if 
the act and occasion of making denials suggests otherwise. (Parsons’s denials 
of personhood also extended beyond  audience members, to historic figures 
including Ramana Maharshi and Hitler, presumably selected for rhetorical 
impact as one is widely regarded as an enlightened sage, and the other an 
outstanding monster).  Secondly, they show that Parsons does not speak about 
this discourse from outside of it, as does my analysis, but speaks from within it, 
incongruously defining himself by it and enacting it in spite of its paradoxical 
consequences.   
The bulk of my analysis will focus on Parsons’s interactional expertise 
and its associated affectivity, which overlays any persona which is constituted 
through such interactions as the above.  (Both extracts for instance illustrate 
the speed at which Parsons answers questions, with no appreciable gap in 
either between a question ending and Parsons’s humorous responses). I shall 
address this link through his treatment of mental states and dispositions of the 
kind which conventionally would be attributed to an individual.  Some he 
described as  illusory or “apparent” (e.g. choice/free will) whereas others (e.g. 
preferences/opinions) he  acknowledged existed, even after liberation, but 
 - 203 - 
described them as “arising” without ownership.  I am not sure if there is any 
consistency behind how dispositions are allocated between “illusory” or 
“arising”, just that the notion that states may arise but belong to no-one serves 
as an organising principle behind many unconventional grammatical 
constructions in Parsons’s dialogues.   
This next extract illustrates this principle at work.  An audience member 
is being encouraged to use this notion of “arising”. It comes  several minutes 
after Parsons  had explained that after liberation “opinions” and “preferences” 
still “arise”. The questioner words her question in a way which suggests after 
liberation there is still a person having  opinions/preferences.  Parsons’s 
response at line 4 bluntly contradicts this notion:  
 
 
Extract 4.9  Parsons Kingscote Talk Pt2 402 111107 1h14m36s 
 
 
 
 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
J: 
 
 
P: 
J: 
P: 
J: 
X: 
J: 
P: 
I don’t understand how um, a 
liberated person can s- then  still 
have preferences and opinions. 
No they don’t have preferences. 
Oh alright.  They arise. 
They arise yeah. 
So where can they arise from? 
((Very loud cough)) 
Where can they arise from? 
Nothing.  Everything arises out of 
nothing. 
 
 
The questioner’s “Oh alright” at line 5 has a “if you insist” quality to it.  
Her following self-correction is minimal, simply replacing the notion of opinions 
being held by anyone with the notion “they arise”. This  is approved by 
Parsons’s repetition at line 6.  The correction sequence itself renders the earlier 
question otiose. The questioner’s modified inquiry about from “where” opinions 
might arise (i.e. if not a person) is a different question which Parsons then 
answers.  What is striking is that the questioner treats Parsons’s first “answer” 
as a call to police her own phrasing, recognises her infringement, and makes 
amends quickly and unproblematically. Parsons might have answered the 
original question by saying something like “they don’t have preferences 
because after liberation preferences simply arise, for no one, from nowhere”. 
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But instead there is this exchange in which the questioner is taken to task 
about her own talk. 
Likewise, when I questioned Parsons, I committed an error by referring 
to  “an appreciation of being no one”. In the following extract, already 
summarised by the Seeker Self, I had not completed my question or even this 
phrase, before  Parsons interrupted, contradicting this notion at line 4:   
 
 
Extract 4.10  Parsons Kingscote Talk Pt2 402 111107 52m49s 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 

 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
K: 
 
 
P: 
 
K: 
P: 
 
 
K: 
P: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P: 
K: 
P: 
K: 
 
 
 
 
K: 
P: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
P: 
(P:) 
P: 
….When, when the seeker drops. And. 
And so there’s an appreciation of 
being no o[ne. 
          [No there isn’t. 
   (1.2) 
So [((indistinct)) 
   [Liberation is not an appreciation 
of being no one.   
   (0.3) 
There is no one (   [  ) 
                    [And since- The 
seeker might appreciate the (0.2) 
value of being no one but that’s a 
story. And uh when there’s liberation 
there is no one, there’s no thing.  
There’s not the living in oneness. 
   (0.5) 
There’s not a being at one. 
So there is just no one. 
There’s nothing.= 
=Is that different from- or is there 
a distinction between that and 
oneness. Or is being (0.2)  no one 
(0.4) is that 
   (0.6) 
one[ness? 
   [Well these are words. It’s very 
difficult.  I use oneness and being 
as the same thing. (0.3) So after 
liberation there is only oneness or 
being or love.  There is ((Sound of 
someone leaving the room, to whom 
Parsons shouts:)) Alright! 
   (2.0) 
B- it’s indescribable. 
It can’t be described at all. 
But it isn’t somebody appreciating 
oneness. 
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I was slower to recognise my “error”  than the last questioner.  Just after I 
started to respond to Parsons’s interruption (“So6.” At line 6), Parsons talked 
over me asserting liberation does not entail an “appreciation of being no one”. 
My  self-correction at line 10 did not halt Parsons’s further elaboration,  
although seems likely to have been heard by him since it is incorporated word 
for word in his continuing talk (“there is no one” at lines 10 and 15, 
respectively).  Even after Parsons had answered my question, at lines 37 and 
38 he ended our exchange by reworking his first correction  (i.e. lines 7 and 8),  
implying that although what he speaks of is ineffable (“indescribable”), he can 
be and is  emphatic about how not to speak of it, construing my term “an 
appreciation” as wrongly implying a “somebody” doing the appreciating. 
Parsons’s assertions of ineffability and stringent policing of how 
audience members speak of the ineffable creates inconsistencies between how 
he  responds to others and how he formulates his own talk.  This is illustrated 
by comparing this extract to the earlier one in which Parsons encouraged a 
questioner to describe him as  “someone who says he’s not there6”.   In spite 
of denials of personhood, Parsons uses conventional language which implies a 
separate producer and recipient.  His talk is not an aphoristic discourse which 
purports to stretch beyond language’s dualistic confines, but an adaptation of 
conventional discourse deployed in “expert interaction”.  This adaptation is 
purposively  selective about the referential features it subverts, its common 
objective seeming to be unsettling its recipients’ sense of distinctiveness or 
familiarity with personal pronoun usage.  Attempting this through conventional 
talk necessarily involves the producer of such discourse appearing to make the 
same mistakes they correct in others.  The impossibility this attempt obscures 
is that, as Mauss (1985) has underlined, the notion of “I” or “me” is more 
ancient and ingrained in linguistic expression than any concept of “self”.  While 
Mauss treats legal and moral notions of  persona (mask), personage (role), 
person (as fact) and self  (the Kant-Fichteian self,  “the condition of 
consciousness and of science” (ibid, 22)) as historic concepts, he considers it 
beyond doubt that all languages contain pronouns denoting an “I” or “me”.  
Moreover,  he points out that  wherever languages deal with relationships 
between speakers and the objects about which they speak, “the ‘self’ (moi) is 
everywhere present, but is not expressed by ‘me’ (moi) of ‘I’ (je)” (ibid,  3).  Put 
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simply, Parsons is bending dualistic language to assert the non-duality of 
himself and his interlocutors, so inevitably this exercise throws up paradoxes, 
contradictions, and incongruities.  
The conversational forms Parsons uses to correct audiences and 
encourage them to self-monitor and articulate his discourse lend themselves to 
being catalogued by conversation analysis. Matilal (1992) suggests ineffability 
claims are generally but one aspect of wider  language games,   references to  
ineffability being accompanied by other strategies to express supposedly 
ineffable truths, such as poetic language, contradiction, and negative dialectics 
or neti neti (not this not that reasoning). Such strategies have their own 
conventional forms.   But for my analysis of the construction of expertise and its 
relation to authority an extensive how-it-is-done exposé is unnecessary. What  
is important is that Parsons’s corrective style and subversion of familiar 
grammar comprise the practices through which this version of enlightenment 
(reconfigured as “liberation”) is promulgated. Since  this  linguistic game5 is 
conducted using conventional language, which does not allow for consistency 
in self-narrating oneself as no self, when others  attempt to use language as 
Parsons, he  is presented with endless expertise affirming opportunities to take 
speakers to task.  
The jocular nature of some but not all exchanges is also important, 
including Parsons’s seemingly rehearsed self-deprecations. This lends a 
playful, humorous aspect to events, to which audience members may 
contribute.  Without such humour the event would be a relentless reiteration 
that audiences are always wrong, whether in their  culturally ingrained senses 
of individuality or in their habitual use of a language which implies their 
“separation”. While this is the thrust of the event, the copious comedy adds an 
entertainment aspect to Parsons’s performance. Parsons does not nurture or 
guide the experiences of his audience progressively as did Gangaji or Parish, 
but continually mixes humour and bluntness. 
Most audience members seemed to participate in this event by tracking 
the conversations, laughing at times, occasionally questioning Parsons or 
                                                 
5 I use the term “game” to capture the playful and enticing aspects of these interactions, not in 
Wittgenstein’s sense.  
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throwing out a quip or tease at him.  The Seeker Self participated in this way 
and his description of feeling “bruised but amused” seems an understandable 
affective response. There was however another type of engagement.  Three or 
so participants seemed to say nothing, sitting (when I checked sporadically) 
with eyes closed  as if meditating.  Parsons had mentioned that some attend 
his meetings to “bask in boundlessness”, and that something “energetic” 
happens in such dialogues.  There was also a long lull at one point after which 
Parsons announced “This is all there is”, after which followed a much lengthier 
somewhat pregnant silence (which was eventually broken by an audience 
member’s tease, renewing the linguistic game; see the discussion of Extract 
3.2 in the previous chapter).  It would therefore be inaccurate to represent 
Parsons’s expertise and the nature of the discussion as evocative of only 
humour or “bruising”, though for the “spiritual tourist” these are the most 
prominent aspects. 
Returning to the debate about “authority”,  Parsons’s corrective style 
makes him an obvious “social authority”, to use Wood’s term.  Conversely, 
while overtly he offered no encouragement for people to ascertain personal 
truths, there were occasional long silences, while Parsons waited for questions, 
in which one could mull over what was said or perhaps, as some seemed to do, 
“bask” in these conversations without contributing to them.   Clearly, there is a 
conceptual difficulty in speaking of the authority of the Self where participants 
maintain there is no self, though the polyvocal view of consciousness suggests 
this position is itself a “voice” amongst others.  Approaching the question of 
authority through the lens of expertise presents a sharper image, as the 
enactment of Parsons’s expertise is inextricably reliant upon his position as the 
“expert” whose role is to respond to the questions of others using his unusual, 
adapted discourse.  Mieg’s interactional structure thus institutionalises 
Parsons’s position as always having the last word. This works well to enable 
deployment of his adapted discourse as the first word is almost certain to be 
correctable, or provide scope for a quip.  Parsons’s performance in such 
interactions also exhibits skills in terms of the speed and accuracy of his 
responses, targeting not just   pronouns but phrases which connote 
personhood, and repertoires of responses for when this discourse is turned 
back on himself.   That his performance is so skilled personalises it to him as 
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might a stand up comedian’s sense of timing and fluency in dealing with 
hecklers contribute to a distinct stage persona.  
Finally, as  Wood has highlighted,  the other side of “authority” is not the 
“self” but its “subjectivation”.  Again, this may be approached through the lens 
of expertise and Bakhtin/Volosinov’s sociological view of consciousness as 
polyvocal.  That audience members were sufficiently adept in this discourse to 
make and respond appropriately to jokes and to varying degrees to self-monitor 
themselves  suggests  it  had been or was already incorporated  in their “inner 
speech” (Volosinov 1971:  14-15).     Since even when equipped with an 
understanding of his discourse, the audience lacked both Parsons’s rehearsed 
seeming speed and fluency, and interactional position as answerer and 
corrector of questions, his expert position was assured throughout.  
 
 
4.5 Discussion 
 
Each of the three gurus I have considered were constituted as experts  
through different practices and contextual features. In each case, a guru’s real 
or virtual persona was associated with the experiences of audience members in 
both linguistic and extra-linguistic ways, with variations in emphasis between 
the two. 
The core aspects of the EC event which constituted Cohen as expert 
and associated him personally with both the discourse of evolutionary 
enlightenment and the subjective experience of attendees, were the oscillation 
between videos of his prior expert interactions and authorial assertions, and 
group exercises where attendees were to experience and articulate aspects of 
his teachings.   Viewed through the lens of Heelas’s concept of “the authority of 
the Self”, there was a sense in which Parish created a “‘context’ to enable 
participants to experience their [own] spirituality and authority” (Heelas 1996:  
23).  This context was however more that of “the group” than “the self”, since 
people articulated their contemporaneous experiences communally. While this 
is somewhat reminiscent of Tavory and Goodman’s (2009) Rainbow Gathering,  
in which the communal became incorporated into definitions of selfhood,  here 
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the communal itself was coloured by a single discourse, that of evolutionary 
enlightenment.  As the event progressed, accurate expression of this discourse 
was more astutely policed as the meaningfulness of group activities came to 
depend more and more upon this discourse.   
Heelas was well aware of the quandary faced by “the authority of the 
Self” as an ideal,  owing to academic arguments that “experiences” merely 
validate the meanings which help construct them (op. cit, 191). Developing this 
argument, we can say that to not adopt such meanings may therefore make it 
difficult to experience “conversions”.  My difficulty in speaking from the 
Authentic Self illustrates this. Wood’s key analytic conclusions concerning 
“nonformative” religiosity are of little help in explaining either apparent 
“resistance”, or “conversions”,  as his concept of nonformativeness derives 
from an assessment of the (“relativizing”) effects of a variety of authorities 
across “religious” settings.  Unlike Wood, my analysis does not make 
comparisons and collective assessments  across settings in this way, but 
makes comparisons only to draw out the particular features of  each setting.  
My difficulty in speaking from the Authentic Self stemmed from my readings of 
academic literature not competing religious beliefs; whereas my prior familiarity 
with other forms of meditation and “the Ground of Being” actually reinforced my 
subjectivation in the first exercise. The point is, that each individual brings 
different biographic baggage as well as physiological characteristics, and while 
one may identify broad tendencies, identifying a whole field as “nonformative” 
unduly generalises the interplay of supportive and competing “pulls” which may 
exist at “shop floor” level, for different individuals, across different settings 
within any such field. 
Focusing on practices of expertise, and how they shape and channel 
subjective experience, encourages more nuanced analysis of  the mechanisms 
by which subjectivities and practices are linked within settings, and “authority” 
is enacted.  In the EC event, this approach highlights that  pedagogy, personal 
experience, and its public articulation, are organised around an authored 
discourse which follows a centripetal, homogenizing direction throughout the 
event.  
Gangaji’s and Parsons’s events provide two further occasions of 
expertise in which self/other “authority” are juxtaposed in ways which are 
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mutually enabling.  Gangaji’s expertise was more affective and embodied in her 
physical personage than Cohen’s, and through the structure of her events,  her 
manner of speech, and her pronouncements, she was  identified with “stillness” 
to Cohen’s “authenticity”.  As with Cohen, the events I considered involved a 
movement:  here beginning with a full audience experiential event (the initial 
silence), moving to smaller scaled but more intense personal experiences 
(staged epiphanies), then back to an audience wide event (the final silence) 
after statements to the effect that the stage encounters all indicate the same 
thing.   The audience silences seemed to cultivate experiences as if under 
one’s “own authority” (Heelas, supra), whereas stage conversation entailed  
sensual bodily contact with Gangaji and inculcation of more personal and 
intense experiences the meaning of which Gangaji articulated. Both types of 
experience were affective, and for both, unlike EC, people were not required to 
enunciate any authoritative discourse. Rather, Gangaji did so for guests, 
appearing as a “social authority” (Wood 2007).  In this setting social barriers to 
the repetition of the discourse by persons other than Gangaji, such as the form 
of her interactions and rhetoric of having “no teaching”, served to further 
personalise it as “hers” although unlike Cohen she did not claim authorship 
over it.  Nevertheless, my analysis of the recital of a poem, like other 
“entertainments” which occur at such satsangs, suggests that participants are 
called upon to enact affect, as if performing changes in their epistemic state as 
during stage encounters and also enactments of stillness during communal 
silence.  Gangaji’s talk and her intimate physicality with her guests  further  
bolstered the association between her personage and participants’ 
experiences.    
Parsons’s expertise was constituted entirely differently, through his 
speed and fluency in expert interactions in which his role as “expert” positioned 
him to correct and assess the statements of others.  Playing this linguistic 
game involved policing the talk of oneself and others for compliance with the 
impossible aim of completely denying one’s own and everyone else’s 
rudimentary sense of being an “I”.  That conventional language and grammar 
cannot consistently work in this way means even Parsons’s own utterances 
frequently fell afoul of this aspiration.  Of all the cases, here it is most obvious 
that  “authority” (as influence over others) is played out through interactional 
 - 211 - 
practices which constitute an (unusual) expertise. To participate in or observe 
such interactions is an affective experience since one is compelled to be 
deliberately reflexive towards one’s language use, and rattled or amused by the 
subversions of conventional discourse. A very high degree of fluency in this 
“game” would be required to approach it without deliberation.  Questioners here 
are not steered towards either progressively deeper experiences or constrained 
articulations,  but throughout held accountable to the same impossible standard 
of speech, rooted in conceptually simple assertions of non-duality.  
Perseverance in this “bruising” game which maintains Parsons’s expertise was 
softened by the prevalence of humorous exchanges at this event. 
Any empirical analyses of participants’  “practices” is afforded greater 
sociological purchase when attempts are made to do more than simply 
describe those practices, and to apply or develop a theoretical framework.  I 
have combined an STS approach which emphasise  expertise as an 
interactional performance with  Bakhtin/Volosinov’s view of subjectivation as 
involving the assimilation of discursive “voices” into  polyvocal consciousness.  
This framework proves very useful in discussions of authority, discouraging us 
from seeing “conversions” or “resistance” as polar opposites, but as either new 
or old “voices” coming to prominence in any situation. My own reactions to 
events demonstrate that particular situations are not wholly deterministic and 
may both reinforce and run counter to pre-existent voices.  Contrary to 
Partridge’s and to an extent Heelas’s views about the “problematic” nature of 
tensions between self and other authority in the “New Age”, such “tensions” 
thus become viewable analytically not only as “dilemmatic” aspects of a lay 
ideology, and thus unlikely to cause participants the same sorts of troubles that 
they might academics who try to discern a more coherent and consistent 
“intellectual ideology” (Billig et al. 1988), but as enabling features of practices of 
expertise through which the constitution of expert statuses and meaningful 
experiences are inextricably interwoven.  Take away any opportunity for 
participants to experience guru’s truths as their own, in group or individual 
situations,  and we are left with doctrinal pronouncements; take away the 
pronouncements and we may be left with nothing at all.  
 Finally, seeing gurus as experts prompts us to consider what might 
provide the warrant for their experiential expertise in a general, societal sense. 
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At a basic level, they are all enmeshed in cultures outside of orthodox religion 
and academe, which provide people with experiences and understandings of 
what is taken to be their essential nature.  If this seems an odd state of affairs,  
we might remind ourselves that the possibility that we may not be who we think 
we are has long been regarded by academics as a core aspect of “New Age” 
thought (cf. Hanegraaff 1998: 212).  I suggest it is also a fundamental feature of 
the related but more general and older discourse of spirituality.  At its most 
blunt, this notion crystallises in succinct and provocative adages such as simply 
“You are not who you think you are” (e.g. Freke 2005).  Variants of this phrase, 
like the phrase itself, are repeated with mantra-like regularity across 
contemporary enlightenment cultures.  Gangaji’s assertions that people are not 
there “stories” is a clear example.  Such  radical and blanket denials of the 
value and accuracy of the presumed self-conceptions of people in general (or 
at least those not yet familiar with the practices and discourses of an 
enlightenment culture) double as attention grabbing slogans and rhetorical 
means by which addressees are configured as fundamentally ignorant of a 
most basic aspect of social life, their own identity. While these are not the only 
kinds of slogans employed by enlightenment cultures in their promotional 
materials, expressions of this premise thus serve as a prominent type of angst-
inspiring precursor and rhetorical preliminary to each culture’s problematisation 
of the self through its idiosyncratic configuration of the seeker.  Ideologically, 
however, even where  unstated, it is the notion that we do not truly know who 
we are which underpins all of the enlightenment cultures I have considered.  
Each culture would have us believe that we will not truly know who we are, or 
be able to live in accordance with our nature, without the help of its discourses 
and practices. This is nothing new or peculiar to contemporary enlightenment 
cultures, and again is a feature of the discourse of spirituality which is 
becoming increasingly prominent within Western societies. 
The problematisation of the self within the discourse of spirituality seems 
to support and encourage a range of current cultural trends noted by other 
scholars.  For example,  the propensities for individuals to embark upon their 
own  “reflexive project of the self”  (Giddens 1991), to fulfil their own “hero’s 
journey” (Campbell 1993), to seek out sources of “affect” (Grossberg 1998), 
and to  trust in an ever more diverse class of “experts” (cf. Beck 1992, and 
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Giddens op cit.).  Interestingly, experts with both scientific and non-scientific 
credentials presently figure in popular media which addresses, arbitrates upon, 
and constructs our perceptions of the most intimate aspects of our selves 
(including not only our “spiritual” essence, but the bricks and mortar of our 
physical size and appearance). The experiential expertise of the gurus I have 
considered seems to me remarkable in that it may be seen as an expression of 
so many diverse cultural trends, yet in its instances is so differentiated, 
nuanced and varied.  
Finally, I should be clear that while enlightenment cultures are all 
concerned with the expert guided revelation of the true nature of the self, and 
share a common ideological premise and even some of its related adages to 
the effect that we are not who we think we are,  each guru’s expertise lies in 
inculcating particular kinds of experience or affect associated with a kind of 
truth (or “enlightened self” - see the next chapter) which is only necessarily 
regarded as a final truth within that culture.   Paradoxically, although the 
foundational ideology seems to invite this possibility, the notion  that “you are 
not who you think you are” is never invoked recursively within the same 
enlightenment culture.  Logically, there seems nothing to prevent this 
occurrence.  Rather, by convention, each culture never treats its own affective 
prize or configuration of the enlightened self as a basis for a further spiritual 
quest or transformation, other than perhaps repeated affirmations.  In this 
sense, a guru’s experiential expertise is always located within the horizons of 
their own enlightenment culture, and enlightenment cultures themselves may 
be regarded as organized more around affect and expertise than enquiry into 
the nature of the selves which populate them. 
 
 
SEEKER SELF:  Well, like you said before, you haven’t helped me 
choose the best guru here.  In my years of seeking, I’ve tried many practices 
and of course some teachers are very different from others in how they go 
about things. I like the idea of treating them as having a similar kind of 
expertise, with different manifestations.  But where does this sort of research 
lead? I mean, what next? 
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ACADEMIC SELF: I have shown that researching spiritual authority may 
be recast as a study of expertises. I suggest this brings out important but easily 
overlooked aspects of Heelas’s and Partridge’s work on the New Age, moves 
out of the self-other authority dualism,  and encourages fruitful interdisciplinary 
dialogue with STS.  But there are snags to this.  Styles of analysis like 
participants’ “voices” are discourses, reflecting and refracting socio-historic 
conditions.  Even the notion of polyvocality, however “useful” it may be,  should 
not be viewed as the ultimate nature of selfhood.  Also, today’s emphasis upon 
studying practices brings a danger of reducing these occasions of expertise to 
an endless catalogue of practices, in service of societal conditions which 
themselves encourage researchers to objectify their subjects in this way (cf. 
Danziger 1990).  
You, my seeking friend,  have helped me avoid the centripetal allure of 
these tendencies, through your ethnographic descriptions and occasional 
surrenders and catches which hint at your own transformations.  How Tao-
daimon tensions play out for other researchers will however vary for different 
scholars and subject matters. They do not have to be expressed in dialogues, 
such as ours, and  I hope future scholars find other ways to reflect upon them 
as aspects  of inquiry.  Though as for “what next” empirical studies, I suggest 
Parsons’s dialogues lend themselves to conversation analysis of his linguistic 
game.  That would provide scope for contrasts and comparisons with like 
analyses of other occasions, such as Gangaji’s quasi therapeutic staged 
encounters or the EC exercises and discussion.  Alternatively, researchers 
might explore the different practices of expertise the “same” guru deploys 
across different settings, either synchronically or diachronically.  Some 
practices, such as video iconophilia, seem suited to  occasions where others 
teach on a guru’s behalf, though are not exclusive to those occasions as the 
plethora of DVDs and CDs produced by such speakers indicates.  
SS:  That could all be interesting, but it doesn’t, to quote John Lennon 
out of context, Gimme Some Truth. 
AS:  I don’t mean to patronise you, old friend, but I’m afraid I find your 
continuing desire to find some sort of spiritual truth in my analysis rather naive. 
As Barbara Herrnstein Smith points out, the scandal of philosophy has long 
been its “inability to show how, when and why we can be sure that we know 
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something or, indeed, that we know anything” (2005:  1). What makes you think 
I could possibly hope to provide you with anything that might satisfy your 
demand for truth in any lasting or final sense, when I am on such infirm 
foundations even amongst fellow academics?  
SS:  Well, I have never thought about this before,  but thankfully I do not 
go about my life or seeking trying to be an academic or philosopher.  I suppose 
like many “seekers” I tend to assume that that being convinced of spiritual 
truths is ultimately down to a combination of faith and personal experience.  I 
liked how one of the authors you discussed in an earlier chapter (Hammer, I 
think) put it – that experience is the key “litmus test”.  Can’t you offer me some 
findings in ways that I can test against my own experiences? 
AS:  Well, the view that experience is the foundation of knowledge is not 
as esoteric as Hammer or indeed Heelas might imply, as it also underpins 
many scholarly forms of empiricism and is how we tend to conduct our 
everyday lives. We’re digressing, but you have of course already benefitted 
from the same fieldwork experiences as me, and perhaps now you might also 
think of our exchanges as providing you with further telling experiences of the 
sort you seem to crave? I should add however, that this is not one of my aims 
and I don’t mind you disagreeing with me. 
SS:  Well, I am certainly feeling unsettled by your argument, in ways I 
didn’t feel unsettled when with any of the gurus. It has bothered me a bit that 
each time I see another guru, I’m kind of back at square one again. But like we 
discussed earlier, the book The Quest suggests it is possible overall spiritual 
progress can be made in this way. I know you disagreed6. 
AS: Like I pointed out just now, the adage “you are not who you think 
you are”  can always be invoked, but guru’s expertises seem to be constituted 
through practices which by convention stop short of never-ending recursivity.    
However, the potential deconstructability of any teaching of enlightenment by a 
second teaching, can create very real dilemmas for spiritual seekers who 
traverse several enlightenment cultures.  The teachings and practices of a 
selection of such cultures may well appear irreconcilable with each other.  For 
me, this made the cultures difficult to research.  For you, it creates the 
“ideological dilemma” of deciding which is right.  I can’t help you resolve that 
dilemma, though perhaps I can offer other perspectives on it.  For example, 
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Derrida (1997) might point out your dilemma is based on a more foundational 
or “logocentric” presumption of Western science, philosophy, and religion, 
which is that any  “fabric of signs” is “preceded by a truth, or a meaning already 
constituted by and within elements of the logos” (ibid, 14; “logos” here means 
something outside of the interplay of signs, that is, to Derrida a “presence”). 
Derrida critiqued this “ethnocentric metaphysics”, arguing that even where truth 
might be taken to be a “transcendental signified”, something outside of the 
logos and beyond the meaningful universe of signs, it nevertheless requires 
nothing more than the interplay of signs (ibid, esp. 7-30; 79).  This logocentrism 
permeates the discourse of spirituality.  It could hardly be otherwise.  However, 
I say this without configuring you as an ethnocentric seeker, or allowing much 
scope for you to experience “affect”, so I doubt you will find it “enlightening”.   
SS: You can sound rather annoying, you know that?  Look, what I’m 
really after is some truth.  Are you saying there can be no truth?  (And if you 
are, how could that be true?)  
AS:  I can see I’m frustrating you.  I’m sorry but I cannot help my tone, 
and I assure you I am trying to think of ways I might help you while arguing my 
thesis. Perhaps the next chapter about different gurus’ truths will help satisfy 
your demand for truth more, as it discusses several competing truths.   
SS:   Why is it with you everything is always multiple6.?  
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Chapter 5 Truths: Debating the 
Enlightened Self 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
According to Heelas’s (1996) seminal work The New Age Movement, a 
defining feature of that movement is its emphasis  on “Self-spirituality”.  This 
spirituality entails an epistemology in which paradoxically the self is taken to be 
the ultimate arbiter of truth about the self.  The previous chapters have  made it 
apparent that each of the gurus I have researched in depth make considerably 
different truth claims.  This chapter explores the diversity amongst such 
spiritual truth claims themselves, focusing on how articulations of an ultimate 
truth or the nature of enlightenment rely upon different notions of “the self”.  My 
analysis extends academic understanding of “Self-spirituality” by showing that 
as a theoretical abstraction it can nonetheless accommodate different 
meanings participants give to “the self”.  Attending to those different meanings 
is important in assessing the practical consequences of particular versions of 
“Self-spirituality”. 
This chapter contributes to my wider thesis argument by attempting to 
show that different views of spiritual enlightenment are associated with different 
but particular notions of the self, which like idealisations of the seeker (see 
Chapter 3) are analogous to notions of selfhood in wider culture.  I will discuss 
different notions of what I term “the enlightened self” while analysing some 
argumentative textual materials, drawn from public sources (a guru’s magazine, 
a series of letters published online, and an internet forum), in which four 
contemporary popular authorities on spiritual enlightenment,  Andrew Cohen, 
Gangaji, Tony Parsons, and Holigral, clash with each other. Arguments 
between proponents of contemporary spiritualities have rarely been subject to 
sociological scrutiny, although Hammer’s (2005) work (see Chapter 1) 
underlines the persuasive and always contestable character of esoteric 
rhetoric. Even Heelas early accounts of “self-religions” as organised around 
different “indigenous psychologies” did not address the role of different cultural 
 - 218 - 
selves in conflicts between “self-religions”.   In contrast, in social studies of 
science, scientific “controversies” have long provided social researchers with 
materials which have allowed them to lay bare the social factors which impinge 
upon scientific truth claims.  Gieryn (1983; 1999), for instance, found that in 
different “credibility contests”, the same scientists did not present their theories 
and claims uniformly, but accentuated differing ways of distinguishing their own 
argumentative position from that of their competitors, including  non-scientists. 
He termed the rhetorical selections involved “boundary work”  (1983:  782).    
In this chapter I focus upon one aspect of the boundary work undertaken 
by proponents of different approaches to enlightenment:  their notions of the 
self.  Unlike Gieryn, however, I do not only focus on rhetoric, but argue that 
respective perspectives each incorporate a different view of “the enlightened 
self”, and that differences between enlightened selves are significant to the 
academic notion of “Self-spirituality”. I argue that we need to be wary of 
describing such cultures as if they exemplify a single “spirituality”, especially 
when considering the possible impact of Self-spirituality upon contemporary 
society.   
The following chapter is arranged as follows.  I begin with some brief 
definitions, and then discuss the concept of Self-spirituality introduced by 
Heelas (1996), and relate it and its more recent usages to Heelas’s earlier work 
on “indigenous psychologies” (1981).   This discussion highlights the tendency 
in recent religious studies and sociology of religion literature to emphasise 
similarities between “New Age” or “holistic” activities and beliefs whilst also 
neglecting their differences. Two themes run through my subsequent analyses 
of argumentative materials involving Cohen, Gangaji, Parsons and Holigral.   
Firstly, I suggest the multiplicity of enlightened selves pursued across 
enlightenment means that Heelas’s notion of Self-spirituality needs to be 
reconsidered,  as whilst apt it glosses a myriad of differing self-conceptions.  
Secondly, I argue that each enlightened self offers different modes of 
engagement with the world, that is different ways of interpreting the world and 
acting in it, suggesting differing impacts upon contemporary culture and 
interrelationships with other enlightened selves.  
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SEEKER SELF:  [Sighing.] I suppose this means that again you’re going 
to avoid saying which teacher or truth you prefer?   
ACADEMIC SELF:  I’m afraid so.  Like you, I’ve obviously got my 
preferences.  But my academic aim isn’t to assess the merits of any of the 
teachers or truths I’m examining, and given the assurances I gave participants 
at the outset about the relativistic nature of my methodology it would be pretty 
unethical to do so.  
SS:  This relativism of yours seems either a cop out, or a real obstacle to 
you ever becoming enlightened yourself.  That’s kind of sad. 
AS:  I’m not sure if I should thank you for those  sentiments or not.  But 
you shouldn’t feel too sorry for me.  It isn’t that I don’t have preferences or 
beliefs myself, it’s just that there are practical and ethical reasons I’m not going 
into them.  But that shouldn’t stop you finding your own truths here.   
SS:  Let’s see.  
 
 
5.2 Enlightened selves and modes of engagement  
 
Before beginning, I need to clarify what I mean by both “the enlightened 
self” and “modes of engagement”.   The “enlightened self” is my own term and 
refers to whatever self-concept (or concepts)  participants in enlightenment 
cultures (including gurus and other spokespeople) associate with 
enlightenment.  This self is multiple, varying across enlightenment cultures, 
each manifestation being associated with wider cultural notions of selfhood.  It 
is an etic idealisation of the selves which can be distilled inductively from 
research materials and also identified in other largely literary sources (i.e. it is 
not a Weberian ideal type), and while participants themselves do not speak of 
“the enlightened self”’, their arguments about the nature of enlightenment or the 
correctness of each other’s views and practices are particularly good materials 
for identifying it from their discourses.   
“Modes of engagement” requires a little further elaboration as the term 
has been used slightly differently across several disciplines. I shall use the term 
to mean subjective orientations and their associated practical actions. The term 
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has recently been used in a similar sense by scholars across disciplinary fields, 
and I share with such other scholars the inclination to describe such modes in 
my own terms rather than using  participants’ own descriptions.    To cite but 
three examples of such studies, writing about science students’ “orientations” 
towards “natural phenomena”,   Rath and Brown (1996: 1087)  define such 
modes  “as different ways of looking at what are presumably different internal 
orientations, but [to which] we do not have direct access”.  They identify six 
such modes amongst science pupils, being “exploration”, “engineering”, “pet 
care”, “procedural”, “performance”, and “fantasy”, and go on to assess the 
pedagogical advantages of each and suggest teachers might encourage 
modes which are more productive of pupils’ learning.  Writing about his own 
experience in listening to music,  Morrison (2007: 404) defines modes of 
engagement as  “the active, operational means by which listeners experience 
music”. He identifies several categories of such modes, including “theoretical”, 
“aesthetic” and “associational”, and suggests certain modes may be mutually 
enhancing. Finally, Hill (2008) argues audiences viewing documentary 
programmes  have different overlapping “modes of engagement”  with 
documentary media, including  “immersion” and “reflection”, both contributing to 
its “wider role in society and culture” (ibid, 229).  
All of these studies portray participants as actively relating  to external 
phenomena (natural events,  music, documentaries),  adopting, changing and 
shifting between “modes of engagement” with them as they do so.  They all 
treat the adoption of specific modes as consequential (whether for curriculum 
learning, musical appreciation, or the significance of documentaries in wider 
society).  Rath and Brown’s analysis stands out by their suggestion that 
science teachers might deliberately encourage pupils into particular modes in 
order to assist their learning.   My analysis extends such usages of the notion 
of modes of engagement by suggesting particular analytically identifiable 
“selves” may have both differing and overlapping modes of engagement with 
the world.  
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5.3 The scholarly neglect of the self in Self-spirituality 
 
As outlined in Chapter 2, in the second period of his work Heelas saw 
the “New Age Movement” as defined by “what is taken to be the authority of the 
Self” (1996: 221).  This emic epistemological stance is associated with various 
beliefs and practices relying upon notions of “the self”,  which Heelas termed 
“Self spirituality” (ibid, 2).   Heelas held that typical of such spirituality is the 
belief that “Perfection can be found only by moving beyond the socialized self – 
widely known as the ‘ego’ but also as the ‘lower self’, ‘intellect’, or ‘mind’ – 
thereby encountering a new realm of being.  It is what we are by nature” (ibid, 
19).  He also pointed out that the truths revealed within Self-spirituality are 
characteristically treated by its practitioners as “perennial” ones – that is, 
participants take the same truths to lie to lie at the core of various religious 
traditions regardless of  their differences (ibid, 27; also Huxley 2004). “Self-
spirituality” as conceived by Heelas  therefore relies upon “the self “ as not only 
the ultimate source of authority, but also as a conceptual object, an ontological 
presupposition, and the key focus of practices of enquiry, revelation, and 
transformation.  The homogenising tendency of this concept, “Self-spirituality”, 
is apparent from Heelas’s introductory comments about the term:  
 
“Beneath much of the heterogeneity, there is remarkable constancy.  
Again and again, turning from practice to practice, from publication to 
publication, indeed, from country to country, one encounters the same 
(or very similar) lingua franca to do with the human (and planetary) 
condition and how it can be transformed. 
This is the language of what shall henceforth be called ‘Self-spirituality’.”  
(ibid, 2) 
 
Treating “Self-spirituality” as an analytical abstraction from  otherwise diverse 
spiritual pursuits and beliefs is innovative,  though analysts following Heelas 
have needed to be cautious about the possibility of reifying his abstraction.   
For instance, recently  Aupers and Houtman (2006: 204) go so far as to elevate 
“Self-spirituality”, in particular its emphasis upon a deeper or more authentic 
core self, to be “the binding doctrine in the spiritual milieu” (my emphasis).  
Heelas himself was more careful to allow for “variations on the theme of Self-
spirituality”, and envisaged a spectrum between “purist” or “world rejecting” 
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approaches which focused almost exclusively upon self–realization or bettering 
one’s “inner world”, and “empowering” or “world affirming” approaches which 
sought to make the best of the “outer world” through associating spirituality with 
the pursuit of material prosperity. Heelas suggests that most “New Age” paths 
seek to bestow “the best of both worlds”, for instance allowing for both “self-
enhancement” and “mainstream-transformation” whilst not challenging the 
fundamentals of capitalist society (1996: 29ff). The “basic lingua franca of Self-
spirituality”,  a diverse collection of adages, practices and concerns which treat 
“the self” as  epistemological object and authority, is what unites the diverse 
activities pursed by New Agers, to the extent their differences may be seen as 
“variations on this fundamental theme” (ibid, 36). 
Wood (2007; 2009), as I have mentioned previously,  has explored the 
problematic notion of “authority” in “New Age” pursuits, and Sutcliffe has 
highlighted the distinction between “New Age” as emblem and idiom.  However,  
little work has addressed the problematic nature of “the Self” in etic concepts of 
either “Self-spirituality”,  or the related concept of “the authority of the Self”, 
given possible variations in the concept of the self used within different “Self-
spiritualities”.  Most recent sociology of religion and religious studies texts 
instead continue to conceptually homogenise and label various “holistic” 
activities and beliefs to form their distinct objects of study.  While many of those 
writing after  Heelas’s (1996) study no longer identify a “New Age Movement” in 
their materials, they nevertheless tend to group activities and beliefs in a similar 
manner so that we now have etic abstractions such as  “grassroots spirituality” 
(Forman 2004, esp. Ch. 4),   “progressive spirituality” (Lynch 2007, esp. 55-60), 
and  “reflexive spirituality” (Roof 1999: 74-5). Each is  defined slightly differently 
by respective authors, and the page references I have cited highlight the 
continuing identification of participants’ concerns with “the self”.  Heelas himself 
has remained astutely alive to changes in popular terminology, and  now refers 
to  “spiritualities of life”.  However he now  eschews etic use of the term “Self” in 
describing such spiritualities because “it is considerably less appropriate 
today6.the term has too many individualistic connotations” (Heelas 2008, 237 
n.1). The issue of whether or not the meaning of “the self” has become any 
more varied today than in the 1990s is an empirical question beyond the scope 
of my analysis, though I expect that if one looked closely at the variety of 
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materials Heelas included in his earlier study it would be possible to distinguish 
many varieties of “self” even then.  I also suggest that even if  the term “self” 
might not figure so frequently in participants’ discourses, their activities and 
beliefs  may still be underpinned by identifiable notions of “the self”.  My 
argument is  that while there is remarkable overlap between recent studies, 
suggesting  very real underlying cultural change(s),  dating back to Heelas’s 
1996 text there has been a common  tendency by academics to gloss over 
differences in order to populate their respective “spiritual” fields.  I further 
suggest that this draws attention away from significant differences within any 
spiritual field, and that these differences may fruitfully be made into topics of 
study, and approached with an analytical intention to excavate the notions of 
the self which populate them. 
This last point is well exemplified by Lynch’s discussion of how the 
“evolutionary development of the self” is described within his “progressive 
spirituality” as “an authentic integration of the self6within the complexities of 
embodied experience” (op. cit.: 58-9).  In justifying this universal generalisation, 
Lynch cites two academic articles on Wicca, and a book promoting a “Bridget 
Jones” perspective on female spirituality (authored by an American spirituality 
professor though more popular than academic).  The implication is that this 
view of the self is common to these authors and all “progressives”.  Whilst 
Lynch’s observation may hold true for some of the materials I will consider 
below, it is hardly characteristic of all of them.   
The neglect of the different meanings given to “the self” within  “Self-
spirituality” is even more surprising given a concern with the “true” nature of the 
“the Self” is often an obvious feature of enlightenment cultures.  This was 
noticed by Heelas in the first, “self-religions”, period of his work (again, referred 
to in Chapter 2). Indeed, his earlier writings present a sophisticated approach to 
the study of popular or new “religions” which took account of the cultural 
varieties of the self, and how such varieties are incorporated in specific groups 
indicating a deep link between popular religion and its societal context.    I 
suggest it is fruitful to re-think “Self-spirituality” using Heelas’s earlier approach 
to “self-religions” and especially his theorising of the use they make of 
“indigenous psychologies”.  To expand upon my earlier discussion (see 
Chapter 2), indigenous psychologies are “the cultural views, theories, 
 - 224 - 
conjectures, classifications, assumptions and metaphors – together with 
notions embedded in social institutions – which bear on psychological topics” 
(1981:  4).  At the heart of such psychologies lie a “distinctive”, taken for 
granted and  culturally variable “view of the self” (ibid, 4).  Within any culture or 
time, there may be many such psychologies, so that on examination any one 
may seem “strange, multi-faced and apparently incoherent” (ibid, 7).  This view 
both  underscores the “relativity of how we conceive ourselves” (ibid, 8), and 
the “essential and vitally important” role of indigenous psychologies in all 
cultures.  Indeed, Heelas claims that “To operate as a human being requires a 
basic model or indigenous psychology 6mediating and functioning between 
raw and inchoate – i.e. animal – nature and the outside [social] world” (ibid, 13). 
Heelas suggests indigenous psychologies facilitate social life by enabling 
people to sustain an “inner” sense of self, including with respect to “the 
sociocultural”, and also to be operated upon by social institutions (ibid.).  
In a paper written shortly after this publication on “indigenous 
psychologies”, Heelas (1982) distinguished “self-religions” from other “new 
religious movements”, and argued they shared the characteristic of having 
“developed techniques which locate or construe the subjective in such a 
fashion as to make this realm predictable, secure, liveable, and in a nutshell 
social” (ibid, 70).   In “socialising the subjective”, self-religions provided models 
“for conceptualising and organising the exploration of the self” (ibid, 75).  
Heelas observed that “important models” were moreover provided by 
“indigenous psychologies or culturally held assumptions about the nature of the 
self” (ibid, 75).  The meaning of participants’ subjective experience of their “self” 
was thus “dependent on” or “modified by” these “socially and culturally given 
models” (ibid, 80). Heelas went on to conjecture that self-religions existed in 
“equilibrium” with wider society, being neither counter-cultural nor 
fundamentalist, as  like wider culture they were  “based on the premise of the 
structured, autonomous individual” (ibid, 82). 
One can see is such early works hints of Heelas’s belief in the possibility 
of ultimate truths, whether scientific or otherwise.  For instance, in this period of 
his work he afforded a privileged position to professional, experimental, and 
some indigenous psychologies which he considered might be “adventitious with 
respect to man’s psychological nature”.  Nevertheless, just as Heelas’s later 
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work suggests an ambivalence towards and adoption of the perspectives of 
those he is researching, and various “ultimate” views of the self and its 
authority, in this early work he both afforded certain psychologies “adventitious” 
standing, while sympathising with the view that “how we conceive ourselves 
affects our psychological nature and actions” (1981: 16).  It is this latter view 
that coloured his argument that academic understanding of social institutions 
requires an understanding of their associated indigenous psychologies (ibid, 
17). Nevertheless, whilst Heelas’s interest in the self continued throughout this 
early work on “self-religions” and his focus on “Self-spirituality” (see Chapter 2), 
he came to treat the “New Age” movement and subsequent “spiritualities of life” 
as if they are characterised by a “spirituality” or ideology we might regard as 
just a single indigenous psychology. 
Indeed, in his canonical work on New Age, Heelas (1996) did not refer to 
his earlier work on indigenous psychologies or his analysis of how self-religions 
made use of cultural theories of the self.  He does not cite his “indigenous 
psychologies” (1981) work at all, and only cites his “self-religions” (1982) 
publication in passing, for further reading on the subject of “radical 
subjectivism” and “radical authority”, without mentioning his actual arguments in 
that publication.  In his more recent still publications, Heelas tends not to refer 
to or cite his “self-religions” or “indigenous psychologies” works at all (e.g. 
Heelas et al. 2005; Heelas 2008).      
A possible explanation of Heelas’s disinclination to address cultural 
varieties of the self in his more recent work is that this would not fit well with his 
aim of defining his “New Age movement”, or more recently “spiritualities of life”, 
as distinct though respective researchable phenomena notwithstanding the 
“hotch-potch” of beliefs and practices which its constituents present. Further to 
Sutcliffe’s (2004) critique of this approach to “New Age” (see Chapter 2 above), 
we may note here that Heelas’s analytical interest in “New Age” was well-
served by the notion of a common “Self-spirituality”, shared by every 
constituent of the “hotch-potch”.  However, this interest would not have been so 
well-served, but very likely challenged and contradicted, had he focused on the 
possibility that pockets within any supposed “New Age” conglomerate may 
each be operating with very different models of the self, indigenous or 
otherwise.  In short, “Self-spirituality” and “indigenous psychologies” point in 
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very different analytical directions:  the former is homogenising and invariably 
used by Heelas in the singular, while the latter is disaggregating and generally 
presented in the plural.  
Although “Self-spirituality” may be seen as etic device which facilitated 
the reification of “New Age” as a research topic (cf. Sutcliffe 2003; Frisk 2005), I 
suggest this trend may be redressed not through discrediting the entire work of 
its main exponent (that is, Heelas;  see for example Wood 2007), but by 
renewing interest in the analytical approach found in the earlier work of the 
same author.  Today, research methods such as those of conversation and 
discourse analysis are more widely taught and offer scholars great scope for 
investigating “micro” scale textual or interactional practices within 
enlightenment cultures.  What those methods generally lack is a way of relating 
their findings to “macro” issues beyond the particulars of specific occasions, 
just as those interested in “big themes” such as “Self-spirituality” can struggle to 
show how those themes feature in the minutiae of daily life.   Heelas’s “self-
religions” work points to the possibility of linking “cultural” levels of analysis, 
through the specification of the types of self found in indigenous psychologies, 
with “interactional”, “textual”  and even “subjective” levels of analysis in which 
similar seeming selves figure in both discourse and relatedly meaningful 
experience (as I have suggested previously, gurus’ discourses of the self not 
only figure in interactions, but in thought). It is in this spirit I approach my 
enlightenment cultures in this chapter, thereby attempting to show how one 
might redress the neglect of the self in “Self-spirituality”. I am therefore 
assuming that each enlightenment culture may for these purposes be regarded 
as a modern example of “Self-spirituality”, although none of these cultures have 
been either researched or so categorised by Heelas himself.  
 
5.4 The cases 
 
The case materials I consider below represent clashes between the  
“indigenous psychologies” of different enlightenment cultures, and 
enlightenment cultures and lay commentators. Through these materials, I shall 
show the continued relevance of “the self” in analysing and theorising 
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contemporary spiritual pursuits, though with a renewed analytic openness to 
the varieties of self we find or have occasion to reflect upon.  Whereas gurus 
are renowned for their capacities to endlessly elaborate upon their spiritual 
truths (even ineffable ones), in these four “credibility contests”, where 
participants contrast their position with that of an opponent, differences are 
presented succinctly.  My interest is in what aspects of respective teachings 
and activities are emphasised when such contrasts are drawn, and in particular 
the nature of the enlightened selves which seem pertinent to these materials.  
Previous Chapters have addressed at length teachings associated with 
all but one of the perspectives represented in these exchanges, the additional 
perspective being that of “traditional” Advaita Vedanta. Here, while that 
perspective is represented in some publications associated with Cohen, it is  
relayed principally through the publications of Dennis Waite. As I explain below, 
Waite is  not a guru or teacher of enlightenment.  Although he  does not run 
courses on enlightenment, and was not a  formal participant in this research, I 
shall analyse his public exchanges with Parsons in order to show some 
distinguishing features of Parsons’s enlightened self.   
 
5.4.1 Doing the Advaita shuffle: worldly and transcendental 
selves 
  
The first materials I will analyse are a discussion between Cohen and 
Gangaji, as reported in an article in the first issue of What is Enlightenment? 
(WiE?), a magazine published through Cohen’s organisation, a  US-based non-
profit organisation promoting his own teachings, now an international charity 
EnlightenNext. (In  2008 WiE? was  renamed EnlightenNext:  The Magazine for 
Evolutionaries).  The article concerned is titled “The Advaita Shuffle”.  The 
article has two parts, its multiple respective authors indicative of its editorial 
importance at the time (Roth 1992;  van der Braak, Parish and Roth 1992).  
One needs to know something of the stake which Cohen and Gangaji had in 
this discussion to appreciate the article’s significance in Cohen’s magazine, 
and so some historical background is needed.  
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 Cohen has produced two autobiographies, the first (1989) predating his 
falling out with his guru, Poonja (“Papaji”) of Lucknow, and the second (1992) 
postdating this. According to the first, in 1986,  Poonja recognised Cohen’s 
enlightenment and asked him to teach in the West.  Throughout the late 1980s 
and 1990s, Poonja similarly accredited and launched other Western teachers of 
enlightenment.  By 1988 Cohen had created the Moksha Foundation1 as a 
vehicle for his own teachings, and by 1991 he was promoting ideas alien to 
Poonja, such as a  distinction between “personal” and “impersonal 
enlightenment”.  With this distinction came the idea that enlightenment was 
necessary for the evolutionary development of humanity (cf. van der Braak 
2003: 99-101; 102)2. In 1990, as word of such departures was reaching  
Poonja, a former student of Cohen’s, Antoinette Varner, tracked down and 
visited Poonja (Moore 2003:  77-8)3.  Poonja re-named her “Gangaji” and 
asked her to teach people who had left or been “kicked out” by Cohen,   “to 
bring them Papaji’s message”  because Cohen was “not teaching what he had 
received from Papaji” (ibid,  129).  Gangaji duly obliged. 
Gangaji’s  biography refers to Cohen subsequently attending one of her 
satsangs where  “a real confrontation” occurred, after which they wrote each 
other “a couple of letters” before she “let it go” (ibid, 130).4 For his part, in his 
second autobiography, Cohen (1992) explains that in 1990 he learnt one of his 
own former students had visited Poonja and “been given an Indian name, 
proclaimed to be a ‘satguru’ and asked to teach” and was attracting  students 
who had not “lived up to” Cohen’s own teachings (ibid, 82- 88).5   By 1990, 
Cohen perceived his credibility was at stake.  As he puts it:  
 
                                                 
1 The term “Moksha” has clear Eastern etymology. Though it is used slightly differently across 
various  strands of  Hinduism and especially Advaita, broadly, it refers to the realization of the 
pervasiveness of “self” and “release” from the cycle of life and rebirth (see extensive discussion 
in Deutsch and Dalvi (2004)).  It does not appear to have been a term given any particular 
emphasis by Poonja.   
2 van der Braak is a former student of and writer for Cohen.  His (2003) autobiographic text is 
highly critical  of Cohen, and while it provides useful insights into Cohen’s early “teaching 
career”, one should not forget its own controversial nature.  
3 Moore’s (2003) biography of Gangaji is approved by Gangaji, and is non-critical and near 
reverential of her. Its editorial bias is thus the reverse of van der Braak’s text.  
4 Neither Cohen nor Gangaji mention each other by name in their biographies, though a reader 
of all three such texts would have little doubt they are referring to each other. 
5 Like “moksha”, “satguru” or “sadguru” has overtly Eastern origins and subtleties of meaning 
across traditions. Broadly, it  means a “true” or “enlightened” guru. 
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“Slowly, I began to find myself in the midst of quite a predicament where 
the stakes were very high.  I became alarmed.  I was in the middle of a 
public spectacle6.”  (1992: 89) 
 
Cohen reacted to any unfolding spectacle in two very public ways.  Firstly, he 
made claims to have a different view of enlightenment from and to have 
“surpassed” his former teacher (ibid, 106).6  Secondly, in his magazine Cohen 
reported his attempt to “publically discuss” with Gangaji the “serious 
misunderstanding” he had heard she was alleging he held (p. 13). 
The mutual discussion referred to by both Gangaji and Cohen is used 
extensively in the WiE? shuffle article.  The first part of the article is somewhat 
abstract, explaining what is meant by the “perils” of the “Advaita Shuffle.” It 
claims Cohen is questioning the “Absolute teachings of Advaita” because of a 
“fundamental disagreement” with his teacher Poonja. Cohen maintains that 
many people taught by Poonja (and two other named “Advaita” teachers) 
“mistakenly feel relieved from the burden of responsibility for their own 
behaviour” (p.12). The article suggests their “mistake” is based upon a belief  
they are not real, which the article suggests is an erroneous conclusion drawn 
“from their own spiritual experiences of no-separation”.  The reason they come 
to such an erroneous conclusion is claimed to be the “enslaving” effect of a way 
of speaking and thinking Cohen terms the “Advaita Shuffle”. According to the 
article,  
 
“ [The ‘Advaita Shuffle’ occurs when] any difficulty that one is faced with, 
from within or without, 6[is] ‘Advaited’ by saying that it is all unreal or all 
the Self anyway. 6[The ‘Advaita Shuffle’] can paralyze a person and 
prevent him or her from sober self-introspection because to consider 
one’s ‘self’ is to entertain illusion, is to deny one’s own realization, is to 
embrace the falsity of dualism6.the freedom to face any difficulty or 
imperfections in one’s own character is destroyed.” (p.12) 
 
 
                                                 
6 Whilst Cohen and Poonja have thus discredited each other, Poonja has also discredited all of 
his Western enlightenees by claiming in an interview with his biographer to have given them 
mere spiritual “lollipops” (Godman 1998: 363-7), and in the same interview and elsewhere 
alluded to having “secret” or “final” teachings he is never reported to have revealed (Godman 
op. cit.; Poonja 2000:  544-5). This demonstrates both the contestable nature of enlightenment, 
and perhaps also a rhetorical ploy by Poonja to heighten and retain Westerners’ interest in his 
own teachings when those he had “enlightened” on returning to their countries became “gurus” 
in their own rights (cf. Godman op. cit.).   
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The article describes this view as “ridiculous”, contrasting it with  Cohen’s 
uncritically presented but cryptic view that to be “truly free” one must pursue the 
goal of “radical transformation” in which there is no separation between who 
one is and what one might  become (ibid.).   
The second part of the article is an “illustration” of the shuffle being used 
as a “technique” of other- and self-deception in the discussion which took place 
between Cohen and Gangaji when he attended one of her satsangs. Parts of 
their conversation are indented as if transcriptions from a recording, or cited 
with quotation marks in the text, though the article does not explain if or how 
the conversation was recorded.7  The first indented exchange begins: 
 
“A: I think that6behaviour and conduct is the only way that one can 
objectively understand and judge to what degree another person has 
really awakened and understood.  There’s really no other way to tell. 
G:  Well, I disagree with you radically. 
A:  How else can you judge? 
G:  Well, who’s judging? 
A:  Whoever you are. 
G: Well, then who’s identifying with the judging? 
A: Come on.  This is called the ‘Advaita Shuffle’.  You can say that to 
anything6.It’s impossible to have a conversation because you can 
‘Advaita’ anything that way and it’s impossible to make any progress.  
You can say, ‘Who’s asking the question?’ who’s answering the 
question?  Who wants to know?  Who’s worrying?” 
G:  Well, I suggest you ask those questions and then you’re quiet and 
you listen. 
A:  Right, but then there’s no discussion. 
G:  Well, what’s discussion?  Then there’s no one to discuss with”   
 (p. 13.  A is Andrew Cohen; G is “Ganga”, a formal version of 
Gangaji) 
 
 
The article claims this extract “illustrates the impossibility of having a rational, 
mutual inquiry with someone who is "stuck in the Absolute viewpoint.  It defies 
all common sense and logic” (p.13).  The article also provides an emic analysis 
of the transcript, adding to the abstract discussion in the first part by suggesting 
that through the shuffle,  “attention is drawn away from the actual content of the 
discussion and put back on the questioner himself”,  avoiding “descent into the 
                                                 
7 In his own autobiography of his time with Cohen, van der Braak, (2003: 104-7), one of the 
authors of this part of the article, reports that  Cohen produced the transcript of the discussion.  
I am not aware of any public comment by Gangaji upon its  accuracy, though since my analysis 
is of the article whether or not it is accurate is irrelevant.    
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relative” but at the cost of destroying the possibilities of “investigation, learning 
and exchange” (p.13).  
Cohen’s “difficulty” in drawing Gangaji into an impromptu rational debate 
is in part that from Gangaji’s perspective she is in satsang, where “shuffling” is 
part of her experiential expertise.  The sort of debate Cohen  is inviting requires 
a “time out” from satsang practices and insertion of an altogether different type 
of exchange.  While Gangaji does not debate with Cohen wholly in a 
conventional way, she does indicate her disagreement with Cohen’s notion  
that “behaviour and conduct” are the only ways to tell  “to what degree another 
person has really awakened”, and that from her perspective  the idea of  “who’s 
judging?” is problematic.  Cohen’s  “come on6” dismisses these remarks as 
“shuffling”, suggesting that it is already a recognised and labelled form of 
evasive rhetoric (“you can say that to anything6”).  This move on Cohen’s part 
itself relies on a form of rhetoric, the powerfully persuasive rhetoric of 
obviousness (cf. Edwards et al. 1995: 42), which contrasts sharply with the 
manner in which Gangaji draws boundaries between herself and Cohen as the 
article continues.   
A key aspect of Cohen’s critique is his allegation that Gangaji is 
deploying an evasive gambit.  The   “Advaita Shuffle” is portrayed as improper, 
even “ridiculous”, from the common sense, “relative”,  worldly perspective in 
which individuals have rational debates, are  accountable for their actions,  and 
might change themselves. The article favours this worldly perspective, 
asserting that  Gangaji’s “idea of Enlightenment” is “totally divorced from the 
human being, has no bearing on the life they lead, and entails no responsibility” 
(ibid, 13), whereas from Cohen’s perspective  “Absolute realization [may] be 
taught in such a way that it can be practically understood, recognized and 
practiced” (p. 14). Gangaji is not quoted as challenging Cohen’s notion of  the 
“Advaita shuffle”, though it seems unlikely the analysis and descriptions of the 
multi-authored article featured in her and Cohen’s actual discussion.   
 The different manner in which Gangaji  articulates  her stance  becomes 
more apparent later in the article, after she is reported as saying that Cohen 
has “landed”. The article explains this means that he has “identified with his 
realization, and has therefore lost it” (ibid, 13).  In a later transcribed dialogue, 
Gangaji goes further, and is reported to have said  “if you6identify degrees of 
 - 232 - 
Enlightenment through behaviour, your realization is not complete” (p. 14). This 
implies that from her perspective Cohen may never have been “enlightened”.  
Unsurprisingly, Cohen does not respond to the shuffle as a configured seeker 
might, instead treating them as evasive rather than occasions for his own self-
reflection.   
Through juxtaposing Cohen’s and Gangaji’s differing stances, the article 
presents readers with the appearance of incommensurable perspectives.  
Cohen portrays his position as superior through associating it with rationality 
and common sense, and this view is supported by the text surrounding the 
transcripts. He and it portray Gangaji as mistakenly or deliberately “stuck in an 
Absolute view”, in the sense certain of her responses are not conventional 
answers to Cohen’s questioning but prompts characteristic of Gangaji’s style of 
staged self inquiry.   Gangaji on the other hand portrays Cohen as having 
improperly lost that view, and her responses treat him as if he were a seeker 
who erroneously believes he is enlightened.  The impression of 
incommensurable ideas is reinforced by how the article ends:   it reports that 
Gangaji declined Cohen’s request for a further discussion, and that she 
described the very “idea of a debate” as  “absurd” (p. 14).  
 One reason Cohen and Gangaji’s respective views on enlightenment 
seem so opposed to each other is that they tap into divergent idealisations of 
the self.   Below, I first discuss the worldly self suggested by Cohen’s position, 
which I argue reflects Giddens’s (1991) view of the self in high modernity, 
before discussing the transcendental self apparent in Gangaji’s position, which 
I suggest accords with Copleston’s (2004) exposition of “the One” in various 
religious and philosophical traditions.  
 Although the article does not claim that Gangaji’s supposed view that the 
self is “illusory” is wrong, or challenge the validity of her “absolute” view, its 
assertions that her position is “totally divorced from” the “relative” world, and 
that she is “stuck” in an “absolute” view, prioritise this “relative” world.  The 
latter is portrayed as the world in which enlightenment may be taught to others, 
and in which notions of personal transformation and degrees of enlightenment 
make sense.  Enlightenment here is thus a “practical” matter, something which 
may be “taught”.  The consequences of such teaching are also portrayed as  
practical matters, being “transformations” resulting in observable, measurable 
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changes in “behaviour”. The enlightened self here is thus very much of the 
empirical world, capable of action as well as “sober self-introspection” (p. 12).  
Such a self resonates with familiar academic portrayals of the sovereign  
Enlightenment subject, such as Hall’s (1992) characterisation of it as “endowed 
with the capacities of reason, consciousness and action”.   
The view of the self reflected in Cohen’s position is however not simply  
that of a stable sovereign individual.  His emphasis upon personal 
transformation is also reminiscent of Giddens’s account  of the self in 
contemporary society, or “high modernity” as Giddens calls it.  In traditional 
societies, Giddens considers an individual’s sense of self is given to them 
through being embedded in local social relations which do not change between 
generations. In fast-changing contemporary society, however, characterised by 
institutionalised forms of reflexivity which undermine traditional certainties 
about knowledge and existence, Giddens considers the construction and 
maintenance of  the self has become each person’s individual responsibility in 
a lifelong  “reflexive project of the self”.  As changing life circumstances result in 
individuals acquiring new or altered selves,  Giddens notes “the altered self has 
to be explored and constructed as part of a reflexive process of connecting 
personal and social change” (ibid, 33).  Like the enlightened self endorsed by 
the article, the self in high modernity is the upshot of prior worldly 
transformations and subject to self-monitoring by individuals and at times 
experts (cf. ibid, 179-80).  This enlightened self is however not as mutable as 
Giddens’s sociological view of the self, as the article envisages the possibility of 
“complete and radical transformation” and “the end of all becoming” (p. 12).  In 
Giddens terms the reflexive project of the self here merges with new religious 
or spiritual views which may be regarded as supplying certainties otherwise 
undermined by the reflexivity inherent in modernity (ibid, 196; 207).  The mode 
of engagement of this self towards the world is not spelled out in the article at 
the level of practices, though it is clearly a self which has much to do in the 
world, in order to transform itself.  Implicitly, this is also a self requiring 
guidance from others in what it must do in order to transform, as well as being 
open to having its progress assessed by others.  
The article presents Gangaji’s treatment of enlightened selfhood very 
differently.  In the extract referred to above, she explicitly questions Cohen’s 
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empirical self.  The view of the self which Gangaji endorses involves a 
paradoxical denial that  there is anyone who might assess the enlightenments 
of others.  The self supposedly revealed by this self-questioning is not a 
somehow transformed self as judged by others,  but as we have seen a  
“realization” or  experience of the “absolute” nature of the self as ontologically 
all-encompassing.  That is, as stillness.  I shall refer to this view of the 
enlightened self as a transcendental one. The distinction between the empirical 
and the transcendental underpins the entire article, and echoes a common 
distinction made across many world religions and philosophies which endorse a 
single ultimate reality.  This pervasive distinction has been considered by 
Copleston (2004) in his “metaphysics of the One”.8   Copleston describes  it as 
being between “the empirical self, the self as object of self-consciousness and 
of thought” which is “in the world”, and a notion of “the self as subject, the self 
as objectifying but not objectified” which is “not in the world” (ibid, 174).  
Copleston refers to this other worldly self as “the I-subject, which objectifies the 
empirical self” (ibid, 175), though I  refer to it simply as the transcendental self.   
Copleston suggests the equation of the transcendental self with the One 
always generates puzzles which “seem artificial or unreal to the plain man” 
(ibid, 190).9 He points out the transcendental self (“I-subject”) is far removed 
from “the living, sensing, desiring, remembering, thinking and willing” agentive 
human being (ibid, 190).   
Copleston’s analysis goes some way to explaining the antagonism 
between Cohen’s and Gangaji’s stances as the level of the selves they invoke,  
as in Copleston’s terms to a “’worldly’ being”, the “metaphysics of the One”  
appear “so much airy nonsense” (ibid, 193).   Gangaji’s reported 
encouragement to Cohen to reflect on who would judge the enlightenments of 
others injects such a transcendent conception of the self into Cohen’s 
otherwise worldly efforts at debate.    “Debate” performed in these terms is not 
                                                 
8 Copleston’s sources are wide ranging, including various schools of Taoism, Buddhism, 
Advaita Vedanta, Islamic mysticism, and Western philosophy 
9 As examples of such puzzles Copleston cites the questions of whether there may be a 
plurality of I-subjects, or a single transcendental subject, and if the latter whether or not this 
single subject is ultimate reality.  Copleston shows how such questions are answered differently 
in discussions of “the witness” across distinct schools of Hindu religious philosophy, while 
arguing that theories of the self alone cannot found a metaphysics of the One (ibid, esp. 182; 
194-5).   
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debate at all, but a continual deconstruction of the empirical self or selves 
which might conduct it.  The views of the self contrasts markedly and offer very 
different prospects for action in the “relative” or everyday world.   While the 
precise nature of Cohen’s scheme for identifying and gauging the 
enlightenments of others is not explained in the article, it shows a commitment 
to the empirical world.  Gangaji’s position  likewise offers no prescriptions for 
engaging with the world or others, though differs from Cohen’s in appearing to 
afford no significance to any worldly activity whatsoever, aside perhaps from 
enquiry into the nature of one’s self. Its mode of engagement appears to be 
entail turning away from the world, as is illustrated by Gangaji’s declination of 
any further “debate”.  
Thus,   whilst superficially both Gangaji and Cohen may be viewed as 
exemplars of Self-spiritualities, the different notions of  the self underpinning 
and invoked by the their respective portrayal in the article  (whether worldly or 
transcendental)  predate them and, as Copleston’s discussion illustrates, 
historically have a varied and oppositional relationship.  This article highlights 
the continued pertinence of Heelas’s distinction between world-affirming and 
world-rejecting  (or at least neglecting) currents in  “Self-spirituality”, and that 
this distinction itself may be further developed by reference to the types of self 
associated with each pole. 
 
5.4.2 The satirical satsang: evolving and complacent selves 
 
 
The shuffle article was not the last occasion in which Gangaji appeared 
in dialogue in WiE?, for she also featured in a satirical satang published some 
ten years later.  I am discussing this article briefly because while it invokes 
similar self concepts to those of the shuffle article, it is very different in form and 
introduces a greater “evolutionary” emphasis to its favoured empirical self and 
suggests further characteristics of the mode of engagement of Gangaji’s 
transcendental self. 
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From its monotone pamphlet-like beginnings, WiE? had by 2002 
become an international news stand periodical.10 Gangaji and other “Advaitin” 
teachers remained staple targets of critique.  The satirical piece concerned was 
titled “Who’s transforming anyway?”, and was originally published in  2002 and 
reproduced in full in WiE?’s fifteen year anniversary issue in 2006, with cartoon 
illustrations and a new introduction referring to the “Advaita Shuffle” article and 
describing  “neo Advaita”, already a derogatory term,  as “spiritual heroin.”  
Before considering the article, again as background it is important to 
note that Cohen’s sympathies towards “evolutionary” thinking appear to have 
steadily increased, and that not only did this alienate him from Poonja but it 
created new contemporary allies for his views.   Two prominent popular authors 
sharing  Cohen’s interest in evolution and with whom he later forged alliances 
are popular spiritual author and philosopher Ken Wilber (e.g. 2001), who wrote 
a forward to one of Cohen’s recent texts (2002) and with whom Cohen since 
conducted “guru and pandit” dialogues in WiE?, and also popular author and 
public speaker Don Beck (e.g. Beck and Cowan 1996) with whom Cohen 
addressed an audience of politicians and business people in Copenhagen in 
2003. Beck and Wilber are marginal to academe though each have elaborate 
conceptual theories of individual and collective development which suggest that 
different  people may be at different evolutionary levels compared to their 
contemporaries, and moreover may improve their  evolutionary standing within 
their lifetimes. The finer details of Wilber’s and Beck and Cowan’s models are 
unimportant to my analysis, though two points are worth highlighting. First,  
such allies come with their own overlapping literary heritages, inspirations and 
citable authorities.  Wilber for instance has positioned his own work amongst 
prior “integral” and “evolutionary” scholars, with overt acknowledgments to  an 
Indian yogi Sri Aurobindo (1872-1950) who also emphasised the concept of 
“evolution” in his teachings  (e.g. Wilber 2000: 83-4). Beck and Cowan for their 
part identify French spiritual and “evolutionary” philosopher Pierre Telihard de 
Chardin (1881-1955) as an exemplar of the highest “holistic” developmental 
level in their scheme (Beck and Cowan 1996:  47).  Second, equipped with 
                                                 
10 Its quarterly circulation is presently about 75,000 copies. Source:   EnlightenNext magazine 
webpage, “About EnlightenNext”. Viewed on 23 August 2010 at 
http://www.enlightennext.org/about/   .  
 - 237 - 
such allies, Cohen has been able to present “evolutionary”  aspects of his 
teachings as not only a great departure Poonja’s message that “There was 
nowhere to go and there was nothing to do” (cf.  Cohen and Wilber 2002), but 
as credible in terms of the ideas of such  contemporary popular thinkers.  We 
will see this happening in the satirical satsang. 
The article itself is written by Jessica Roemischer, presently a senior 
editor for the magazine, and is written as  a fictional interview style debate  
about the nature of satsangs between a (fictional) writer for WiE? called 
“Stacey Heartspring”, and a “panel” of real contemporary neo-Advaita or 
satsang teachers (being  Gangaji, Parsons and four others).     The stated aim 
of the “satsang” is to educate WiE? readers about satsangs.  The dialogue of  
panel members is largely culled from their own publications, with actual 
quotations italicised. While Cohen does not appear in the article, and 
Heartspring’s dialogue is not attributed to any literary authorities, she is 
recognisable as the  voice of evolutionary thinking. She is portrayed as initially 
drawn by the nihilistic  suggestions of the “neo” panel, but increasingly  
disturbed and “confused” by them, eventually overtly disagreeing with them and 
voicing her own  aspirations to have “evolutionary significance” and to 
“transform” herself.  Throughout this fictional debate, numerous historical 
characters materialise to offer brief contributions.  For example, Telihard de 
Chardin and Sri Aurobindo appear to bolster Heartspring’s spiritual evolutionary 
perspective, while the Marquis de Sade (1740-1814) seems to  suggest the 
neos’  denials of personal responsibility are compatible with his  own amoral 
hedonism, and Adolf Hitler (1889-1945) and war criminal Eduard Strauch 
(1906-1955) appear as personifications of historic evils the reality of which the 
neos appear to deny.    
The “satirical satsang” is thus not written as if a proper satsang, and 
uses a  dramatic format to present and attack the views of its “panel”.     
Heartspring initially warms to her guests, under their guidance succumbing to 
“comforting, reassuring, and freeing” feelings before remembering her 
“evolutionary potential” and becoming more critical of them  (p. 154-5). As the 
satsang unfurls, the panel speak as if in agreement with each other, while 
being collectively aligned with historical monsters and made to appear 
irrational, amoral, and inappropriately accepting towards reprehensible actions.  
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Behind their opposing views lies two very different views of the self. The 
following extract illustrates this, as Hitler and Strauch disagree with an 
unperturbed Parsons-character about free will: 
 
“TONY: Stacey, there is no question of there being free will, simply 
because there is no one there in the first place who can have a will or 
make a choice.  
HITLER: But, I could not have done it [i.e. instigated atrocities]  without 
so many willing participants. And here with me is one of my 
commanders, Eduard Strauch, who will testify to that.  
STRAUCH: Heil Hitler! No one should ever doubt the eagerness of the 
men who served under you. Even if the killing was hard and unpleasant . 
. . we [were] convinced that someone must carry out these tasks. I can 
state with pride that my men [were] proud to act out of conviction and 
fidelity to their Führer.  
TONY: Everything that happened . . . could not have been any other 
way.”    
(p. 160; original italics indicate quotation from a 
published source.) 
 
 
In this dialogue, through fictionally confronting Parsons with the historical 
persons he would characteristically deny ever existed,  his quoted  remarks 
appear heinous and supportive of  past atrocities. 11   Gangaji too is made to 
appear ridiculous, such as in the following exchange which re-presents remarks 
she was reported in the shuffle article to have made to Cohen, as if they are 
responses to inspirational remarks quoted from the evolutionary inclined  sage 
Sri Aurobindo, who as mentioned above has been cited by Cohen’s 
contemporary Wilber as an influence upon his own thinking: 
 
“SRI AUROBINDO: Yes, Stacey, I shall join you for the evolutionary 
benefit of all. And this is how I can best answer this most fundamental 
question of human meaning: Man’s greatness is not in what he is but in 
what he makes possibleH. If earth calls and the Supreme answers, the 
hour can be even now for that immense and glorious transformation.  
                                                 
11 While this exchange is entirely fiction, Parsons actually has denied there was ever a person 
called Hitler.  He did so at  the talk he gave in Cheltenham considered in the last chapter, and 
has done so in print (e.g. Parsons 2003:  27).  In the latter text his clarified that although  “Hitler 
was the one arising as Hitler6There’s no Hitler there” (my emphasis).  This is of course in 
keeping with Parsons’s denial there is such a thing as a person, and assertions of  oneness, 
though like many of his statements is rhetorically provocative and begs further questioning. In 
the satire he is fictionally confronted with the “airy nonsense” of his views, as seen from  the 
commonsense  perspective of  the “plain man” (Copelston op. cit.).  
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GANGAJI: Well, I disagree with you radically. . . . I would say that’s a 
“landing.” . . . [Because] what’s missing is the realization that this idea of 
a doer is a thought and empty.  
STACEY: A “landing”? I was just starting to feel elevated66” 
(p. 162-3)  
 
 
Following this quotation from Sri Aurobindo with Gangaji’s quoted denial of a 
“doer” is rhetorically emotive and deflationary.    Heartspring’s put down 
response both ridicules the possibility of treating Sri Aurobindo’s inspirational 
remarks as  a “landing”, and asserts her own individuality in doing so (“I was 
just6”).   Gangaji’s suggestion there is no “doer” is thus rhetorically 
undermined. 
The satsang article is therefore similar to the shuffle one.   Denials of 
responsibility for one’s behaviour, denials of there being   distinct people,  and 
supposedly confusing “shuffling” again figure prominently and negatively. 
These again stand in contrast with assertions of individuality and a positive 
portrayal of endeavouring to better oneself in the world.  While Cohen’s distinct 
authorial “voice” has disappeared altogether, aspects of his teachings are 
apparent to those familiar with them in the dialogue of the fictitious “ringmaster” 
and the  historic allies which materialise to support her.  The position on the self 
which they adopt is again analogous to the self in Giddens’s high modernity 
discussed above, though here there is a more overt emphasis upon the 
Western cultural truisms that people are discrete  individuals in an “evolving 
universe”, in which there is individual choice, and free will.  Such cultural 
truisms are here combined with a view of evolution, broadly in sympathy with 
the evolutionary thinking of several of Cohen’s contemporaries  and/or their 
own influences (mentioned above).  The result is that unlike happenstance 
Darwinian evolution, Heartspring presents readers with a view of evolution  
which treats each individual as having “evolutionary significance” in the world,  
assuming that through choices and efforts in their own lifetimes they might  
(personally) “evolve” or “transform”.   Like the shuffle piece the satire is 
imprecise about what might be done to achieve such evolution.  It does 
however portray worldly aspirations to change and improve oneself as positive, 
and the perspective of the “panel” as negative in spite of the comfortable 
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feelings it might instil.   The panel’s view entails a denial of any worldly or 
sovereign individual self  (“there is no one there,” p. 160; it is “illusory,” p. 163), 
and asserts a now familiar transcendental view (the self is  
“everywhere6formless, limitless, timeless6” p. 154-5).  Again, the view of the 
self which is portrayed as in opposition to the empirical self which may evolve is 
a transcendental one,  not of or concerned with the world of evolution, and the 
only purpose associated with it in this article is its realization. This latter view 
denies the reality of oneself and the possibility of choices,  and  encourages an 
amoral complacency and acceptance of everything as it already is  (“all 
concepts of good or bad6are products of an unawakened mind” p159). The 
only redeeming features of this perspective, as portrayed in the article,  are the 
transient feelings of comfort to which Stacey briefly succumbed before 
remembering her “evolutionary potential” (p. 154-5).   
In a caricatured manner, the article therefore portrays the panel 
members’ mode of engagement with the world as a kind of coping or 
acceptance in which no matter what one’s circumstances, one may feel 
comforted and that all is already perfect. In any event,  there is nothing one 
might do to change anything as one’s identity is illusory and there is no free 
will.  This contrasts markedly with Heartspring’s “evolutionary” line, which 
presents a mode of engagement which sees the self as an object of 
transformation, and embraces personal responsibility and ethical evaluations of 
the actions of others.  The world here could be better, and if it is not itself begs 
transformation. 
Like the shuffle article, the satire portrays proponents as emphasising 
either worldly or world transcending concerns, so that editorial views 
represented in the article stand in contrast to those of other characters.  Also 
like the shuffle article the satire does not resolve such oppositions – the un-
satsang like debate has no clear winner.  However, it ends with the suggestion 
that  a transcendental perspective on the self is not necessarily incompatible 
with having worldly concerns,  and so does not demand the amoral approach to 
life which it has attributed to panel members.  In this sense, the satire implies 
panel members are wrong.  This suggestion is made through a quotation from 
Ramana Maharshi (1879-1950; the Indian sage in whose lineage Gangaji 
claims to be).  He materialises towards the end of the article as a 
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representative of “traditional Advaita”, and comments that:  “it is true that we 
are not bound and that the real Self has no bondage. It is true that you will 
eventually go back to your source. But meanwhile, if you commit sins, as you 
call them, you will have to face the consequences” (p. 163).   
 
5.4.3 Traditional -vs- Neo-Advaita: self-realised and self-
denying selves 
 
The next materials are concerned with distinctions between Parsons’s 
teachings and those of “traditional” Advaita.  Advaita Vedanta is an ancient  
non-dual religious philosophy based on Hindu Upanishads and Vedas (see 
Deutsch 1973).  Here, a self-denying self confronts a self-realised or self-
knowledgeable self. 
Advaita means “not two”, its name asserting its own truth claim about the 
nature of reality and human selfhood.  Neo-Advaita, on the other hand, is a 
derogatory term, which post-dates the 1992 inaugural issue of WiE? though its 
precise origins are unclear.   Parsons  is frequently described by the term by  
“seekers on the Internet” (Waite 2007: 884).  This is partly because he 
professes no allegiance to any established spiritual traditions, yet occasionally 
refers to Advaita in explaining his own teachings.  For instance, in the Foreword  
to a collection of his dialogues he states:      
 
“The Sanskrit word Advaita points to that which cannot be spoken of and 
exposes the utter futility of the idea something called a seeker could 
discover something called enlightenment” (2003:  xii). 
 
The impression easily given by such statements is that Parsons teaches 
Advaita Vedanta.  This has led to critiques of Parsons by proponents of  
“traditional” versions of Advaita, and several argumentative responses by 
Parsons.  The materials I will consider here are drawn from such exchanges  
between Parsons and a proponent of “traditional” Advaita -  Dennis Waite.  The 
exchanges span several years and include online “essays” and critical 
references to Parsons in Waite’s printed publications.12   I have concentrated 
                                                 
12 Waite’s website, last viewed on 23 August 2010, is at  http://www.advaita.org.uk . Parsons’s 
website, last viewed on 23 August 2010, is at  http://www.theopensecret.com/  
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upon the recurrent themes of different levels of reality (which is analogues to 
the distinction made between absolute and relative or empirical and worldly in 
the preceding materials) and the view of the self which a teacher should adopt 
in addressing seekers.  
Waite is a self-taught scholar on Advaita who runs a website hosting 
writings on Advaita by himself and other  contributors.   Waite is not a spiritual 
teacher but more a popular expert on Advaita and contemporary teachers of 
enlightenment.  Although he favours “traditional” Advaita, Waite’s publications 
brings to mind Collins’s notion of “the guru industry” in management theory.  
This is: 
 
“the (diverse) grouping of writers and commentators who have grown up 
around the ‘gurus’6.  Those active in the ‘guru’ industry 6are not 
themselves ‘gurus’.  However they exist symbiotically with the ‘gurus’, 
and have drafted works which, in various ways, comment upon, or distil 
the ideas of the ‘gurus’”    (Collins 2000: 79). 
 
Waite’s publications  “comment upon” not only Parsons, but many other 
contemporary teachers of enlightenment.   In spite of differences which I 
describe below,   Parsons still   figures in Waite’s online listing of suggested 
neo-Advaitin teachers recommended for “advanced seekers”.13  
In  Waite’s 2003 book The Book of One: The Spiritual Path of Advaita, 
he describes Parsons as a “direct path” teacher, distinct from “traditional 
paths”.   Here, he suggests the “logic” of Parsons’s direct path is that since, 
ontologically, there is only “One”, “we” must already be “it” so there is nothing to 
be done but “acquire the knowledge and then have the direct experience that 
this is indeed the case” (2003:  121; 201-2).  By 2005, however, as mentioned 
above,   Parsons had been labelled as neo-Advaitin in WiE?    By this time 
also, writings critical of neo-Advaita had been  published through Waite’s 
website by other authors. In March 2005, while not referring to Waite (or other 
critics) by name,  Parsons responded to such critical  comparisons between 
traditional and neo-Advaita with an online essay titled “The Divine 
Misconception: On the subject of Traditional Advaita (Oneness) versus 
                                                 
13 Waite’s website, last viewed on 23 August 2010 at 
http://www.advaita.org.uk/teachers/teachers.htm . 
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NeoAdvaita” (2005b). Parsons opened this essay by suggesting “It has recently 
been argued that Traditional Oneness is somehow better than ‘NeoOneness’,or 
even ‘PseudoOneness’”.  While not claiming to be “neo”, Parsons  thereby  
became a spokesperson for those so labelled.  In the article he denigrates the 
“traditional” perspective as “just another established religion with a proliferation 
of teachings”.  He argues: 
 
“[Traditional Advaita] has no relevance to [Parsons’s account of] 
liberation because it is born out of a fundamental misconception6. that 
there is such a thing as a separate individual with free will and the 
choice to become [liberated].”   
 
In April 2005, Waite (2005)  added a section about neo-Advaita to his 
website, and included Parsons’s above essay and his own on the same 
subject, “Traditional versus Neo-Advaita”.14  Waite’s essay made distinctions 
based upon teaching methods and views of reality.  So far as teaching is 
concerned, it contrasted the professed gradual and systematic  pedagogy of 
traditional Advaita with the neo-Advaita teaching method which according to 
Waite  “attempts to force the truth 6 upon an unprepared mind”. Waite also 
claimed  “The use of the language of non-duality (e.g. avoiding use of the word 
‘I’) cannot be relied upon to mean that the ego of such a speaker is dead”, and 
conversely  “there is no need or desire to avoid the use of the word ‘I’ in the 
absence of an ego”.  On the nature of reality, Waite’s essay argued that 
whereas Advaita recognises “a phenomenal level” of reality in which there 
appear to be “objects and people”, neo-Advaitins erroneously insist that there is 
“only the [unitary] reality” and all else is  mere “perception” or “stories”.   
In his subsequent 2007 book Back to the Truth:  5000 Years of Advaita, 
Waite followed “seekers on the Internet” and described Parsons’s teachings as 
“neo-Advaita”, explaining this   path “makes no concession to the ignorant 
seeker” as “There is no seeker and nothing to be sought6.There is only This” 
(2007: 384ff).   Parsons seems to have cooperated with this text, by supplying 
                                                 
14  As of 23 August 2010, Waite’s “traditional vs Neo-Advaita” section includes 21 essays by 
various authors, including the 3 by Parsons to which I refer below and a further series of 
exchanges between Parsons and two other critics.  Also, it includes a series of email 
exchanges between Waite and another “neo-Advaitin”, Jeff Foster.  Waite’s exchanges with a 
third supposed neo-Advaitin, Charlie Hayes, have been removed at Hayes’s request. Website 
viewed on 23 August 2010 at http://www.advaita.org.uk/discourses/trad_neo/trad_neo.htm . 
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Waite with comments and private correspondence clarifying his views (such as 
highlighting an “energetic element” in his view of liberation)  (Waite 2007: esp. 
387).  
With his 2008 publication, Enlightenment:  The Path Through the Jungle 
(2008a), Waite became more overtly critical of Parsons and other neo-
Advaitins.  This  book  argued that traditional Advaita teaching methods are 
proven,  whereas modern Western approaches to enlightenment are unlikely to 
work.  This book provides “key definitions” which clarify how Waite is using 
common terms, such as: 
 
“enlightenment -6It is self-ignorance that prevents recognition of the 
truth about our nature and that of reality6.Enlightenment is the event in 
time when the mind realizes that we are already free. 
 
“self-knowledge - 6removes self-ignorance.  6Self-knowledge is the 
very specific recognition that I am already That which I have been 
seeking. 
 
“neo-advaita -  the style of teaching that purports to express only the 
final, absolute truth of advaita. It does not admit of any ‘levels’ of reality 
and does not recognize the existence of a seeker, teacher, ignorance, 
spiritual path etc.”.  (ibid, 8) 
 
The crux of Waite’s technical critique is again that neo-Advaitins fail to 
distinguish between “levels” of reality.  Waite explains such levels in some 
detail here, suggesting that traditional Advaita recognises three levels of reality:  
 
  
“6paramArtha – the absolute reality; vyavahAra – the apparent, day-to-
day reality; pratibhAsa – the illusory. 
 
[Or]: 
 
66satyam (that which is absolutely real), mithyA (that which is neither 
real nor unreal, but has a ‘dependent’ reality) and tuchCham (that which 
is completely unreal).”   (2008:  51) 
 
Waite argues that neo-Advaita only recognises absolute reality, and that its 
teachers make statements which confuse absolute and day-to-day realities.  He 
explains that day-to-day reality is the phenomenal, empirical reality that is 
experienced, and in which “there are seekers and there can be enlightenment” 
(ibid, 54).  Waite suggests that neo-Advaita simply presents the “’bottom-line’ 
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conclusions”  of traditional Advaita, while denying “empirical reality in the form 
of everyday appearance and human experience”.  He claims this is an 
inadequate and confusing method for enlightening others, and that  a 
“traditional” approach is superior in that it “acknowledges that we appear to be 
separate individuals”, and provides “appropriate practices and teaching” 
necessary to gradually reach Advaita’s final understanding. (ibid, 47-9).    
 Now addressing Waite by name, Parsons (2008a) published a further 
essay titled  “Traditional not two-ness is better than Neo not two-ness ???”.  
Here,  Parsons professes puzzlement that Waite is making “a comparison 
between two perspectives which simply do not meet”.  Parsons  suggests they 
do not meet because Waite’s traditional approach is “dualistic”, that is “rooted 
in the belief that there is something called a seeker (one) that can attain 
something else called enlightenment (two).” 
The substance of the exchanges thus becomes repetitive.  Parsons is 
reasserting his  earlier (2005b) argument against “traditional Advaita”.   Waite’s 
subsequent response to Parsons’s (2008b), again made the distinction 
between levels of reality, though reduced them to  “absolute” and “relative” 
levels of reality.  Waite also portrayed Parsons as inconsistent with his own 
admonitions there is no person,  arguing that to think or speak at all adopts the 
relative, dualistic viewpoint because both speech and thought are dualistic.  As 
he puts it:   
 
“Tony Parsons claims that the perspectives of traditional and neo-
advaita ‘do not meet’ and cites the example that the latter does not 
recognize the existence of an ‘individual’. Yet, in the same essay, ‘Tony’ 
is repeatedly referring to ‘Dennis Waite’. Every time he takes a satsang, 
he speaks to others ‘individuals’. It is pointless to deny the transactional 
level of reality in which he charges £10 per person for a 3-hour talk (to 
no-one). Traditional advaita also uses duality to point to non-duality (and 
openly admits this). It just does so in an infinitely more logical, 
reasonable and effective manner.”   
(Waite 2008b) 
 
 
On September 2008 Parsons added a brief “Final Response” to his preceding 
essay, which as of August 2010 remains his last contribution.  In full it reads:  
 
 - 246 - 
“Most of the recent ‘traditionalist’ responses to my TA versus NA essay 
clearly confirm again that there is no recognition of the one fundamental 
difference between these two perspectives, and this renders any further 
debate futile. 
The relentless need to set right against wrong very successfully 
demonstrates the incomprehension of a message that points to that 
which is beyond both.”                   
(2008, my emphasis) 
 
 
Parsons’s remarks  imply he and Waite (and other critics) have reached 
an impasse, and that he is therefore withdrawing from the debate.   This clearly 
was not so from Waite’s last essay, which like attendees at Parsons’s meetings 
often do pointed out that in activities of teaching and writing, Parsons appears 
to embrace the relative,  address others as individuals and behave as if one 
himself.   We have seen in prior chapters that  Parsons is highly skilled at 
rebuffing such comments at his meetings, though as the “Advaita shuffle” 
article suggests, the ways in which he does so do during talks are ill-suited to 
rational debate where attempts at humour or to exacerbate contradictions 
would appear evasive or simply affirm Waite’s critique.  If this interpretation is 
accurate, repetition, withdrawal, and silence seem to be the only options 
available to Parsons which do not draw further attention to contradictions in his 
position in ways which, in such a debate, are unlikely to be advantageous.   
So far as respective views of the enlightened self are concerned, Waite’s 
view points to a more worldly enlightened self than that implied of Parsons, 
since he relates his view of ultimate reality to everyday appearances 
pragmatically, by heuristic conceptual means which describe “levels” of reality.  
In effect, Waite is arguing that the teaching of enlightenment not only should 
proceed as if  there are real separate people, but even for Parsons inevitably 
does so.  But the worldly self this implies is quite different from that apparent in  
Cohen’s view of enlightenment.  It is not a  transforming self, or an evolving 
one, but a self-realized self.  Prior to enlightenment, this self is in a state of self-
ignorance analogous to the sociological notion of “false consciousness” (a term 
often wrongly attributed to Marx, though originating in Engel’s (2004) portrayal 
of a person’s ideological unawareness of their true motives, and imagining of 
“false or apparent motives”).  Quite simply, it is not what it thinks it is and must 
be relieved of its false consciousness (“self-ignorance”) through acquiring “self-
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knowledge” culminating in the event of its enlightenment.      To Waite, once 
this self realizes its true nature, it may still engage with the relative world 
without any compulsion to speak in a particular way such as by avoiding or 
constantly questioning personal pronouns. Like Gangaji’s transcendental self, 
this self-realised self is not presented by Waite as if it has any necessary  
orientation towards the world. Since this is largely apparent by way of omission 
in the materials I have considered, I shall add that my interpretation of this 
aspect of these exchanges is borne out by a helpful personal communication 
from Waite in which he explained that in his view:  
 
“6 pursuing enlightenment is something a person tends to do when 
totally disillusioned with 'society' and certainly not with any aim of 
benefitting it. And, for the enlightened, although society still has day-to-
day applicability at a practical level, it no longer has any 'meaning' as 
such.” 
(Email from Waite to myself dated 7 March 2008) 
 
This view that enlightenment detracts from the meaning of social 
existence is reminiscent of Heelas’s earlier identification of the “purist” or “world 
rejecting” strand within “Self-spirituality”. Waite’s “version” of  Advaita embraces 
a complex and  multi-faceted view of the self which allows for its 
contemporaneous extension across levels of reality (it appears both separate in 
the relative domain, and not separate in the absolute).  That after 
enlightenment the absolute level is prioritised to the extent other levels have 
only practical significance and little meaning does not deny the reality of other 
levels, though is “purist” in discouraging commitment to them.    
The enlightened self implied by Parsons has a similar “purist” 
appearance.  However, it is not a self-knowledgeable self, pragmatically 
oriented to the world and others, but a stark self-denying self, attributed with no 
free will, and provided with no prescriptive inclinations, whether world bettering, 
evolutionary or otherwise.  Implicitly,  Parsons’s enlightened self is a worldly 
self but in a different sense to either Cohen’s or Waite’s worldly selves - it is not 
dispersed between levels of reality but is  “all there is” (2008).  This self uses 
language in a self-contradictory manner to deny its speakers’ and recipients’ 
distinctiveness.   The performance of such unusual linguistic gymnastics 
provide a characteristic means by which this self engages with the world, and  
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is identifiable to others.  This is an expressive self, and though lacking the 
impetus to change the world found in Cohen’s enlightened (“Authentic”) self, it 
is very much of the world, where it is enacted.  
These differing enlightened selves are perhaps less familiar than 
Cohen’s empirical self or Gangaji’s transcendental self, though they each 
likewise  relate the self to the One.  Waite’s views of enlightenment are drawn 
from “Advaita”, and thus based on a version of Copleston’s “One” derived from 
ancient Hindu sources and ideas.   I shall elaborate no more about these 
sources, other than noting that for purposes of debate with Parsons, Waite 
distils Advaita’s views of reality to the contrast between the absolute and the 
relative, which we saw in the shuffle article.  It is not clear why he does this, 
though it seems that two levels of reality have more rhetorical appeal than three 
(or more).   Parsons does not attribute his views to any such distinct 
philosophical-religious sources, though his configuration of and manner of 
teaching about the self-denying self have several Western cultural antecedents.    
The view of the self as illusory or not a distinct entity has been a familiar 
one in Western thought for some time, at least since Nietzche’s critique of 
Descartes’s elusive cogito  (Nietzche 2003:  45-7). But as with Gangaji’s 
transcendental self, Parsons’s enlightened self is not just a denial of a 
sovereign subject – it  asserts an all-encompassing self, that is  “oneness”.  
This ontological aspect to Parsons’s teachings is absent from Nietzche’s 
reasoning about Descartes’s “I”.  More so than Gangaji’s enlightened self, this 
self is based upon stylistically characteristic stark denials. While Parsons does 
not encourage “self inquiry” like Gangaji, nevertheless his denials of 
personhood are a discursive practice which constitutes a self.  Like the 
apophatic discourse of negative theology examined by Sells (1994 – discussed 
in Chapter 1), Parsons’s denials of separation follow discernible albeit odd 
seeming literary or linguistic conventions, such as what Waite calls “speaking 
non-dually”.  This way of speaking may be  interpreted analytically as providing 
a “kataphatic  affirmation” (Sells op.  cit.) of   “oneness”.  Parsons refers to  an 
“energetic” aspect to his meetings and shifts between referring to oneself as if 
separate and then as non-existent may be regarded as encouraging “energetic”  
kataphatic moments.  This self’s mode of connection with itself and the world is 
thus affective.  The  abrupt provocative style Parsons adopts, both in the 
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debate with Waite and at his  meetings, is reminiscent of an historical 
communicative form associated with teaching the truth, the Cynic parrhesiastic 
game of “provocative dialogue” referred to by Foucault (2001 126ff).15   In this 
style of conversation, a philosopher’s answers are designed to “hurt” a 
questioner’s pride, “forcing him to recognize that he is not what he claims to be” 
(ibid, 126) , and to  “fight  a spiritual war within himself”  against “his own faults” 
(ibid, 133).   Likewise, the self-denying self apparent in Parsons’s debate with 
Waite is at war with itself,  denied by itself (and others, such as Parsons) 
through linguistic and literary means. Its fault is believing in itself, or speaking 
as if it has such a belief, even if,  as for Waite’s self-realized self, this is only a 
pragmatic belief.  That these two selves are at odds is unsurprising, since the 
self-denying self is at odds with every possible self.   
Since the only way the self-denying self may make itself known is 
through self-denial, its mode of engagement with the world may be 
characterised as expressive.  Subjectively, it also seems a coping self, like the  
transcendental self attributed to both Parsons and Gangaji in the satirical 
satsang, lacking  distinctiveness and choice.  It is however still engaged with 
the world, although without any subjective sense of control.   
 
 
5.4.4 Being authentic:  distinguishing personal authenticity 
from   the authentic self 
 
In this final section I will draw upon materials from an internet forum 
concerning Cohen’s teachings to show how Holigral’s bricolage enlightened 
self contrasts with Cohen’s unitary enlightened self, although both are 
described as “Authentic Self”. 
While I was participating in the Holigral Authentic Leadership course 
which was the subject of Chapter 1, I had several discussions with one of the 
facilitators,  Peter, about how difficult it was to market the course.  The main 
                                                 
15 Foucault (2001) considers this game is exemplified by the fictional discussion between 
Diogenes the Cynic (c 404-323 BC)  and Alexander the Great (356- 323 BC) as reported by Dio 
Chrysostum of Prusa (c 40-110AD). Foucault emphasises the personal risk taken by Diogenes, 
whose remarks might easily have elicited the wrath of Alexander.  Interestingly, like Alexander, 
Parsons’s audiences seem to play his game without anger or taking personal affront.  
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problem was that there is no succinct and understandable way to convey what 
Holigral sells.   Describing the activities of the week (drawing pictures,   
pondering them, adding some more6) and/or the outcomes people achieved 
(enlightenments, resolving personal issues, better business performance6) 
would be long winded and odd.  Describing what they offered as “Accelerated 
Enlightenment” or “Awakenings” (titles of earlier courses)  did not explain what 
they did.  
Nonetheless, during the course, Peter and Saunders  occasionally took 
time outs from their roles as facilitators to devote to promotional activities.  
These activities ranged from canvassing participants about what they thought 
of the course and how it might be described (it was such debates that 
generated the description “Philosophy of Life” for Saunders’s outlook), to 
drafting and disseminating advertisements for publications such as 
Glastonbury’s free “holistic” what’s on guide, The Oracle.  Peter also spent time 
contributing to online forums.  One such forum he drew my attention to was the 
social networking site, “zaadz.com.”  He showed me his post on it, together 
with several  replies.16  
Peter’s selection of “zaadz.com” was not accidental. The site, a kind of 
MySpace intended for those sharing an interest in world betterment, was at the 
time being advertised in Cohen’s WiE? magazine.  The  same 2006 
anniversary issue of WiE? which featured the reprint of the shuffle article 
carried an advertisement announcing that WiE? had “teamed up with” this site 
“to create an online forum where together all of us can explore an urgent 
question:  What kind of future are we going to create?”.  Peter was an avid 
reader of WiE?, and knowledgeable about Cohen as well as spiral dynamics 
theory.  He had recently attended one of Cohen’s events and had decided that 
zaadz.com would be a good place to try to get people interested in Holigral’s 
courses.  He showed me his message thread on one of Holigral’s computers.  
                                                 
16 Zaadz was a US website established in 2004.  It was  akin to MySpace, but aspired to 
provide an open forum  for people with interests in spirituality and world betterment.  Members 
and posters did not have to be sympathetic towards Cohen.  Threads relating to Cohen or 
WiE? were however easily locatable.  In 2007 zaadz.com was acquired by US company Gaiam 
and renamed gaia.com.  The site closed in 2010. 
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Peter’s first message was posted in the WiE? “Discuss it with the 
editors” thread.  It reads:17 
 
 
 
 
“Emergent Knowledge & David Grove 
[Peter]  said Sep 29, 4:37 PM: 
I went to my first Andrew Cohen seminar in London this week. I’m really 
excited about what Andrew was saying. Its unbelievable the overlap of 
his message and what we are now doing at www.holigral.com With one 
major difference, which someone here maybe be able to enlighten me 
on. 
We believe we have the next generation of NLP (recognised by others 
not us), using a blend of a number of theories we have come up with a 
course that is what Andrew espouses.  
We facilitate people to ‘emerge’ their own understanding of ‘Authentic 
Self’ and the overlaps occur because they come to the same conclusion 
as Andrew. We are on the same track.  
Self discovery is the ultimate in Personal Development and we utilize 
‘Emergent Knowledge’ techniques to evolve a person to their own 
‘Authentic Self’. 
My question is how does Andrew facilitate people to an understanding of 
‘Authentic Self’. Does Andrew, tell people, training and teaching in the 
old fashion, pump it into them way? 
There is more about David Groves work on ‘Emergent Knowledge’ at 
www.cleanlanguage.co.uk and courses at www.holigral.com” 
 
 
The post is highly promotional and includes several technical terms or 
acronyms.  Its title and content refer to “emergent knowledge”, a term likely to 
be meaningful to only a niche of possible readers since it is a recent concept 
developed by New Zealand psychotherapist David Grove (1950-2008).18  It  is 
associated with the belief that therapeutic clients may already hold within them 
the knowledge required for  their own healing, which a therapist may encourage 
them to realise by using non-leading or “clean” questions.  “Pump” teaching 
would be extremely unclean. The post also  refers to NLP, which means 
“Neuro-Linguistic Programming”.  NLP originated in the mid-1970s, based upon 
                                                 
17 All quotations from this thread were taken from zaadz.com, last viewed on 16 December 
2006 at http://pods.zaadz.com/wie/discussions/view/65371 . The link is now dead. 
18 Emic works by or about Grove’s work include: Lawley and Tomkinson (2000) and  Grove and 
Wilson (2005). 
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academic  studies  of several successful therapists and hypnotists.19  Since 
then, although lacking academic credibility,  it has become a popular and 
diverse psycho-therapeutic approach, with varieties and adaptations across 
such fields as self-help, personal coaching,  business efficacy, and stage 
hypnotism.  Its historic association with hypnotism and that it may be perceived 
as offering short cuts to personal change or effectiveness through manipulation 
and mimicry can however detract from its popular appeal.   
Although Cohen’s teachings do not claim any allegiances to NLP or 
therapy,   Peter claims there is  only “one major difference” between Cohen’s 
“teaching” and what Holigral are “doing”.  The  post does not merely inform 
readers of this,  but encourages a lengthier exchange by ending with  questions 
as if seeking information itself from thread readers or WiE? editors.   Aside from 
my own conversation with Peter, given he recently attended a “seminar” with 
Cohen and located and posted on a thread devoted to Cohen’s magazine, it is 
likely that when he placed this post Peter already knew Cohen’s teachings 
involve five prescriptive “tenets” to be followed by people on the path to 
“evolutionary enlightenment”, and also describe how enlightened people act.   
Also that Cohen has six “principles” which describe enlightened living.   While it 
is unlikely Peter would have a comprehensive understanding of all of Cohen’s 
teaching techniques, it is inconceivable  he might  have thought Cohen’s 
teachings might be somehow  facilitated or elicited from anyone with no prior 
inkling of them.   Peter’s questions presuppose as well as  incorporate a 
contrast between “facilitating” (a term he also applies to Holigral’s activities) 
and  “telling”, the latter being presented negatively as being “old fashion[ed]”  or   
“pumping”.   The “hook” encouraging responses to the post and reception of it 
as not just an advertisement but a genuine enquiry into Cohen’s teaching 
methods is a mixture of flattery and mutual corroboration: Peter has attended a 
seminar with Cohen, which  “excited” him, and claims people Holigral facilitates 
“evolve” and come to the “same conclusions” as Cohen. The barb, almost 
invisible, is that Peter’s references to “’Authentic Self’” do not connote a 
                                                 
19 Early NLP texts written by its founders include Grinder and Bandler (1975 and 1981). NLP’s 
association with the Human Potential Movement have earned it entries in several 
encyclopaedias of religion (e.g. Partridge 2004b: 440-1), though as noted in another such entry, 
it is “rarely seen as an explicitly spiritual venture”(Ryan 2006: 440).   
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singular entity, but a concept in respect of which individuals might  “‘emerge’ 
their own understanding” or “evolve” towards “their own” version of it.   
The first reply Peter received was dated just hours after his post, and 
combined disparaging scepticism about NLP (“this gives me the creeps”) with 
support for his implicit suggestion that Cohen uses “pump” teaching (“I'm sure 
Andrew uses the usual pump method as well as others”).   The reply ended by 
also encouraging further posts, with the remark “I think you've got a good 
question here”.  Peter did not respond at all to that second post.  Eleven days 
later, in October 2006, a poster I will identify as “DG” replied from Cohen’s 
perspective.  In this exchange of similarities and differences, the entire post 
again is relevant:  
 
 
“Re: Emergent Knowledge & David Grove [extract] 
[DG] said Oct 9, 7:14 PM: 
What a great question and line of inquiry!  Sounds like we might be 
developing similar approaches in some ways, and even more 
importantly, coming to some similar conclusions!  I’m by no means an 
expert (or even a novice!) in NLP, but in terms of your question about 
facilitating the “authentic self”, I would answer a couple ways. First, 
Andrew’s (http://www.andrewcohen.org/teachings/path.asp) 5 tenets of 
Evolutionary Enlightenment are the foundation for how we can live in a 
way that enables the very emergence of the authentic self you are 
referring to.      
Certainly formal “teachings” are an important and essential part of this 
emergence, both public and with his students, but, in the end, the 
development of the “authentic self” and our ability to express and be 
responsible for it’s emergence is entirely up to the individual.   That 
means me and you!  In that sense, the “training” is an ongoing 
willingness to engage the highest and best part of ourselves for the best 
reasons, and at the same time make sure we take responsibility for the 
fears, desires and self concern of the “ego”.   We also do formal 
meditation practice, collective practice (meetings, groups), and much 
more!  Hope that helps somewhat, it’s a fascinating topic we are very 
interested in!” 
 
 
Notice that DG construes Peter’s questions as being about how Cohen 
facilitates “the authentic self” (my emphasis) , and thereafter refers separately 
to the emergence and development of “the authentic self” as if it were a 
singular entity.  Also, his answer does not adopt Peter’s phraseology of “telling” 
or “pumping”, but refers to “teachings” as “important” and “essential” to the 
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emergence of the authentic self,  adding  the notion that the emergence of the 
(singular) authentic self is down to individual “responsibility”.  He ends with  an 
open ended list of activities  “we” as such responsible individuals pursue. 
In Peter’s reply, he does not acknowledge or thank the previous posters 
for their information (it is unlikely to be news) but in amongst further 
descriptions of Holigral’s activities and heritage, asserts his own view of 
“Authenticity”,  dropping his earlier references to “Authentic Self” and speaking 
only of “authenticity” now, and describing it as a quality about which people will 
have their “personal interpretation”:  
 
“Re: Emergent Knowledge & David Grove 
[Peter] said Oct 12, 5:11 AM: 
David’s Work complements our own and is a huge development on 
present NLP. We have been told it is 4th generation, with a more 
spiritual leaning together with quantum physics etc. 
What is the definition of ‘Authenticity’ (there’s another thread on this 
subject here), there is a number of views but essentially I would argue 
it’s a personal interpretation. We have all had very different life 
experiences and so we will all come at Authenticity from our own angle.  
At Holigral we work on facilitating a person to emerge their own 
understanding of their own authenticity. We run 7-day courses which 
facilitate a person to confront there limiting behaviour resolve issues and 
redefine who they are. By becoming whole without all the past 
behaviours and influences a person can express themselves as one.  
From this place a person can decide what fits with their understanding 
and how they would like to go forward emotionally, intellectually, 
spiritually etc. I for instance use meditation and draw around like-minded 
people to support my thinking and personal development.  
‘Certainly formal “teachings” are an important and essential part of this 
emergence, both public and with his students’ 
I agree, however who’s teaching, this by definition becomes the teachers 
interpretation of ‘Authenticity’, and limits another persons development 
to authenticity. 
www.holigral.com” 
 
 
The only overt connection between Peter’s post and the earlier replies is 
the quotation he comments on towards the end.  This succinct quote confirms 
the obvious, that  Cohen has “formal ‘teachings’”.  Peter’s remarks upon it, 
though presented as an agreement, are antithetical to Cohen’s approach. 
Peter’s suggestion that  a  “teacher’s interpretation of ‘Authenticity’” will limit 
another person’s “development to authenticity” implies having a prior 
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conception of authenticity or “Authentic Self” are inferior to Holigral’s approach 
to “authenticity”, which recognises  “We have all had very different life 
experiences” and “facilitates” people to “emerge their own understanding of 
their own authenticity”.  The view of authenticity which comes across here 
treats it as a very different aspect of each individual’s “personal development”, 
rather than a universal quality or state substantially the same for everyone.   
Two further postings followed, the first a short comment by DG in which he 
claimed  in his experience as “a student” (presumably of Cohen) it was 
“possible6to teach radical ‘authenticity’, and not limit or inhibit that expression 
within another”.  However the next, final, post in the thread hones in on Peter’s 
posts implying a different view of the authentic to that of Cohen.  Reminiscent 
of Heelas’s distinction between purist and empowering poles of the New Age, 
this poster distinguishes Cohen’s interests in enlightenment and “the Authentic 
Self” from “personal empowerment” or “personal development”: 
 
 
“Re: Emergent Knowledge & David Grove [extract] 
[FH] said Oct 18, 3:54 PM: 
6 I guess we should probably come to an understanding of what we 
may be meaning by A.S. Andrew for sure has a specific definition as well 
as places its emergence and embodiment in a very specific context6.  
 
“It’s different to personal empowerment (please forgive me if this is not 
what NLP is about – I don’t have any direct of NLP but do hear that it’s 
been used in the business context). In my experience, the Authentic self 
is as CP puts it is the best part of oneself, and the best part of oneself is 
interested in egoless creativity. In one sense its very simple to access in 
the right conditions (when there’s trust, openness and something that’s 
very close to my heart, collective unselfconscious spiritual inquiry).  
 
“The work that Andrew’s doing - with more than just his students6 
through the magazine, the talks and courses we do, is to activate this 
and draw attention to the fact that a part of us exists (I kind of want to 
say, once awakened) which is already free from the need for personal 
development, simply because it’s the part in each of us, a function in 
human consciousness which is solely interested in the development of 
consciousness6and as you’re also are finding, a place that is not 
attached to the past. But I really do think that it’s development (of the 
individual) that is vastly different from the usual ideas found around 
spiritual community and personal development 6 “ 
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In this post, the Authentic Self is given a “specific definition” in Cohen’s 
teachings, though that the poster “FH”, chooses to define it as if by reference to 
his personal experience of it and CP’s posting, “the best part of 
oneself6interested in egoless creativity”,  treats it as something real and the 
same to all of them.  To FH, this “part of oneself”  unquestionably “exists” and is 
even “free from the need for personal development”.  The post sensitively does 
not assert Peter is wrong, but implies he is talking about something “vastly” 
different to Cohen’s authentic self. 
As outlined in the “seeker chapter” above, Holigral’s view of the self is a 
bricolage which draws on multiple sources, though in particular upon the 
therapeutic trope of the fragmented self which as Hoskins and Leseho (1996) 
suggest may become whole or integrated through particular therapeutic 
interventions.  The enlightened self here is not a transcendental self, but a 
redefined, “whole” or “emergent” self.  It is peculiar to each individual, given 
their differing life experiences.   The bricolage origins of this self are apparent 
from Peter’s open ended listing of Holigral’s sources (“David’s Work 6 NLP6 
quantum physics etc.”).  It is also an “empowered” self in that once attained its 
possessors need to make their own decisions about “how they would like to go 
forward” in the world. While Peter claimed “Self discovery is the ultimate in 
Personal Development”, it is difficult  to see any final stopping point for this self, 
as any seemingly integrated self may always fragment and require re-
integration, or encounter new life experiences bringing about the possible need 
for further self-integration.   
This implicitly empirical self has much in common with the personal 
truths often associated with New Age, as recognised by Heelas in his 
references to Roy Wallis’s notion of “epistemological individualism” (1996:  21, 
40 n.13).  In the terminology which Holigral has adopted from Grove, 
knowledge of such a self, indeed becoming such a whole self,   is “emergent”.  
Holigral’s course attendees are considered to come to their own insights or 
conclusions, which once arrived at are considered to  integrate the otherwise 
disparate aspects of their  psyches.   The group exercises in committing to 
paper and interrogating one’s own understanding of “authenticity” outlined in 
the introductory ethnography are illustrative of this approach.  What “Authentic 
Leadership” meant  was from the outset up to each course participant to decide 
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for themselves. However, where discussions with fellow participants diluted any 
sense in which views of authenticity were entirely idiosyncratic,    the notion of 
an integrated, embodied, whole self unique to each participant underpinned  
many course activities.   
In terms of modes of engagement, Holigral’s enlightened self has some 
affinity with Cohen’s Authentic Self, as it also manifests in the material world, 
where it may be discerned through better performance in one’s life, work, 
sports and so forth).    Cohen’s Authentic Self, however, whilst expressible in 
the material world is conceptualised within his teachings as  a fixed entity, 
transcendental though common to everyone (although expressed by each 
person to differing degrees, depending on their levels of enlightenment or 
evolution).  This Authentic Self is not so much “a” self but a shared facet of 
selfhood – the “best part” of ourselves, or more esoterically the “evolutionary 
impulse” driving the creative process which is both  identifiable with and 
attainable by Cohen’s “tenets”.  Whereas Cohen’s Authentic Self is  always 
oriented towards the goal of assisting the evolutionary process, Holigral’s 
enlightened self’s orientation towards the world is primarily determined by itself 
according to itself.   
      
5.5 Discussion 
 
 
While Heelas’s early work might seem dated, and he now disfavours 
references to “Self-spirituality”, I hope to have demonstrated the continued 
pertinence of this original penetrating notion to understanding contemporary 
spiritualities.   I have analysed various exchanges between proponents of 
different views of enlightenment in terms of the different enlightened selves 
which each imply, drawing analogies between such selves and notions of the 
self in social and therapeutic theory as well as religious philosophy to illustrate 
that each enlightened self draws upon cultural resources and antecedents, 
some of which overlap (such as the common preservation of a notion of a 
transcendental aspect to the self, present across the materials all bar Peter’s 
posts about authenticity) and some of which are more particular to certain 
perspectives (such as Parsons’s provocative dialogues which bluntly deny the 
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self).  Enlightenment cultures are (still) all about the self, defining it, 
transforming it, inquiring into it, or realizing it.    My analysis adds to Heelas’s 
contribution by adopting  a more nuanced approach to such similar seeming 
spiritualities by treating possible examples as potentially different indigenous 
psychologies, each with different and consequential views of the enlightened 
self, my heuristic notion for the elusive “it”  towards which participants might 
aspire.   These enlightened selves may all be underpinned by monist 
ontologies, though range from selves which are not that different from the 
sovereign self of “Western individualism” to self-denying selves which claim no 
reality nor  free will. 20   
To demonstrate variations between enlightened selves is however an 
empty refinement unless it can also be demonstrated that these differences are 
somehow consequential, either for individuals or in a more social or aggregate 
manner.  I shall therefore end by discussing how these differences operate at 
the individual level, and then how they may apply to aggregate phenomena, 
such as societal change. 
Recollect that Heelas allowed for “variations” within Self-spirituality, and 
envisaged a spectrum between purist world-rejecting self-actualization,  and 
self-empowerment  and   pursuit of prosperity.  But, in spite of his earlier work 
on indigenous psychologies he did not necessarily associate these poles with 
different concepts of the self, and in discussing each he gives the impression 
that either may be associated with notions of an inner, higher or authentic self 
(ibid, 29ff; 74ff).  While my materials bear this out superficially (such as in the 
zaadz  posts about “Authentic Self”, this term being used by both Peter and 
Cohen’s supporters), when one looks closely at the nature of the selves implied 
by apparently similar terms significant differences appear. Heelas’s later use of  
a single  analytic vocabulary (comprising “Self-spirituality”, “Self-work”, a “Self-
ethic” and so forth) for the myriad of activities and beliefs he considers diverts 
attention away from such nuances.   These differences are extremely important 
to participants in distinguishing their views of enlightenment from the views of 
others, and this goes some way to explaining the lack of co-operation between 
                                                 
20 That Holigral endorses a form of monism is not immediately apparent, and possibly not true 
for all “facilitators”.  However, it is true of Saunders whose online publication The Dance of the 
Void relays “the truth of the one” (2008a: 4). 
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people sharing superficially similar spiritual viewpoints (cf. Lynch  2007: 92ff).  
Although “Self-spirituality” may be portrayed by analysts as a  coherent doctrine 
which can simply be “put to work” across various activities (whether in forms of 
energy healing, meditation, or seminar spiritualities concerned with personal 
empowerment) (cf. Heelas 1996 Ch. 3), this is not borne out when boundary 
work between participants is considered.   In disputes, similar terms may be 
used (including descriptions of a self or the term enlightenment)  but in different 
hands such similar terms may suggest very different notions of what an 
enlightened self might be.  Such different notions of the self in turn present 
different possibilities for engaging with the world and others.  
To recap briefly on the enlightened selves suggested by the materials,   
in both  WiE? articles we have a worldly, evolving or transforming self keen on 
improving itself and the world brushing against a transcendental one which 
seems disengaged from the world and only concerned with its own self-
realisation.  In the debate between Waite and Parsons, what begins as one 
proponent simply summarising and classifying the views of others culminates in 
antagonistic views of enlightenment, which juxtapose a self-realised self which 
treats itself and others as distinct pragmatically,  with a self-denying self whose 
orientation towards the world is based upon its own denials, such as in  
conversations of self-monitoring reminiscent of  the provocative philosophical 
dialogue of antiquity.     Neither self holds any specific impulses to improve the 
world, though the latter is perhaps ironically afforded more implicit guidance for 
its engagement with the world, at least in expressive activities. Finally, in the 
zaadz postings, a personally authentic unique and improved whole self, a 
product of personal development and equipped to make its own idiosyncratic 
life choices, is played against a universal authentic self defined within the 
teachings of a particular guru though nonetheless real to its advocates. 
Whereas Cohen’s Authentic Self  turns toward the world with impersonal 
evolutionary aspirations, Holigral’s view of the integrated (enlightened) self has 
no necessarily prescribed features – each person’s enlightenment and 
subsequent mode of engagement with  the world is potentially different.  Rather 
like the selves in crisis which turn to therapies in Giddens’s account of high 
modernity, these  integrated selves are purportedly returned to the world better 
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suited to perform in it.  Those who resonate with Cohen’s vision of the 
Authentic Self, in contrast, are more orientated towards transforming that world.   
At a more aggregate level, differences in the discourses which comprise 
the self reflect differences in wider socio-historic conditions (Volosinov 1973).   
Here then we have a variety of contemporaneous selves brushing against one 
another though each spawned from slightly different cultural foundations.  It 
seems apt to regard their appearance together in these materials as a 
consequence of the “disembedding” and globalising tendencies Giddens 
identifies in modernity.   What each such enlightened self might hold in store for 
society if taken up en masse is of course speculative to envisage,  though 
highly pertinent given the eye to the future of certain academics.  For example, 
Colin  Campbell (2007: 359-60) has predicted that the spread of “ontological 
monism” may provide “seeds of the final rejection of Western individualism”.  
Also, Heelas himself has raised doubts about whether the authority of the Self  
alone is a sufficient basis for an ethical existence, implying it is an insufficient 
foundation for social order (1996: 223 note 7) (see the discussion of these 
references in Ch. 2).    
The different views of  enlightenment I have considered, and their 
related enlightened selves and particular modes of engagement with the world, 
exhibit such considerable differences that it is clearly problematic and 
inaccurate proceeding as if all forms of “ontological monism” undermine 
individuality or are necessarily reliant on only “the Self” (and what sort of self?) 
for ethical guidance.  We might compare two extreme positions. Cohen’s 
worldly enlightened self offers the prospect of combining monism with a whole 
hearted commitment to “individualism” as well as personal and worldly 
transformation or evolution.   On the other hand, Gangaji’s transcendental self 
is not so much oriented towards changing itself or the world, but coping, finding 
peace, stillness, and itself in whatever conditions life may throw at it.  In terms 
of their recent promotional statements, the trajectories of these two enlightened 
selves could be little clearer.  Neither entails an abandonment of individualism, 
nor a turning to the self for ethical guidance. Rather, from recent website 
statements, Cohen’s teachings now are oriented towards bringing about a 
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“revolution in consciousness and culture”21, whereas Gangaji’s teachings 
remain  “not a path that leads you anywhere” other than to “who you are”.22  
Enlightened selves draw upon cultural antecedents spanning from 
antiquity to contemporary therapeutics, and when they crystallise in disputes 
about enlightenment they each seem to gain their distinctiveness in opposition 
against other selves. It is also clear that at least in the disputes I have 
considered, no enlightened self is irrevocably dismissed.  Whether disputes 
end with a party withdrawing or just fizzle out, at the level of debate there are 
no winners as there is no institutional framework to arbitrate or determine 
disputes.  Such observations suggest a time when any one enlightened self  
might replace the sovereign subject may be rather distant, as there are no 
obvious paths by which any contemporary enlightened self might speedily 
reach a hegemonic position.   Indeed, I suggest academics who concentrate on 
identifying mass cultural swings have tended to understate the degree to which 
the spiritual milieu is constantly at war within itself, not just as a result of its 
presence in capitalist economies in which its participants must compete against 
each other in a “spiritual marketplace” (Carrette and King 2005), but because 
any such milieu is little different from other social domains concerned with the 
production and dissemination of knowledge about the world and ourselves, 
including religion and academe (cf. Abbott 2001 and Collins 1998).    
The pay offs of attending to differences and disputes within Self-
spirituality is  more accurate understanding of participants’ own respective 
spiritualities and self conceptions, and a more nuanced basis for 
conceptualising their relationships with and impact upon not only wider society, 
but also each other.  Whereas the conventional view within sociology of religion 
and religious studies, at its simplest, treats “spirituality” as an oppositional 
category to that of “religion” (e.g. Heelas et al. 2005), my analysis of divisions 
between enlightenment cultures shows that as a discourse and perhaps 
general social phenomenon, “spirituality” is not only “dissident” (Sutcliffe 2003: 
216) towards things taken to be outside itself, but is beset with conflicts and 
divisions within itself.  This accords with the view of “spirituality” as “lived 
                                                 
21 This is the title of an undated article on Cohen’s website, last viewed on 25 October 2010 at 
http://www.andrewcohen.org/andrew/revolution-consciousness-culture.asp?ifr=hpNews . 
22 Gangaji’s undated essay titled “The End of All Excuses” viewed on 25 October 2010 at 
http://www.gangaji.org/index.php?modules=content&op=all_excuses . 
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ideology” in Billig et al’s (1988) sense discussed in my introductory chapter, 
beset with internal dilemmas and contradictions.   
A possibility of particular interest which I have not been able to address 
purely by qualitative analysis is whether or not “credibility contests” between 
persons committed to different enlightenment cultures may actually be more 
prevalent within those cultures than credibility contests involving “traditional” or 
“orthodox” religion.  My impression is that this is very much so, and that 
whereas enlightenment cultures may all at times portray themselves as distinct 
from orthodox religion, any intellectual debates or heated exchanges are more 
often between themselves. On this, I have no examples of Cohen, Gangaji, 
Parsons, or Holigral debating their teachings with representatives of 
institutionalised Western religions such as the Catholic Church, and what few 
examples I do have are mostly in the form of guru-pronouncements and ad hoc 
responses to audience members’ questions. These do not seem to create such 
issues of credibility as seen in the above materials, nicely captured by Cohen’s 
(1992: 89) reference to being “in the middle of a public spectacle”. So, who 
then is this “public”?  At the time, the only people likely to be interested in any 
such “spectacle” would have been those people with some interest or stake in 
the teachings of Gangaji, Cohen, and of course Papaji. The “public” which such 
credibility disputes might concern is therefore not the public at large, or even a 
public comprised of adherents to “traditional” forms of religion, but a public 
already involved with, or perhaps circulating between, different enlightenment 
cultures.  
Cohen is unusual in that he is my only research participant who has 
actively sought out and published debates with those of views different to his.  
It is therefore significant that the “interviewees” who feature in his magazine 
(WiE?/EnlightenNext) are predominantly “gurus” in other enlightenment 
cultures rather than official representatives of traditional, denominational 
religions.  Such interviews therefore generate debates in which both 
interviewers’ and interviewees’ have prior spiritual credentials, and are 
characterised by their respective spiritual identities being constructed and 
affirmed in a usually mutually corroborative fashion through the course of such 
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interviews.23  They also serve as discursive space in which overt and subtle 
distinctions may be drawn, whether just in the (edited) interview transcripts or, 
as in the shuffle and satsang articles, with additional editorial commentary.  
The significance of this insular character of credibility disputes between 
enlightenment cultures is that  it prompts us to rethink the common view within  
academe, that “spirituality”, the “cultic milieu”, “New Age” and so on are 
somehow “alternative” to “traditional” religion.  Whether or not this is truly the 
case,  it appears that participants in particular examples of such “alternatives” 
put much discursive effort into establishing how the teachings, practices,  and 
so forth of their respective enlightenment culture present “alternatives” to those 
of other such cultures.  The resultant credibility contests between 
enlightenment cultures  seem likely to be more important to participants than 
how they may fare in such contests with particular denominational religions, 
again, not that the latter type of completion seems to be common.    
This discussion also sheds some light on a concern scholars of popular 
religion have long addressed: that diverse popular religions or “spirituality” 
might “organise” to form a “movement” (cf. York 1995; Heelas 1996; Lynch 
2007).  My analysis and discussion suggests that attempts to organise different 
enlightenment cultures to produce any kind of institutional alternative to 
orthodox religions are likely to be futile, or will simply result in the formation of 
another enlightenment culture (albeit perhaps an odd one, structured in ways 
which allow for the co-presence of multiple gurus, and divergent teachings, or 
else transform this multiplicity into something else).   It seems likely that the 
best that can be hoped for by participants in such cultures who wish to form 
such a collective whilst preserving their own distinctiveness is the adoption of 
common discourses with emblematic terms and membership schemes,  to 
which cultures may affiliate much like the federations of craftspeople or 
professional bodies. (In the UK, an example of such emblem-building is the 
establishment of the “Foundation for Holistic Spirituality” by William Bloom and 
Nigel Anthony in 2007.  Through this organisation, Bloom and others have 
promoted the  “Holistic Spiritual Alliance”,  which individuals or organisations of 
                                                 
23 See Atkinson and Silverman (1997) on our “interview society”.  I discuss the mutual 
corroboration of spiritual or “non-ordinary” identities in guru-guru interviews in my master’s 
thesis,  Abbott (2006). 
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a “spiritual” inclination may join, and also instigated a multi-media campaign to 
encourage people of a “spiritual” inclination to identify their religion as “holistic” 
in the 2011 UK census).24  However, such emblem-building creates for 
participants the same problems faced by academics who study the popular 
“spiritual”, “religious”, or “New Age” field:   even if “membership” requires formal 
agreement to a code of values or practice guidelines, the nature of the 
collective thus labelled will be inherently imprecise so long as people are free to 
promote their own teachings and practices. Unless enlightenment cultures 
themselves change, and succumb to external “authorities” in how they go about 
their activities, any such collective labels will simply obscure their rich and 
consequential  variety of seekership activities and seeking and enlightened 
selves.  
Finally, as well as going some way to explaining the apparent lack of co-
operation within contemporary “progressive spirituality” (cf. Lynch  2007: 92ff), 
my analysis suggests Western individualism may not be as threatened by any 
spread of “ontological monism” as Campbell suggested.  Indeed, of the 
enlightened selves I have considered the one which is most intent upon 
changing the world ironically seems to be the one most concerned with its own 
transformation and evolutionary significance.  Stripped of such rhetoric, a 
sovereign subject lurks within it.  On the other hand, the most radical seeming 
                                                 
24 For details of Bloom’s UK 2011 census “campaign”, see http://www.holisticmap.org/,  viewed 
31 March 2011.  For details of the “Foundation for Holistic Spirituality” and its “Holistic Spiritual 
Alliance” (HAS) established by Bloom and others, see    http://www.f4hs.org/holistic-spiritual-
alliance/  viewed 31 March  2011.  The HSA’s webpage describes it as “a democratic and 
transparent structure so that people who take a holistic approach to spirituality can achieve 
representation on public decision-making and consultative bodies”.  In the US, Ken Wilber’s 
“Integral Institute”, which dates back to the 1990s, is a similar and more complex association of 
independent individuals.  Members appear to share the aim of wishing to “awaken humanity to 
full self-awareness”, and to this end be in sympathy with Wilber’s “integral” philosophy. Cohen 
is listed on the Institute’s website as a founding member in the “Integral Spirituality” category, 
along with former Transcendental Meditation leader and best-selling author Deepak Chopra 
(see http://www.integralinstitute.org/?q=node/1#history last viewed 18 December 2010). The  
advent of such organisations evidence the cultural prominence achieved by the discourse of 
spirituality, and the possibility that people outsiders might classify as “alternative” or “New Age” 
may yet defy the views of academics who have held that they are part of a “milieu” which is 
unlikely to ever form a social movement.  It would seem that academics have not predicted the 
possibility that the “milieu” may organise as if a trade federation, requiring members’ discursive 
allegiance to  a number of “holistic” or “integral” statements which allow a great deal of scope 
for members to still “do their own thing”. This is very different from the formation of a single, 
traditional religion or religious denomination, though is also not quite just an  institutional 
support for seekership as referred to by Campbell (2003). The stated aims of both UK and US 
“federations” are to exert social and political influence beyond themselves.      
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enlightened self, the self-denying self, has no propensity to change the world 
and offers its possessors no new ways of behaving in the world.   
 
5.6 Epilogue 
 
 
SEEKER SELF:  Hmm, ok6I suppose there is some truth in this chapter 
on truth.  I’m kind of disappointed though that you don’t see much hope of the 
different enlightenment cultures all pulling the same way enough to amount to a 
real movement though. 
ACADEMIC SELF:  I’m sure this is no reason for you to despair.  If you, 
like Bloom whom I’ve cited, or the authors of The Quest (which I was talking 
about when you first interrupted me in Chapter 2), want to encourage 
“spirituality” in some general sense, then a theme of my thesis has been that 
the discourse of spirituality is very much an expanding discourse, which has in 
any event already penetrated rather secular seeming aspects of our lives, 
including academic writing and practice, even without such formal 
organisations.  I find it very interesting that some people are organising and 
attempting to speak on behalf of what I see as a general cultural current and 
diffuse discourse. It’s exciting too, as it provides something meaty to study. 
SS: OK, that sounds more positive.  You’re saying that people don’t 
need to organise into movements for there to be a cultural revolution.  But 
you’ve kind of avoided talking about teachers’ actual truths, and instead taken 
them each to imply a different notion of “the enlightened self”.  Right? So where 
does that leave any revolution, and especially the details of each teacher’s 
individual teachings? 
ACADEMIC SELF:  I prefer to think in terms of gradual social change, 
rather than sudden revolutions.  But, yes, you are right that I’ve concentrated 
on “selves” rather than the full scope and detail of each guru’s teachings.  
Having pursued each guru’s teachings for a time myself, the three things which 
have struck me most are variations in  how they portray seekers, have 
expertises which associate themselves with affective experiences of those 
seekers, and truths which imply different ways of viewing and being in the 
world. I’ve approached the latter conceptually by  what I’ve called the 
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enlightened self and its modes of engagement. An advantage of looking mainly 
at disputes has been that any dispute (or satirical portrayal) is fairly self-
contained. 
SS:  OK.  But they never identify an “enlightened self”, do they?  In fact, 
folk like Parsons would be very dismissive of this whole notion – doesn’t 
Parsons say there is no self? 
AS:  He’d probably say “enlightened self” is just a story.  I accept that 
“the enlightened self” is a concept at odds with most or all of the teachings I’ve 
considered.  But I’m not attempting to offer up something to compete with 
spiritual teachings or even enter dialogue with them on this.  In my argument, 
the “enlightened self” is simply an abstract notion of what a self might be if it 
were possible to encapsulate the conclusions of any teaching as a 
recognisable self with which one might identify.  And whether or not one denies 
there is any such thing as a self, our language and social lives are organised as 
if there is.   
SS:  Apparently. Alright then, but I don’t see what use the concept of 
an enlightened self might be if it is at odds with what teachers say about the 
self (or their version of the self6).   Suggesting say a “self-denying self” is one 
thing, but if it doesn’t have any validity to seekers or enlightened teachers what 
use is the concept at all?   
AS:  Those are good questions.  Each self I have identified is an 
abstraction which is not necessarily the same as how particular people actually 
view or speak of themselves.  These “selves” are unlikely to be  identified by 
participants or described in these terms, as they are my own analytical 
distillations.   However, it is quite possible participants might recognise 
themselves or others in such selves, just as these same enlightened selves 
and their modes of engagement may be used analytically elsewhere, such as 
to interpret how people narrate themselves outside of such debates.  Let’s take 
the enlightened self I have identified in our four guru’s discourses as examples. 
Cohen’s inspired worldly self-transforming self appears to have been 
adopted as an authorial self in a follower’s book-length biographic account of a  
retreat with Cohen. Wombacher (2008:461) refers to wanting to “play my part”  
in the “story of evolution”, to be “a real player, a broker of destiny from whose 
very flesh  and blood the future would be wrought.”  
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Gangaji’s “coping” transcendental self, still and unmoving 
notwithstanding biographic turmoil or “stories”,  was strikingly impressed upon 
me in a circular email I received through her mailing list announcing the death 
from cancer of her UK co-ordinator, Katherine Watson.25  The email included 
an extract from a letter to Gangaji from Katherine, sent a month or so before 
she died,  referring to her lymphoma as “frightening” but ultimately “life-
enhancing”, and reporting that notwithstanding her long and serious illness 
heeding Gangaji’s advice to “stop” she experienced the “most beautiful stop” 
and what is “always here”,  for which she was “just so, so grateful”.   
Parsons’s self-denying self has of course limited scope for expression in 
a social world organised in ways which continually reaffirm individuality, though 
a collection of “seven stories of awakening” written up and published by film 
director Sally Bongers  (2008) interestingly purports to show how for “ordinary” 
individuals, the realisation they are no-one does not prevent their mundane 
lives from continuing, although several contributors seem less invested in their 
activities than previously.  
Finally, Holigral’s website has long featured “testimonials” which echo 
the bricolage of ideas, practices and sources upon which Saunders draws as 
well as a propensity to treat his courses as concerned with “personal 
development”.  The testimonials are various, applauding Saunders’s intellect 
and innovations within NLP, and affirming the  beneficial and effective upshot of 
his courses in the personal lives, work, and sports of former participants.  Out 
of twenty two testimonials, only two use the term “spiritual”, and while one of 
those, also a  course facilitator,  describes her  “fragmented mind-body-soul 
(spiritual) and physical bodies” re-aligning, the other refers to an “unusual 
spiritual experience” and being “empower[ed]6 to make the right decisions for 
me.”26 
While none of this  “proves” my analysis, it does illustrate how “seekers” 
might narrate themselves in terms reflecting the enlightened selves and modes 
of engagement which I have described. 
                                                 
25 Email dated 14 January 2010 from “Gangaji & Staff”, titled “A Blessed Life”. Katherine, her 
real name,  was Gangaji’s  host during the London talks described earlier.  
26 http://holigral.com/testimonials last viewed 18 March 2011. 
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SS:  OK, I follow.  And because the “selves” are just voices, these 
people you’ve mentioned don’t always have to identify with just one of them? 
AS:  Absolutely, although some voices mix better than others.  As 
Wood’s work highlights, individuals who have encountered a multitude of  
authoritative voices may produce accounts which suggest they are somehow 
unchanged by any of them.  On the other hand, I have argued that some voices 
have greater homogenising tendencies than others.  For instance,  Cohen’s 
worldly enlightened self is rather intolerant of Gangaji’s transcendental self, 
whereas though Parsons’s self-denying self may ultimately be just as  
transcendental as Gangaji’s enlightened self, it is expressed through several 
distinct practices (vocal self-denials rather than descriptions of stillness).  
SS: OK, I see there are “dilemmas” (as you might say) when we try to 
see these teachers as having similar truths, as their truths suggest or “reflect” 
different kinds of self.  But does this go for all kinds of truth?  I wonder, what of 
the truths of this thesis?  Are they associated with a particular kind of self too?   
AS:   Of course. You and I are of course written as if we are each a 
single distinct voice.  This reflects the distinctions made in Chapter 2 between 
the Academic and Spiritual Quests which drive this research, and the Tao-
daimon tension which is generated by these overlapping projects.  The self this 
implies for this text’s author is of course a dichotomous one, constituted in the 
dialogic interrelationship of these voices.  You could say the text is self-
exemplifying of its adoption of Bakhtin and Volosinov’s polyvocal conception of 
consciousness.  
SS:  Well, I must say I’m more than a little frustrated not to have been 
given more say.  For a dual-voiced text, this has been rather one-sided. 
AS:  I’m afraid that writing up Social Science PhD research is not 
egalitarian towards all the possible voices, quests or selves it might involve.  
When this text is eventually evaluated, it will be assessed more for its 
contribution to academic literature than for how appealing it might be as  (our) 
spiritual autobiography. Having you here has however helped me avoid 
blending academic and spiritual discourses less reflexively, and thus probably 
ending up even more “one-sided” towards my academic perspective, because 
that  perspective is characteristically inclined to appear critical or even sceptical 
towards participants’ beliefs. It can also all too easily be deployed in ways 
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which favour certain beliefs, usually those shared by the author, over others.  
Feuerstein’s study of spiritual eccentrics illustrates this point.  He regards 
“enlightenment” as a singular phenomenon, an “illusive [sic – I think he means 
elusive] realization” (2006:  446). He concludes by suggesting that we are 
justified in being sceptical towards all teachers of enlightenment who do not 
show the “overwhelming signs of mastery” of adepts of “advanced approaches” 
to Yoga (2006:  453-4).  In contrast, I have not sought to be any more or less 
critical towards any of my research participants.  And quite unlike Feuerstein, I 
do not see enlightenment as a single phenomenon or realization.  That was 
more an initial observation than finding (see my Introduction to this thesis), 
though I have since expanded upon and substantiated that observation 
analytically, and I hope that I have convinced you of it by now. 
SS: Okay, but again, I don’t feel I’ve said enough.   Maybe it would 
have been better if you’d stuck with “Hatterr”-style episodes. 
AS: Like I’ve mentioned, that would have made recounting my 
analysis trickier.  At least, I think it would have been more awkward to write and 
follow.  Also,  our voices would have overlapped more, like they did in Chapter 
1. This way, our conversations serve to remind the reader of the different but 
sometimes overlapping concerns, beliefs, and in short discourses which come 
into play when people set about studying “spiritual” practices. That is how I 
have addressed the “Tao-daimon”. 
SS:   So the truth is, I’m safe to stay? 
AS: Funny how this always boil downs to you, but yes.  I don’t think 
either of us are quite done yet. I need to pull things together and I imagine 
you’re still hoping to find or lose your “self”. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion:  Putting the 
Self Back into “Self-Spirituality” 
 
 
 
6.1 Outline 
 
In this chapter, I first remind readers of the thematic manner in which I 
have ordered my analytical chapters (addressing configured seekers, expert 
gurus and truths about enlightened selves). To give readers a sense of how in 
analytical terms each of the four enlightenment cultures I have considered  
operates I then draw together my thematic findings to present a short overall 
picture of each.  I highlight that the multiplicity of seeking and enlightened 
selves, each echoing ancient or modern cultural selves,  makes the notion that 
“the authority of the Self” characterises New Age or any contemporary 
spirituality problematic.   Likewise, I  elaborate how the multiplicity of the self 
within enlightenment cultures creates difficulties for assessing the overall 
propensity of New Age or contemporary spirituality to promote  social change in 
wider society.  My central argument is that over recent years those who study 
contemporary spirituality have tended to neglect the  self as a topic of study, 
and that this neglect has both black boxed the self and obscured the 
consequential varieties of the self within enlightenment cultures.  My research 
has addressed this neglect in several ways:   by arguing for the continuing 
relevance of Heelas’s early approach to self-religions; by problematizing the 
self and its authority so as to provide a means of finding conceptual order 
within a bricolage of spiritual practices and beliefs;  by documenting several 
practices by which  seekers are  configured as distinct selves rather than as 
sharers of a common identity;  by documenting practices of experiential 
expertise whereby gurus are linked to the subjective experiences of configured 
seekers;  and by showing how credibility contests between participants 
demonstrate there are  incompatibilities and tensions within the spiritual milieu 
which are organised at the level  of the self.  I argue that replacing analytical 
concerns with investigating “the authority of the Self” or overarching spiritual 
 - 271 - 
ideologies with the project of elaborating practices of expertise and self 
configuration, supplemented by cultural histories of specific and identifiable 
cultural selves,  provides several academic benefits.  In particular, it provides a 
conceptually informed approach to empirical investigation which reveals an 
order within the diverse milieu, and provides the possibility of more nuanced 
assessments of each culture’s potential to bring about cultural change.  
Towards the end of this chapter, I revisit my tangential aim of addressing the 
Tao-daimon tension in researching religious subject matter by using two literary 
voices, the Seeker and Academic Selves.  After I suggest some directions for 
further research, the chapter ends with a discussion between these two voices, 
which suggests their dialogue, like the wider interplay between academic 
discourse and the discourse of spirituality, is an on-going one.   
 
6.2 Themes in the milieu 
 
In 1972, Campbell (2002)  wrote of a “cultic milieu”, populated by a 
“society of seekers” who “do not necessarily cease seeking when a revealed 
truth is offered to them.”  He conceived such seekers as all “united by a 
common ideology of seekership”, sharing the “basic seekership belief” that 
“truth” or “enlightenment” is “an esoteric commodity” attainable after “suitable 
preparation and a ‘quest’”.   This milieu is self-sustaining, bolstered by 
institutions and ideology which support seekership.  While individual groups 
may be ephemeral and unstable, he saw the milieu itself as a self-sustaining 
“entity”, with its constituents affording each other mutual sympathy and support, 
rarely criticising each other and exhibiting much toleration between themselves. 
This picture of a “milieu” distinct from wider society yet still part of it 
permeates emic and etic discussions of the contemporary spirituality and the 
so-called New Age. Heelas (1996) identified common features of the 
“spirituality” of participants in New Age activities as the primary basis for 
grouping them as a distinct “movement”.  He saw this common spirituality as 
resting upon “what is taken to be the authority of the Self””.  More recent 
scholars, notably Wood (2007; 2009) and Sutcliffe (2003; 2008), have used 
ethnographies to advance understandings of the New Age and any milieu 
within which it may be located,   prompting us to question their  cohesiveness 
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and status as distinct cultural enclaves.  In raising such questions, the issue of 
how analysts and participants may view “the self” is given little prominence.  
Wood’s work was focused tightly on  Heelas’s notion of  self-authority, rather 
than the nature of the self,  and found this authority to be empirically elusive in 
the networks he explored, and in which he argued there were  multiple 
competing authorities which “relativized” one another in “non-formative” 
religiosity.  Sutcliffe on the other hand has highlighted the foundational import 
of seekership across diverse activities, suggesting that as an identity, activity, 
and habitus it underpins a myriad of activities, though what may comprise 
seekership seems to vary between its different instances.   
One striking aspect of this literature is that it affirms the self or identity as 
being of great emic import, yet does not focus explicitly on emic or etic notions 
of the self per se.    Admittedly, one needs to be  wary of making straw men, as 
in fairness Heelas and others are pursuing other arguments.  However, the 
result is that participants’ notions of “the self” remain unanalysed and un-
theorized, the concept of “Self spirituality” itself being  shorthand for emic 
proclamations.   Relatedly, analytical notions of the self and its authority, and 
identity terms such as seeker, have never, so far as I am aware, been 
contrasted with what participants might mean by such terms.  It is in this sense 
the self has been black boxed in studies of popular religion.  
This is not so much an empirical  gap in the literature, or one calling for a 
particular research method to address,  it is a gap in analytical focus.  While I 
set out to study enlightenment(s) rather than the varieties of the self in 
enlightenment cultures, my research steadily focused upon the latter.  In 
analysing the variety of seekership activities in my materials, as well as the 
expertise of  gurus and the differences between participants’ positions on 
enlightenment in “credibility contests”, my analysis has repeatedly highlighted 
the importance of attending to underlying discourses on the self, which 
contribute to the shaping of a variety of seekers, gurus, and truths. 
My movements between data sites encouraged me to clarify my own 
view of the self. My approach has entailed  combining Woolgar’s (1991) notion 
of the configured user of computer technology with Saukko’s  (2008) 
sociological adoption of  Bakhtin and Volosinov’s polyvocal view of 
consciousness in her work on the “anorexic self”.   Woolgar is more concerned 
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with practices, whereas Bakhtin/Volosinov are more concerned with 
discourses, so that their distinct approaches may be combined in an heuristic 
manner without overt contradictions.  With this focus and theoretical orientation 
the contributions I offer to literature on contemporary spirituality fall under 
themes corresponding to my three analytical chapters.   
Throughout I have treated the production of spiritual enlightenment as 
analogous enough to  the production of scientific knowledge to warrant 
applying recent ideas within science and technology studies (STS) as heuristic 
tools.  Firstly, sensitized by Woolgar’s notion of configured users, I presented 
an analysis of configured seekers which shows that local practices configure 
users of spiritual services and discourses in ways which reflect a variety of 
wider cultural tropes of the self,  each carrying consequences for how a 
seeker’s quest might unravel. This is a departure from the conception of 
seekers as pre-formed possessors of a common identity category with 
associated dispositions to seek (e.g. Sutcliffe 2003; 2008), and addresses the 
variability in meaning of the term in participants’ own usages (as noted by 
Warburg 2001, discussed in Chapter 2). Secondly, inspired by recent STS work 
on  expertise, I have analysed occasions involving spiritual teachers in  terms 
of experiential  expertise, which are  constituted from varied practices and 
technologies whereby others come to associate gurus’ personas with affective 
experiences and particular discourses of the self.  This approach is an 
alternative to prevailing academic tendencies to treat gurus as authoritative or 
charismatic figures, following Weber’s foundational work in early sociology  
(e.g. 1978). The terms “guru”, “authority” and “charisma” have since become 
inextricably linked across disciplines and in common speech, and this linkage 
weighs against the most prominent characteristic of New Age pursuits identified 
by Heelas (1996), the view ultimate authority rests within oneself. The 
quandary polar perspectives on “authority” create is addressed by Heelas’s 
notion that external authorities and experts are “mediated by inner experience” 
(1996: 21).  However, while Heelas’s work nudges in this direction he stops 
short of examining the mechanics of how such mediation may occur 
empirically.   And thirdly, inspired by STS interest in scientific controversies,  I 
have analysed several “credibility contests” concerning enlightenment, and my 
analysis has  opened gurus’ truths to sociological scrutiny by identifying the 
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different forms of enlightened selves they imply, the culturally available selves 
they reflect, and their different modes of engagement with the world.   
Such themes in my analytical chapters have been argued through 
analyses of “fragments” drawn from larger events, interactions, exchanges, and 
publications.  This organisation differs from the ethnographic immersion of the 
opening chapter written around my early fieldwork at Holigral, in Glastonbury, 
which immersed the reader in just one enlightenment culture.   While this 
thematic structure has allowed me to elaborate my analyses of the configured 
seeker, experiential expertise, and enlightened selves systematically and 
sequentially, it has not drawn attention to the overall and analytically significant 
differences between the enlightenment cultures I have researched.  It is to this 
task that I now turn, after which I will summarise how my analysis relates to the 
literature reviewed earlier, in particular the notion of “the authority of the Self”.   
 
6.3 The cases 
 
Below, I  take each of my four key research participants in turn and 
elaborate them in terms of the etic themes of the configured seeker, 
experiential expertise, and enlightened self.  In doing this, I combine analytical 
findings from a variety of research sites.  Each view is necessarily incomplete, 
both for this reason and because gurus’ teachings change over time and are 
presented differently in style and content across different settings.  
Nevertheless, I have already included sufficient materials for readers to have 
gained some sense of each culture’s distinctiveness, and it is that which I wish 
to draw out through summarising my prior analyses. 
 
6.3.1 Revving up revolutionaries (Cohen) 
 
Cohen’s teachings identify and address a privileged audience  of 
“postmodern” seekers already on the “leading edge” and attributed with “the 
postmodern self”.  This self is not altogether a good one to possess, however, 
as it is typified as leading a “soap opera” life,  empty of meaning and offering no 
prospect of exploring important “existential” truths.  Ultimately, the image 
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conjured is of lives wasted through preoccupation with personal, egoistic 
pursuits which lack “evolutionary” significance for either the individual or his or 
her culture. The chords struck resonate with academic portrayals of the 
postmodern self as stripped of a life of meaning and genuine affect or 
transcendence (Grossberg 1997).  This self, like the “ego” in Cohen’s 
teachings, is never portrayed as the source of authority or truth, but rather as 
an obstacle to enlightenment and self- and collective-evolution,  a villain to be 
overcome, or given up.  Cohen’s teachings have furthermore  “evolved”, and 
are now  conceptually sophisticated, distinguishing several facets of selfhood, 
including “ego”,  “Authentic Self” and a “choosing faculty”, as well as distinct  
“selves”, such as the “postmodern-”, “personal-”, and “narcissistic self” (not all 
of which terms I have considered as not all appear in my materials).  His 
teachings also include various principles or “tenets” to which one must adhere 
in order to make the Authentic Self more prominent within oneself, and involve 
new spiritual practices such as enlightened communication.    Indeed, the 
teachings are so conceptually sophisticated that they lend themselves to being 
taught by others and by distance learning programmes.   
This programmatic potential creates a problem for Cohen’s special 
status as guru, and I have elaborated how his special status, that is his 
experiential expertise, was preserved at one specific event where he was not 
physically present.  The collective practices through which this expertise, and 
Cohen’s guruhood, were constituted involved punctuating pedagogic 
presentations by another teacher (Chris Parish) and video clips of Cohen 
elaborating and claiming authorship of a particular vocabulary of the self 
(concerned with an impersonal, evolutionary impulse and emphasis upon 
collective actions) with group exercises in which participants had experiences 
or examined introspectively their own experiences, and then discussed them 
with each other using terms from this vocabulary.  Authority here was not solely 
vested in any physical person (cf. Wood 2007), or in one’s self (cf. Heelas 
1996), or somehow “relativized” and rendered ineffective (Wood op. cit). 
Rather, it was dispersed in the social relations involving  images, discourse, 
and personal experiences.  In particular, it involved an oscillation between 
“authoritative” teaching by the event’s facilitator, Chris Parish, orchestrated 
exercises in which participants had personal experiences, the articulation and 
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discussion of personal experiences within small and later larger groups,  and 
the re-presentation of Cohen as an authorial figure responsible for the 
discourse being taught and rehearsed throughout the day.  The latter was 
mediated by familiar contemporary technologies such as audio-video 
recordings of Cohen played back to the entire ensemble.   While there was a 
discernible “centripetal” (Bakhtin 1981) tendency  at the enlightened 
communication event, the emergence of the authentic self at the climax of that 
event requiring the prevalence of its discourse rather than the actual presence 
of Cohen, the varied and cyclical structure of the event makes it clear that 
“authority” did not rest singularly in a discourse, practice, or person but is best 
seen as an overall consequence of their rich and varied interrelationships.  
As for the Authentic Self itself, “it” is of course very much an “it” within 
Cohen’s teachings, portrayed as a part  of ourselves which we share in 
common (literally) with all others, attributed with its own, human-like, motivation 
– to evolve. Evolutionary rhetoric is not only prominent within Cohen’s 
teachings (as in descriptions of an “evolutionary impulse” which one might 
perceive) but provides a rhetorical basis for this particular enlightened self’s 
mode of engagement with the world.  As necessarily part of a material 
evolutionary process, this self does not merely want to realise its own nature 
and then get back to or turn away from its prior life, but wants to actively 
contribute to the evolutionary process as its life purpose, arranging its life and 
associates and working deliberately to evolve itself and its world or culture, to 
thereby become “the leading edge of the leading edge” (Cohen and Wilber 
2007).  
Given by definition not everyone is as privileged or evolved  as even 
Cohen’s un-enlightened seekers,  such evolutionary aspirations are also 
revolutionary ones in both a social sense and in Cohen’s rhetoric.1  However, 
strikingly,  the concrete form and nature of such revolution, and the more 
evolved societal forms which may follow, were not elaborated in any of the 
                                                 
1 Cohen has long spoken of his aspiration to promote a “revolution” in “consciousness and 
culture”.  His recent teachings specifically promise to equip individuals to precipitate cultural  
change. A  recent flyer for one of Cohen’s weekend retreats promised to reveal how to  
“Catalyze a ‘tipping point’ that can lead to dramatic change at a cultural level”. (From an online 
advertisement for the  “Being & Becoming Weekend Retreat with Andrew Cohen: Changing the 
World from the Inside Out”,  Lenox, MA, October 8-10, 2010. Viewed on 30 November 2010 at 
http://www.andrewcohen.org/retreats/foxhollow-10.asp ). 
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events I have attended nor are they spelled out on Cohen’s website.   While 
Cohen does not profess to be a prophet, nor a politician, ostensibly he is  
endeavouring to assist the evolutionary process he identifies with the Authentic 
Self by providing teachings and activities people can engage in on their own 
(e.g. meditation and distance learning) and with each other (e.g. courses, 
enlightened communication and online or telephone seminars) in order to 
encourage its emergence over other aspects of selfhood at a mass level, or at 
least enough to form a cultural vanguard to serve as a tipping influence for 
societal changes.  Implicit in this agenda is an ethical if not political 
endorsement of both personal and societal change, in whatever form is 
identified with enlightened or authentic existence.  A specification of what 
counts as authentic societal change in this context is conspicuously absent 
from Cohen’s introductory and freely available materials at this time, though the 
worth of seeking such change in principle within Cohen’s teachings is  that 
doing so accords with the universal directional evolutionary force permeating all 
worldly existence. 2  
Cohen’s spirituality is therefore very much oriented towards what Heelas 
(1996:  31) described as “mainstream-transformation”, however not exactly as 
Heelas defined this term.  Heelas described it as  a New Age path lying 
between the extremes of seeking the best of the “inner” and “outer” worlds, 
respectively, that is one aimed at attaining “the best of both worlds”.  Heelas 
characterised the mechanisms of doing so as learning to “detach [oneself] from 
– while living within – the capitalist mainstream”  (ibid.).  In contrast, while 
superficially Cohen’s rhetoric matches that of Heelas (Cohen speaks of 
“changing the world from the inside out”3) Cohen’s teachings do not so much 
encourage detachment from the “mainstream”, but engagement with its present 
                                                 
2 The emphasis upon individual responsibility within Cohen’s teachings stands in tension with 
his evolutionary and unidirectional theme. The notion of cultural evolution suggesting a 
spontaneous inevitability, as in Darwinian natural evolution, which is not dependent on 
individual volition.     Taking responsibility for one’s own evolution may be viewed as a 
contradiction in terms. This obvious conceptual tension did not appear to trouble the occasions 
or discussions I have considered. 
3 This metaphor heads one of Cohen’s recent “quotes of the week” circulated to email mailing 
lists and published online (dated 2 March 2008,  last viewed at 
http://www.andrewcohen.org/quote/?quote=271 on 1 January 2011). In April 2009, he held a 
retreat in  Lenox, MA, similarly titled “Spend a Weekend Discovering How to Change the World 
from the Inside Out”.  While the aspirations are clear, the shape of any future world is not. 
 - 278 - 
“evolutionary” state, until such time as evolutionary change, which we can 
assist and work on,  kicks in and transforms it, and us,  into something else.   
 
SEEKER SELF: I must say, I was really tempted to go to some of 
Cohen’s more recent talks just to find out more about how evolutionary 
enlightenment may offer practical routes to social change, even if it wouldn’t 
involve adding to your thesis6 
ACADEMIC SELF: But I (or rather our more pragmatic supervisor) talked 
us both out of it, if I remember.6. 
SS: I will go to more of his events when I have more time. It sounds like 
he’s becoming more specific about how to bring about societal change, and I 
really want to feel part of that. There is always more to learn, it seems, though 
I’m a bit bothered that Cohen does not seem to publically acknowledge any of 
his students as enlightened.  Sure, I realise he regards the nature of 
enlightenment itself as evolving, but you’ve not said much about that. 
AS: There is a lot to do here, and of course if the cultural world is 
changing or “evolving” it is wholly consistent to regard what might count as true 
enlightenment as constantly changing with it.  Cohen’s friend Wilber (2006) 
takes that view, which of course applies as much to Cohen’s own 
enlightenment, or enlightenments. In a worldly sense, the acquisition and 
maintenance of “evolutionary enlightenment” is a life-long project, like 
Giddens’s project of the self in late modernity. I’m not sure the piecemeal 
specification of this project to paying course attendees will ultimately assist it, 
though this strategy may encourage repeat-audiences.  It works against wider 
dissemination and easy scrutiny of Cohen’s more political goals, by which I 
mean social change.  But let’s move on6..  
 
6.3.2 Transcending or coping? (Gangaji) 
 
While Cohen’s configured seekers might be glossed as a privileged 
cultural elite, Gangaji’s seekers are characterised by her as privileged in 
another sense, that of being “called” to be present at her meetings – that is, 
being in her presence.  Such rhetoric prioritises her physical presence in a way 
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Cohen’s physicality was not important in the enlightened communication event.  
However, like Cohen’s postmodern seekers, Gangaji’s audience are configured 
as sharing a common predicament, though here independent of their personal 
or biographic circumstances.  Whatever history seekers bring with them here 
falls under the rubric of their “stories”.  The storied seeker is anyone and 
everyone, and their problem is not so much the detail of their  stories, but 
mistakenly identifying themselves with those stories.  In a radical departure 
from the customary mode of treating the narrative self of twentieth century 
literary theory and therapy (cf.  Eakin 1999; Hoskins and Leseho, 1996), this is 
not a narrative self whose biography must be re-narrated, but one whose 
biography must be obliterated in a biography-free state of “stillness”.  This 
destruction of one’s storied self  is not an intellectual process or one reliant on 
re-narrating one’s self as “still”, but is built upon the personal experience of 
stillness as ever available, and perception of it as one’s true nature. 
Like that of Cohen, Gangaji’s guruhood or authority is constituted 
through practices which provide scope for her audience members to have 
experiences which may be interpreted using her vocabulary of the self.  
Gangaji’s own practices of expertise rely more on bodily proximity, touching, 
and the evocativeness of her own presence than did those of Cohen, which 
relied more on an authored discourse of authenticity.  While Gangaji’s 
performances are video recorded and from the materials mentioned at the end 
of the last chapter, and recordings may  affect viewers to “stop”, they do not 
present viewers with the same experiences and possibilities and indeed 
“authority” available to those actually present.  In the video recordings of the 
London talks I attended, the long opening and closing silences had been edited 
out, and the possibility of speaking directly with Gangaji is obviously absent.  
While entire audiences participate in opening and closing silences, only some 
participate directly in stage encounters though these take up most of Gangaji’s 
events (and publications).  These encounters have such a recognisable form 
(proceeding through elaboration to Gangaji’s prompts to examine one’s inner 
experience in certain ways and final statements about the meaning and 
significance of the exchange to her wider audience)  and common themes 
(such as finding calm amongst the turmoil of life), that they appeal both through 
the reassuring predictability of their trajectories, and as exposés of the private 
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lives and problems of others.  Each encounter underlines the specialness of 
Gangaji’s actual presence and the applicability of her teachings and delivery to 
any individual. Even in video form, her physicality (exemplified by touching and 
grooming her guests), and  embodiment of her discourse of the self, of 
“stillness”, is clear.  Gangaji personifies calm and her expertise is in 
encouraging others to do likewise, through the format of her stage show and 
relying on audience members’ participation and in particular willingness to 
narrate themselves on stage in front of strangers in quasi-therapeutic 
exchanges of a chat-show nature. That there is no shortage of stage volunteers 
perhaps testifies to the ubiquity of the chat-show format and possible 
encouragement for audience participation supplied by the availability  of 
recordings of the encounters, soon or immediately after each event. 
Unlike its storied predecessors, the enlightened self here is a 
transcendental self beyond all stories.  This self is not an empirical or worldly 
self, but is an ontological assertion akin to the elusive “One” of many Eastern  
religions and ancient philosophy (cf. Copleston 1997).  The emphasis of 
Gangaji’s teachings and performances is encouraging others, regardless of 
their backgrounds, to identify this self as their own true nature.  While Gangaji 
does, perhaps unavoidably, venture views of how people may behave “true” to 
this truth, she purposefully distances her teachings from “therapy”, and lacks 
the world-changing aspirations so apparent in Cohen’s enlightenment culture. 
Gangaji’s teachings therefore   fit better with Heelas’s view of the world 
rejecting “spiritual purist”, oriented almost exclusively towards “self-realization” 
for its own sake (1996:  30).  However, while Heelas’s spectrum implies this 
necessarily involves world-rejection, this is not entirely so when one considers  
Gangaji’s teachings closely.  While the direction of her teachings is towards 
self-obliteration, her repeated emphasis is upon the moment of “stopping”. The 
boundedness of such stoppings is illustrated by the short stage encounters in 
which audience members “stop”, then minutes later resume their roles as part 
of a larger audience.  Metaphorically, this illustrates that “stopping” is not 
necessarily incompatible with life-as-before.  However, such a return to the 
world (of stories) is clearly different from the potentially life-long project of self 
and societal transformation/evolution envisaged by Cohen. While Cohen’s view 
seems more in keeping with Western, sovereign notions of selfhood, Gangaji’s 
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emphasis upon stopping one’s stories of selfhood abruptly, temporarily, but 
potentially repeatedly, have a more Eastern aspect. That Gangaji does not 
advocate  maintaining states of stillness without stories all the time might 
therefore be viewed as her own “adaptation” of the Eastern notion of 
enlightenment entailing “ego death” (cf. Rindfleish 2007).  However, from an 
etic standpoint it is arguable that even “Eastern” religions variously adapt the 
notion of “ego death” in ways which preserve forms of social selfhood even in 
hermit-like and monastic forms of existence.  What is interesting is that 
Gangaji’s adaptation of the notion, if it is that, allows people to simply return to 
their same lives as before. Identification with  a transcendental story-less self,  
however provides a means of reflecting upon or coping with the world without 
aspiring to change either it or oneself.   That Gangaji provides truths which 
afford people ways of coping with difficult circumstances and relief from 
negative stories of themselves is perhaps best borne out by her being the only 
guru I have studied who has organised a free teaching programme  targeted at 
prisoners with criminal convictions.   
SEEKER SELF:  Yeah, sure, Gangaji is more focused on helping people 
see who or what they really are than with changing the world.  And yes, that 
might give some people a way of coping.  But you need to be wary of devaluing 
her teachings by leaving it at that.    What you call coping may have a more 
positive aspect, not by setting out to change specific things about the world but 
by freeing people to get on with their lives in the recognition of their nature and 
interconnectedness with others.  You don’t need to be a prisoner or have life 
problems to benefit from that. Cohen’s teachings might also be ways of coping 
for some, by making them feel more significant than they did previously. 
ACADEMIC SELF:  I agree.  I’m trying to draw threads together here 
and my vignettes of course do not capture the full richness and potential of 
each enlightenment culture, just highlight prominent distinctions and how the 
cultures as a whole hang together in idiosyncratic ways.    That Gangaji’s 
culture is clearly more about self-realization than life-long personal 
improvement, and more immediately disposed towards coping with the world 
than transforming it are prominent  distinctions between her teachings on 
enlightenment and those of Cohen.  If I may go on, we can see another 
variation of what I have termed coping in Parsons’s teachings 
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6.3.3 Putting down the comic seeker (Parsons) 
 
 
Like Gangaji’s storied seeker, Parsons’s seeker is caught up with 
activities or stories he or she thinks may bring about enlightenment.  The 
propensity to seek in this enlightenment culture is not so much associated with 
acting in accordance with a creative impulse (as with Cohen) or discontent 
within one’s stories  (as with Gangaji), but is a developmental aspect of our 
humanity.  To Parsons,  sometime in childhood development, we come to 
regard ourselves as separate and distinct from other people and things.  
Parsons claims that this leaves a sense of loss, without a clear idea of what 
has been lost.  Seeking enlightenment, and indeed other worldly forms of 
seeking (such as for money, success, possessions) are seen as attempts to 
fulfil this sense of loss.  Seeking here is not a cultural disposition or aspect of 
our relative evolutionary development, but is  developmentally hard-wired into 
our physical nature.  Ironically, Parsons holds that seekership activities 
(whether aimed at enlightenment or attaining happiness through more worldly 
acquisitions, such as money or possessions), tend to reaffirm the seeking 
individual’s status as a separate individual,  thus making the attainment of what 
has been lost impossible so long as the seeking continues.  There is a double 
irony here, rendering this seeker all the more comic, as in ontological terms 
Parsons’s developmental theory implies that reality does not change when a 
developing human comes to regard themselves as a (separate) person, rather  
what the seeker has “lost” and in later years seeks is always there, just 
obscured by an erroneous or illusory sense of personhood or separateness.  
Thus, this comic seeker is like a tourist who never takes in a view, or even 
realises where they are,  because of rushing to the next item on an endless 
itinerary.  
Whereas Gangaji’s transcendental non-self is relayed by her in an 
embodied manner, and is something to be felt by stage guests and audience 
members alike, Parsons’s self-denying non-self is essentially linguistic. The 
actual exchanges at Parsons’s meetings evidence attempts on his part to 
discursively enact a lack of personhood or individuality, using ordinary 
language and grammar which constantly affirm such distinctions.  Inevitably, 
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given the distinctions between self and other endemic to language and 
conventional ways of perceiving the world,  Parsons cannot enact or claim a 
lack of personhood consistently or without the possibility of challenge.  Indeed, 
such challenges are encouraged throughout the event, by Parsons’s succinct 
elaboration of his view of reality, his short and fast answers to questions, and 
his willingness to tolerate long silences between questions without speaking 
himself.  Questions at his events follow a smallish number of themes which 
typically turn his own teachings back upon himself (through questions such as 
why is he speaking to this audience, or how does he conduct mundane 
features of his life like his marriage or having a passport), just as the simplicity 
of some of his assertions encourage people to ask “so what?” or “what is the 
point?” questions. Parsons’s responses typically are short, including further 
self-denials and statements to the effect his meetings have no point and 
nothing to offer seekers, thus inviting further questions.  It is through 
encouraging and responding to such questions and occasional long silences 
that Parsons’s events gain their distinctive character, and for questioners can 
seem frustrating or, as he says, “uncompromising”.  
It is through his skill in pre-empting and quickly and succinctly answering 
audience members’ topical questions in ways which provide no guidelines or 
exercises which help the questioner in a conventional sense that Parsons’s 
experiential expertise is constituted.  Questioners and their phrases  become 
the focus of Parsons’s curt and predictable corrections. That there is much 
laughter during such exchanges indicates that many audience members are 
able to track and recognise the “fit” of Parsons’s rapid-fire responses, and 
recognise that his self-denying manner of speech is incongruous with 
conventional speech, even if they do not mimic it to his satisfaction themselves.   
The overall impression this gives is of an unusual linguistic game between 
Parsons and his audience, with Parsons’s role being the corrector of others and 
master of this impossible speech.  The self-denying self which Parsons enacts 
can never be enacted or described perfectly, though the format of the event, 
with Parsons as speaker, affords him interactional privileges such as the 
possibility of having the last humorous or serious word in such exchanges. This 
is a message where the main task of seekers within an audience is simply to 
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“get it” or “bask” in it, while speaking at all provides scope for Parsons to 
demonstrate his own expertise through correction.   
Beyond such linguistic games, and possibilities of experientially  basking 
in a sense of nonduality, Parsons’s teachings are devoid of pragmatic 
prescriptions about how one should act in the world, and deny the worth of 
seeking to change it or oneself in any way.  They are therefore positioned 
towards the “self-realization” extremity of Heelas’s spectrum of New Age 
thought, as though not overtly world-rejecting they are focused upon the true 
nature of self and reality.  Indeed, Parsons’s teachings encourage audiences to 
regard and express themselves as part of the world and not separate from it,  
everything being “Oneness”.   
It is the lack of overt moral prescriptions, coupled with a disinclination to 
provide guidance aimed at conduct in the “relative” or “illusory” world of 
separation in both Parsons’s and Gangaji’s teachings,  that from a worldly  
standpoint, such as that of Cohen, make these teachings appear nihilistic. This 
said, the mode of engagement with the world of this self-denying self is an 
expressive one, as such a self is displayed to others through self-denials.  One 
obvious practical benefit of identification with such a self-denying self is  
release from the inclination to fruitlessly seek something else, and perhaps 
moral restraints that may previously have seemed repressive.  Analytically,  we 
can see such moral and pragmatic absences are accentuated in Parsons’s  
public performances where they are asserted by him in explicit and succinct 
ways, becoming part of the spectacle of audience questions and Parsons’s 
subsequent humour and corrections.  In this sense, Parsons’s teachings are 
the most provocative of the three so far;  they are presented in ways designed 
to elicit a multitude of conversational responses  which become part of the 
performance. The speed of the exchanges at Parsons’s meetings coupled with 
his keen wit and fluency in dealing with “hecklers”, also suggest that while his 
teachings and style may in principle appear to rest on rather simple, easily 
mimicked linguistic practices, to perform as he does requires a keen sense of 
timing and ability to select from a stock of further provocative elaborations as 
the exchanges unfurl.    
SEEKER SELF:  I think you have misrepresented Parsons here as being 
only about “performance”, and as being the stage comedian to whom  the 
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comic seeker is a constant foil.  Sure, he is pretty sharp with his “non-duality 
speak”, and of course it isn’t possible to speak or act as if you don’t exist, but I 
don’t see that as his main aim nor that, as you seem to imply, this means his 
performances don’t originate from “his” liberation, in some way.  Many people 
really do identify themselves with their pronouns, and stories, as if those 
pronouns and stories always point to something stable and unchanging.  So, to 
rattle that identification as Parsons does can be very “revealing” even 
“enlightening”.  This isn’t just a game, though it is all done rather playfully. 
ACADEMIC SELF:  I’m sorry, but I don’t mean to disparage Parsons by 
referring to his performances as a game. I mean that the form and content of 
his performances, including the audience participation he relies upon,  are 
coherent  and structured enough so that audiences can discern how to take 
part and even take a stab at trying to speak like Parsons, as well as recognise 
when others and they themselves are offending any local conventions in ways 
incongruous with normal speech.  Indeed, Parsons is so “good” at these 
performances that he sets quite a benchmark.  And yes, it is serious game as it 
is played in ways which reinforce a self-perception very different from the 
familiar sovereign individual, that of the self-denying self.   
SS:  Thanks.  And just to underline the serious, and “liberating” aspect of 
these “games”, of course life goes on for people after these meetings, even the 
“baskers”.  You seem to be assuming that any teacher of enlightenment must 
necessarily provide people with a new morality or  weird way to live their lives.  
As the accounts from ordinary self-realized folk in that book you’ve already 
mentioned make clear, life can continue much as before after liberation 
(Bongers  2008).  
AS: Yes, but again these are stories of very ordinary lives continuing. 
Indeed, they celebrate their ordinariness. True, these are not newly amoral or 
newly moral lives, but generally lives lived without the sort of aspirations 
towards greatness and evolutionary significance suggested by Cohen’s 
teachings.  That is a big difference.  Also, the self-denying self is a self which 
may be expressed as well as lived, and even without being “teachers”, those 
giving such accounts of themselves show they can express such a self as 
being their innermost identity. Indeed, of all the enlightened selves this one is 
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perhaps the most “viral” in that linguistically it seems the simplest to enact, 
albeit not necessarily with Parsons’s  finesse.  
 
6.3.4 Fixing the fragmented self (Holigral) 
 
Steve Saunders, and other Holigral teachers, offer their forms of 
enlightenment to yet another configuration of the seeker, who is here an 
individual whose self is fragmented through the vicissitudes of his or her unique 
life experiences.  Using ideas and practices taken from psychotherapeutic 
approaches addressing a fragmented self, the trajectory here is towards 
reintegration,  wholeness of being, or embodiment of one’s self and all its 
fragments.  This therapeutic objective is approached through interactional, 
artistic, or imaginative “processes” which bring forth past events and feelings in 
symbolic forms, and re-work  them collaboratively in ways which appear to 
address contemporary personal  issues. 
Clearly,  any “enlightenment” here comes about very differently from the 
other three teachers I have considered.  Cohen’s teachings aim to oust the 
“personal” and replace it with what is “evolutionary” on a greater scale, while for 
Gangaji personal biographic details are irrelevant to the stillness which one 
may always find at their heart, and for Parsons such stories would simply and 
erroneously reinforce the illusion of there being a person who has become 
fragmented.  For Holigral, in contrast, that each individual has a unique past 
and thus unique form of self-fragmentation requiring specific, individualised 
attention is very important.  This emphasis upon biography gives their courses 
a very individualistic thrust:  though various “processes” are undertaken 
together, and even places visited as collective outings, each  person 
nevertheless is encouraged to see themselves as pursing a unique “personal 
journey”, culminating in a sense of wholeness which may be subjectively very 
different from the experiences of others on  the same course though cultivated 
by the same ”processes”.  
The bricolage of influences apparent in Holigral’s practices (including 
both therapeutic theory and Saunders’s interpretation of quantum physics) and 
some of their extravagant seeming claims (such as to provide training which 
obviates the need for further personal development, or to have distilled many 
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years of spiritual practice into mere days) however sits oddly with the more 
overtly commercial aspects of their venture.  In presenting a bricolage, Holigral 
also present a version of enlightenment which combines the material and 
mundane. The “games” and “outings” which make up their courses no doubt 
carry appeal to those who want to work on their own individualistic things in a 
pleasant setting, and whether or not focused upon existential issues provide 
much scope for site-seeing while pursing one’s “project of the self” (Giddens 
1991). On the other hand, the constant development of new “processes”,   and 
the availability of courses on how to “facilitate”  others using such processes, 
serve a clientele heavily biased towards personal development professionals 
who may incorporate Holigral’s techniques, or similar common ones (such as 
“clean language”) in their own therapeutic repertoires.  Holigral offers licensing 
arrangements, and certifications, to put such incorporation on a legal and 
commercial basis.  Certainly, there is a mixing of the commercial and spiritual 
here, with Holigral presenting themselves in ways which may emphasise either 
or both.   That their version of enlightenment involves such an overt 
juxtaposition of the spiritual and commercial was brought home to me by the 
academic-like certifications given to course attendees.  Interestingly, while 
many individualised “enlightenments” or “awakenings” occurred on the retreats 
I attended, in contrast the certificates at the end of the course merely recorded 
the days spent in training which were the same for us all. My own attendance 
qualified me for a certificate as a “Trainer” implying I had not so much attained 
enlightenment, or even freed myself of psychological troubles,   but acquired 
new skills I might use to work upon others. Other certifications required further 
hours of training.   
While bestowing certificates itself implies an expert knowledge on the 
part of the “examiners”, it is through their command of the therapeutic 
processes in which others narrate themselves that Holigral’s facilitators’ 
experiential expertise is most apparent.4  The practices are designed to 
inculcate intense focus on the part of clients, and to move them towards 
experiencing realisations concerning their biographies or selves.  As designer 
of templates for many such therapeutic styles of exchange, and the provider of 
                                                 
4 For reasons of space I did not analyse this at length in previous chapters, though have shown 
several of the forms taken by this expertise in the opening ethnography. 
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the (bricolage) theory which explains how they work, Saunders is regarded as 
having technical knowledge and skills beyond the expertise he is able to teach 
other “facilitators”.   Furthermore,  his role as skilled and informative  tour guide 
and local host also embellished this expertise.  The town of Glastonbury is a 
site of both orthodox and alternative religious significance, pilgrimage, and 
quest where the notion of finding one’s personal truth abounds (Bowman 
2000).  It is thus for many what Gieryn (2002; 2006) would term a “truth spot”, 
its name, location, and long established historic connotations adding legitimacy 
to any esoteric truths gleaned there.  However it is not just that Saunders lives 
and offers courses there, but he associates himself and the “processes” of his 
courses with this place by showing himself to be knowledgeable about the 
locale, and as part of his retreats leading excursions to several sites of 
particular esoteric significance while course attendees subjectively “work” on 
their individual issues.  This technique accentuated place to the attendees,  
adding veracity to the realisations they came to about themselves whilst 
navigating any such “truth spot”.     
Such use of “sacred places” is absent from the other teaching occasions 
I have considered.  It nicely illustrates here that “authority” may not only reside 
within practises rather than people, but be diffused into the places in which 
these practices occur. Wood did not consider place as associated with authority 
in his investigations into “the authority of the Self”, though the extent to which 
the truth of oneself may be associated with or gleaned from or at particular 
sites adds to the sense in which authority is not possessed  either within “the 
self” or simply exerted by another.     
Notwithstanding the rich and varied bricolage associated with its various 
enlightenments  (for by definition, in this culture everyone’s enlightenment or 
attainment of wholeness will differ), and its various commercial and spiritual 
aspects,  the mode of engagement of the enlightened self formed here is very 
much back towards the world, not necessarily to improve it, but as an improved 
performer in it.   The emphasis upon personal issues, personal journeys, and 
“clean” facilitating, and on  attaining one’s own understanding of “authenticity” 
and of what one will do with one’s life after the course is very individualised 
compared to Cohen’s efforts to steer people towards a common evolutionary 
end, and also Gangaji’s and Parsons’s bracketing of the practical world and 
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emphasis upon personal revelations.  Returning to Heelas’s typology, Holigral 
seem very much a best of both worlds approach, their personalised 
enlightenments equipping people to get back to their lives and perform better. 
And while its teachings and techniques borrow and adapt from many sources,  
for those who wish to facilitate others using such techniques, Holigral’s system 
of training, accreditation and licensing encourage prolonged commercial 
associations. 
SEEKER SELF:  Hmmm, but surely all the other forms of enlightenment 
mix commerce and spirituality in some way.  Every teacher has followers and 
needs money.  Why do you highlight this only in Holigral? 
ACADEMIC SELF:  You’re right, of course. If I may speak this way, 
everyone I’ve researched is selling authored products which touch on 
existential issues and purported truths about the self and reality, including 
courses, books, periodicals and  CDs.  We’ve seen that Cohen’s products are 
sold in a culture to which people may enlist with a view to changing the world, 
whereas Gangaji and Parsons seem to point people in more personal or 
expressive directions. All three exhibit a kind of authorial branding, and offer 
scope for communal activities, travel to retreats or talks at international venues, 
and so on to see or speak with the guru in person.  Holigral also offers many of 
these things, but is the only group I’ve researched which has 
certification/qualifications and aims to license accredited practitioners who in 
turn may mix Holigral’s techniques (which they claim facilitate enlightenments) 
with others obtained elsewhere, or else perhaps enter other business 
relationships with Saunders et al.  The structure and membership of Holigral’s 
business partnership has itself changed considerably during my study, the 
transmission of its teachings occurring through such shifting formal 
relationships. 
SS:  Surely then it isn’t right to speak of Holigral as  having a “teaching” 
on enlightenment?  That’s a bit disappointing as I think I made a lot of  spiritual 
progress myself during my Authentic Leadership course, though I accept that 
wouldn’t count as enlightenment elsewhere. 
AS: Enlightenment is one thing they offer, though along with other 
possibilities or products, such as phobia cures and ways to help others resolve 
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their own personal issues.  They differ from the other cultures I have studied 
only in degree though, for it is not as if the others offer only “enlightenment”. 
 
  
6.4 Self-authority -vs-  multiple seeking and enlightened 
selves? 
 
Clearly, each of these four cultures offers different scope and ways for 
anyone else to be recognised as enlightened.  Cohen’s enlightened 
communication event for instance was more a collective consciousness raising 
event than opportunity for any particular individual to be accredited as 
enlightened, whereas at Gangaji’s talks only specific audience-volunteers are 
enrolled in public displays of enlightenment.  The nature and source of authority 
within each culture and occasion also seems varied to the extent that finding 
commonalties between the materials is problematic. Nevertheless, contrary to 
Heelas’s (2008: 237 n1) current considered  avoidance of the term “self” 
because of its varied meanings, I suggest the term is still an appropriate one for 
researchers to concern themselves with, but more as topic for analysis than 
descriptive category.   
However, my analysis demonstrates that it is inappropriate to treat “the 
self” as the source of authority in enlightenment cultures, or that “the authority 
of the Self” is a common ideological feature of these cultures, for three main 
reasons.  Firstly, across cultures there is enormous variation in the nature of 
the enlightened (or “true”) self which from an emic perspective might hold such 
authority, even in a simplistic sense.   Unless we bring with us a concept of the 
self to superimpose upon such cultures in order to attribute it with authority, we 
should be wary of speaking of self-authority as a common feature of all such 
cultures, just as we should not assume any reference to the self always means 
the same thing.    Secondly, within the cultures I have considered,  there are a 
multiplicity of selves, such as those I have identified as seekers and 
enlightened selves.  Identifying which one or more may be exercising authority 
is problematic, and entails an analytic reification of an authoritative self or 
selves.  Thirdly, and most importantly, it is simply unnecessary to attribute 
authority to a “self” in order to describe or explain the operation of “authority” 
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within an enlightenment culture.  My argument has been that authority is 
dispersed between and within discourses, practices, people and even settings.  
So, although “Self-spirituality” still seems to me an apt description of non-
orthodox teachings of enlightenment which are concerned with the ontological 
truth of the self,  the notion of “self-authority”, as an etic concept, seems best 
abandoned.   On this, I therefore agree with Wood (2007; 2009), although for 
very different reasons:  whereas Wood sees a multitude of external authorities 
pulling different ways, none being a self, I suggest “authority” is better 
conceived analytically as a consequence of the interrelationship of practices, 
discourses, and physical technologies which produce selves. 
The self in various recognisable cultural forms is nevertheless both an 
object and resource within enlightenment cultures.  It is an object in that an aim 
common to seeking activities across such cultures is to discern or experience 
its true nature. It is a resource in that its multiple cultural forms are used to 
configure both seekers and what they may become.  Seen this way, pursing 
enlightenment within any culture entails self-identification with at least two 
possible selves, and practices oriented towards a shift between them,  such as 
from a narcissistic self to an authentic one, or from storied to still, comic to 
denied, or fragmented to whole.  Each enlightened self thus gains 
distinctiveness through its associated seeker self precursor.  Seeking and 
enlightened selves “fit” one another in that the latter solve issues of the former, 
and are not easily interchangeable as they are paired not so much logically but 
through indigenous psychologies and narratives which denote boundaries 
between different versions of enlightenment.  Thus, a “fragmented self” might 
be healed by exercises considered to allow it to integrate biographic events and 
gain a new understanding of itself and its “authenticity”, but this is not the same 
thing as connecting with “The Authentic Self” within us all.  Sociologically, 
therefore, each enlightenment culture brings to the fore particular historic and 
contemporary possibilities of what a self may be, and foregrounds possibilities 
of identification with very different forms of selfhood, whether as seekers or 
enlightened individuals. 
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6.5 Enlightenment and wider society 
 
In her popular psychology text, Generation Me, Twenge (2006: 50) has 
pointed out that the present world is one so replete with aphorisms and advice 
concerning “the self” that we do not notice this anymore. Self-spirituality, it 
appears, may well have gone mainstream.   Yet my argument has been that 
behind the facade of uniformity created by the cultural prevalence of a diffuse 
discourse of spirituality, which furnishes a common, overlapping, and 
occasionally debated vocabulary,  the self is as multiple, perhaps even more 
multiple, than it has ever been.     The different enlightenment cultures I have 
studied  each draw upon differing, albeit sometimes overlapping, historic and 
contemporary notions of selfhood carrying very differing notions of what it is to 
be a self, and of how one should (or should not) engage with the world.  In 
other words, aside from other forms of institutional or economic integration, 
each culture is integrated into wider societies through echoing selves available 
within them.   The process of enlightenment within each culture entails 
movements between different selves, achieved through social practises 
(whether adopted, designed, adapted or synthesised) which  embellish the 
expertise of certain individuals who seem  responsible for such transformations 
or experiences. Luckmann (1990) would probably regard such experiences as 
“intermediate” or “little” transcendences in an otherwise expanding religious 
field now populated by commercial (albeit often “charitable”) enterprises.  
Certainly, all the “gurus” I have studied perform internationally, though their 
teaching activities are limited to Westernised, capitalist societies in which 
teachings and texts may be exchanged for money.   While I have not sought to 
compare the magnitude or scale of such experiences, nor to dwell upon their 
obvious commerciality, what strikes me most about their “fit” with wider society 
is the extent to which they all involve an affective recycling of the self in a range 
of its past and present guises, characteristically (at least during the occasions I 
recorded) without addressing the historicity or hybrid character of the notions of 
the self they rely upon and excluding or dismissing other possible selves.  An 
individual’s affective discovery or realization of an enlightened self is in this 
sense only a partial re-discovery of one or more societal selves. 
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Understanding the operation of authority within any specific 
enlightenment culture is also extremely important to discerning its fit with wider 
society.  I have shown this requires detailed attention to both the selves with 
which a culture is concerned and the practices whereby one may be replaced 
by another.   Although the variety of practices are such that there may seem to 
be little commonality between cultures, the use of lectures, stage shows, small 
group work, and even art and drawing activities are all staple features of 
contemporary life, drawn from pedagogic and recreational or entertaining  
activities. Superficially, therefore, all enlightenment cultures provide “experts” 
who offer their own mixes of instruction and entertainment on the subject of the 
self.  If, as writers such as Giddens suggest, the burden of constituting and 
maintaining a sense of self has now become a necessary project of each 
individual, commitment to any of the enlightened selves offered by each 
enlightenment culture seems to have a distinct attraction:  “ontological 
security”. Also, if, as Grossberg suggests, modern life involves people in 
seeking out new and repeatable opportunities for affect, the cultures provide 
these as well.  But as we have seen, enlightened selves are not equal in how 
they turn back upon the social world in which they circulate, nor without the 
commitment of faith is any security they afford necessarily permanent, 
otherwise I suggest there would be no “serial seeking”.5 The upshot is a view of 
Campbell’s milieu as kind of industry of the self, operating within wider society 
and addressing without always resolving the vicissitudes of the self which it 
creates. If anything, the cultures add to such vicissitudes by disseminating the 
notion that people are not generally who or what they believe themselves to be.  
There is also some “fit” between the types of self which populate 
different enlightenment cultures and the different forms of engagement they 
encourage from their seekers as well as the different ways in which they 
preserve their “gurus’” figurehead status.  Cohen is notorious for not accrediting 
students as enlightened as himself,  though through his organisations provides 
lots of courses and activities for students to participate in.  This makes sense if 
enlightenment is viewed as a lifelong project of an ever evolving self, and 
                                                 
5 Constructionism is characteristically hostile towards adopting matters of “faith” (cf. Edwards et 
al. 1995), though I use the term here in its customary sense of meaning a strong personal 
belief, whatever the “authority” for it.  
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Cohen is viewed as riding the same evolutionary wave as the rest of us.  
Gangaji and Parsons appear to provide “instant”, “transmission”-like 
opportunities for a more final form of enlightenment, with less investment of 
time and effort by seekers, whether through staged encounters which invoke a 
transcendental self beyond stories or brief conversational exchanges 
encouraging a self-denying self.  Yet Gangaji’s  physicality and identification 
with “stillness”, and Parsons’s mastery of linguistic gymnastics, are not easily 
mimicked, at least not during their own performances.  Certainly such 
“practices” were not “taught” at the events I visited. An analogy is stand-up 
comedy:  most people can repeat a joke or two heard at such events, but few 
possess the sense of timing and other skills required to be an entertaining 
comedian.  Nevertheless, some “make it”, and both Gangaji and Parsons have 
several entrepreneurial successors who hold events in the same style as their 
own teachers.6  Finally, the fragmented self Holigral works upon lends itself to 
being healed within a finite therapeutic timeframe, varying with the nature of the 
fragmentation or trauma concerned.   Holigral is the only organisation I 
researched which specifically teaches and attempts to licence its “enlightening” 
techniques to others.  Again, this makes sense for once healed this self is by 
definition prone to further fragmentation, leaving scope for “further work” and  
implying that there is a need and value in acquiring the skills to do it.  
The enlightenment cultures share a common concern with 
“enlightenment” and occasionally interact directly with one another thereby 
affirming both their commonality and distinctiveness.  Through looking at what 
occurs within such cultures, and how several relate to each other, I have shown 
that while they each address similar problems or themes (the need for seekers 
which fit enlightened selves, and transformation mediated through the expertise 
of another) the outcome of each culture is very different.  
Differences between the types of selves promoted between 
enlightenment cultures goes some way to explaining their apparent dis-
                                                 
6 Amber Terrell, the author of Gangaji’s biography (1997), describes herself as being in 
Gangaji’s “lineage”.  See her website, last viewed on 11 April 2011 at 
http://www.truelightmusic.com/satsang/lineage_amber.htm.   Several “non duality” authors, 
especially those publishing through Salisbury based Non-Duality Press, attended Parsons’s 
talks before coming to their own self-denying realizations and embarking on their own teaching 
and authorial careers in a similar style to Parsons. For example  Gill (2006:15-16) and 
Sylvester (2006:15).  
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inclination to band together to exert political force (cf. Lynch 2007).  That the 
cultures are concerned with issues of credibility between themselves, and 
occasionally interact with each other in “credibility contests” suggests they each 
may be equally or even more concerned with how they stand as alternatives to 
each other than as alternatives to traditional or denominational religions.   The 
presence of such contests attests to the cultures themselves orienting to 
themselves and each other as having common and sometimes competing 
concerns, even though they have not organised into a common collective.  The 
viability of any such organisation seems dubious given that cultures are at least 
in part defined through their disputes with other such cultures.  However, I have 
argued that such formal organisation is not required to promote “spirituality” in a 
more general sense, and I suggest that all of the enlightenment cultures I have 
considered promote discourses and practices which stand as examples of this 
diffuse trend (cf. Campbell 1982).  
However, it is the differences within each enlightenment culture which 
have mainly concerned us.  Here, differences in the modes of engagement 
associated with different  enlightened selves are particularly important, as such 
differences are pertinent to the warnings about the future impact of alternative 
spiritualities on Western society and selfhood found in some academic 
literature.  For example, in reviewing his work in Chapter 2, I noted that 
Campbell (2007: 359-60) has argued there has been a shift to an Eastern 
world-view is threatening to erode “Western individualism”.  However, we have 
seen that Holigral’s and Cohen’s respective forms of enlightenment affirm 
individuality, while even Gangaji’s and Parsons’s more overtly Eastern, 
transcendental or self-denying selves which seem very distant from 
individualism have no difficulty in returning to or coping with their ordinary or  
troubled Western lives, or indeed lives as spiritual talk-sellers. Given  dualistic 
distinctions underpin not only all aspects of social existence, but all known 
languages (Mauss 1985), “individualism”, Western or otherwise, seems likely to 
be more resilient than Campbell’s predictions imply.   Nevertheless, 
enlightenment cultures are very much concerned with self and self change, and 
are characterised by practices which configure and transform selves in ways 
which creatively stretch the boundaries of what a self may be today, drawing 
upon some forms of selfhood which do not seem well suited to current social 
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existence.  It is not beyond the realms of possibility that individual cultures 
within the bricolage may yet produce modes of selfhood which pose serious 
challenges to Western individuality.  However, that threat does not appear to lie 
in the materials I have considered here. 
In that my conclusions appear to leave Hall’s (1992) “Enlightenment 
subject” intact, they echo Heelas’s assessment of Californian “self-religions” in 
the early 1980s though for different reasons.  Heelas claimed the “self-
religions” were flourishing partly because they were not counter-cultural nor 
fundamentalist but like many aspects of wider society were “based on the 
premise of the autonomous individual who has to be organized or structured to 
be fulfilled or explored” (1982:  81).  Heelas also distinguished his “self-
religions” from “movements where sociocultural institutions determine the 
subjective by providing meanings and techniques which take away the 
experience of individual autonomy or selfhood” (ibid, 83).7 Unlike Heelas’s 
account of his self-religions, the enlightenment cultures I have researched all in 
their own ways challenged experiences of or beliefs in individual selfhood. At 
Holigral, Saunders spoke of course delegates getting “outside” of or “leaving” 
their selves, the enlightened communication event incorporated exercises 
intended to inculcate experiences of the “ground of being” in which 
distinctiveness disappears,  Gangaji called upon her audiences to momentarily 
“stop” their stories, and Parsons repeatedly denied his own personhood. 
Nevertheless, none of the events or teachings suggested or encouraged 
people to withdraw completely or permanently from ordinary social life, even 
                                                 
7 Wood (2007:  61) suggests this distinction highlights certain problems in Heelas’s treatment of 
“authority”, and implies a “continuum” between subjectivation or determination by external 
authorities and the “freedom of autonomy of the self”.  However, Wood’s reading of Heelas is 
somewhat superficial here, and assumes a coherence between his early and latter work which 
is, as I have argued, rather doubtful in view of the clear break in Heelas’s  analytical approach.  
Moreover, in fairness to Heelas, if we focus on his early work (esp. 1982) it is very clear that his 
thinking on “self-religions” acknowledges that sociologically speaking, participants in religious 
or indeed any other social groups are never entirely free or autonomous to determine 
themselves or the meaning of their experiences.  In contrast to Wood’s critique, I see Heelas’s 
distinction between self-religions and other religious movements as an astute one,  made on 
the basis that whereas some religious groups such as his “self-religions” encourage their 
members to experience their selves as if they are free and autonomous, others endeavour to 
eradicate such experiences and experience their selves in accordance with overt prescriptions, 
such as may be found in  scriptures.   Whether or not this stands up as is a valid way to 
categorise “religions” analytically,  contrary to Wood’s interpretation, Heelas’s early thinking  
clearly envisages the sociological truth is that people’s experiences and subjectivities are 
always “socialised” ones (1982: 82-3).  
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though their respective enlightened selves each imply different modes of 
engagement with that social life.  
 
  
6.6 Contributions to the field 
 
My contributions to literature on “New Age” may now be specified in 
detail. I have sought to redress the over simple view of the self and self-
authority which sees the latter as lending an   ideological coherence to a myriad 
of  diverse pursuits (the later point being recently exemplified by the 
thematically overlapping identification of a “spirituality revolution” (Tacey 2004);  
“spiritualities of life” (Heelas 2008); “grassroots spirituality” (Forman 2004); and 
“progressive spirituality” (Lynch 2007)).   Rather than impose an order on my 
materials by distilling or imposing a common ideology of the self,  I have 
attempted to make sense of  the apparent bricolage they present in ways which 
preserve their differences.   My analysis has shown how each different 
enlightenment culture I examined addresses similar (etic) issues in order to 
operate:  configuring seekers; establishing or maintaining the experiential 
expertise of gurus; and presenting the possibility of a credible enlightened self 
vis-à-vis other enlightened selves.  These three themes in themselves are 
hardly revolutionary, and echo notions in communication theory of media 
producers, messages, and audiences, though I have arrived at them in an 
inductive, grounded sense (Glaser and Strauss 1967).    In reality, the themes 
all overlap, so that practices which configure a seeker may also constitute a 
guru and present a truth. For purposes of analysis and to facilitate comparisons 
between materials I separated them in previous chapters.  As I have drawn 
together these thematic discussions to outline the workings of each culture as a 
whole, so it is now apt to draw together the ways in which my analysis 
contributes to and fits in the literature I reviewed at the outset.  Accordingly, 
below I shall first review how my approach to “authority” has differed from 
previous approaches, and then how my analysis of seekers, gurus and their 
truths also contribute to earlier academic literature.  
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6.6.1 Who or what has authority?  
 
Prevailing academic approaches to spirituality tend to either  take “the 
authority of the Self” to be their  defining  feature, lending them an ideological 
coherence which they might otherwise lack (as originally argued by Heelas 
1996), or an etic chimera which evaporates upon examination, as competing 
influences upon an individual cancel each other out (as recently put by Wood 
2007; 2009). By focusing on practices whereby the “self” or “selves” are made 
relevant to participants in a particular activity, the cultural historicity of such 
selves, and their attendant modes of engagement with the world, my analysis 
has shifted the terms of such recent debates, while building upon Wood’s lead 
in investigating the ethnographic detail of occasions at which authority, in a 
colloquial sense,  might be assumed to operate.  The upshot, in my analysis, is 
that as Heelas insightfully identified, “the self” remains a key aspect of 
contemporary spiritualities, however clearly the self lurking behind etic notions 
of “the authority of the Self” and across emic “teachings”,  is not singular but 
multiple.  Rather than put this empirical multiplicity to one side because dealing 
with it can be problematic or confusing when one’s topic is “spiritualities” en 
masse (cf. Heelas 2008:  237, n. 1), I have made it a topic.  The payoff is that 
the collective “bricolage”  the different approaches to spiritual enlightenment 
presents on first glance may be approached as an arena populated by different 
seeking and enlightened selves, with different cultural histories, associated 
through practices of experiential expertise, and with different  propensities 
towards the world.  Differences within this more orderly bricolage are affirmed 
in credibility contests, my analysis of which  underlines the importance of  
considering the variety of selves available to participants,  their tensions and 
attendant modes of engagement with the world, when making predictions about 
the potential of contemporary spiritualities to bring about societal change.  My 
analysis therefore describes deep orderings to my materials, which all share a 
concern with spiritual enlightenment, not in terms of the presence (or absence) 
of a shared ideology, but in terms of the local practices by which they each 
constitute or represent seekers, gurus, and truths, in ways which draw upon or 
echo elements from wider culture, in particular  notions of the self.   
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6.6.2 Seekers made not found 
 
The seeker selves articulated within enlightenment cultures, and to 
which those pursuing enlightenment are configured as users of spiritual 
technologies,  draw upon and reflect distinct analytical and historical notions of 
the self. Those considered here include: 
 
1. A soap-opera lived self, provided with no answers to existential 
questions in its privileged but empty life, requiring meaning and purpose 
beyond its every day concerns.  
2. A storied self, which identifies with its own stories whether good or bad 
ones, but may be something other than it thinks it is. 
3. A comic seeking self, forever looking for what is under its nose whether 
happiness, wealth, or a more esoteric sense of its identity as “onenes”, 
but prevented from ever having that which it seeks through its 
commitment to seeking. 
4. A fragmented self, splintered by traumas of its own biography, requiring 
therapeutic interventions or “processes” to reintegrate its fragments. 
 
In emic terms, such seeker selves are not portrayed as possessing 
authority,   but as being problematic, calling for different forms of help which are 
not interchangeable between selves.  For example, a philosophy and sense of 
purpose will do much to alleviate a soap-opera self’s empty existence, though 
little to retrieve splinters of a previously shattered self.    
Sutcliffe’s work on seekership highlights the importance of considering 
the variety of activities which may be linked by the identity of seeker or its 
related habitus, but stops at considering how such a generic identity term or 
general habitus might become something different within specific settings.   My 
analysis has shown that at a local level, what it is to be a seeker is dependent 
on local practices and orchestrated discourses rather than prior attributes of 
human audiences.  This is a new way of viewing seekership.   
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6.6.3 Gurus as experts not authorities 
 
While self-authority  has been widely accepted as a common feature of 
many diverse alternative or “New Age” pursuits, Heelas originally conceived 
“the authority of the Self” as an emic idealisation, and acknowledged that  other 
authorities and experts were “mediated” through the “what is taken to be the 
authority of the Self”.  Wood found little evidence in favour of self-authority in 
his own ethnographic and interview materials, though his conclusion that the 
multiple authorities to which his seekers were subjected had a kind of overall 
“nonformative” influence on them begs a more intricate analysis of particular 
occasions at which “authority” might operate “in situ”, whether or not this is 
acknowledged by participants or theorised by Wood “post hoc”. In his attack 
upon the notion of “the authority of the Self” in “New Age” activities, he noted a 
variability or multiplicity of “competing authorities”, but he did not consider the 
analytical, historical, and interactional specifics of each different personalised 
authority within the wider “network” from which he drew his case studies.   
I have approached this difficult topic of  authority not as if it is a  
personalised phenomenon, to be located within “self” or “others” such as 
“gurus”, but as a consequence of practices, especially those I have identified as 
constituting  “experiential expertise”.  My argument here is that the same 
practices which constitute certain persons as having a special status by  
associating them or their personas with the experiences of others,  contribute to 
the constitution of the self and apparent authority of both seeker and guru, for 
instance by encouraging the use of an authored discourse of the self which in 
turn may be incorporated in seekers’ polyvocal consciousness, in effect 
becoming an aspect of their “selves”.  While it thus becomes less useful to 
speak analytically in terms of personalised “authority” (even pertaining to a  
“self”), seeing “authority” as a feature or consequence of practices does not 
imply it to be ineffectual or “relativized” during any particular occasion.   
In my materials practices of experiential expertise take a variety of 
forms, including: 
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1. Where a guru is not present, oscillation between video tuition, personal 
experience, and group debate concerning matters defined by terms 
chosen by a guru. 
2. A mixture of exposition, questioning, close proximity and physical 
contact from the guru. 
3. A linguistic game where the guru has more speed and familiarity than 
others, as well as the interactional role of “expert”. 
4. A “bricolage” relying on a multitude of props and activities, including  
therapeutic-styled interactions, the provision of “scientific” expositions, 
and displaying familiarity with and integrating local “truth-spots”. 
 
These practices are more than a rhetoric of persuasion (cf. Hammer 2005) 
since they rely on active participation by others who also gain identity from 
them. They are also very different from scientific expertises, which are not 
concerned with creating associations between individuals and experiences of 
“truth”, or the fostering of subjective experiences at all (and so while it was not 
my aim, my analysis offers a small contribution to STS work on expertise by 
introducing a new descriptive category of expertise).     
 
6.6.4 Many enlightened selves 
 
Like seeker selves, the enlightened selves articulated in enlightenment 
cultures also draw upon and reflect rather distinct “indigenous” notions of the 
self found outside of the enlightenment cultures.  Those examined here include: 
 
1. A post-modern self-reflexive self, evolving and yearning to improve itself 
and the world. 
2. A still, transcendental or non-self, renouncing its own biography and 
identity to become still, embodied and momentarily content in ways 
which seem neither “modern” nor “postmodern”. 
3. A rhetorically self-denying non-self, performed linguistically. 
4. A therapeutic whole self, achieved through putting together its former 
fragments to achieve a unity. 
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This list, like the others above, is of course not complete – other 
enlightenment cultures or occasions may reflect other selves.   It is also the 
most difficult to set out with any accuracy as it is in the nature of enlightenment 
cultures to deny their teachings can be reduced to simple formulations, or even 
to words. That differences between such selves figure in “credibility contests” 
between proponents of differing enlightenment cultures highlights the rather 
unexplored non-consensual and non-tolerant character of alternative 
spiritualities.  That certain cultures may define themselves through opposing 
other cultures provides some explanation of the puzzling lack of collective co-
operation between holders of superficially similar beliefs, and likewise within 
the so-called “New Age movement” (in so far as we might still speak of such a 
“movement”, following Sutcliffe’s (2003) genealogical study). Seeing popular 
religion or spirituality as beset with such antagonisms also invites analogies 
with the combative interrelationships scholars have noted amongst other 
knowledge-based communities (Abbott 2001; Collins 1998).  
   
6.6.5 Methodological contributions 
 
Tangential to my main thesis arguments, I also set out to address the 
problem of “distance and engagement” in religious scholarship which Neville 
(1996) described as “the Tao-daimon”, and the related distinction between 
academic and spiritual forms of discourse.  Briefly, the first “problem” arises 
because to gain access to religious or spiritual materials and otherwise engage 
with them, to varying degrees scholars necessarily must participate in following 
the “way” those materials present,  while fulfilling their obligations as scholars 
often requires them to ignore their former close relationship with their subject 
matter and instead emphasise the distant perspective of their academic 
discipline.   The second issue arises because to study spirituality may involve  
taking up aspects of its discourse as well as coming into conflict with some of 
its statements or aims (remembering it is characteristically a dissident 
discourse).  
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I chose not to ignore this first issue, and also addressed the second,  in 
two ways. First, by the introductory ethnography. This is intended to convey 
events and  feelings which I would not have been able to portray the same way 
or at all had I restricted myself to only writing “analytically” about recorded or 
textual materials, as I originally planned. I selected this encounter rather than 
any others because it explains the background to my embrace of ethnographic 
methods, more than just as a small supplement to less impressionistic 
recordings or texts.  Its episodic style, modelled on Desani’s fictional text  
(1972), implies a succession of other such encounters with enlightenment 
teachers.   Although my research did indeed involve a succession of 
encounters, to perform and present sociological analysis I decided against 
writing about each teacher separately as that would have encouraged lengthy 
elaborations which would make for very difficult reading and emphasise the 
Tao over the daimon.  Also, although aspiring to provide thick descriptions, 
through biographically highlighting certain conflicts within myself while in the 
field, this univocal style tends to obscure the distinctions between academic 
and spiritual discourse I made at the outset.  I therefore prepared subsequent 
chapters differently, based on themes which gradually emerged in a “grounded” 
manner, as I explored other research sites and materials.  Within this thematic 
structure, honouring the Tao-daimon tension was difficult, as attempting to do 
so seemed to  involve mixing different and incompatible literary voices, such as 
an enthusiastic seeker, an ethnographic voice, a conversation analytic one, a 
literary reviewer voice, and so on, each of which stylistically jarred with the 
others.    
In early drafts, I therefore experimented with a multitude of such distinct 
“voices”, though the form of the resulting writing seemed to distract from the 
substance of what I was trying to convey.  Inspired by my supervisor, Paula 
Saukko’s encouragements, the second way I addressed the Tao-daimon 
tension was to distil all of the academic voices, as is customary, into one, 
though unconventionally I kept a “Seeker Self” voice specifically as an 
ethnographic voice and critical commentator upon anything the main text, or its 
persona the “Academic Self”,  might say, particularly in more positivistic 
moments.  The Seeker voice is intended to represent the “Tao” of my research, 
and personifies the discourse of spirituality within my text. It is also my voice, 
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the literary “catch” of many prior “surrenders” (Wolff 1976) which makes serious 
points representative of my own ethnographic experiences, and more than 
occasional sense of unease about the widening gap between my writing and 
participants’ truths and concerns.  Through this voice I also attempt to convey 
that each culture I studied has touched me personally in ways I cannot easily 
relay through analysis or report alone. I must however acknowledge that the 
idea of a singular seeker voice, like that a singular discourse of spirituality,  is 
somewhat contradicted by the multiplicity of discourses of the self mentioned in 
previous chapters.   Like “New Age”, the Seeker Self and its discourse of 
spirituality may be regarded as “constructions”. But this does not detract from 
their explanatory worth as, sociologically speaking, so is just about everything.  
In the above ways I have used myself as an “ethnographic resource” 
(Collins  2010).  This has not only allowed me to convey sociological insights  
which might otherwise have been lost in overly privileged or analytical writing, 
but has also been true to the academic view that ethnographic research itself 
entails the adoption of multiple selves on the part of a researcher  (cf. Reinharz 
1997). In so far as this has involved “reflexivity” on my part, it has however 
been a restrained form of reflexivity.   
I realise there are risks a reader may read the Seeker voice as indulgent 
or satirical, so I have tried to write it briefly, and make its satire more self- than 
other-directed.8   The “bias” of this text is heavily towards my academic thesis 
and so its involvement is fairly minimal, as it tends to lapse into biographic 
details and appreciations or detractions of things both academic and spiritual 
which are not directly pertinent to analytical arguments.  I should however 
emphasise that while periodically reminding readers of Tao-daimon tensions, 
the inclusion of a Seeker voice is not intended to be read as “relativizing” (in 
Wood’s sense) the Academic Quest or to completely undermine it  (as one 
might read more self-deconstructive “reflexive writing”,  which raises readers’ 
doubts about why the writer troubled to say anything at all – cf. Fuchs 1992:  
30-1).   Its main function is to periodically “rattle” the otherwise privileged, and 
necessarily “daimonic” Academic voice, dialogically performing the gulf 
                                                 
8 According to Mulkay (1985), sociological analysis is a form of parody,  and parody may 
therefore be used as sociological analysis. However, another reason I wrote the seeker voice 
as more self than other-satirical is that like parody, other-directed satire is easily readable as 
ridicule and I wish to avoid that possible reading.   
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between academe and its objects of study not as  different “ways”, but as 
different discourses and relatedly different selves to which researchers may 
have different commitments at different times.   
 
6.7 Summary of conclusions 
 
Addressing tendencies in prior research to black box the self in 
contemporary spirituality, and to view diverse practices and beliefs as 
underpinned by a common ideology of the self, my analysis attempts to put the 
self back at the heart of research into “Self-spirituality”. By doing so in a way 
which combines analyses of interactional and textual practices with a style of 
analysis and theorising first introduced to studies of religion by Heelas in the 
early 1980s, I have shown that the enlightenment cultures I have examined are 
distinguishable from each other by virtue of their respective configurations of 
the self.  These configurations are achieved in settings and through practices 
which in themselves are often remarkably mundane (e.g. lecture halls and 
office-like spaces; watching videos and having small group circle discussions, 
or questioning an “expert” speaker).  Not only do the selves upon which the 
configurations rely  have different cultural histories, gaining distinctiveness by 
drawing upon different cultural resources, but they are different in nature from 
each other, with divergent “modes of engagement” toward the wider world,  
sometimes to the extent that viewed from the perspective of one culture, anther 
culture’s enlightened self appears abhorrent.   Thus, the postmodern self which 
is concerned to improve or “evolve” itself and its world through a concerted 
project (Cohen) is reminiscent of the Giddens’s reflexive self of late modernity, 
continually evolving itself as a lifelong project.  This self is recognisably 
congruent with sovereign Western selfhood.  It may be thought of as the 
antithesis of enlightened selves which deny themselves linguistically (Parsons) 
or through experientially “stopping” their biographies (Gangaji). These are 
difficult to reconcile with sovereign selfhood, and appear to have more in 
common with transcendental notions of selfhood or “the One” as in a variety of 
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Eastern religions and Plotinus’s philosophy9 (cf. Coppleston 2002). The 
fragmented self  which needs to be made whole (Holigral) differs again, being a 
modern self to be worked upon but drawing upon psychotherapeutic traditions 
concerned with personal biography and aiming towards personalised healing or 
wholeness, whereupon this self may again go about its life in the world.   
The way in which the self is configured across the enlightenment 
cultures I have examined therefore melds the  Eastern/philosophical, Western 
and therapeutic in ways which allow each to come to the fore differently.  These 
differences underpin conflicts and clashes between cultures at the level of the 
self.  That both seeking and enlightened selves are consequentially multiple 
therefore complicates the possibility that “New Age” or contemporary popular 
spirituality generally may, in spite of the variety of their practices,  prompt a 
similar “spiritual revolution” of some sort. Indeed, while Campbell (2007) 
warned the direction of his “Easternization of the West” thesis was towards the 
end of Western individualism, at least some of the overtly “revolutionary” 
cultures within that spirituality reaffirm such individualism. On the other hand, 
while Heelas (1982) considered his “self-regions” were all in “equilibrium” with 
wider culture due to their reliance on a notion of the “autonomous individual”, 
some enlightenment cultures whilst tacitly addressing and being comprised of 
such individuals, attempt to undermine experiences of individuality by 
transforming it into something comic, the subject matter of interactional games 
involving other “individuals” which are inherently humorous and entertaining.  
Two important points need to be made here.  Firstly, although different 
enlightened selves may have different modes of engagement with the social 
world, no enlightened self I have encountered seems to be without any mode of 
engagement at all. Secondly, whilst Heelas’s characterization of self-religions 
as being in equilibrium with wider society seems apt, the enlightenment 
cultures I have examined do not necessarily seem to be in the same sort of 
equilibrium with either society or each other. So far as society is concerned, 
they play off and add to contemporary inclinations to work on and explore the 
self as a reflexive project, and find opportunities for affective experiences 
beyond those of one’s daily activities.  So far as they relate to each other,  they 
                                                 
9 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One have been notably popularised by Cohen’s friend and 
occasional collaborator, Wilber (e.g. 2006). 
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each gain and defend their distinctiveness and merit through credibility contests 
between themselves,  rather than, say,  with denominational religions. This 
affirms the sense in which any “milieu” in which they exist is, as a whole, self-
perpetuating, and provides an explanation of this in that its constituents may be 
viewed as sharing a common discourse of spirituality the nature and contents 
of which are capable of innumerable variations and meanings, and moreover of 
drawing upon a wide range of (sometimes incommensurable) cultural 
configurations of the self which form the basis of internecine though 
irresolvable conflicts.  In other words, the discourse of spirituality and cultural 
bank of prior selves upon which it draws in particular manifestations together  
provide scope for the ideological dilemmas which give the spiritual milieu both 
its overall form, and its internal divisions. 
Finally, none of this denies self-authority as a participants’  “truth”, 
however it does require clearer conceptual distinctions between participants’ 
and analysts’ understandings of it.  I must again empathise that the configured 
self, and its polyvocal consciousness, are heuristic tools I have adopted in 
order to produce a sociological analysis of enlightenment cultures. They are not  
empirical findings about the “true” nature of the self or self-authority.  This is 
important, as otherwise my analysis would carry some uneasy implications for 
participants’ truth claims.  For, from this heuristic perspective, the bricolage  of 
contemporary spiritual practices and beliefs are not so much characterised by 
the “authority” of “gurus” being  “mediated”  by either “inner experience” or “the 
authority of the Self” (Heelas 1996), but  practices of self-configuration and 
expertise which mediate multiple selves.  Analytically speaking, the etic 
configured self cannot be the source of authority in enlightenment cultures or 
other “New Age” pursuits,  as it is by definition always configured within those 
cultures or pursuits by practices which draw upon wider cultural understandings 
of the self.   
 
6.8 Further directions 
 
The methodology and analytical approach I have adopted here is 
transportable to other empirical materials.  As I have analysed enlightenment in 
 - 308 - 
terms of practices of expertise whereby selves are configured and transformed, 
and shown credibility contests about it to entail enlightened selves with 
particular and differing dispositions towards the world, so other more 
mainstream religious and social phenomena may be investigated in this way.  It 
would for instance be possible to research how selves such as those of 
Christians, Muslims, Buddhists and so on are  configured in different ways in 
different settings, through what practices of expertise or transformation, and the 
sorts of selves they may aspire to be in different contexts.  Exploring how 
multiple versions of a Christian self, Muslim self and so on may echo or 
influence other notions of selfhood,  be tolerant or intolerant of other discourses 
of the self, and provide varying modes of engagement with the world, would do 
much to enrich our understanding of  how different ways world religions are 
actually lived and experienced may have implications on a macro level, while 
providing a systematic approach to drawing comparisons between potentially 
diverse materials and occasions considered in fine detail. 
As for enlightenment cultures themselves, I have inevitably only 
scratched some surfaces.  Attending to details at the level of  what is actually 
said and done is a painstaking process and doing justice to both the detail and 
variety of empirical materials, while presenting “analysis” of them,  is a difficult 
balancing act.   Further research of this sort is needed into a wider selection of 
teachers and sites in order to identify other configurations of the seeker and 
enlightened self, and their cultural antecedents and worldly propensities. The 
thrust of this work would be to systematically map spiritual “milieu” and provide 
greater knowledge and understanding of its variety and relationship with wider 
society at the level of the self, and the scope within that variety for revolutionary 
challenges.  My own view is that since enlightenment cultures appear to 
redress problematic aspects of seeker selves echoing prior cultural notions of 
the self  through enlightened selves which also echo earlier selves, and are not 
lived in ways which threaten the sovereign individuality enshrined in language, 
their scope for ever becoming the impetus rather than mirrors of societal 
change is likely to be negligible. However, in so far as they incorporate the 
“discourse of spirituality”, or aspects of its “spiritual repertoire”, in a very 
general sense, they are already all part of the process of societal change 
identified by Sutcliffe (2003). Their study itself seems to be contributing to the 
 - 309 - 
infusion of spiritual discourse into academic writing, as does this thesis, 
although it is written in a way which draws attention to this quality.  Yet even 
having noticed this shift, it is difficult to envisage a time when either the social 
or academic worlds may change to such an extent that Tao-daimon tensions no 
longer exist, or are handled in a routine fashion.  My own belief is that such a 
time is nevertheless likely to be closer to hand than either the end of Western 
individualism or what might be regarded as “religion”. 
 
6.9 Epilogue:  More seeking? 
 
SEEKER SELF: 666666. 
ACADEMIC SELF:  Well, I see you’re speechless.  Is that a good thing?  
Should I go on? 
SS:  Not for me.  If I’ve understood right, all the questing I’ve done  has 
simply helped you prove that I’m multiple, and that I’ve been  several different 
unenlightened selves with no prospect of knowing which teacher will give me 
true spiritual enlightenment.  Even worse, you’re saying my voice is yours and 
implying that every view of the self apart from yours is mistaken. 
AS: Not at all. I’m saying that each enlightened self draws upon the 
cultural pool differently, bringing some elements to the fore rather than others, 
and is associated with particular practices of expertise whereby it may become 
your own self in a very felt way.  I’m not claiming this to be the ultimate nature 
of selfhood, just that it is a particular view of selfhood I have adopted here for 
the utility it provides in making sense of popular spiritual activities. From my etic 
perspective, it makes no sense to speak of a final, true form of spiritual 
enlightenment.  But from your perspective it obviously does.   And as for us, 
we’re written differently not interchangeably, so I doubt we will ever convince 
each other of our different perspectives.   
SS: So are you saying you’ve proved there is no true and final 
enlightenment?  That’s how it seems. Surely that would offend the 
“methodological agnosticism” you spoke of earlier, and the “relativism” you 
mention in your consent forms. 
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AS:  I definitely have not disproved the possibility of enlightenment.  
Don’t forget, we have got to this point in our mutual journeys through my 
selection of different spiritual teachers, and analytical reliance upon academics 
as diverse as Heelas, Woolgar and  Bakhtin for my heuristic view of a culturally 
fed, configured and polyvocal self.   This view of the self is itself one culturally 
given possibility amongst others. You might choose to simply disregard it and 
me and carry on seeking as before.  In any case,  seeking is hardly pointless, 
and can be part of trying to improve the world or coping with personally 
troubling aspects of it.  Not to mention meeting like-minded people... 
SS: Er, that doesn’t make it sound any better as how am I to choose 
how to seek? Look, surely you must have a better truth to offer me. Between 
ourselves even?  Maybe your truth, if you have one? Even if it is that I will 
never be really enlightened.  
AS: I wouldn’t go that far (it would be ethically improper to, anyway, even 
if I believed it). I can see your difficulties though.  They are in deciding which 
path to follow when there are too many to test in a lifetime, and of knowing  
truth when you find it.  These are the same troubles faced in antiquity by 
Lucian’s Hermotimus. Lucian was a rhetorician and satirist in ancient Syria who 
lived during the second century AD.  In one of his short comic tales,  The Rival 
Philosophies (Fowler and Fowler 1905), the character of Lycinus spells out 
such difficulties to his friend Hermotimus who in the tale was otherwise keen to 
follow various philosophical masters. Lycinus points out  difficulties like those of 
recognising the truth when one finds it, and there being more paths to follow 
than one has time to peruse and test,  prompting Hermotimus to give up 
following any philosophers,  and get on with his life. Ironically, the discussion 
thus casts the critical Lycinus as offering his own “rival philosophy”.  I wouldn’t 
want you to see me like Lycinus. 
SS:  Well, I’m not minded to quit seeking.  There must be some final 
truth for me somewhere, if not here.  Do you think if we kept talking to each 
other I might come to some form of enlightenment and want to stop?  
AS:  Perhaps, though personally I’d rather learn about something new 
and talk to you about that.  How about we take up meditation again.  That’d 
give us something to talk about. Also, this is nearly the last page and I could do 
with unwinding.   
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SS:  Okay. But I’m more interested in transcending than unwinding.   I’ve 
seen a flyer for a new class in town.  Let’s give it a bash.  Maybe this time6.  
AS: Just don’t snore when you’re “transcending”. 
SS: You really do just have to spoil everything, don’t you.10 
[Both selves grab their coats and start walking towards town, continuing 
their dialogue as they go.  The Seeker is still yearning to feel satisfied in a  
“truth” which he claims the Academic Self would never be able to recognise,  
but that does not stop him looking or trying to persuade the Academic Self that 
not everything is “constructed”. The  Academic is dismissive of the possibility of 
ever finding a final truth of the self, but  strangely positive towards the Seeker’s 
quest.  He thinks that by tagging along, he might refine the heuristic notion of 
the configured self and explore how other forms of enlightened or religious 
selfhood  might  hold differing sensibilities and promise for individuals and 
societies in these troubled times. Maybe he might help the Seeker after all6] 
 
NOTE TO PAULA AND MALCOLM (#2) 
 
Well, I didn’t finish till long after Malcolm (who got me going) retired,  and 
Paula (who got me finished) left for sabbatical.  Of my many academic gurus, 
whether true, false, distant, close, present, absent, generous, reluctant, alive or  
departed, it seems strange that you two may not read my thesis before it is 
marked, or maybe not at all. I am however very grateful for Professor 
McGuigan’s support and helpful feedback while I finalised the manuscript.  I 
hope that if you read it you will be pleased with the final shape of it.  Anyway,   
I’ve put this note here not only to record some extra thanks to you all, but to 
highlight the rather unplanned similarity between the “serial seeking” I took up 
                                                 
10 This final exchange is inspired by a “FISU” meditation lesson which I recorded but have not 
analysed here.  The 20 minute meditation entailed mental repetition of a “mantra”  (i.e. a sound 
given to me for this purpose) while lying prone on the floor in my teacher’s very warm, 
darkened, incense filled spare bedroom late on a weekday evening. I commented afterwards 
that the session had passed in a flash to me. My teacher, who had looked in on me periodically 
and also noted the shallowness and rhythm of my breathing, surmised that I had  
“transcended”. Feeling pleased about my spiritual progress, when  I later played back the 
recording of this session to my disappointment any moments of transcendence were 
accompanied by audible snoring while my teacher was away.  Sleeping is not the aim of 
meditation, and neither I nor my teacher would have known I had drifted in and out of sleep, or 
perhaps slept most of the time, were it not for the research recording.  
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in my research and “serial supervision” under which I laboured upon it.   That 
this “seriality” implies I have been configured in multiple ways as a researcher, 
and have not always been seeking the same academic “truth”, or even “self”, is 
perhaps very apt. (I hesitate to suggest you have each somehow “relativized” 
each other, though as is conventional I must claim the resulting bricolage as 
very much my own). 
Speaking of seeking, my future academic and personal seeking will 
never quite be the same since Malcolm suggested I read about Woolgar’s 
configured user, and  Paula  suggested Bakhtin / Volosinov’s  polyvocal view of 
consciousness might interest me.  While these authors have helped me 
academically, I hope, I shall leave the task of attempting to integrate the 
differing types of quest I have pursued to the philosophers.  Of them,  Angel 
(1994)   makes a persuasive case that humanity may benefit from a synthesis 
of various aspects of both spiritual and rational forms of enlightenment.  For the 
time being anyway, the lot of both sociology and religious studies seems to me 
to be to pursue academic enquiries in tension with their subject matter, never 
quite coinciding with the world views of their objects of study.  I still think there 
is more scope for fruitful dialogue between sociologists and theologians, and 
even spiritual teachers, than Berger’s (1969) rather sharp delineation between 
empirical sociology and theological subject matter allows. Furthermore, I 
suggest the penetration of the discourse of spirituality into predominantly 
empiricist academic discourse which I have alluded to, as well as its spread 
throughout our culture (or occulture) in general makes continuing dialogue 
inevitable.    
For these reasons my ending is therefore not a resolution or merger of 
either of my quests, in any final sense. I’m still not sure whether or not  it reads 
“better” than the mirrored page I was thinking of inserting, as a visual metaphor 
for my various arguments, and to connote the book of enlightenment opened by 
Cord the Seeker, in the dated kung fu film The Silent Flute (1978).  I do hope it 
better conveys the on-going character of “seeking” and the sense in which 
neither of my quests is truly over yet. 
Pasternak (2007) argues it is this capacity to quest which makes us 
“human”.  Why that should be, what forms are taken by our quests, and the 
nature and origins of the selves we may discover, reject, or become in the 
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process of questing,  seem to me highly important sociological questions, 
however open-ended the answers may be.  
 
Best wishes,  
 
Keith 
 
 
 
 
________________________ 
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APPENDIX 1: Sample Consent 
Forms 
 
 
 
 
Andrew Cohen (and Chris Parish), Gangaji, Steve  Saunders, and  Tony 
Parsons all received and signed forms similar to the first form below.  Each 
person’s form was adapted slightly, for instance some taught enlightenment 
under the banner of a charitable company, whereas some were individuals. 
“Gurus” treated the consent forms very seriously, and were proactive in 
requesting clarifications and amendments, either themselves or through other 
helpers or advisers.   Other research participants upon which I have relied were 
either asked to sign barer consents, such as the second form,  or not given 
forms at all  (e.g. if distributing the forms was impractical or would disrupt the 
occasion I was researching).  I only made my own (audio) recordings of events 
without asking for permissions from everyone present where those events were 
in any case also obviously being recorded on behalf of a “guru”. 
The first, longer form I based upon the British Sociological Association’s 
2002 “Statement of Ethical Practice”.   I am indebted to Prof. Derek Edwards of 
Loughborough University for supplying me with a form he had used in his own 
social research which I adapted to produce the second, shorter form, for use 
when administering the larger form was impractical but I was able to make brief 
personal contact with everyone at an event and whom I wished to record.  
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Sample Detailed Form 
 
 
 
 
 
AWAKENINGS RESEARCH - INFORMATION SHEETS AND 
CONSENT FORM    (version 6.01- Blank) 
 
 
 
Project (provisional):  A sociological analysis of awakenings  
Researcher:   Keith Abbott 
Position:   Postgraduate PhD student  
Institution / contact: University of Loughborough, Dept of  Social Sciences,  
 University of Loughborough, Loughborough LE11 3TC 
Research Supervisor:  Dr M. Ashmore (address as above) 
 
(1) INFORMATION SHEETS  
 
You are invited to take part in a social research project.  Social research is an ethical 
process.  If you agree to take part you will be asked to sign the following consent form.  
Before you decide it is important that you understand what the research entails.  
Please read the following pages and ask questions at any time. 
 
Description of research project:  
This is a qualitative study of  explanations and accounts of spiritual phenomena, in particular 
“awakenings”, “enlightenment”, “conversion” and the like.  Also of interactions, conversations 
and texts about such phenomena. This research is relativistic in that no set of beliefs or 
practices will be treated as superior to, or more correct than, any others.  The research is likely 
to form the basis of a PhD dissertation/thesis and possibly publications and academic 
presentations.  It is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) and likely to 
run for around 3 years, until September 2009, unless completed sooner. 
 
Why are you of interest to this study? 
You may have self-selected having heard of the project, or been approached because you may 
have relevant experiences or views on spiritual issues, or be participating in relevant activities 
in your daily life.  At this stage the likely number of participants in this study is not known. 
 
Do you have to take part? 
No. Taking part in this research is voluntary.  You may withdraw your consent at any time by 
contacting the researcher. However, if you withdraw consent your contribution may 
nevertheless have already been used or published in whole or part so if you think you may 
withdraw consent it is best from your perspective to do so very soon. 
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If I participate, what is involved? 
You will be asked to sign a consent form (which is joined to these information sheets). If your 
contribution is by interview it is unlikely to take more than 1-2 hours, though you may be asked 
if you will agree to subsequent interviews.  If you are going about your normal work or tasks, 
and are being observed or recorded as you do so, that you are participating should not add 
unduly to the time it takes you to complete your tasks.  You may be asked to agree to your 
interview or activities being recorded – this will for instance allow the researcher to study 
features of your talk and other practices in depth. You are not being tested in any way. Your 
participation may also involve the researcher making use of other materials about you, 
including for instance your internet  homepage if you have one and any “spiritual biography” 
you have produced.  There will be no financial benefit to you in participating, though your 
contribution may help advance our knowledge of spiritual experiences and practices, and so 
have a wider social benefit.  There should be no personal risk, discomfort or detriment to you in 
participating, aside from sparing your time. 
 
How will information I provide be used or processed? 
Any information or materials provided by or about you arising from your participation in this 
study or relevant to that participation, whether by recordings, transcripts of such recordings or 
otherwise,  may be used for purposes of the above research and the publication thereof. Also, 
such data may be stored/used/published/processed/passed on (a) by the researcher and other 
researchers including for purposes of other research not limited to the topic and scope of the 
present research) and (b) by the researcher and others for purposes of teaching and/or 
dissemination of knowledge.  
 
What about my confidentiality and privacy? 
Unless you specifically waive/release your own confidentiality/privacy/anonymity so far as 
practicable any signed or  personal information you give, including any consent form, will be 
stored separately from any other information or contribution you give and steps will be taken to 
protect your anonymity, confidentiality, and privacy - including possibly releasing/publishing 
only parts of your contributions whether in transcribed or audio/visual-recorded form, changing 
names, altering the pitch of your voice in sound recordings,  and so forth. If you consent to the 
information you give or any recordings of yourself being used in other research then likewise in 
the absence of a specific waiver/release from yourself the researcher will take similar steps to 
ensure subsequent researchers cannot identify you.  This said, if you wish to remain 
unidentifiable in visual materials (e.g. photographs) you should be aware that this may mean it 
is not possible for those materials to be used at all. 
 
What about the confidentiality and privacy of others? 
If you accidentally or intentionally  name or identify a client or third party then unless that 
party has consented to being identified or that part of your contribution is edited and/or names 
are changed the researcher  may not be able to use it or pass it to other researchers.  This  might 
not apply to references you make to people already in the public sphere.  
 
What about the Data Protection Act 1998?  (Fair Processing Notice) 
The information you provide will be held and processed as explained in these information 
sheets and on the accompanying consent  form.  Loughborough University will be the data 
controller for purposes of the Data Protection Act 1998.  The personal data you may provide, 
such as might make you identifiable, will be processed in accordance with the Act wherever 
and to whatever extent the Act applies.  Where reasonably practicable, and/or unless you 
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specifically waive or release your own confidentiality/privacy/anonymity your personal data 
and contributions will be anonymised to protect your privacy, confidentiality and anonymity in 
ways which make it impossible to identify you personally from such information and/or from 
any other information held or likely to be held by the University.  This anonymity may limit or 
remove any obligation or ability to give you access to personal data you have provided.  The 
University’s data protection policy may be viewed at 
http://www.lboro.ac.uk/admin/ar/policy/dpact/ .  Any requests or queries about data protection 
issues should be addressed in the first instance to the Data Protection Officer, Mrs M.  
Routledge, at Academic Registry, Loughborough University, Loughborough, LE11 3TU. 
 
Are there circumstances in which my anonymity privacy or confidentiality may not be 
protected?  
Aside from it you waive confidentiality, this is highly unlikely, and if you are concerned this is 
a possibility it is best that you discuss this with the researcher at the outset, though if through 
your participation in this study the researcher becomes aware of any criminal conduct then it 
may not be possible to preserve your anonymity in so far as the researcher or University may be 
under any legal or ethical duty to report that conduct to proper authorities. 
 
Will I be told out about the findings? 
If you would like, you will be given a free summary of the research findings.  To receive this 
you will need to supply contact details or keep in touch with the researcher/University. You 
might also be invited to comment on findings and their style of presentation before the research 
is finalised.  Every participant’s input is very important to this qualitative research and 
informing you of the findings is intended to be a courtesy, thanks, and effort to add something 
to your own understanding without attempting to “know better.” 
 
About the researcher 
Keith grew up in Glastonbury, England,  and since at school there has been interested in such 
things as altered states, dreams, and past-life regression.  Having previously worked for a 
quarrying company, he left Glastonbury in 1981 to study Sociology at York University.  He left 
academe to become a solicitor, at which he worked for about 12 years, mostly in Somerset and  
Dorset, during which time he returned to Glastonbury and Street and studied Ki-Aikido 
eventually becoming a 2
nd
 Dan assistant teacher there. He has also studied Shiatsu, and a little 
Hatha Yoga.  In Summer 2005 he took up a doctoral research studentship at Loughborough 
University which led to creating this project.  
 
Remember you can ask questions at any time, even while reading the consent form 
below. 
 
(2) CONSENT FORM 
 
Delete/amend and initial any changes as agreed by the participant:- 
1. OPPORTUNITY FOR QUESTIONS: I have read and understood the above 
information sheets and this consent form and have been given a chance to ask questions 
before signing. 
2. AGREEMENT TO TAKE PART: I agree to take part in this research (and that this 
agreement also applies to earlier occasions where I have been recorded or otherwise 
contributed to this research).   
3. RECORDING, STORAGE AND PUBLICATION OF DATA: I give permission that 
“Materials” including: 
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• images of me;  
• interviews with me; 
• internet materials about me or relevant to me (including any “spiritual biography” I 
have produced, personal and/or business homepages and websites); 
• other recordings of my work/activities/practices;  
• anything which I have authored and which is not secret or confidential, whether 
available to the public at large or any part of them, and whether freely in the public 
domain or whether only ordinarily available after  payment (so, including  for instance 
extracts from published books I may have written and works of art I may have 
produced); and 
• any materials I may provide to the researcher,  
may be: recorded and stored by audio and/or visual recording devices and media (tapes, 
discs, other electronic and magnetic storage etc); copied and transferred between such 
devices and media in whole or part; and used and/or quoted in  research theses, 
dissertations, and publications (including by electronic and/or  hard copies/written means) 
for academic and/or educational purposes (I licence the copyright in all such “Materials”  to 
the researcher for these purposes). 
4. RESEARCHER’S COPYRIGHT AND ASSURANCES:  I agree that the researcher 
has copyright ownership of any images (including photographs) and any other 
recordings he takes or makes during this research, including of images of myself.  I 
understand the researcher intends to use such images and recordings only for academic 
and/or educational purposes and publications, and that he will consult with me again if 
(which is unlikely) he wants to use any such images or recordings for any other 
purpose.  The researcher also assures me he will state his own copyright on or near any 
images of me which he uses to deter others from using the same images without his 
permission. The researcher also acknowledges that nothing in this form transfers 
ownership of any  actual techniques I might teach or use.  
5. AGREEMENT TO BE IDENTIFIED: Indicate which of the following apply to you: 
a. I agree to waive my own privacy, confidentiality and anonymity and consent to 
being named correctly and identified without editing in any data, transcripts, 
recordings, images, theses, dissertations, publications, teaching and/or 
dissemination of knowledge and so forth. (I.e.  images of myself and my 
surrounds may appear unaltered and I do not wish to remain anonymous and 
leave this entirely up to researchers’ discretions). Or: 
b. I agree that any images (including still photographs and any video recordings) of 
myself may be used and/or published without editing or disguising my 
appearance in any way, but I would like all recordings, transcripts,  web pages 
and so forth  edited before being published so as to otherwise protect my 
anonymity, privacy and confidentiality.  (I.e. images of me should appear as I 
am, but I do not want my real name given out).  Or:- 
c. As for (b) save that any pictures video recordings or other images of me should 
also be altered if necessary so as to preserve the anonymity of my image. (I.e. I 
am willing to participate in this research, but do not want to be identified by my 
real name or be easily identifiable from any images of myself).  
6. DESTRUCTION OF FORM, DATA RETENTION, AND FURTHER 
RESEARCH: I understand that the researcher’s copy of this signed form may be 
destroyed in the future, before or after the conclusion of the project, including to 
anonymise my contribution or personal data if the researcher decides to do so.  I also 
agree that data from this research may be stored indefinitely, for instance in case it is 
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useful in further research and I give permission for the data to be used by the researcher 
and other researchers with this in mind. 
 
Research Participant:- 
Signed (Participant)……………………. Address (optional)……………………… 
                                                                          ………………………………………….  
Print name………………………….…...         ………………………………………….. 
Date……………………………….….…   ………………………………………… 
Researcher:- 
Signed (Researcher)…[Keith Abbott]….         Date…………………………………… 
 
PLEASE DON’T FORGET TO ALTER PARAGRAPH 5 AS APPROPRIATE 
AND TO INITIAL ANY CHANGES 
 
 
 
Sample Short Form 
 
 
 
 
STATEMENT OF INFORMED CONSENT  
AND PERMISSION TO USE INFORMATION (version 2.00) 
 
Research project:    A sociological study of awakenings 
Institution:  Department of Social Sciences, Loughborough 
University, Loughborough LE11 3TC 
Researcher:    Keith Abbott 
 
The purpose of this agreement is to ensure that your contribution to the above research 
project is in strict accordance with your wishes.   
 
Please tick EITHER: 
 
I give my permission for any interviews which I am about to give/have given, 
for any information or materials I supply,  and for any  recordings and/or 
images of me, my surroundings, drawings and any other communications 
involving myself to be used for research purposes  (including research 
publications and reports) without preservation of anonymity. 
 
OR 
 
I give my permission for any interviews which I am about to give/have given, 
for any information or materials I supply,  and for any  recordings and/or 
images of me, my surroundings, drawings and any other communications 
involving myself to be used for research purposes  (including research 
publications and reports) with strict preservation of anonymity. 
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I am agreeable to my contributions being used by the researcher for research and 
educational purposes and in publications and reports without further reference to me, 
and I assign the copyright in my contributions to the researcher for these purposes. 
 
This research is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). 
 
 
  
Signed (participant) …………………………………………    Date…………………. 
Name (print)……………………………………………………………………………. 
Address (optional) ………………………….…………………………………………. 
………………………………………………………………………………………….
……….…………………………………………………………………………………  
………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Signed (researcher) …………………………………………    Date…………………… 
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APPENDIX 2: Jefferson 
Transcription 
 
 
 
I made all of my audio recordings of live events using Sony digital audio 
recorders (the now superseded model ICD-MX20).  The small devices have 
built in highly sensitive stereo microphones and record using a  high quality, but 
lossy, proprietary SONY format which was more than adequate for my 
purposes.   Using a personal computer, I converted the recordings to WAV files 
using the software supplied with the recorders (SONY’s Digital Voice Editor 
version 2.31).  I then used Audacity (freeware, version 1.2.6) and dBpoweramp 
(proprietary licensed versions up to release 13.5) to play, edit and convert the 
WAV files to MP3 formats.  I listened to the recordings repeatedly, through both 
a computer and personal mp3 player.  I manually transcribed passages which 
seemed interesting or particularly important to my analysis as it developed, 
again using Audacity for playback, though I continued to immerse myself in the 
recordings as a whole to retain a sense of the overall context each fragment of 
talk had been extracted from.  
Transcripts from my own recordings are described as “extracts” in the 
preceding text.  Their titles follow my personal system which identifies the 
relevant master recordings in my research archive and position in each 
recording. For example, “Extract 4.6 Gangaji London Satsang 201 170507 
1h19m47s” refers to the sixth extract used in chapter 4, a recording of 
Gangaji’s teachings made at a Satsang style event in London on 17 May 2007.  
“201” (like other alphanumeric acronyms I use) is an idiosyncratic reference to 
the particular digital recording or sound file concerned (I often used several 
recorders in overlap at the same event, in case any of them failed, as 
occasionally happened).  The time reference indicates the point in the relevant 
master recording at which the extract begins. This system allows for easy 
checking of transcripts against master recordings, and helps convey a sense of 
how far into each event/recording any particular transcript lies.  
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I transcribed the recordings mostly using conventional literary grammar 
and presentation.  However, where minutiae of speech (meaning its pace, tone, 
pauses and so forth) is relevant to my analysis I have borrowed from a more 
systematic method of transcription, that of sociological conversation analysis.   
Since the untimely death in 1975 of the founder of sociological 
conversation analysis, Harvey Sacks, his colleague and collaborator Gail 
Jefferson has refined its transcription system which is now denoted by her 
name (although others have also contributed to it – see for instance Hepburn 
2004).  Jefferson (2004), Hutchby and Wooffitt (1998), Wooffitt (2005), ten 
Have (2005) all contain good summaries of the notation.   
The following is a brief guide to “Jefferson transcription” symbols as I 
have used them here.  I have not used this system for all of my transcripts as it 
is not always relevant to my analysis and if used extensively it can be 
distracting and make following the substance (rather than form) of talk difficult.  
The system excels in simply conveying the pace of ordinary speech, spoken 
emphasis, and “overlap” (where one speaker talks over another). While unlike 
in “pure” CA I mostly concentrate upon the substance of speech, occasionally 
my analysis requires attention to the form used to deliver that content. 
 
Symbol  Meaning 
 
P: Single letter abbreviations used to identify speakers e.g. 
“P”  for Parsons, or Peter etc.   
[  and   ]  Start and  finish of overlapping speech. 
(0.5)   Timed pause/silence in tenths of a second. 
 (.)   Timed pause/silence  of 0.1 seconds or less. 
hiss::::   Sound before colon is continued. 
word   Audible emphasis on underlined letter(s). 
wo::rd   Letter preceding colon underlined – underlined letter  
   “punched up”, falling intonation. 
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wo:::d Colon following letter underlined indicates sound punched 
up at colon, or rising intonation. 
word   Underline on first letter indicates whole word punched up. 
WORD Capital letters (aside from names) indicate relative 
loudness. 
 Rising/falling pitch greater than that conveyed by underline 
or  standard punctuation  
°word°  Relative quietness of talk between degree signs. 
°hhh   In breath. 
hhhh   Exhale. 
w(h)or(h)d(h)  Breathiness/laughter through a word. 
=   No discernible gap. 
>word<  Words between arrowheads spoken quickly. 
<word>  Words between arrowheads spoken slowly. 
.  ,  ?   Intonation as suggested by symbol. 
(   ) / (this?/or that?) Transcriber’s doubt / alternate best hearing(s) if 
discernible. 
((Comments)) Transcriber’s comments in double parenthesis. 
misspellings  Sometimes used where they phonetically fit sounds of 
actual  talk. 
 Right pointing arrow draw’s reader’s attention to indicated 
line. 
 
(Adapted from the above sources, especially ten Have,  2005) 
 
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
